BT  21  . 088  1917  v.2 
Otten,  Bernard  John,  1862- 
1930. 

A  manual  of  the  history  of 

(innma  « 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2019  with  funding  from 
Princeton  Theological  Seminary  Library 


https://archive.org/details/manualofhistoryo02otte 


•i 


f 


A  MANUAL  OF 


THE  HISTORY  OF  DOGMAS 


Volume  II 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  DOGMAS  DURING 
THE  MIDDLE  AGES  AND  AFTER, 

869-1907 


BY 

REV.  BERNARD  J.  OTTEN,  S.  J. 


PROFESSOR  OF  DOGMATIC  THEOLOGY  AND  THE  HISTORY  OF  DOGMAS 


IN 

ST.  LOUIS  UNIVERSITY 


B.  HERDER  BOOK  CO. 

17  South  Broadway,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

and 

68  Great  Russell  St.,  London,  W.  C. 

1918 


IMPRIMI  POTEST 
Sti.  Ludovici,  die  io  Maii,  1918 

A.  J.  Burrowes,  S.  J., 

Praep.  Prov. 


NIHIL  OB  ST  AT 
Sti.  Ludovici,  die  31  Julii,  1918 

F.  G.  Holweck, 

Censor  Librorunt. 


IMPRIMATUR 

Sti.  Ludovici,  die  31  Julii,  1918 
*i*Ioannes  J.  Glennon, 

Archiepiscopus, 

Sti.  Ludovici. 


Copyright,  1918 

by 

Joseph  Gummersbach 


All  rights  reserved 
Printed  in  U.  S.  A. 


FOREWORD 


The  first  volume  of  this  Manual  traced  the  history  of  dog¬ 
matic  development  from  the  beginning  of  the  second  century 
to  the  end  of  the  ninth;  the  second  follows  that  development 
up  to  the  present  time.  However,  the  greater  part  of  these 
pages  is  devoted  to  the  study  of  mediaeval  theology.  The  au¬ 
thor  deemed  this  course  proper  because  the  great  Scholastics 
of  the  Middle  Ages  prepared  the  way  for  the  important  work 
accomplished  by  the  Council  of  Trent,  and  thereby  materially 
contributed  to  the  full  development  of  a  large  number  of 
dogmas.  Post-Tridentine  theology  has  received  rather  scant 
attention  —  too  scant,  perhaps,  in  view  of  the  intense  ac¬ 
tivity  displayed  by  its  many  eminent  representatives.  But, 
considering  the  purpose  of  the  present  work,  that  was  un¬ 
avoidable.  For  the  Manual  is  primarily  intended  as  a  text¬ 
book,  and  as  such  it  should  not  be  too  bulky.  Hence,  as  it 
was  impossible  to  attempt  anything  like  a  thorough  review  of 
the  theology  of  both  periods  —  for  they  cover  a  thousand 
years  —  it  appeared  preferable  to  accord  a  merely  summary 
treatment  to  the  less  important  of  the  two,  and  then  give  to 
the  other  all  the  attention  which  its  valuable  contribution  to 
the  history  of  dogmas  seemed  to  demand. 

Eastertide ,  1918. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Aside  from  the  works  of  theologians  whose  teaching  is  reviewed 
in  these  pages,  the  following  is  a  partial  list  of  books  consulted  in 
the  composition  of  the  present  volume.  Those  marked  *  are  by  non- 
Catholic  authors.  Works  specially  adapted  for  supplementary  read¬ 
ing  are  referred  to  in  a  footnote  at  the  beginning  of  each  chapter. 

Bach,  J.,  Die  Dogmengeschichte  des  Mittelalters  vom  christologischen 
Standpunkte,  oder  die  Mittelalterliche  Christologie,  in  drei  Thei- 
len,  Wien,  1874,  1875. 

Bachelet,  Le,  LTmmaculee  Conception,  Paris,  1903. 

Baudrillart,  L’Eglise  catholique,  la  Renaissance,  le  Protestantisme, 
6th  ed.,  Paris,  1905. 

Bellamy,  J.,  La  Theologie  Catholique  au  XIX  Siele,  Paris,  1904. 
Caperan,  L.,  Le  Probleme  du  Salut  des  Infideles.  Essai  Historique, 
Paris,  1912. 

Catholic  Encyclopedia,  New  York,  1907  foil. 

Denifle,  H.,  Luther  und  Luthertum,  3  vols.,  Mainz,  1904. 

- Die  Entstehung  der  Universitaeten  des  Mittelalters  bis  1400,  2 

vols.,  Berlin,  1885. 

Denifle-Chatelain,  Chartularium  Univ.  Parisiensis.  Paris,  1889-91. 
Denifle-Ehrle,  Archiv  fuer  Litteratur-  und  Kirchengeschichte  des 
Mittelalters,  6  vols.,  Freiburg  im  Breisgau,  1885-1892. 
Denzinger-Bannwart,  Enchiridion  Symbolorum,  Definitionum  et  De- 
clarationum  de  Rebus  Fidei  et  Morum,  nth  ed.,  Freiburg  im 
Breisgau,  1911. 

Dictionnaire  Apologetique  de  la  Foi,  Paris,  1911  foil. 

Dictionnaire  de  Theologie  Catholique,  Paris,  1909  foil. 

Doellinger,  I.,  Die  Reformation,  ihre  innere  Entwicklung  und  ihre 
Wirkungen,  3  vols.,  Ratisbon,  1846-48. 

*  Dorner,  A.,  Grundriss  der  Dogmengeschichte,  Berlin,  1899. 

Du  Plessis  D’Argentre,  Collectio  judiciorum  de  novis  erroribus  qui 
ab  initio  XII  s.  usque  ad  a.  1713  .  .  .  proscripti  sunt,  Paris,  1755 
foil. 

Dummermuth,  A.  M.,  S.  Thomas  et  doctrina  praemotionis  physicae, 
Paris,  1886. 

Ehrhard-Kirsch,  Forschungen  zur  Christlichen  Literatur-  und  Dog¬ 
mengeschichte,  vols.  V-XI,  Mainz,  Paderborn. 

*  Fisher,  G.  P.,  History  of  Christian  Doctrine,  New  York,  1911. 
Frins,  V.,  Scti.  Thomae  A.  doctrina  de  cooperatione  Dei  cum  omni 

natura  creata  praesertim  libera,  Paris,  1893. 

v 


VI 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Funk,  F.  X.,  A  Manual  of  Church  History,  2  vols.  Authorized 
Translation  from  the  5th  German  Edition  by  Luigi  Cappadelta, 
St.  Louis,  1910. 

*  Gairdner,  J.,  Lollardy  and  the  Reformation  in  England,  4  vols. 

London,  1908. 

Ghellink,  J.,  Mouvement  Theologique  du  XIIe  Siecle,  Paris,  1915. 

Gietl,  R.  I3.,  Die  Sentenzen  Rolands,  Freiburg,  1891. 

Goetzmann,  W.,  Das  Eucharistische  Opfer  nach  der  Lehre  der  ael- 
teren  Scholastik.  Eine  dogmengeschichtliche  Studie,  Freiburg 
im  Breisgau,  1901. 

Grabmann,  M.,  Die  Geschichte  der  Scholastischen  Methode,  2  vols. 
Freiburg  im  Breisgau,  1909,  1911. 

Granderath,  G.,  Constitutiones  dogmaticae  s.  oecum.  Concilii  Vati- 
cani  explicatae,  Freiburg,  1892. 

Granderath-Kirsch,  Geschichte  des  Vatikanischen  Konzils,  von  seiner 
ersten  Ankuendigung  bis  zu  seiner  Vertagung,  nach  den  authen- 
tischen  Dokumenten,  6  vols.  Freiburg,  1903,  1906. 

Grisar,  H.,  Luther,  6  vols.  Authorized  Translation  by  E.  M.  La- 
mond,  St.  Louis,  1913. 

*  Harnack,  A.,  Lehrbuch  der  Dogmengeschichte,  vierte  neu  durchar- 

beitete  und  vermehrte  Auflage,  3  vols.  Tuebingen,  1909,  1910. 

Hefele,  C.  J.,  A  History  of  the  Councils  of  the  Church,  7  vols.  Sec¬ 
ond  German  Edition,  1879  foil.  Only  the  first  three  volumes 
have  been  translated  into  English. 

Hergenroether,  J.,  Handbuch  der  allgemeinen  Kirchengeschichte,  3 
vols.  Vierte  Auflage,  neu  bearbeitet  von  Dr.  J.  P.  Kirsch.  Frei¬ 
burg,  1902. 

Klee,  H.,  Lehrbuch  der  Dogmengeschichte,  2  vols.  Mainz,  1887  foil. 

*  Loofs,  F.,  Leitfaden  zum  Studium  der  Dogmengeschichte.  Halle, 

1901. 

Mansi,  J.  D.,  Sacrorum  Conciliorum  Nova  et  Amplissima  Collectio,  63 
vols.  Paris,  1854  foil. 

McCormick,  P.  J.,  History  of  Education.  Washington,  D.  C.,  1915. 

Mignon,  A.,  Hugues  de  Saint-Victor  et  les  origines  de  la  Scolastique, 
2  vols.  Paris,  1896. 

Minges,  P.,  Der  Gottesbegriff  des  Duns  Scotus,  Wien,  1907. 

- Die  Gnadenlehre  des  Duns  Scotus,  Muenster,  1906. 

Moehler,  A.,  Symbolism :  an  Exposition  of  Doctrinal  Differences  be¬ 
tween  Catholics  and  Protestants.  Translated  by  J.  B.  Robert¬ 
son,  New  York,  1844. 

Pastor,  L.,  History  of  the  Popes  from  the  Close  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
5  vols.  Translated  by  F.  I.  Antrobus,  London,  1891  foil. 

Pesch,  C.,  Theologische  Zeitfragen ;  Glaube,  Dogmen  und  geschicht- 
liche  Tatsachen.  Freiburg  im  Breisgau,  1908. 

Pourrat,  P.,  Theology  of  the  Sacraments.  Authorized  Translation 
from  the  Third  French  Edition.  St.  Louis,  1910. 

Rapin,  R.,  Histoire  de  Jansenisme.  Paris,  1861. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


vu 


*  Rashdall,  H.,  The  Universities  of  Europe  in  the  Middle  Ages,  2  vols. 

Oxford,  1905. 

*  Realencyklopaedie  fuer  Protestantische  Theologie  und  Kirche,  22 

vols.  Leipzig,  1896-1909. 

Renz,  F.  S.,  Die  Geschichte  des  M'essopfer-Begriffs,  oder  der  alte 
Glaube  und  die  neuen  Theorien  ueber  das  Wesen  des  Unblutigen 
Opfers,  2  vols.  Freising,  1901. 

Riviere,  J.,  The  Doctrine  of  the  Atonement,  2  vols.  Authorized 
Translation  by  Luigi  Cappadelta.  St.  Louis,  1909. 

Salembier,  L.,  The  Great  Schism  of  the  West.  Authorized  Transla¬ 
tion  by  M.  D.,  New  York,  1907. 

Schill,  A.,  Die  Constitution  Unigenitus.  Freiburg,  1876. 

*  Schaff,  P.,  Creeds  of  Christendom,  3  vols.  New  York,  1877. 
Schwane,  J.,  Histoire  des  Dogmes,  6  vols.  French  Translation  from 

the  Second  German  Edition  by  A.  Degert  and  P.  Belet.  Paris, 

I9°3_4- 

Schneemann,  G.,  Controversiarum  de  divinae  gratiae  liberique  arbi- 
trii  concordia  initia  et  progressus.  Freiburg  im  Breisgau,  1881. 
Swoboda,  H.,  Das  Concil  von  Trient.  Wien,  1913 
Taylor,  H.  O.,  The  Mediaeval  Mind,  2  vols.  London,  1914. 

Toner,  P.  J.,  Dissertatio  Historico-Theologica  de  Lapsu  et  Peccato 
Originali.  Dublin,  1904. 

Turmel,  J.,  Histoire  de  la  Theologie  Positive,  2  vols.  Paris,  1904-6. 
Vacandard,  E.,  Histoire  de  Saint  Bernard,  Paris,  1895. 

Werner,  K..  Der  heil.  Thomas  von  Aquino.  Ratisbon,  1858. 

- Joh.  Duns  Scotus.  Wien,  1881 

*  - Franz  Suarez  und  die  Scholastik  der  letzten  Jahrhunderte. 

Ratisbon,  1861. 

Wetzer  und  Welte,  Kirchenlexikon,  2nd  ed.  Freiburg  im  Breisgau, 
1882  foil. 

Wulf,  De,  History  of  Mediaeval  Philosophy.  Translated  by  P.  Coffey. 
London,  1909. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Foreword . iii 

Bibliography . v 

INTRODUCTION 

Rise,  Development,  and  Decline  of  Scholasticism  ...  i 

A  —  Preparatory  Stage . 4 

B — Golden  Age  of  Scholasticism . 11 

C  —  Decline  of  Scholasticism . 22 

D  —  Sources  of  Arguments . 24 

CHAPTER  I 

The  Existence  of  God:  His  Essence . 29 

A  —  The  Existence  of  God . 29 

B  —  God’s  Essence  ....  36 

CHAPTER  II 

The  Attributes  of  God . 49 

1.  The  Divine  Intellect  —  Knowledge . 52 

2.  The  Divine  Will . 60 

(a)  Omnipotence . 61 

(b)  Freedom  of  the  Divine  Will . 63 

CHAPTER  III 

Predestination . 66 

A  —  Predestinarian  Controversy . 66 

B  —  Teaching  of  the  Scholastics . 72 

CHAPTER  IV 

The  Blessed  Trinity . 84 

1.  Existence  of  the  Mystery . 84 

2.  Errors  of  Some  Early  Scholastics . 85 

3.  Definition  of  Person . 88 

4.  Principles  of  Divine  Processions . 89 

ix 


X 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

5.  Divine  Relations . 94 

6.  Divine  Persons . 96 

CHAPTER  V 

Creation  of  the  World . 100 

1.  The  Creative  Act . 101 

2.  Efficient  Cause  of  Creation . 105 

3.  Exemplary  Cause  of  Creation . 108 

4.  Final  Cause  of  Creation . 108 

5.  Creation  in  Time . 109 

6.  Creation  and  Conservation . in 

CHAPTER  VI 

Angelology . 113 

1.  Creation  of  the  Angels . 113 

2.  Elevation  of  the  Angels . 114 

3.  Nature  of  the  Angels . 117 

4.  Knowledge  of  the  Angels . 121 

5.  Volition  of  the  Angels . 124 

6.  Mutual  Relation  of  the  Angels . 125 

7.  Ministry  of  the  Angels . 127 

CHAPTER  VII 

Anthropology . .* . 129 

1.  Essential  Identity  of  the  Rational  and  Sensitive  Soul  .  .  131 

2.  Creation  of  Individual  Souls . 133 

3.  Union  of  Soul  and  Body . 134 

CHAPTER  VIII 

The  State  of  Original  Justice . 142 

1.  Perfection  of  the  Intellect . 148 

2.  Perfection  of  the  Will . 130 

3.  Perfections  of  the  Body . 151 

CHAPTER  IX 

Original  Sin . 155 

1.  Nature  of  Original  Sin . 155 

2.  Transmission  of  Original  Sin . 164 


CONTENTS 


xi 


CHAPTER  X  PAGE 

ChRISTOLOGY . lyi 

A — Some  Christological  Errors . 171 

B  —  Christology  of  the  Great  Scholastics . 175 

1.  Preliminary  Questions . 179 

2.  The  Person  Assuming  Human  Nature  ....  182 

3.  The  Human  Nature  Assumed . 183 

4.  Definition  of  Human  Personality . 185 

5.  The  Hypostatic  Union . 188 

6.  Consectaria  of  the  Union . 191 

CHAPTER  XI 

SOTERIOLOGY . 196 

A  —  Some  Soteriological  Errors . 196 

B  —  Soteriology  of  the  Scholastics . 201 

1.  Necessity  of  the  Redemption . 201 

2.  The  Atonement . 203 

3.  Effects  of  the  Atonement . 206 

4.  The  Death  of  Christ . 21 1 

CHAPTER  XII 

The  Church  of  Christ:  The  Papacy . 214 

A  —  The  Church  of  Christ  . . 214 

B  —  The  Papacy . 219 

1.  The  Spiritual  Supremacy  of  the  Pope  ....  220 

2.  Relation  of  Church  and  State . 229 

CHAPTER  XIII 

Actual  and  Sanctifying  Grace:  Justification  and  Merit  .  234 

A  —  Actual  and  Sanctifying  Grace . 234 

B  —  Justification  and  Merit . 246 

CHAPTER  XIV 

Infused  Virtues:  Theological  and  Cardinal . 253 

1.  Nature  of  Infused  Virtues . 253 

2.  Division  of  Infused  Virtues . 255 

3.  The  Virtue  of  Faith . 257 

4.  The  Virtue  of  Hope . 263 

5.  The  Virtue  of  Charity . 267 

6.  The  Cardinal  Virtues . 270 


xii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XV  PAGE 

The  Sacraments  in  General . 272 

Definition  and  Efficiency  of  the  Sacraments  ....  272 

1.  Definition  of  a  Sacrament . 273 

2.  The  Efficacy  of  the  Sacraments . 276 

CHAPTER  XVI 

The  Sacraments  in  General . 284 

Sacramental  Grace:  The  Character:  Need  of  Intention: 

The  Number  Seven:  Institution  of  the  Sacraments  284 

1.  Sacramental  Grace . 284 

2.  The  Sacramental  Character . 285 

3.  Need  of  Intention . 290 

4.  The  Number  Seven . 292 

5.  Institution  of  the  Sacraments . 295 

CHAPTER  XVII 

Baptism  :  Confirmation . 298 

A  —  Baptism . 298 

B  —  Confirmation . 305 

CHAPTER  XVIII 

The  Holy  Eucharist . 310 

The  Real  Presence:  Transubstantiation:  The  Manner  of 
Christ’s  Presence:  The  Accidents  of  Bread  and 
Wine . 310 

1.  The  Real  Presence . 31 1 

2.  Transubstantiation . 3x3 

3.  The  Manner  of  Christ’s  Presence . 320 

4.  The  Accidents  of  Bread  and  Wine . 322 

CHAPTER  XIX 

The  Holy  Eucharist . 327 

The  Form  of  the  Consecration:  The  Matter  of  Consecra¬ 
tion:  The  Consecrating  Minister:  The  Eucharist 
as  a  Sacrament:  The  Effect  of  the  Sacrament: 

The  Eucharist  as  a  Sacrifice . 327 

1.  The  Form  of  Consecration . 327 

2.  The  Matter  of  Consecration . 329 


CONTENTS 


Xlll 


PAGE 

3.  The  Consecrating  Minister . 330 

4.  The  Eucharist  as  a  Sacrament . 332 

5.  Effects  of  the  Sacrament . 334 

6.  The  Eucharist  as  a  Sacrifice . 335 

CHAPTER  XX 

Penance . 338 

Practice  of  the  Early  Middle  Ages:  Teaching  of  the  Scho¬ 
lastics  . 338 

A  —  Practice  of  the  Early  Middle  Ages . 338 

B  —  Teaching  of  the  Scholastics . 344 

1.  The  Virtue  of  Penance . 344 

2.  The  Sacrament  of  Penance . 349 

CHAPTER  XXI 

Indulgences . 361 

Historical  Development:  Theological  Exposition  .  .  .  361 

A  —  Historical  Development . 362 

1.  From  the  First  Century  to  the  Seventh  ....  363 

2.  From  the  Seventh  Century  to  the  Twelfth  .  .  .  364 

3.  From  the  Twelfth  Century  to  the  Council  of  Trent  .  368 

B  —  Theological  Exposition  . . 372 

CHAPTER  XXII 

Holy  Orders:  Extreme  Unction:  Matrimony  ....  380 

A  —  Holy  Orders . 380 

B  —  Extreme  Unction . 387 

C  —  Matrimony . 393 

CHAPTER  XXIII 

Mariology  . 397 

Sanctification  Before  Birth:  Immaculate  Conception: 

Divine  Motherhood:  Veneration . 397 

A  —  Sanctification  before  Birth . 397 

B  —  The  Immaculate  Conception  . . 403 

C  —  Divine  Motherhood . 412 

D  —  Veneration  of  Mary . 415 


XIV 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

Eschatology . 418 

Resurrection  of  the  Dead:  General  Judgment:  The  Pun¬ 
ishment  of  Hell:  The  Joys  of  Heaven  ....  418 

1.  The  Resurrection  of  the  Dead . 418 

2.  The  General  Judgment . 422 

3.  The  Punishment  of  Hell . 426 

4.  The  Joys  of  Heaven . 430 

CHAPTER  XXV 

Medieval  Heresies:  Mediaeval  Councils . 438 

A  —  Mediaeval  Heresies . 439 

1.  Peter  de  Bruys  and  the  Petrobrusians . 439 

2.  Tanchelm  and  Eon  de  Stella . 440 

3.  Amalric  of  Bene  and  David  of  Dinant  ....  441 

4.  The  Cathari  or  Albigenses . 442 

5.  The  Waldensians . 443 

6.  John  Wiclif . 444 

7.  John  Hus . 446 

B  —  Mediaeval  Councils . 447 

1.  The  Fourth  Lateran  Council . 448 

2.  The  Second  Council  of  Lyons . 450 

3.  The  Council  of  Vienne . 452 

4.  The  Council  of  Constance . 454 

5.  The  Council  of  Florence . 456 

CHAPTER  XXVI 

The  Protestant  Reformation  :  The  Council  of  Trent  .  .  458 

A  —  The  Protestant  Reformation . 458 

Errors  on : 

1.  Holy  Scripture . 463 

2.  Original  Sin . 464 

3.  Free  Will . 464 

4.  Grace  and  Justification . 464 

5.  Predestination . 465 

6.  The  Sacraments . 465 

7.  The  Church  . . 466 

8.  The  Communion  of  Saints . 466 

B  —  The  Council  of  Trent  .  .  . . 4 67 

Teaching  on : 

1.  Holy  Scripture  and  Tradition . 468 


CONTENTS 


xv 


PAGE 

2.  Original  Sin . 468 

3.  Justification . 470 

4.  The  Sacraments  in  General :  Baptism  and  Confirma¬ 

tion  . 472 

5.  The  Sacrament  of  the  Holy  Eucharist  ....  473 

6.  The  Sacraments  of  Penance  and  Extreme  Unction  .  475 

7.  The  Sacrifice  of  the  Mass . 475 

8.  The  Sacrament  of  Orders . 476 

9.  The  Sacrament  of  Matrimony . 476 

10.  Purgatory:  Veneration  of  Saints  and  Images:  In¬ 
dulgences  . 476 

CHAPTER  XXVII 

Neo-Scholastic  Theologians  . 478 

CHAPTER  XXVIII 

School  Differences . 486 

1.  God’s  Foreknowledge . 487 

2.  Controversies  on  Efficacious  Grace . 492 

3.  Some  Differences  of  Opinion  among  Theologians  .  .  .  497 

CHAPTER  XXIX 

Heretical  Tendencies . 504 

1.  Baius  and  Baianism . 504 

2.  Jansenius  and  Jansenism . 507 

3.  Paschase  Quesnel . 510 

4.  Gallicanism  . 511 

5.  Febronianism . 514 

6.  The  Synod  of  Pistoia . 516 

7.  Rationalism . 517 

CHAPTER  XXX 

Some  Papal  Decisions:  The  Vatican  Council:  Modernism  521 
A  —  Some  Papal  Decisions . 521 

1.  The  Immaculate  Conception . 521 

2.  The  Syllabus  of  Pius  IX . 523 

B  —  The  Vatican  Council . 524 

C  —  Modernism . 530 

Conclusion . 534 


A  MANUAL  OF  THE  HISTORY 

OF  DOGMAS 


INTRODUCTION 


RISE,  DEVELOPMENT,  AND  DECLINE  OF  SCHOLASTICISM  i 


In  the  study  of  doctrinal  development  during  the  Middle 
Ages,  and  also  in  modern  times,  no  account  need  be  taken 
of  the  Eastern  Church.  For  after  the  schism  caused  “by 
Michael  Cerularius,  patriarch  of  Constantinople  (1053- 
1059),  the  East  contributed  nothing  to  the  development  of 
doctrine.  Cut  off  by  its  own  suicidal  act  from  the  source  of 
ecclesiastical  life,  it  became  absolutely  sterile.  Its  theology 
is  to-day  where  it  was  left  by  John  Damascene  in  the  eighth 
century,  except  that  along  some  lines  it  has  actually  fallen  into 
error.  Hence,  while  investigating  this  second  period  of  dog¬ 
matic  development,  the  student  can  give  his  undivided  atten¬ 
tion  to  the  theology  of  the  West. 

In  western  lands,  moreover,  the  learned  world  shifted  its 
center  of  intellectual  activity  from  the  Latin  to  the  Germanic 
nations.  After  the  seventh  century  it  was  chiefly  the  British 
Isles,  France,  Germany,  Northern  Italy,  and  Visigothic 
Spain,  that  supplied  the  men  who  preserved  what  was  still 
left  of  the  old  learning  and  prepared  the  way  for  the  gradual 
development  of  the  new.  Venerable  Bede,  Aldhelm,  and  Al- 


1  Cfr.  Grabmann,  Geschichte  der 
Scholastischen  Methode,  I,  II ; 
Ghellink,  Le  Mouvement  Theolo- 
gique  du  XIIe  Siecle ;  Denifle  and 
Ehrle,  Archiev  fuer  Litteratur-und 
Kirchengeschichte  des  Mittelalters : 
De  Wulf,  Scholasticism  Old  and 


New;  *Rashdall,  Universities  of 
Europe  in  the  Middle  Ages;  De 
Wulf.  History  of  Medieval  Philoso¬ 
phy:  *Taylor,  The  Medieval  Mind; 
Denifle,  Die  Entstehung  der  Uni- 
versitaeten  des  Mittelalters  bis  1400. 


2 


INTRODUCTION 


cum  in  England,  Paulinus  of  Aquileia,  Haymo  and  Rabanus 
Maurus  of  Fulda,  Walafried  Strabo  of  Reichenau,  Servatus 
Lupus  of  Ferrieries,  Druthmar,  Paschasius  Radbertus  and 
Ratramnus  of  Corbie,  Hincmar  of  Rheims,  Prudentius  of 
Troyes,  and  Aeneas  of  Paris,  were  some  of  the  writers  and 
theologians  who  bridged  over  the  dark  chasm  that  intervened 
between  the  Patristic  past  and  the  Scholastic  future.  None 
of  them  displayed  much  originality  and  independence  of 
thought,  but  they  were  all  industrious  workers  and  did  good 
service  in  preparing  the  way  for  the  greater  men  that  were  to 
follow. 

During  the  Patristic  period,  embracing,  roughly  speaking, 
the  first  seven  centuries  of  the  Christian  era,  there  was  not 
only  a  gradual  and  more  or  less  continuous  fixation  of  dog¬ 
mas,  but  also  a  constant  growth  of  theological  knowledge, 
touching  nearly  every  point  of  revealed  truth.  Even  such 
doctrines  as  were  not  directly  connected  with  what  had  been 
explicitly  defined,  or  what  had  been  embodied  in  the  various 
symbols  of  faith,  were  in  many  instances  placed  beyond  all 
reasonable  doubt  by  the  consensus  of  approved  teachers  and 
the  universal  acceptance  of  the  faithful.  The  Ecclesia 
docens  and  the  Ecclesia  discens  ever  worked  hand  in  hand  to 
push  forward  the  process  of  doctrinal  development.  Conse¬ 
quently,  aside  from  defined  truths,  there  was  at  the  close  of 
the  Patristic  age  a  large  body  of  doctrines  that  were  a  matter 
of  common  belief,  although  strictly  speaking  they  did  not  yet 
form  a  part  of  the  Catholic  faith.  Many  of  them  received 
their  full  development,  and  were  incorporated  into  the  faith, 
during  the  following  centuries. 

We  shall  witness  the  same  harmonious  cooperation  of  these 
two  agencies  during  the  Scholastic  period.  In  one  sense, 
however,  the  Ecclesia  discens ,  precisely  as  represented  by 
theologians  of  recognized  authority,  stands  out  with  far 
greater  prominence  than  at  any  previous  time.  Since  the  be¬ 
ginning  of  the  Middle  Ages  comparatively  few  great  heresies, 
attacking  fundamental  doctrines  of  the  faith,  called  for  con¬ 
ciliar  or  even  for  papal  definitions  of  revealed  truths;  while 
the  intensely  speculative  spirit  of  Scholasticism  was  ever  ac- 


RISE  OF  SCHOLASTICISM 


3 


tive  in  deducing  new  theological  conclusions  and  in  bringing 
out  into  clearer  light  the  full  contents  of  revelation.  In  this, 
great  assistance  was  derived  from  the  application  of  philo¬ 
sophical  methods  to  the  exposition  of  Christian  doctrine,  with 
the  result  that  the  deposit  uni  ddei  and  the  contents  of  Chris¬ 
tianized  philosophy  were  brought  into  closest  contact. 

However,  it  must  not  be  imagined  that  there  was  anything 
like  an  abrupt  break  between  the  two  periods  of  doctrinal  de¬ 
velopment  just  indicated.  The  transition  from  the  one  to  the 
other  was  very  gradual,  extending  over  a  space  of  fully  three 
hundred  years.  Still  less  was  there  anything  like  a  doctrinal 
change  as  Patristic  theology  passed  into  that  of  the  Scholastic 
period.  Scholastic  theology  is  the  legitimate  offspring  of  Pa¬ 
tristic  teaching,  having  essentially  the  same  contents  although 
it  differs  somewhat  in  method  and  form.  Both  admit  Augus¬ 
tine’s  “  Intellige,  ut  credas,”  and  its  converse,  “  Crede,  ut  in- 
telligas  ” ;  but  each  in  its  own  way.  The  representatives  of 
the  Patristic  age  used  reason  but  emphasized  authority,  while 
their  successors  of  the  Scholastic  period  used  authority  but 
emphasized  reason. 


Scholasticism 

This  term  is  used  to  designate  both  a  pedagogical  method 
and  a  doctrinal  system,  and  as  such  it  is  applied  to  theology 
as  well  as  to  philosophy.  In  the  present  connection  it  need 
be  considered  only  in  reference  to  theology.  Scholastic  the¬ 
ology  is  distinguished  from  Patristic  theology  on  the  one  hand, 
and  from  positive  theology  on  the  other.  Its  distinctive  fea¬ 
ture  is  speculative  investigation  of  the  data  of  revelation, 
chiefly  by  the  aid  of  philosophical  methods.  In  reference  to 
this  particular  characteristic  the  Schoolmen  themselves  dis¬ 
tinguish  between  theologia  speculativa  sen  scholastica  and 
theologia  positiva.  The  latter  gathers  and  coordinates  the 
data  of  revelation,  the  former  philosophizes  about  these  data 
and  deduces  theological  conclusions.  However,  it  was  not  a 
barren  speculation  that  interested  the  Schoolmen;  they  were 
ever  intent  on  giving  to  their  investigations  a  practical  turn. 


4 


INTRODUCTION 


They  speculated  much,  but  primarily  to  enable  the  faithful  to 
lead  a  fuller  Christian  life. 

Historically  the  term  Scholasticism,  as  now  employed, 
probably  dates  back  to  the  seventh  century.  By  that  time  it 
seems  to  have  become  customary  to  call  the  head  of  any  Chris¬ 
tian  institution  of  learning  magister  scholae,  capiscola,  or 
scholasticus.  Furthermore,  as  it  was  then  generally  incum¬ 
bent  on  the  head  of  the  school  to  teach  dialectics,  the  usage 
gradually  crept  in  to  designate  any  branch  of  studies  in  which 
dialectics  were  used,  whether  its  subject-matter  was  philoso¬ 
phy  or  theology,  Scholastic  studies,  that  is,  studies  which  came 
primarily  under  the  direction  of  the  scholasticus.  Hence 
Scholastic  theology  really  means,  as  was  stated  above,  a  sys¬ 
tem  of  theological  teaching  in  which  the  dialectic  method  pre¬ 
vails.  It  is  moreover,  though  to  a  limited  extent,  the  union 
of  philosophy  and  theology  in  contents  as  well  as  in  method. 

Historical  Development 

It  is  customary  to  distinguish  three  different  stages  in  the 
gradual  development  and  decline  of  the  Scholastic  system, 
although  there  are  no  hard  and  fast  lines  of  demarcation. 
From  the  tenth  to  the  thirteenth  century  the  system  was  and 
remained  more  or  less  in  a  state  of  preparation.  During  the 
thirteenth  century  it  reached  its  full  development  and  great¬ 
est  perfection.  From  the  beginning  of  the  fourteenth  cen¬ 
tury  up  to  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  it  fell  into  a  condition  of 
decline,  and  finally  lost  much  of  its  ancient  prestige.  A  brief 
outline  of  this  historical  aspect  of  Scholasticism  may  here  be 
given,  as  it  will  enable  us  to  follow  more  intelligently  the 
development  of  doctrine  in  its  relation  to  the  labors  of  the 
Schoolmen. 


A  —  Preparatory  Stage 

The  early  Middle  Ages  received  from  the  Patristic  period 
a  fairly  complete  body  of  formulated  doctrines,  built  up  on 
the  basis  of  divine  authority.  The  principle  enunciated  by 
Pope  Hormisdas,  “  The  first  condition  of  attaining  salvation 


RISE  OF  SCHOLASTICISM 


5 


is  to  safeguard  the  rule  of  right  faith  and  not  to  deviate 
from  the  teaching  of  the  Fathers  ”  2  found  universal  accept¬ 
ance.  Hence  the  main  effort  of  the  earliest  Schoolmen  was 
to  preserve  what  had  been  delivered  to  them  by  their  forbears 
in  the  faith.  As  Rabanus  Maurus  expressed  it :  “  It  is  above 

all  things  necessary  to  have  the  right  and  immaculate  faith, 
and  to  know  by  heart  the  symbol  drawn  up  by  the  holy  Fathers, 
in  accordance  with  the  rule  laid  down  by  the  teaching  of  the 
Apostles.”  3 

From  this  dominating  tendency  of  harking  back  to  the  Pa¬ 
tristic  past,  both  as  regarded  the  contents  of  the  faith  and  its 
outward  expression,  resulted  in  course  of  time  the  Libri  Sen- 
tentiarum ,  in  which  the  teachings  of  different  Fathers  were 
collated  and  grouped  under  certain  general  heads  of  doctrine 
and  more  or  less  extensively  commented  upon  by  the  author 
or  compiler.  Thus  originated  the  Sentences  of  William  of 
Champeaux,  of  Anselm  of  Laon,  of  Robert  Pulleyn,  the  Sic- 
et-non  of  Abelard,  and  a  little  later  the  Summa  S ententiarum 
of  the  Lombard.  For  their  material  these  authors  depended 
chiefly  on  the  Florilegia,  or  Catenae ,  of  Patristic  excerpts, 
compiled  in  the  preceding  centuries.  The  works  of  Augus¬ 
tine,  of  Pseudo-Denis,  of  Gregory  the  Great,  and  of  John 
Damascene,  were  in  most  instances  the  direct  sources  whence 
these  excerpts  had  been  taken ;  but  through  them,  and  there¬ 
fore  indirectly,  the  works  of  many  other  Fathers  were  also 
laid  under  contribution. 

Up  to  the  eleventh  century  Scholastic  activities  were  almost 
exclusively  directed  by  traditionalism,  but  thereafter  a  new 
tendency  began  to  manifest  itself.  Men  were  no  longer  satis¬ 
fied  with  repeating  and  systematizing  traditional  teaching,  al¬ 
though  the  contents  of  this  teaching  were  even  then  univer¬ 
sally  regarded  as  sacrosanct.  They  began  to  emphasize  the 
rational  side  of  revealed  doctrines,  to  search  for  philosophical 
proofs,  which,  though  in  the  very  nature  of  things  incapable 
of  demonstrating  the  mysteries  of  Christian  revelation,  would 
at  least  be  helpful  towards  showing  their  congruity  and  rea¬ 
sonableness  to  the  inquiring  mind.  It  was  from  these  first 

2  Epist.  7,  9.  3  De  Ecclesiastica  Disciplina,  3. 


6 


INTRODUCTION 


attempts  at  placing  the  faith,  so  far  as  might  be,  on  a  rational 
basis  that  Scholasticism  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term  was 
born. 

Anselm  and  Abelard 

The  two  men  who  contributed  most  to  the  development  of 
Scholasticism  in  its  earlier  stages,  though  along  different  lines 
of  thought  and  method,  were  Anselm  of  Canterbury  (  +  1109) 
and  Abelard  of  Pallet  (  +  1142).  Both  were  true  Scholastics 
in  the  sense  that  they  brought  reason  to  bear  upon  the  data  of 
revelation,  but  in  their  methods  and  viewpoints  they  stood 
worlds  apart.  They  may  be  regarded  as  the  founders  of  two 
different  schools  of  theological  thought,  which  existed  and 
worked  side  by  side  during  the  Scholastic  period.  The  one 
was  inclined  to  mysticism  and  found  its  best  representative 
in  Bonaventure ;  the  other  emphasized  intellectualism  and 
reached  its  highest  perfection  in  Aquinas. 

In  Anselm’s  case  the  following  points  are  decisive  in  de¬ 
termining  his  position  and  his  influence  upon  Scholastic  specu¬ 
lation.  i°.  He  is  to  all  intents  and  purposes  an  extreme  re¬ 
alist.  Universals  are  to  him  not  a  mere  flatus  z*ocis,  nor 
mere  mental  concepts;  they  exist  ante  rem  as  objective  reali¬ 
ties,  not  indeed  in  the  physical  order  of  things,  but  in  the 
mind  of  God.4  Hence  in  his  theological  speculations  he 
does  not  deal  with  forms  only,  but  with  things.  From  this 
results  the  elaboration  of  concepts  in  conformity  with  the 
reality  which  they  express,  the  form  being  subordinated  to 
the  contents.  20.  A  close  follower  of  Augustine,  he  empha¬ 
sizes  the  predominance  of  the  will,  both  in  God’s  government 
of  the  world  and  in  man’s  correspondence  with  God’s  inten¬ 
tions.  God’s  ruling  will  is  supreme  in  the  world,  and  man’s 
free  will  is  his  noblest  faculty.  30.  He  admits  that  reason 
has  its  legitimate  field  of  inquiry  in  matters  theological,  never¬ 
theless  in  the  study  of  revealed  truths  faith  should  pre¬ 
cede  reason.5  The  “  Credo  ut  intelligam  ”  comes  first,  and 
then  the  “  Intelligo  ut  credam  ”  6  40.  Furthermore,  this  m- 

4  Monol.  26-27. 

5  Cur  Deus  Homo?  1,  1-2. 


6  Proslog.  1. 


RISE  OF  SCHOLASTICISM 


7 


telligere  or  understanding  is  not  precisely  the  result  of  dia¬ 
lectic  speculation,  but  rather  of  contemplation,  of  intuition. 
The  mental  process  consists  in  experiencing  rather  than  in  rea¬ 
soning.  Hence  Anselm  is  a  Christian  mystic,  not  a  Christian 
rationalist. 

In  Abelard  the  entire  viewpoint  is  different.  i°.  Com¬ 
pared  to  Anselm,  he  is  an  anti-realist.  Universals  do  not 
exist  ante  rem ,  nor  merely  post  ran ,  but  rather  in  re.  They 
have  no  existence  apart  from  the  individual.7  Their  univer¬ 
sality  is  conferred  by  the  mind,  which  forms  an  abstract  con¬ 
cept  of  what  is  common  to  the  different  individuals  of  the 
same  species  or  genus.  Hence  he  may  be  classed  among  the 
moderate  realists,  although  his  views  on  the  subject  of  uni¬ 
versals  are  rather  undeveloped.  2°.  He  conceives  the  object 
of  theological  science  to  consist  in  the  application  of  his  Sic-et- 
non  method  to  tradition  and  revelation,  in  as  much  as  dialec¬ 
tical  reasoning  must  show  that  apparently  contradictory  propo¬ 
sitions  in  the  writings  of  the  Fathers  and  in  Holy  Scripture 
are  in  real  agreement.  30.  He  has  no  desire  of  doing  away 
with  authority,  but  he  wishes  to  make  it  amenable  to  reason.8 
The  part  of  reason,  however,  is  not  to  demonstrate  the  truths 
of  revelation,  but  rather  to  show  that  they  are  conformable  to 
the  requirements  of  the  human  intellect.9  40.  He  regards  it 
as  a  fundamental  principle  that  the  writings  of  the  Fathers 
do  not  compel  belief,  but  leave  the  reader’s  freedom  of  judg¬ 
ing  for  himself  intact.  Holy  Scripture  alone  is  of  itself  in¬ 
fallible.10  Hence  the  two  chief  sources  of  arguments  are  the 
Bible  and  reason.  50.  Intellectual  processes  in  the  domain 
of  theology  do  not  consist  in  contemplating  and  experiencing, 
but  in  analyzing  concepts,  in  distinguishing  propositions,  and 
in  deducing  conclusions  by  dialectical  methods.  He  is,  there¬ 
fore,  not  a  Christian  mystic,  but  a  Christian  rationalist. 

It  is  thus  in  the  writings  of  these  two  men  that  we  find  the 
sketchy  beginnings  of  the  whole  Scholastic  system.  Both  en¬ 
deavor  to  combine  authority  and  reason,  but  each  in  his  own 
way.  Anselm  is  wholly  intent  upon  appropriating  the  con- 

7  Sum.  Dial.  204.  9  Ibid.  2,  2. 

8  Introduct.  ad  Theol.  2,  3.  10  Sic  et  Non,  Prolog. 


8 


INTRODUCTION 


tents  of  revelation,  and  then  meditating  on  them  for  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  showing  forth  their  striking  harmony  with  all  the 
requirements  of  the  human  intellect;  yet  he  is  prepared  at  any 
moment  to  cling  to  revelation  even  where  reason  fails.  Abe¬ 
lard  criticizes  received  forms,  weighs  authorities,  distinguishes 
what  appears  identical  in  meaning,  combines  what  seems  con¬ 
tradictory  in  expression,  and  thus  gives  full  scope  to  the  vast 
resources  of  keen  dialectics.  Anselm  is  speculative,  Abelard 
is  critical;  Anselm  deals  exclusively  with  realities,  Abelard 
operates  chiefly  with  concepts.  Both  give  reason  its  due;  but 
while  Anselm’s  reverence  for  tradition  keeps  him  always 
within  the  lines  of  orthodoxy,  Abelard’s  critical  propensity 
brings  him  at  times  into  conflict  with  the  teachings  of  faith. 
Anselm  Christianizes  Plato  and  works  in  the  spirit  of  Augus¬ 
tine ;  Abelard  takes  over  the  technique  of  Aristotle  and  dis¬ 
cusses  theological  problems  from  the  standpoint  of  a  jurist. 

Further  Development 

Whilst  Anselm’s  views  and  methods  commended  themselves 
especially  to  mystic  contemplation,  Abelard’s  mode  of  pro¬ 
cedure  was  admirably  adapted  to  school  purposes.  It  stimu¬ 
lated  the  speculative  trend  of  the  age,  and  in  a  short  while 
found  wide  acceptance.  At  the  same  time,  however,  violent 
attacks  were  made  on  its  rationalizing  tendencies,  which  were 
regarded  by  many  as  inseparable  from  the  new  system  of 
thought.  Bernard  of  Clairveaux,  William  of  St.  Thierry, 
John  of  Salisbury,  Walter  of  St.  Victor,  and  the  brothers 
Geroch  and  Arno  of  Reichersberg  fought  strenuously  to  coun¬ 
teract  Abelard's  influence  in  the  schools.  But  when  Peter 
Lombard  (  +  1164)  issued  his  Summa  Sententiarum,  Abe¬ 
lard’s  method,  if  not  his  views,  gained  the  day.  Peter  had 
been  a  disciple  of  Abelard,  but  he  was  more  conservative  than 
his  master,  and  in  writing  his  great  work  he  carefully  elim¬ 
inated  all  rationalistic  elements,  in  so  far  as  they  tended  to 
subordinate  authority  to  reason.  He  did  not  escape  con¬ 
demnation  on  the  part  of  such  men  as  Walter  of  St.  Victor, 


RISE  OF  SCHOLASTICISM 


9 

but  the  intellectual  world  of  the  day  decided  in  his  favor,  and 
so  he  became  for  all  times  the  Magister  Sententiarum. 

With  the  Sunima  Sententiarum  of  the  Lombard  the  first 
period  of  Scholasticism  may  be  said  to  have  formally  opened. 
Up  to  that  date  matters  were  still  in  a  state  of  transition. 
Even  this  great  work  appears  somewhat  sketchy  as  compared 
with  the  Summae  that  originated  in  the  following  century, 
but  it  marked  a  decided  advance  along  the  lines  traced  out 
by  Abelard.  It  soon  became  the  favorite  text-book  of  the 
schools,  and  remained  so  till  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century, 
when  it  yielded  its  place  to  the  Summa  of  St.  Thomas. 
Nearly  all  the  great  Scholastics  wrote  commentaries  on  its 
text,  of  which  more  than  three  hundred  are  still  extant.  The 
following  is  a  brief  sketch  of  its  contents  and  the  method  of 
discussion  adopted  by  the  author. 

Adhering  rather  closely  to  the  general  outline  of  systematic 
theology  as  found  in  the  De  Doctrina  Christiana  of  St.  Au¬ 
gustine,11  Peter  divided  his  subject  matter  into  res  and  signa 
—  realities  and  signs.12  The  res  are  subdivided  into  realities 
that  are  the  object  of  fruition,  and  realities  that  are  intended 
for  use.  The  former  are  contained  in  the  triune  God  as  the 
summa  res ,  the  latter  comprise  the  world  and  all  created 
things.  By  signs  are  understood  those  religious  observances, 
ceremonies,  and  rites,  which  symbolize  something  beyond  their 
own  constituent  elements.  They  are  of  two  kinds:  Those 
which  only  symbolize  that  of  which  they  are  signs,  and  those 
which  actually  confer  what  they  symbolize.  To  the  former 
class  belonged  the  sacraments  of  the  Old  Law,  the  latter  class 
is  made  up  of  the  sacraments  of  the  New  Law.  This  division 
is,  however,  only  imperfectly  carried  through  in  the  body  of 
the  work,  especially  as  regards  the  signa;  hence  St.  Thomas 
points  out  that  the  real  principle  of  divisions  underlying  the 
Sentences  is  God  as  principium  and  finis  —  God  as  the  source 
whence  all  creatures  come,  and  God  as  the  end  to  which  all 
creatures  must  return.13 

11  Op.  cit.  i,  2. 

12  Sent.  I,  d.  I,  c.  1-2. 


13  In  Sent.  I,  d.  2:  Divisio  Textus. 


10 


INTRODUCTION 


The  body  of  the  work  is  divided  into  four  books.  The 
first  contains  the  teaching  of  the  Church  on  the  Blessed  Trin¬ 
ity.  The  principal  points  discussed  are:  The  existence  of 
the  mystery  (d.  2-34),  the  generation  of  the  Son  (d.  4-91), 
the  procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit  (d.  10-18),  the  equality 
and  circuminsession  of  the  three  divine  persons  (d.  19-21). 
Then  follows  a  discussion  on  Trinitarian  terminology  (d. 
22-26,  30),  personal  properties  (d.  27-29,  33),  and  appropria¬ 
tions  (d.  31-32,  34).  The  remainder  of  the  first  book  treats 
of  the  attributes  of  God  in  reference  to  the  world :  omni¬ 
science,  omnipresence,  providence,  predestination  (d.  35-41). 
omnipotence  (d.  42-44),  and  finally  the  will  of  God  (45-48). 

The  second  book  treats  of  creation.  The  first  part  is  de¬ 
voted  to  a  discussion  of  the  Church’s  teaching  on  the  angels 
(d.  1-11)  :  their  nature  and  endowments  (d.  3-4),  probation 
and  fall  (d.  5-7),  evil  spirits  and  good  angels  in  their  relation 
to  the  world  (d.  8,  9-1 1).  Then  the  creation  of  the  ma¬ 
terial  world  is  considered,  the  hexaemeron  (d.  12-15),  crea¬ 
tion  of  man  (d.  16-20).  This  is  followed  by  treatises  on  the 
fall  of  our  first  parents  (d.  21-23),  on  grace  and  free  will 
(d.  24-29),  on  original  sin  (d.  30-44). 

The  third  book  has  for  subject-matter  the  Incarnation,  in¬ 
fused  virtues,  and  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  points 
considered  in  reference  to  the  Incarnation  are :  The  mys¬ 
tery  and  its  causes  (d.  1-5),  the  properties  of  the  God-Man 
(d.  6-16),  the  work  of  redemption  (d.  17-22).  The  second 
part  discusses  the  theological  virtues  (d.  23-32),  the  cardinal 
virtues  (d.  33),  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Ghost  (d.  34-35),  the 
relation  of  the  virtues  (d.  36),  and  the  law  of  the  Old  and 
New  Covenant  (d.  37-40). 

The  fourth  book  contains  the  theology  of  the  sacraments 
(d.  1-42),  and  eschatology  (d.  43-50). 

The  exposition  runs  on  freely,  without  much  attention  to 
the  Videtur  quod,  the  Videtur  quod  non,  and  the  strictly  syl¬ 
logistic  forms  of  argumentation  found  in  the  works  of  later 
Scholastics.  However,  instead  of  simply  citing  a  series  of 
texts  for  and  against  a  given  point  of  doctrine,  as  Abelard 
had  done  in  his  Sic-et-Non,  Peter  usually  interweaves  with  his 


GOLDEN  AGE  OF  SCHOLASTICISM 


ii 


authorities  his  own  speculations,  though  not  to  the  same  ex¬ 
tent  as  the  authors  who  wrote  about  a  century  later. 

Among  the  Lombard’s  immediate  successors  must  be  men¬ 
tioned  Peter  of  Poitiers  (  +  1205),  who  left  a  Summa  di¬ 
vided  into  five  books :  Alanus  of  Lille,  whose  Apologia  Chris¬ 
tiana,  De  Arte  sen  Articulis  Fidei ,  and  Regulae  Theologicae 
bear  witness  to  his  dialectical  skill  as  well  as  to  his  theological 
learning;  William  of  Auxerre  (-(-1230),  author  of  the 
Summa  Aurea,  in  four  books,  in  which  a  strictly  logical 
method  is  followed;  William  of  Auvergne  (  +  1248),  also 
called  Parisiensis,  whose  treatises  De  Fide ,  De  Trinitate,  De 
Causis ,  Cur  Dens  Homo,  De  Anima,  De  Sacramentis,  form 
the  greatest  achievement  in  Scholasticism  prior  to  the  Sum- 
mae  of  Alexander  Halensis  and  Thomas  Aquinas. 

Side  by  side  with  the  Lombard  and  his  disciples  worked 
the  representatives  of  mysticism,  which  had  found  a  home  in 
the  Abbey  of  St.  Victor  at  Paris.  The  best  known  writers 
of  this  school,  commonly  called  the  Victorines,  are  Hugh 
(-(-1141),  Richard  (  +  1173),  and  Walter  (+c.  1190).  To 
the  “  Credo  ut  intelligam  ”  and  the  “  Intelligo  ut  credam,” 
they  added  a  third  principle,  “  Amo  ut  intelligam.”  They  all 
strongly  emphasized  the  insufficiency  of  reason  for  the  proper 
study  of  things  divine,  but  it  is  especially  in  the  works  of 
Walter  that  opposition  to  speculative  learning  is  carried  to 
great  length.  For  him  dialectics  are  simply  “  the  devil’s  art.” 
In  a  work  commonly  cited  under  the  title  In  Quatuor  Laby- 
rinthos  Franciae  he  denounces  Abelard,  Peter  Lombard, 
Peter  of  Poitiers,  and  Gilbert  de  la  Porree  as  heretics  because 
they  had  treated  with  “  Scholastic  levity  ”  the  mysteries  of 
the  Trinity  and  the  Incarnation.  However,  the  opposition  of 
the  Victorines  to  dialectical  reasoning  had  no  effect  in  check¬ 
ing  the  rapid  development  of  the  Scholastic  method. 

B  —  The  Golden  Age  of  Scholasticism 

A  powerful  impulse  to  the  further  development  of  Scholas¬ 
ticism  was  derived  from  the  contact  of  the  West  with  eastern 
learning  during  the  Crusades.  For  although  the  East  no 


12 


INTRODUCTION 


longer  played  a  part  in  the  development  of  doctrine,  it  was 
nevertheless  the  storehouse  of  earlier  Patristic  lore.  Besides, 
it  was  there  that  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle  had  been  pre¬ 
served  from  utter  oblivion.  The  first  Scholastics  were  fa¬ 
miliar  only  with  the  Categories  and  the  De  Interpretatione  — 
the  Dialeetica  Vetus  —  of  the  Stagirite.  Then  in  the  first 
half  of  the  twelfth  century  the  whole  Organon  —  the  Dia- 
lectica  Nova  —  was  made  available  for  school  purposes  in 
its  translation  by  John  of  Venice.  But  it  was  not  until  a 
century  later  that  all  of  Aristotle’s  works,  Physics,  Meta¬ 
physics,  and  Ethics,  became  known  to  the  Christian  scholars 
of  the  West.  And  yet  it  was  upon  the  knowledge  of  these 
works  that  the  progress  of  Scholasticism  largely  depended. 

Unfortunately,  it  was  an  adulterated  Aristotelian  philoso¬ 
phy  that  was  thus  introduced  into  western  lands.  After  the 
sixth  century,  when  Justinian  banished  the  Athenian  philoso¬ 
phers,  Aristotelianism  had  found  a  home  in  Syria,  and  there, 
in  the  course  of  time,  the  philosophers  of  Islam  corrupted  the 
original  text  to  suit  their  own  religious  views.  Neoplatonic 
pantheism,  the  unity  of  the  active  intellect,  the  denial  of  per¬ 
sonal  immortality,  the  principle  that  what  is  true  in  philoso¬ 
phy  may  be  false  in  theology,  were  some  of  the  many  Ma¬ 
hometan  errors  interwoven  with  the  teaching  of  the  Stagirite. 
And  it  was  this  corrupted  Aristotle  that  was  then  introduced 
into  the  schools  of  Christian  Europe. 

EUnce  it  was  that  the  Church  took  at  first  an  antagonistic 
stand  in  reference  to  Aristotelian  philosophy,  and  more  espe¬ 
cially  to  its  use  in  theological  speculations.  In  1210,  a  pro¬ 
vincial  synod  of  Paris  ruled:  Nec  libri  Aristotelis  de  naturali 
philosophia,  nec  commenta  (Averroes)  legantur  Parisiis  pub- 
lice  vel  secreto,  et  hoc  sub  poena  excommunicationis  inhibe - 
musN  The  prohibition  was  renewed  in  1215  by  the  legate 
Robert:  Non  legantur  libri  Aristotelis  de  Metaphysica  et  de 
naturali  philosophia,  nec  Summae  de  eisdeniN  In  1231, 
Pope  Gregory  IX  modified  this  ruling  by  adding:  Quousque 
examinati  fuerint  et  ab  omni  err  or  urn  suspicione  purgati .16 

14  Chartul.  Univ.  Paris.  I,  70. 

is  Ibid.  I,  79. 


16  Ibid.  I,  138. 


GOLDEN  AGE  OF  SCHOLASTICISM 


13 


With  this  proviso,  the  faculty  of  arts  of  the  University  of 
Paris,  1255,  placed  the  writings  of  Aristotle  on  the  list  of 
books  that  must  be  read  by  the  students.  Finally,  when 
about  this  time  the  Dominican  William  of  Moerbeke,  at  the 
request  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  translated  the  works  of  Aristotle 
anew  from  the  original  text,  all  opposition  on  the  part  of  the 
Church  was  withdrawn.  It  was  then  that  Aristotle  became  to 
the  Scholastics  simply  the  Philosopher. 

The  second  period  of  Scholasticism  is  coincident  with  the 
rise  and  first  spread  of  the  mendicant  orders  whose  teaching 
members  soon  became  its  most  distinguished  representatives. 
There  was  also  a  gradual  shifting  of  the  centers  of  Scholas¬ 
tic  activities.  During  the  first  period  some  of  the  principal 
seats  of  learning  had  been  Tours,  Rheims,  Laon,  Auxerre, 
and  Chartres,  in  France;  Fulda  and  Reichenau  in  Germany; 
Utrecht,  Liege,  Tournai,  and  St.  Laurent,  in  the  Low  Coun¬ 
tries.  In  the  second  period  most  of  these  lost  their  im¬ 
portance,  chiefly  owing  to  the  rapid  growth  of  the  University 
of  Paris.  This  latter  drew  nearly  all  the  most  famous  teach¬ 
ers,  and  consequently  vast  numbers  of  students,  to  its  schools. 
Next  to  Paris,  Oxford,  Cologne,  Naples,  and  Bologna  became 
famous  during  the  golden  age  of  Scholasticism. 

A  word  may  be  said  here  about  the  methods  of  teaching 
that  became  more  or  less  universal  after  the  beginning  of  the 
thirteenth  century.  There  were  two  principal  forms,  lectures 
and  disputations.  The  lecture  usually  consisted  in  a  running 
commentary  on  some  text  which  the  magister  took  as  a  basis 
of  his  instruction.  In  theology  the  first  text  was  the  Bible, 
which  was  studied  from  the  literal  standpoint,  little  or  no 
attention  being  given  to  the  scientific  exegesis  of  the  text. 
Then  came  the  Sentences  of  the  Lombard,  which  were  an¬ 
alyzed,  explained,  and  developed.  This  was  followed  by  a 
thorough  study  and  scientific  exposition  of  the  Sacred  Scrip¬ 
tures.  It  was  usually  after  having  spent  some  years  in  work¬ 
ing  out  and  delivering  this  last  form  of  lectures  that  the 
magister  would  gather  together  the  ripe  fruit  of  his  many 
studies  in  a  Summa ,  or  a  systematic  presentation  of  the  whole 
of  theology. 


14 


INTRODUCTION 


The  disputations  were  of  two  kinds:  the  disputationes  or- 
dinariae,  which  turned  about  the  subject-matter  of  the  lectures, 
and  formed  a  part  of  the  ordinary  curriculum;  and  the  dispu¬ 
tationes  generates  de  quolibet,  which  usually  occurred  twice 
a  year,  at  Easter  and  Christmas.  In  these  latter  the  topics 
discussed  were  exceedingly  varied;  masters,  students,  and  any 
of  the  auditors  being  free  to  propose  questions.  To  the  dif¬ 
ficulties  thus  proposed,  either  the  presiding  master,  or  a  bach¬ 
elor  in  theology  under  his  guidance,  would  then  and  there 
give  a  detailed  solution.  Then,  on  some  subsequent  day, 
the  master  himself  would  give  his  determination  that  is,  sum 
up  and  arrange  in  their  proper  order  the  various  questions 
and  difficulties  dealt  with,  and  at  the  end  give  definite  and 
final  replies.  It  was  chiefly  from  these  determinationes,  or 
closing  exercises  of  the  disputations,  that  the  numerous  quod- 
lib  eta  of  the  Schoolmen  originated.17  This  accounts  for  the 
many  trifling  and  irrelevant  questions  discussed  in  their  pages. 

The  first  great  master  of  the  second  period  of  Scholasticism, 
who  may  in  fact  be  said  to  have  inaugurated  it,  was  Alexander 
of  Hales  (Halensis),  Doctor  Irrefragabilis.  He  was  an 
Englishman,  born  at  Hales  in  Northumbria.  At  first  he 
taught  as  a  secular  priest  at  the  University  of  Paris,  but  in 
1225  he  entered  the  Franciscan  order.  Although  up  to  that 
time  no  religious  had  ever  taught  at  the  University,  he  was 
nevertheless  allowed  to  retain  his'  chair  and  continued  teach¬ 
ing  until  his  death  in  1245.  He  was  as  much  revered  for  his 
piety  as  he  was  respected  on  account  of  his  learning. 

Besides  many  exegetical  writings,  Alexander  composed  a 
Summa  Theologica ,  most  probably  at  the  suggestion  of  Pope 
Innocent  IV.  In  depth  of  thought  and  sublimity  of  ideas  it 


17  The  modus  procedendi  in  the 
theological  schools  of  the  time  is 
thus  outlined  by  Peter  of  Capua, 
who  wrote  in  the  thirteenth  cen¬ 
tury:  “Modus  autem  tractandi 

quaestiones  theologicas  secundum 
Magistrum  talis  est.  Primo  jaci- 
etur  fundamentum  auctoritatum, 
secundo  erigentur  parietes  argu- 


mentorum  et  quaestionum,  tertio 
supponetur  tectum  solutionum  et 
rationum,  ut  quod  in  domo  Dei 
auctoritas  quasi  certum  proponit, 
argumentatio  sive  quaestio  discu- 
tiat,  solutio  sive  ratio  elucidet  et 
clarum  reddat.”  Cfr.  Grabmann, 
Die  Geschichte  der  Scholastischen 
Methode,  II.  532. 


GOLDEN  AGE  OF  SCHOLASTICISM 


15 


may  almost  be  compared  with  the  corresponding  work  of  St. 
Thomas,  but  in  precision  of  reasoning  and  finish  of  expres¬ 
sion  it  falls  short  of  that  masterpiece  of  the  Schools.  It  was 
the  first  real  theological  Summa  ever  written,  and,  in  respect 
of  voluminousness,  also  the  greatest.  Still  largely  Platonic 
in  speculation,  but  at  the  same  time  Aristotelian  in  method, 
it  forms  an  easy  transition  from  the  theology  of  the  twelfth 
to  that  of  the  thirteenth  century.  It  is  the  original  type  of 
what  afterwards  became  known  as  Franciscan  theology. 

Like  the  Sentences  of  the  Lombard,  the  Summa  of  Alex¬ 
ander  is  divided  into  four  parts,  each  of  which  is  subdivided 
into  quaestiones ,  these  into  membra ,  and  the  membra  into 
articuli.  The  first  part  contains  seventy-four  quaestiones , 
treating  of  God,  His  existence,  His  attributes,  and  the  Trinity. 
The  second,  comprising  one  hundred  and  eighty-nine  quaes¬ 
tiones,  investigates  the  subject  of  creation,  of  angels 
and  men,  and  of  sin.  The  third,  in  eighty-three  quaes¬ 
tiones,  has  for  its  subject-matter  the  Incarnation,  the  per¬ 
son  of  Christ,  the  redemption,  and  grace.  The  fourth, 
numbering  one  hundred  and  fourteen  quaestiones,  sets  forth 
the  author’s  teaching  on  the  sacraments.  These  several  divi¬ 
sions  embrace  the  whole  of  theology,  both  dogmatic  and 
moral.  The  treatment,  though  not  quite  as  formal,  is  prac¬ 
tically  the  same  as  that  followed  later  on  by  St.  Thomas,  be¬ 
ing  more  or  less  a  development  of  the  Sic-et-non  method  of 
Abelard.  Usually  the  article  begins  with  a  Videtur  quod 
non,  followed  by  a  number  of  Items .  Then  comes  the  Sed 
contra,  in  its  turn  followed  by  the  Resolutio,  or  Corpus ,  and 
lastly  the  Ad  primum,  Ad  secundum,  etc. 

The  work  of  Alexander  was  continued  by  St.  Bonaventure 
(1221-1274),  who,  though  probably  not  a  pupil  of  the  Doc¬ 
tor  Irrefragabilis,  was  nevertheless  thoroughly  imbued  with 
his  spirit.  Besides  his  large  Commentary  on  the  Sentences 
and  another  one  on  Holy  Scripture,  he  composed  a  compendi¬ 
ous  Summa,  entitled  Breviloquium  Theologicae  Veritatis, 
which  is  considered  the  best  presentation  of  the  theology  of 
those  times.  His  Itinerarium  Mentis  ad  Deum  and  his  many 
mystical  writings  are  also  held  in  great  repute,  while  in  his 


i6 


INTRODUCTION 


Centiloquium  he  has  presented  the  world  with  a  new  and 
original  Sunimct  Sententiarum.  Bonaventure  and  Alexander 
have  been  officially  proclaimed  by  the  Franciscans  as  the  two 
great  doctors  of  their  order. 

Towards  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century  a  powerful 
impulse  was  given  to  the  further  development  of  Franciscan 
theology  by  Robert  Grosseteste  (  +  1253),  chancellor  of  the 
University  of  Oxford  and  later  on  bishop  of  Lincoln.  Though 
not  a  Franciscan  himself,  he  was  a  devoted  friend  and  influ¬ 
ential  protector  of  the  order.  In  his  teaching  and  writings 
he  usually  followed  the  lead  of  Alexander  of  Hales.  The 
best  known  of  his  works  are  his  C  ommentarius  in  Mysticam 
Theologiam  S.  Dionysii  and  his  Dicta  Theologica.  The  lat¬ 
ter  contains  discussions  on  one  hundred  and  forty-seven  dif¬ 
ferent  theological  topics.  He  also  wrote  a  Summa,  but  it  is 
extant  only  in  manuscript. 

Another  light  at  Oxford  was  Richard  Middleton  (Media- 
villa),  an  English  Franciscan  (  +  1300),  who  wrote  an  ex¬ 
cellent  Commentary  on  the  Sentences ,  and  also  a  volume  of 
Quodlibeta.  Of  all  the  Franciscan  theologians,  he  approaches 
most  closely  to  the  method,  viewpoint,  and  perspicuity  of  St. 
Thomas,  although  he  attacked  the  latter  on  several  points  of 
doctrine. 

Closely  allied  with  the  Franciscan  school,  though  not  ex¬ 
actly  a  follower  of  it,  was  Henry  of  Ghent  (Gandavensis), 
at  first  a  secular  priest  and  later  on  a  member  of  the  Servite 
order  (  +  1293).  He  was  a  pupil  of  Albertus  Magnus,  but 
an  independent  genius  and  at ’times  somewhat  erratic.  Freer 
in  method  and  form  than  St.  Thomas,  he  was  almost  his 
equal  in  depth  of  thought  and  wealth  of  ideas.  The  best 
known  of  his  works  is  his  folio  volume  of  Quodlibeta,  but 
his  genius  appears  to  better  advantage  in  his  Summa;  of  this, 
however,  only  the  first  part  is  complete. 

The  Dominican  school  of  theology  properly  begins  with 
Albertus  Magnus  (1193-1280).  He  was,  however,  more  of 
a  philosopher  and  scientist  than  a  theologian,  and  his  chief 
merit  consists  in  having  popularized  the  philosophy  of  Aris¬ 
totle.  In  theological  knowledge,  systematic  treatment,  and 


GOLDEN  AGE  OF  SCHOLASTICISM 


17 


clearness  of  exposition,  he  falls  short  of  Alexander  of  Hales, 
and  is  in  the  same  respects  far  surpassed  by  his  pupil  Thomas 
Aquinas.  He  began  his  dogmatic  writings  between  1240  and 
1250,  with  a  complete  commentary  on  all  the  works  of  the 
Pseudo-Areopagite  and  on  the  Sentences  of  Peter  Lombard. 
In  his  old  age  he  composed  a  Summa,  of  which,  however,  only 
the  first  and  second  parts  were  completed.  In  this  he  supple¬ 
ments  to  some  extent  the  Summa  of  St.  Thomas.  Earlier  in 
life  he  wrote  a  Summa  de  Creaturis,  which  corresponds  to 
the  Summa  contra  Gentiles  of  St.  Thomas.  Besides  these 
works,  he  also  wrote  a  commentary  on  the  four  Gospels  and 
nearly  all  the  Prophets,  and  numerous  homiletic  and  ascetic 
treatises. 

Scholasticism  reached  its  highest  perfection  in  Thomas 
Aquinas,  a  pupil  of  Albertus  Magnus  (1225-1274).  In  ac¬ 
curate  knowledge  of  Scripture  and  tradition,  in  depth  of 
thought,  wealth  of  ideas,  clearness  of  expression,  and  orderli¬ 
ness  of  treatment  he  is  facile  princeps.  He  ranges  over  the 
whole  field  of  philosophy  and  theology,  apologetics  and  exe¬ 
gesis,  and  proves  himself  a  master  in  every  subject  lie  treats. 
His  principle  works  are  the  following: 

i°.  His  Commentum  in  Quatuor  Libros  Sententiarum. 
This  he  wrote  during  his  first  years  of  teaching,  and  on  many 
points  of  doctrine  advanced  in  it  he  later  changed  his  mind. 
Yet  the  clear  explanation  of  the  text  and  the  organically  ar¬ 
ranged  exposition  of  particular  doctrines  already  reveal  the 
mind  of  a  master. 

20.  The  Quaestiones  Disputatae ,  a  collection  of  extensive 
monographs  on  the  more  important  topics  of  theology  and 
philosophy.  There  are  in  all  sixty-three  quaestiones ,  divided 
into  four  hundred  articuli.  In  many  respects  they  constitute 
his  best  work  and  contain  the  key  to  a  right  understanding  of 
his  Summa  Theologica.  They  are  all  gathered  under  the  gen¬ 
eral  titles  De  Potentia,  De  Malo,  De  Spiritualibus  Creaturis, 
De  Virtutibus,  De  Veritate.  In  reference  to  their  contents 
they  might  perhaps  be  better  divided  into  the  treatises  De 
Ente  et  Potentia ,  De  Veritate  et  Cognitions De  Bono  et  Ap- 
petitn,  and  thus  they  would  form  a  complete  system  of  on- 


i8 


INTRODUCTION 


tology,  epistemology,  and  ethics.  The  treatment  is  both 
philosophical  and  theological,  according  to  the  demands  of 
the  subject-matter.  God,  the  Trinity,  creation,  the  Incarna¬ 
tion,  free  will,  grace,  virtues,  and  sin  are  some  of  the  chief 
theological  subjects  discussed. 

3°.  Summa  contra  Gentiles.  This  is  in  contents  mainly  a 
philosophical  work,  written  against  the  errors  of  the  day;  but 
the  topics  treated  have  in  one  way  or  another  a  bearing  upon 
theology,  and  some  of  them  are  strictly  theological.  It  has 
been  said  that  in  no  other  human  work  is  there  such  a  wealth 
of  ideas  compressed  into  so  small  a  compass.  It  is  divided 
into  four  parts.  The  first  two  treat  of  the  essence  and  exist¬ 
ence  of  God  and  of  creatures;  the  third  discusses  the  tendency 
of  creatures  towards  God  and  their  union  with  Him;  the 
fourth  takes  in  theological  subjects  in  one  way  or  another 
connected  with  this  tendency  and  union,  as  the  Trinity,  orig¬ 
inal  sin,  the  Incarnation,  the  sacraments,  and  the  resurrection 
of  the  dead.  In  this  last  part  the  arguments  are  chiefly  drawn 
from  Holy  Scripture.  The  treatment  is  not  dialectic,  as  is 
that  of  the  Summa  Theologica,  but  thetic.  An  excellent  com¬ 
mentary  on  this  monumental  work  was  written  towards  the 
end  of  the  fifteenth  century  by  the  Dominican  Franciscus  of 
Ferrara,  usually  cited  as  Ferrariensis. 

4°.  The  principal  work  of  St.  .Thomas,  at  least  for  theo¬ 
logical  purposes,  is  his  Summa  Theologica .  It  was  com¬ 
posed  towards  the  end  of  his  life,  for  the  purpose,  as  he  states 
in  the  prologue,  of  putting  into  the  hands  of  theological  stu¬ 
dents  a  compendious  presentation  of  the  whole  of  Christian 
theology.  However,  like  most  other  Summae,  it  was  never 
completed,  death  putting  an  end  to  his  labors  whilst  he  was 
engaged  on  the  third  part.  It  ends  abruptly  in  the  middle  of 
the  treatise  on  the  sacrament  of  penance.  This  Summa  is 
divided  into  three  parts.  The  first  part  corresponds  to  our 
treatises  De  Deo  Uno  et  Trino  and  De  Deo  Creante  et  Ele- 
vante ;  the  second,  which  is  subdivided  into  Prima  et  Secunda 
Secundae ,  treats  of  the  tendency  of  rational  creatures  towards 
God,  thus  roughly  corresponding  to  our  treatises  De  Gratia 
and  De  Virtutibus ,  but  it  is  at  once  dogrnatic  and  moral;  the 


GOLDEN  AGE  OF  SCHOLASTICISM 


19 


third  part  has  for  its  subject-matter  the  Incarnation,  the  per¬ 
son  of  Christ,  and  the  means  of  grace,  containing  therefore 
the  same  matter  as  our  treatises  De  Verbo  Incarmto  and  De 
Sacramentis. 

In  treatment  the  Summa  Theologica  is  strictly  dialectic. 
Each  part  is  divided  into  quaestiones,  and  each  quaestio  into 
articuli.  The  articulus  invariably  begins  with  a  statement  of 
the  chief  difficulties  against  the  doctrine  to  be  proved,  em¬ 
bodied  either  in  a  Videtur  quod  non  or  a  Videtur  quod.  Then 
comes  the  argument  for  the  doctrine  under  discussion,  intro¬ 
duced  by  the  phrase  Sed  contra.  This  is  followed  by  the 
corpus,  the  Dicendum  quod ,  or  exposition  of  the  doctrine  in 
question.  Lastly,  the  difficulties  proposed  in  the  beginning 
of  the  articidus  are  answered  in  due  order,  Ad  primum,  Ad 
secundum ,  etc.  As  an  organic  whole,  the  Summa  may  be 
gathered  up  in  this  one  phrase :  Ex  Deo  per  Christum  in 
Deum,  thus  making  God  the  beginning  and  end  of  all  things. 

50.  Besides  these  various  works,  St.  Thomas  began  also  a 
Compendium  Theologiae,  in  which,  following  the  footsteps 
of  St.  Augustine,  he  intended  to  explain  the  contents  of  reve¬ 
lation  in  reference  to  the  three  theological  virtues,  faith,  hope, 
and  charity;  but  only  the  first  part  is  complete.  The  Ex- 
positio  Symboli  Apostolorum  and  the  Expositio  Primae 
Decretalis  (Caput  Firmiter,  IV  Lateranensis)  are  also  valu¬ 
able  productions  of  his  busy  pen.  To  these  must  be  added 
his  Commentarii  in  Sacram  Scripturam,  his  Quaestiones 
Quodlibetales  Duodecim ,  and  some  minor  works. 

While  St.  Thomas  stood  thus  head  and  shoulders  above  his 
contemporaries,  several  of  his  doctrines,  especially  that  of  the 
unity  of  the  substantial  form  in  man,  aroused  violent  opposi¬ 
tion  on  the  part  of  his  confreres  in  the  order  of  St.  Dominic, 
even  as  other  points  of  doctrine  brought  him  into  conflict  with 
the  followers  of  the  Franciscan  school.  Of  his  Dominican 
opponents  the  most  prominent  were  Roland  of  Cremona, 
Richard  Fitzacre,  and  Robert  Kilwardby.  Owing  to  the  in¬ 
fluence  of  the  latter,  who  was  archbishop  of  Canterbury,  the 
University  of  Oxford  carried  its  opposition  to  Thomism  so 
far  as  to  censure  as  dangerous  the  denial  of  the  rationes 


20 


INTRODUCTION 


seminales  and  the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the  substantial 
form  in  man.  This  occurred  in  1277,  three  years  after  the 
saint’s  death;  but  the  following  year  the  general  chapter  of 
the  order  put  a  stop  to  the  opposition  in  its  own  ranks,  by 
decreeing  severe  penalties  against  those  brethren  “  qui  in 
scandalum  ordinis  detraxerunt  scriptis  venerabilis  Patris 
Fratris  Thomse  de  Aquino.” 

But  this  authoritative  coercion  did  not  affect  the  Francis¬ 
cans,  who  made  common  cause  with  the  discontented  Domini¬ 
cans.  Chief  among  them  were  William  de  la  Mare,  author 
of  the  Correptorium  Fratris  Thomae;  Richard  of  Middleton, 
who  was  appointed  to  the  Franciscan  chair  at  Paris  in  1281 ; 
John  Peckham,  who,  after  teaching  at  Paris,  was  chosen  to 
succeed  Kilwardby  in  the  see  of  Canterbury;  and  Peter  John 
Olivi,  who  in  1283  was  condemned  on  account  of  his  unortho¬ 
dox  teaching  on  religious  poverty.18 

This  opposition,  however,  was  as  shortlived  as  it  was  vio¬ 
lent.  The  number  and  influence  of  the  defenders  of  St. 
Thomas  grew  steadily  as  time  went  on.  First  among  these 
were  Ulrich  of  Strasburg,  a  disciple  of  Albertus  Magnus; 
Bernard  of  Hotun,  bishop  of  Dublin;  William  Mackelfield, 
who  taught  at  Oxford;  the  Augustinian  Aegidius  Romanus, 
Doctor  Fundatissimus ;  Peter  of  Auvergne,  and  Godfrey  of 
Fontaines;  all  of  whom  wrote  towards  the  end  of  the  thir¬ 
teenth  or  during  the  first  part  of  the  fourteenth  century. 


18  The  state  of  mind  which  gave 
rise  to  this  opposition  on  the  part 
of  the  Franciscans  appears  from 
the  words  of  Peckham :  “  Quod 

philosophorum  studia  minime  rep- 
robamus,  quatenus  mysteriis  theo- 
logicis  famulantur,  sed  profanas 
vocum  novitates,  quae  contra  philo- 
sophicam  veritatem  sunt  in  Sanc¬ 
torum  injuriam  citra  viginti  annos 
in  altitudines  theologicas  intro- 
ductae,  abjectis  et  vilipensis  Sanc¬ 
torum  assertionibus  evidenter. 
Quae  sit  ergo  solidior  et  sanior 
doctrina,  vel  filiorum  Beati  Fran- 
cisci,  sanctae  scilicet  memoriae  frat¬ 


ris  Alexandri  et  fratris  Bonaven- 
turae  et  consimilium,  qui  in  suis 
tractatibus  ab  omni  calumnia  alieni 
sanctis  et  philosophis  innituntur, 
vel  ilia  novella  quasi  tota  contraria, 
quae  quidquid  docet  Augustinus  de 
regulis  aeternis,  de  luce  incommu- 
tabili,  de  potentia  animae,  de  ra- 
tionibus  seminalibus  inditis  materiae 
et  consimilibus  innumeris,  destruit 
pro  viribus  et  enervat,  pugnas  ver- 
borum  inferens  toti  mundo.”  It 
was  the  opposition  of  the  old 
Platonizing  theology  to  the  new 
Aristotelian  method  and  world-as¬ 
pect. 


GOLDEN  AGE  OF  SCHOLASTICISM  21 

After  that  the  opposition  practically  ceased,  although  outside 
the  Dominican  order  the  different  theological  schools  con¬ 
tinued  to  defend  their  own  views. 

With  St.  Thomas  Scholasticism  reached  the  height  of  its 
development,  and  in  less  than  a  half  a  century  after  his  death 
it  began  to  decline.  At  the  very  beginning  of  this  decline, 
though  still  belonging  to  the  golden  age  of  Scholasticism,  ap¬ 
peared  Duns  Scotus  (1266-1308),  the  Doctor  Subtilis.  He 
was  a  disciple  of  William  Ware,  the  successor  of  de  la  Mare 
both  in  his  chair  of  theology  and  in  his  opposition  to  Thom- 
ism.  That  Scotus  was  an  intellectual  giant,  who  boldly  tackled 
even  the  most  abstruse  problems,  is  universally  conceded;  but 
at  the  same  time  he  is  not  rarely  accused  of  having  used  his 
extraordinary  talents  in  tearing  down  rather  than  in  build¬ 
ing  up.  His  was  an  analytical  mind,  and  as  a  natural  con¬ 
sequence  he  found  much  to  criticize  in  the  works  of  his  prede¬ 
cessors  and  contemporaries.  As  a  general  rule,  however,  his 
criticism  was  objective,  resulting  from  the  keenness  of  his 
intellectual  perceptions  and  not  from  an  innate  tendency  to 
find  fault.  Unlike  the  great  masters  who  preceded  him,  he 
wrote  no  commentary  on  Holy  Scripture,  and  as  a  result  the 
positive  basis  of  his  teaching  is  at  times  lacking  in  broadness 
and  in  depth.  He  was  a  man  of  intense  piety,  and  also  of 
most  sincere  orthodoxy,  although  he  came  occasionally  very 
near  the  danger  line  in  the  logical  trend  of  his  reasoning. 

The  principal  work  of  Scotus  is  his  Commentary  on  the 
Sentences  ( Opus  Oxoniense) ,  written  whilst  he  was  teaching 
at  Oxford.  This  is  completed  by  the  Reportata  Parisiensia , 
in  part  compiled  from  the  notes  taken  down  by  his  pupils  at 
Paris.  He  also  published  a  number  of  Quaestiones  Quod - 
libetales,  and  some  Opuscula,  treating  of  metaphysical  topics. 
His  reasoning  is  always  clear,  but  is  not  as  direct  as  that 
found  in  the  works  of  St.  Thomas.  Besides,  his  profuse 
critical  remarks  make  the  study  of  his  writings  somewhat  of 
a  task.  Owing  perhaps  to  his  critical  attitude,  he  failed  to 
work  out  a  well-connected  theological  system,  although  he 
covered  practically  the  whole  field  of  theology.  He  is  the 
founder  of  the  Neo-Franciscan  or  Scotistic  school  of  the- 


22 


INTRODUCTION 


ology,  which  occupies  an  honorable  position  in  the  theological 
world.  In  substance,  however,  this  school  does  not  differ 
very  much  from  that  founded  by  Alexander  of  Hales  and 
developed  by  St.  Bonaventure. 

C  —  Decline  of  Scholasticism 

After  the  death  of  Scotus,  in  1308,  the  decline  of  Scholas¬ 
ticism  was  very  rapid.  Men  wholly  devoid  of  his  intellectual 
powers,  and  in  many  instances  sadly  lacking  in  orthodox  in¬ 
stincts,  tried  to  imitate  him  in  criticizing  the  theology  of  the 
past,  with  the  inevitable  result  that  they  wasted  their  time  and 
energy  in  the  discussion  of  meaningless  subtleties,  and  thus 
drew  down  the  contempt  of  the  world  upon  Scholasticism  it¬ 
self.  It  was  not  a  question  of  the  times  having  outgrown 
the  system,  as  is  frequently  maintained;  but  of  the  system 
being  too  big  for  the  times.  The  strong  faith,  the  profound 
sense  of  the  supernatural,  and  the  prayerful  intellectuality 
of  the  Middle  Ages  were  on  the  wane,  and  deprived  of  these 
the  fertile  fields  of  Scholasticism  were  doomed  to  be  changed 
into  a  barren  waste.  Empty  sounds  were  made  to  function  as 
ideas,  very  much  as  made-money  is  substituted  for  gold  at 
times  of  national  distress.  An  outward  show  of  learning 
was  maintained,  but  its  substance  had  vanished. 

It  was  in  this  condition  of  intellectual  destitution  and  re¬ 
ligious  atrophy  that  nominalism,  or  terminism,  as  others  pre¬ 
fer  to  call  it,  began  to  flourish  in  the  schools.  This  was  a 
modified  form  of  the  nominalism  of  ancient  Greece,  which 
had  sporadically  cropped  out  in  various  quarters  during  the 
Middle  Ages.  In  the  second  half  of  the  fourteenth  century, 
and  still  more  so  in  the  fifteenth,  it  threatened  to  drive  moder¬ 
ate  realism  entirely  from  the  field.  Its  first  influential  repre¬ 
sentative  was  William  Ockam  (  +  1347),  for  whom  the  way 
had  already  been  prepared  by  Durandus  of  St.  Pourgain 
(  +  1332).  Strictly  speaking  he  was  a  conceptualist  rather 
than  a  nominalist,  in  as  much  as  he  defined  the  universal  as 
“  an  intention  of  the  mind,”  but  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
this  is  a  distinction  without  a  difference.  Like  a  thorough- 


DECLINE  OF  SCHOLASTICISM 


23 


going  nominalist,  he  maintained  that  propositions,  not  things, 
are  the  object  of  all  scientific  knowledge,  and  consequently 
also  of  theology.  Scientia  quaelibet,  sive  sit  realis  sive  ra¬ 
tionale,  est  tantum  de  propositionibus  tanquam  de  Mis  quae 
sciuntur,  quod  solae  propositiones  sciuntur .19  And  again: 
Omne  enim  universale  est  intentio  animae ,  vel  aliquod  signuni 
voluntarie  institutum  tale.  .  .  .  Universale  non  est  aliquid 
extra  animani;  et  certum  est  quod  non  sit  nihil;  ergo  est  ali¬ 
quid  in  anima,  .  .  .  non  objective  tamen,  .  .  .  ergo  subject¬ 
ive  et  per  consequens  est  qualitas  mentis.20 

The  inevitable  result  of  thus  operating  with  merely  sub¬ 
jective  concepts,  and  equivalently  with  empty  sounds,  soon 
showed  itself  in  an  unwarranted  distrust  of  the  mind’s  rea¬ 
soning  powers  in  the  attainment  of  truth.  Such  religious 
truths  as  the  existence,  unity,  and  infinity  of  God,  the  imme¬ 
diate  creation  of  the  universe  by  the  Deity,  the  immortality 
of  the  soul,  and  many  others,  which  the  great  teachers  of  the 
thirteenth  century  had  proved  by  arguments  drawn  from 
natural  principles,  were  held  to  be  undemonstrable  and  there¬ 
fore  entirely  relegated  to  the  sphere  of  faith.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  role  of  dialectics  was  unduly  emphasized,  and  in 
course  of  time  developed  into  mere  logic-chopping.  Along 
with  this,  new  words  and  terms  were  constantly  introduced, 
and  before  long  the  language  of  the  schools  became  a  jumble 
of  outrageous  barbarisms. 

Ockam’s  work  was  continued  by  men  like  Gregory  of 
Rimini,  Robert  Holcot,  John  Buridan,  and  Peter  d’Ailly.  Of 
these  it  was  especially  John  Buridan  who  contributed  power¬ 
fully  to  the  success  of  terminism.  As  rector  of  the  Univer¬ 
sity  of  Paris,  he  wielded  a  wide  influence,  and  during  a  quar¬ 
ter  of  a  century  he  defended  Ockam’s  teaching  with  great 
skill  and  boldness.  After  his  time  Ockamism  spread  very 
rapidly.  Even  Gabriel  Biel  (  +  1495),  a  man  of  great  talent 
and  sometimes  called  “  the  Last  of  the  Scholastics,”  had  noth¬ 
ing  better  to  offer  his  pupils  than  a  Collectorium  ex  Occamo. 
Outside  the  terminist  school  there  were  indeed  a  few  earnest 


19  In  I  Sent.  d.  2,  q.  4,  o. 


20  Quod.  lib.  V,  12,  13. 


24 


INTRODUCTION 


and  learned  men  who  strove  to  preserve  the  glorious  tradi¬ 
tions  of  the  thirteenth  century,  but  they  were  not  of  sufficient 
influence  to  meet  with  permanent  success. 

This  condition  of  things  continued  till  the  Council  of  Trent, 
when  men  like  de  Vittoria,  de  Soto,  Salmeron,  Toletus,  and 
many  others  ushered  in  a  second  spring  of  Scholasticism. 
The  revival  was  very  rapid,  and  by  the  end  of  the  sixteenth 
century  theological  learning  had  reached  a  state  of  perfection 
that  was  almost  unprecedented.  It  was  the  classical  age  of 
Neo-Scholasticism,  followed  by  the  age  of  the  “  Epigones,” 
in  both  of  which  the  great  masters  of  the  thirteen  century 
seemed  to  have  come  back  to  life.  Of  this,  however,  it  will 
be  better  to  give  a  brief  outline  later  on  in  its  own  proper 
place. 

D  —  Sources  of  Arguments 

The  work  of  the  Fathers  consisted  primarily  in  proposing 
the  faith  as  they  found  it  contained  in  Holy  Scripture  and 
tradition,  while  the  efforts  of  the  Scholastics  were  largely  di¬ 
rected  towards  placing  this  faith  on  a  rational  basis.  Hence 
the  writings  of  the  Fathers  are  above  all  else  practical,  whereas 
those  of  the  Scholastics  are  chiefly  speculative.  The  latter  no 
less  than  the  former  accepted  St.  Augustine’s  “  Crede,  ut 
intelligas,”  but  they  placed  a  greater  emphasis  upon  his  “  In- 
tellige,  ut  credas.”  During  this  period,  therefore,  our  study 
of  the  development  of  dogmas  must  to  a  considerable  extent 
be  occupied  with  reviewing  the  arguments  by  which  the  great 
masters  established  the  various  doctrines  of  the  Christian  faith. 

These  arguments  were  drawn  chiefly  from  three  different 
sources :  natural  reason,  tradition,  and  Holy  Scripture.  Those 
drawn  from  natural  reason  were  used  for  a  threefold  purpose  : 
First,  to  prove  the  existence  of  God  and  of  revelation,  or  to 
establish  the  praeambula  fidei,  without  a  clear  apprehension  of 
which  supernatural  faith  would  be  impossible;  secondly,  to 
demonstrate  those  points  of  faith  that  could  be  deduced  from 
natural  principles,  as,  for  instance,  the  immortality  of  the  soul ; 
thirdly,  to  confirm  supernatural  truths  that  had  been  proved  by 
arguments  taken  from  revelation.  In  this  latter  instance  they 


SOURCES  OF  ARGUMENTS 


25 


were  not  advanced  as  conclusive  proofs,  but  simply  as  rationes 
congruentiae,  that  is,  as  arguments  which  were  put  forward  to 
show  a  certain  degree  of  conformity  between  the  revealed 
truths  in  question  and  the  demands  of  right  reason. 

Referring  to  the  first  purpose  which  these  arguments  from 
reason  were  meant  to  subserve,  St.  Thomas  states :  “  It  is 

evident  that  faith  flows  from  two  sources :  First,  from  God, 
by  reason  of  an  interior  enlightenment  upon  which  the  assent 
of  the  intellect  is  made  to  rest;  secondly,  from  the  manner  in 
which  revealed  truths  are  presented  to  the  mind  as  objects  to  be 
believed.  This  presentation  is  related  to  the  knowledge  of 
faith  in  a  manner  similar  to  that  in  which  sense  perceptions 
are  related  to  the  cognition  of  first  principles.”  21  It  is  not, 
strictly  speaking,  the  foundation  of  faith,  but  a  prerequisite 
condition. 

Tradition,  as  a  source  of  theological  arguments,  was  regarded 
by  the  Scholastics  under  a  twofold  aspect:  First,  as  identified 
with  the  vivum  magisterium  Ecclesiae  —  the  teaching  authority 
of  the  Church  herself,  as  exercised  in  each  succeeding  age 
through  her  legitimate  representatives,  that  is,  either  the  Pope 
alone  or  the  bishops  in  union  with  the  Pope.  Taken  in  this 
sense,  tradition  was  universally  held  to  speak  with  an  infall¬ 
ible  voice,  so  that  the  truths  thus  borne  witness  to  could  not 
be  rejected  without  an  error  in  faith.  In  the  second  place, 
tradition  was  not  rarely  understood  as  synonymous  with  the 
teaching  of  the  Saints  or  of  the  Fathers,  either  as  presenting 
the  views  of  individual  Patristic  writers  or  as  embodying  what 
was  more  or  less  commonly  held  by  them  as  a  class.  Thus 
considered,  the  authority  of  tradition  was  again  accepted  as 
final,  provided  it  could  be  shown  that  the  consent  of  the 
Fathers  regarding  a  point  of  faith  or  morals  was  practically 
unanimous.  In  other  cases  it  was  indeed  commonly  regarded 
with  profound  respect,  but  not  as  necessarily  precluding  de¬ 
viation  from  the  view  in  question.  Thus  it  sometimes  hap¬ 
pened  that  the  Scholastics  set  aside  the  opinions  of  individual 
Patristic  writers,  yet  in  so  doing  they  always  proceeded  cau¬ 
tiously  and  with  evident  reluctance. 

21  In  Boeth.  de  Trin.  op.  63,  q.  3,  a.  1  ad  4m. 


26 


INTRODUCTION 


The  third  source  of  theological  arguments,  or  Holy  Scrip¬ 
ture  as  interpreted  by  the  Church,  was  looked  upon  by  the 
Scholastics  as  having  the  very  highest  authority.  And  the 
reason  is  that  the  Sacred  Writings  were  accepted  by  all  of 
them  as  God’s  word,  which  was  held  to  carry  with  it  the  full 
authority  of  His  essential  truthfulness.  “  The  author  of  Holy 
Scripture,”  says  St.  Thomas,  “  is  God,  and  the  human  writer 
acts  merely  as  His  instrument.  For  other  branches  of  learn¬ 
ing  are  the  fruit  of  human  genius,  but  what  is  contained  in 
Holy  Scripture  is  the  result  of  divine  inspiration.”  22  And 
this  teaching  of  the  Angelic  Doctor  agrees  in  substance  with 
the  views  commonly  held  in  the  schools  of  the  Middle  Ages. 
Nearly  all  the  Scholastics  admitted  a  fourfold  sense  in  the 
interpretation  of  Holy  Scripture  —  the  literal,  the  allegorical, 
the  moral,  and  the  anagogical ;  but  it  was  from  the  literal  sense 
only  that  they  drew  their  dogmatic  arguments.23 

The  respective  values  of  the  arguments  derived  from  the 
three  sources  mentioned  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  —  natural 
reason,  tradition,  and  Holy  Scripture  —  are  thus  indicated  by 
St.  Thomas :  “  Sacred  doctrine  is  especially  based  upon  argu¬ 

ments  from  authority,  in  as  much  as  its  principles  are  obtained 
by  revelation :  .  .  .  but  it  has  also  recourse  to  human  reason, 
not,  indeed,  to  prove  faith  (for  thereby  the  merit  of  faith 
would  come  to  an  end),  but  to  make  clear  other  things  that 
are  put  forward  in  this  doctrine.  Since  grace  does  not  destroy 
nature,  but  perfects  it,  natural  reason  should  minister  to  faith 
as  the  natural  bent  of  the  will  ministers  to  charity.  .  .  .  Con¬ 
sequently,  sacred  doctrine  makes  use  also  of  the  authority  of 
philosophers  in  those  questions  in  which  they  were  able  to 
know  the  truth  by  natural  reason.  .  .  .  Nevertheless,  sacred 
doctrine  has  recourse  to  these  authorities  only  as  extrinsic 
and  probable  arguments;  but  appositely  uses  the  authority  of 
the  canonical  Scriptures  as  an  incontrovertible  proof,  and  the 
authority  of  the  Doctors  of  the  Church  as  one  that  may  prop¬ 
erly  be  used,  yet  merely  as  probable.  For  our  faith  rests  upon 

22  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  i,  a.  io;  23  Cfr.  Thomas,  Quodl.  7,  a.  14, 
Quodl.  7,  a,  16;  Proem.  Comment.  15;  Halens.  Sum.  I,  q.  1,  m.  4,  a.  4; 
in  Psalmos.  Albert.  Magn.  In  Sent.  I,  d.  1,  a.  5. 


SOURCES  OF  ARGUMENTS 


27 


the  revelation  made  to  the  Apostles  and  Prophets,  who  wrote 
the  canonical  books,  and  not  on  the  revelations  (if  any  such 
there  are)  made  to  other  Doctors.”  24 

The  need  there  is  of  supernatural  revelation,  in  order  to 
bring  about  the  salvation  of  men,  is  thus  explained  by  the  same 
author :  “  It  was  necessary  for  man’s  salvation  that  there 

should  be  a  knowledge  revealed  by  God,  besides  philosophical 
science  built  up  by  human  reason.  Firstly,  indeed,  because 
man  is  ordained  to  God,  as  to  an  end  that  surpasses  the  grasp 
of  his  reason.  .  .  .  But  the  end  must  first  be  known  by  men 
who  are  to  direct  their  thoughts  and  actions  to  its  attainment. 
Hence  it  was  necessary  for  the  salvation  of  man  that  certain 
truths,  which  exceed  human  reason,  should  be  made  known  to 
him  by  divine  revelation.  Moreover,  even  as  regards  those 
truths  about  God  which  human  reason  could  have  discovered, 
there  was  need  of  their  being  taught  by  the  revelation  of  God ; 
because  otherwise  they  would  be  known  only  by  a  few,  and 
that  after  a  long  time,  and  with  the  admixture  of  many  errors : 
whereas  man’s  whole  salvation,  which  is  in  God,  depends  upon 
the  knowledge  of  these  truths.  Therefore,  in  order  that  the 
salvation  of  men  might  be  brought  about  more  fitly  and  more 
surely,  it  was  necessary  that  they  should  be  taught  certain 
truths  by  divine  revelation.”  25 

24  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  1,  a.  8.  25  Ibid.  I,  q.  1,  a.  1. 


CHAPTER  I 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD:  GOD’S  ESSENCE 

In  tracing  up  the  doctrinal  development  that  took  place 
during  the  Middle  Ages,  it  appears  advisable  to  arrange  the 
various  topics  of  dogmatic  interest  in  the  same  order  that  is 
commonly  observed  in  modern  textbooks  of  theology.  For 
thereby  is  secured  that  continuity  of  thought  with  which  mod¬ 
ern  students  are  most  familiar.  This  requires,  indeed,  some 
rearrangement  of  the  subject-matter  as  treated  by  the  School¬ 
men,  but  only  to  a  limited  extent;  because  most  modern 
authors  retain  the  order  of  treatment  established  by  the  theo¬ 
logians  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Furthermore,  it  is  hardly  neces¬ 
sary  to  remark,  as  the  point  is  sufficiently  obvious,  that  in  the 
study  of  mediaeval  theology  the  writings  of  the  most  rep¬ 
resentative  Scholastics  call  for  special  consideration,  and  that 
the  works  of  less  important  writers  need  be  studied  in  so  far 
only  as  they  contain  points  of  special  interest  to  the  history 
of  dogmas 


A  —  The  Existence  of  God 

In  all  the  great  Summae,  whatever  be  the  date  of  their  com¬ 
position,  one  of  the  first  questions  turns  about  the  existence 
of  God.  The  old  arguments  made  use  of  by  the  Apologists 
of  the  second  century,  and  incidentally  also  by  many  of  the 
later  Fathers,  were  overhauled  and  scientifically  examined. 
The  arguments  from  design,  from  the  different  degrees  of 
perfection,  from  the  contingency  of  all  finite  beings,  and  from 
the  obvious  necessity  of  a  Causa  Prima,  were  all  investigated 
and  retained.  Besides  these,  however,  others  also  were  ex¬ 
cogitated,  as  may  be  seen  by  referring,  for  instance,  to  the 
Summa  of  Alexander  of  Hales.1 


1  Op.  cit.  q.  2,  m.  3. 
29 


30 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


An  entirely  new  argument  to  prove  the  existence  of  God, 
commonly  called  the  ontological  argument,  was  devised  by  St. 
Anselm.  He  derived  it  from  the  idea  of  a  being  than  which 
none  can  be  more  perfect.  This  idea,  he  contended,  is  found 
in  the  mind  of  every  man  who  uses  his  reason,  and  from  its 
very  presence  there  we  may  legitimately  infer  the  objective 
existence  of  such  a  being.  For  if  it  did  not  actually  exist 
outside  of  the  thinking  mind,  we  should  have  a  contradiction 
in  terms.  Because,  on  the  one  hand,  our  idea  represents  the 
being  in  question  as  perfect  in  every  respect,  so  that  nothing 
can  be  added  to  its  perfection;  yet  on  the  other  hand,  if  it 
had  no  existence  outside  of  our  minds,  it  could  obviously  be 
more  perfect.  Hence  the  necessary  inference  seems  to  be 
that  it  has  objective  existence.  And  if  so,  then  God  exists: 
because  a  being  than  which  none  can  be  more  perfect  is  the  in¬ 
finitely  perfect  God.2 

Soon  after  its  appearance  the  argument  was  attacked  by 
Gaunilo,  a  monk  of  Marmoutiers.  As  Anselm  in  formulating 
it  had  alluded  to  the  fool  ( insipiens )  who,  according  to  the 
Psalmist,  “hath  said  in  his  heart:  There  is  no  God,”  Gaun¬ 
ilo  entitled  his  critique,  Liber  pro  Insipiente.  His  refutation 
of  Anselm’s  reasoning  is  divided  into  two  parts.  First  he 
calls  in  question  the  author’s  assumption  that  the  idea  of  a 
most  perfect  being  is  found  in  the  mind  of  every  man  who 
uses  his  reason.  That  is  something  that  can  be  asserted,  but 
nevertheless  lacks  convincing  proof.3  Then  he  points  out  that 
from  the  mere  presence  of  an  idea  in  the  mind  one  is  not  en¬ 
titled  to  infer  the  existence  of  a  corresponding  object.  Thus 
if  one  has  an  idea  of  a  most  beautiful  island,  as  situated  some¬ 
where  in  the  broad  ocean,  is  that  any  reason  why  the  island 
should  really  exist?  And  so  with  the  idea  of  a  being  than 
which  none  can  be  more  perfect.4 

Anselm  replied  to  this  criticism  in  a  Liber  Apologeticus 
contra  Gaunilonem,  in  which  he  first  thanks  his  adversary  for 
his  criticism  and  then  proceeds  to  defend  his  own  position. 

Most  of  the  subsequent  Scholastics  refer  to  Anselm’s  onto- 

2  Proslogium,  c.  2;  cfr.  cc.  1,  3.  3  Op.  cit.  c.  2.  4  Ibid.  c.  6. 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD 


31* 

logical  argument ,  but  there  is  little  agreement  in  their  views 
concerning  its  value.  Alexander  of  Hales 5  and  St.  Bona- 
venture  6  seem  inclined  to  accept  it  as  conclusive,  while  St. 
Thomas  rejects  it  on  the  ground  that  it  implies  an  unwar¬ 
ranted  transition  from  the  ideal  order  of  things  to  the  real.7 
Scotus  makes  it  his  own,  and  endeavors  to  give  it  greater 
strength.8  Some  centuries  later  it  was  brought  out  in  a  dif¬ 
ferent  form  by  Decartes  and  Leibnitz. 

It  was  chiefly  St.  Thomas  who  cast  the  traditional  proofs 
for  the  existence  of  God  in  their  present  form.  And  in 
this,  as  in  many  other  matters  that  have  a  philosophical  bear¬ 
ing,  he  drew  largely  on  Aristotle.  By  way  of  forestalling 
an  obvious  objection,  suggested  by  the  incomprehensibility  of 
the  divine  nature,  he  first  points  out  that  in  order  to  prove 
God’s  existence  we  need  not  have  a  perfect  knowledge  of  His 
essence.  Objectively  the  two  are  indeed  identical,  but  their 
relation  to  the  human  mind  is  not  the  same.  Hence  whilst 
God’s  essence  can  be  known  to  us  here  on  earth  only  im¬ 
perfectly,  the  same  is  not  necessarily  true  of  His  existence. 
For  if  we  cannot  strictly  demonstrate,  by  the  use  of  an 
essential  and  convertible  middle  term,  that  God  exists,  we 
can  at  least  prove  it  by  a  reductio  ad  absurd-urn ,  in  as  much 
as  the  supposition  that  there  is  no  God  necessarily  leads  to  an 
absurd  conclusion.  It  is,  therefore,  a  demonstratio  quia f  not 
propter  quid. 

Having  thus  cleared  the  way,  he  advances  five  proofs  for 
the  existence  of  God,  which  are  calculated  to  satisfy  every 
reasonable  mind.  A  brief  outline  of  them  may  be  indicated 
as  follows. 

The  first  proof  is  taken  from  motion.  It  is  evident  to  our 
senses  that  some  things  are  moved,  that  is,  they  pass  from  a 
state  of  potentiality  to  a  state  of  actuality.  Now  nothing 
can  be  thus  moved,  except  by  something  already  in  the  state 
of  actuality.  Thus  wood,  which  is  potentially  hot,  is  made 
actually  hot  by  its  contact  with  fire,  which  is  actually  hot. 

6  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  3,  m.  3.  7  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  2,  a.  2 ;  Contr. 

6  In  Sent.  I,  d.  3,  q.  2.  Gent.  I,  3,  9. 

8  In  Libr.  I  Sent.  d.  2,  q.  2. 


32 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


And  so  in  every  similar  instance.  This  implies  either  a 
processus  in  infinitum  of  beings  that  move  and  are  moved, 
or  the  existence  of  a  being  that  moves  and  is  not  moved  — 
a  Primum  M ovens  non  mobile.  The  former  supposition  is 
obviously  repugnant  to  reason ;  hence  the  latter  must  be 
admitted.  But  this  First  Mover,  this  Primum  M ovens  non 
mobile ,  every  one  understands  to  be  God. 

The  second  proof  is  drawn  from  the  nature  of  efficient 
causation,  as  observed  in  the  world  around  us.  Every  ef¬ 
ficient  cause  produces  an  effect  different  from  itself.  There 
is  no  cause  that  is  self-productive,  and  the  very  concept  of 
such  a  cause  implies  an  evident  contradiction.  Hence  we 
must  admit  either  an  infinite  series  of  subordinated  causes, 
each  one  of  which  has  been  produced  by  a  preceding  one, 
or  an  unproduced,  self-existing  First  Cause.  The  former 
supposition  is  evidently  absurd.  For  if  in  efficient  causes  it 
is  possible  to  go  on  to  infinity,  there  will  be  no  first  efficient 
cause,  neither  will  there  be  an  ultimate  effect,  nor  any  inter¬ 
mediate  efficient  causes;  all  of  which  is  plainly  false.  There¬ 
fore  it  is  necessary  to  put  forward  a  First  Efficient  Cause, 
unproduced  and  self-existent,  to  which  every  one  gives  the 
name  of  God. 

The  third  proof  follows  from  the  contingency  of  all  mun¬ 
dane  things.  Whatever  there  is  in  the  world  is  of  such  a 
nature  that  it  can  exist  or  not  exist,  as  is  quite  obvious  from 
the  observed  fact  of  generation  and  corruption.  Hence  fol¬ 
lows  the  possibility  that  at  some  time  there  was  nothing  in 
existence.  And  this  being  so,  there  would  be  nothing  in 
existence  now,  except  on  the  supposition  that  beyond  this 
contingent  world  there  is  a  being  the  existence  of  which  is 
necessary.  This  necessity  of  existence,  moreover,  cannot 
come  from  without,  since  that  would  lead  to  an  infinite  series 
of  subordinate  causes.  Therefore  we  cannot  but  postulate 
the  existence  of  some  being  having  of  itself  its  own  necessity, 
and  not  receiving  it  from  another,  but  rather  causing  in  others 
their  necessity.  This  all  men  speak  of  as  God. 

The  fourth  proof  is  based  upon  the  different  degrees  of 
perfection  in  the  various  beings  of  which  this  world  is  made 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD 


33 


up.  Some  are  more  and  some  are  less  good,  true,  noble, 
and  the  like.  But  “  more  ”  and  “  less  ’’  are  predicated  of 
different  things  according  as  they  resemble  and  share  in  the 
perfections  of  an  absolute  standard.  For  what  is  more  com¬ 
plete  in  any  genus  is  the  cause  of  all  in  that  genus.  There¬ 
fore  there  must  also  be  something  which  is  to  all  beings  the 
cause  of  their  being,  goodness,  and  every  other  perfection; 
and  this  we  call  God. 

The  fifth  proof  is  taken  from  the  governance  of  the  world; 
for  we  see  that  things  which  lack  intelligence,  such  as  natural 
bodies,  act  for  some  purpose,  which  fact  is  evident  from  their 
acting  always,  or  nearly  always,  in  the  same  way,  so  as  to 
obtain  the  best  results.  Hence  it  is  plain  that  not  fortuitously, 
but  designedly,  do  they  achieve  their  purpose.  Yet  what¬ 
ever  lacks  intelligence  cannot  achieve  a  purpose  unless  it  be 
directed  by  some  being  endowed  with  intelligence  and  knowl¬ 
edge;  as  the  arrow  is  shot  to  its  mark  by  the  archer.  There¬ 
fore  some  intelligent  being  exists  by  whom  all  natural  things 
are  ordained  towards  a  definite  purpose;  and  this  being  we 
call  God.9 

Duns  Scotus  reproduces  these  various  proofs  with  some 
modifications,  pointing  out  as  a  final  conclusion  that  the  exist¬ 
ence  of  the  world,  both  when  considered  in  itself  as  a  whole 
and  when  viewed  in  the  manifold  relations  of  its  several  parts, 
can  be  satisfactorily  explained  only  by  postulating  the  exist¬ 
ence  of  a  being  that  is  at  once  the  efficient  and  exemplary 
first  cause,  and  also  the  final  cause,  of  all  else.  And  this 
threefold  cause  is  God.10 

The  force  of  these  different  arguments  was  first  called 
in  question  by  Ockam,  and  after  him  by  theologians  of  the 
Nominalist  school  in  general.  Human  reason,  Ockam  con¬ 
tends,  is  impotent  to  prove  either  the  existence  of  God  or 
His  infinite  perfection.11  Both  of  these  truths  must  be  ac¬ 
cepted  from  revelation  as  contained  in  Holy  Scripture  and 
proposed  by  the  Church.12 

9  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  2,  aa.  2,  3.;  11  Quodlib.  VII,  17-21;  II,  1. 

cfr.  Contr.  Gent.  I,  11,  12.  12  Ibid.  Ill,  1,  3. 

10  In  Sent.  I,  d.  2,  10  sqq. 


34 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


In  this  contention  the  Nominalists  placed  themselves  in 
open  opposition  both  to  the  teaching  of  Holy  Scripture  13  and 
to  the  unanimous  consent  of  the  Fathers.14  They,  moreover, 
prepared  the  way  for  the  traditionalism  and  skepticism  of 
later  ages,  which  received  their  final  condemnation  in  the 
Vatican  Council.15 

Leaving  aside  these  vagaries  of  a  decadent  Scholasticism, 
it  may  be  said  that  with  regard  to  the  existence  of  God,  and 
the  source  of  our  knowledge  concerning  it,  all  the  great  teach¬ 
ers  of  the  Scholastic  period  were  in  perfect  agreement  on 
the  following  points : 

i°.  We  can  arrive  at  a  certain  knowledge  of  God’s  exist¬ 
ence  without  any  supernatural  revelation.  As  Albertus 
Magnus  expresses  it,  “  the  fact  that  God  exists  is  not  ex¬ 
clusively  an  article  of  the  faith,  but  is  presupposed  to 
every  article.”  16  True,  God  has  revealed  His  own  existence, 
and  in  so  far  we  know  it  from  a  supernatural  source;  but 
antecedent  to  this  knowledge  of  faith,  we  have  of  it  a  natural 
knowledge,  which  properly  belongs  to  the  praeambula  fidei.11 

2°.  We  acquire  this  natural  knowledge  of  God  indirectly, 
that  is,  from  a  consideration  of  the  world  around  us.  The 
proposition,  “  God  exists,”  is  indeed  self-evident  quoad  se, 
in  as  much  as  God  is  His  own  existence;  but  it  is  not  self- 
evident  quoad  nos ,  since  we  do  not  have  a  perfect  knowledge 
of  God’s  essence.18  Hence  the  existence  of  God  cannot  be 
demonstrated  a  priori,  from  the  very  concept  of  His  being; 
but  it  must  be  proved  a  posteriori,  that  is,  from  the  effects 
of  which  He  alone  can  be  the  cause.19 

3°.  The  immediate  intuition  of  God’s  essence  lies  beyond 
the  unaided  powers  of  all  finite  nature.  Hence  even  the 
writers  of  the  mystic  school  of  theological  thought,  of  which 
the  Victorines  and  St.  Bonaventure  are  the  best  representa¬ 
tives,  are  careful  to  note  that  the  divine  illumination  of  which 

13  Wisdom,  13,  1-9;  Rom.  1,  i&-  17  St.  Thom.  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  2, 

20  cl  2  sd  I 

14  Cfr.  vol.  I,  pp.  70,  71 ;  Ibid.  256  18  St  Thom.  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  2, 

sqq.  a.  2. 

15  Sess.  Ill,  de  Revel,  can.  1.  19  Ibid. 

16  Sum.  Theol.  tr.  3,  q.  17. 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD 


35 


they  frequently  speak  does  not  terminate  at  a  facial  vision 
of  God.  “  That  refulgence  of  light, ”  says  St.  Bonaventure, 
“  by  the  aid  of  which  God  is  seen  face  to  face,  does  not  be¬ 
long  to  nature,  but  is  a  gift  of  divine  condescension  and 
grace.”  20  And  in  another  place,  when  speaking  of  the 
angels,  he  affirms  that  the  intuitive  vision  of  God  is  beyond 
their  natural  powers.  “  And  this,”  he  says,  “  is  evident,  be¬ 
cause  such  a  knowledge  of  God  constitutes  the  first  reward, 
in  the  possession  of  which  the  created  mind  rests  as  in  its 
perfect  beatitude.  But  this  reward  no  one  can  obtain  ex¬ 
cept  by  the  help  of  a  gratuitous  gift  of  God.”  21  Hence, 
when  some  fifty  years  later,  the  Beguines  and  Beghards  as¬ 
serted  that  “  the  soul  has  no  need  of  being  elevated  by  the 
light  of  glory  —  lumine  gloriae  —  in  respect  of  the  vision  and 
blessed  fruition  of  God,”  the  Council  of  Vienne,  through  the 
mouth  of  Clement  V,  condemned  their  teaching  as  hereti- 
cah22 

4°.  The  knowledge  of  God  and  His  existence  is  in  no  true 
sense  innate.  Most  of  the  Scholastics,  as  also  the  Fathers 
before  them,  express  themselves  at  times  as  if  our  knowledge 
of  God  were  inborn.  Thus  St.  Thomas  states:  “  To  know 
in  a  general  and  indefinite  way  that  God  exists  is  implanted 
in  us  by  nature,  in  as  much  as  God  is  man’s  beatitude.”  23 
But  thereby  they  did  not  mean  to  assert  a  real  inborn  knowl¬ 
edge  of  God.  Hence  St.  Thomas,  in  his  commentary  on  the 
De  Trinitate  of  Boethius,  clearly  states:  “Our  knowledge 
of  God  is  said  to  be  inborn  in  as  much  as  through  our  in¬ 
nate  principles  (of  cognition)  we  can  easily  arrive  at  the 
knowledge  of  God’s  existence.”  24  What  is  inborn  is  not  the 
idea  of  God,  but  the  rational  faculty  by  the  right  use  of 
which  we  can  readily  discover  God  in  His  creatures.  And 
St.  Bonaventure  explains:  “If  any  men  of  authority  be 
found  to  say  that  God  can  be  seen  and  beheld  in  the  present 
life,  they  are  not  to  be  understood  as  teaching  that  He  is 
seen  in  His  essence,  but  that  He  is  known  by  some  interior 

20  In  Sent.  II,  d.  3,  p.  2,  a.  2,  q.  2.  23  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  2,  a.  2  ad  1. 

21  Ibid.  24  In  Boeth.  De  Trim  q.  1,  a.  3, 

22  Mansi,  25,  410A.  ad  6. 


3^ 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


effect  produced  by  Him.”  25  Later  Ontologists  appealed  to 
both  of  these  writers  as  fathering  their  peculiar  views,  but 
without  just  cause. 


B  —  God’s  Essence 

The  various  arguments  made  use  of  to  demonstrate  the 
existence  of  God,  as  outlined  in  the  preceding  section,  point 
to  Him  as  the  efficient,  final,  and  exemplary  cause  of  the 
world.  This  necessarily  implies  that  He  contains  in  Himself 
all  the  perfections  found  in  finite  beings,  possible  as  well  as 
actual,  since  in  the  physical  order  of  things  there  can  be 
no  perfection  in  any  given  effect  which  is  not  in  some  way 
precontained  in  its  cause.  Hence  some  Scholastic  theolo¬ 
gians,  among  whom  is  Duns  Scotus,26  infer  from  these  same 
arguments  that  God  is  infinitely  perfect;  whilst  others,  as 
St.  Thomas,27  derive  the  infinite  perfection  of  God  from  the 
established  fact  that  He  is  being  itself.  But  on  the  fact 
that  God  is  infinitely  perfect,  all  are  agreed;  and  this  fact 
immediately  gives  rise  to  two  questions :  First,  what  is  God’s 
essence?  Second,  what  is  the  relation  of  the  divine  perfec¬ 
tions  as  referred  to  one  another  and  to  the  Godhead? 

The  first  question  admits  of  two  different  answers,  ac¬ 
cording  as  we  consider  God’s  essence  as  a  physical  or  a  meta¬ 
physical  entity.  Considered  as  a  physical  entity,  the  essence 
of  every  being,  and  therefore  also  of  God,  is  simply  the  sum 
total  of  perfections  which  constitute  the  being  in  question, 
aside  from  its  accidents  and  relations.  This  is  called  the 
physical  essence,  about  which,  as  referred  to  God,  there  is 
no  difference  of  views  among  theologians.  Considered  as  a 
metaphysical  entity,  the  essence  of  a  being  is  that  particular 
perfection  which  is  expressed  in  its  essential  definition.  It 
is  conceived  as  the  ontological  principle  from  which  all  es¬ 
sential  properties  or  attributes  emanate.  As  applied  to  God, 
and  in  our  human  way  of  considering  the  matter,  it  is  that 

25  In  Sent.  IT,  d.  23,  a.  2,  q.  3. 

26  In  Sent.  I,  d.  2,  n.  20,  25,  30;  cfr.  Quodl.  q.  7,  n.  31. 

27  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  4,  a.  2. 


THE  ESSENCE  OF  GOD 


37 


divine  perfection  which  is  logically  not  derived  from  any 
other,  and  from  which  all  others  are  conceived  to  flow  as 
from  their  primary  source.  Theologians  call  it  the  meta¬ 
physical  essence  of  God.  It  is  with  this  that  we  are  here  con¬ 
cerned. 

Patristic  writers  usually  contented  themselves  with  stating 
that  “  God  is  being  itself  —  not  being  in  the  abstract,  but  in 
its  very  fullness;  nor  being  in  the  passive  sense,  but  as  the 
source  and  fountainhead  of  all  activity.”  28  They  did  not, 
as  a  rule,  enter  into  the  particular  aspects  of  the  question 
of  God’s  being.  Thus  St.  Chrysostom  says:  “That  God 
is  without  beginning  and  unbegotten  and  eternal,  I  know ;  but 
the  manner  of  it  all  I  do  not  know.  For  neither  can  it  be 
shown  by  arguments,  how  He  is  a  substance  which  received 
being  neither  from  itself  nor  from  another.”  29  They  pointed 
out  with  considerable  clearness  that  the  divine  nature  is 
necessarily  unproduced,  that  God  has  the  reason  for  His  be¬ 
ing  within  Himself,  but  beyond  that  they  did  not  venture.30 

Nor  did  the  earliest  Scholastics  go  much  deeper  into  the 
subject,  as  it  is  here  considered.  Thus  St.  Anselm  conceives 
God  as  a  being  than  which  none  can  be  more  perfect;31  and 
after  pointing  out  that  God  does  not  depend  for  His  being 
on  any  cause  outside  of  Himself,  he  states  that  the  divine 
substance  is  through  itself  and  of  itself,  and  that  God’s  es¬ 
sence  is  identical  with  His  existence.32  But  he  does  not  at¬ 
tempt  to  define  what  God’s  essence  is.  Nor  is  St.  Bernard 
much  more  explicit.  He  answers  the  question,  Quid  cst 
Densf  What  is  God f  by  saying:  “Nothing  occurs  to  the 
mind  that  is  more  to  the  point  than  He  Who  Is.  Goodness, 
greatness,  blessedness,  wisdom,  are  all  contained  in  the  one 
word,  He  Is.33  Hugh  of  St.  Victor  merely  repeats  the  state¬ 
ment  of  St.  Augustine  that  God  does  not  produce  Himself ; 34 
and  the  same  is  true  of  Peter  Lombard.35 


28  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  256  sqq. 

29  Horn.  I,  de  Tncompreh.  Dei 
Natura,  n.  3 ;  MG,  48,  704. 

30  Cfr.  August.  De  Trin.  I,  c.  1, 
n.  1;  ML,  42,  820;  Jerome,  In  Eph. 
3,  14 ;  ML,  26,  489. 


31  Proslog.  c.  2. 

32  Monol.  c.  6. 

33  De  Consid.  V,  c.  6,  n.  13. 

34  Sent.  I,  tr.  1,  c.  11. 

35  Sent.  I,  d.  3,  n.  23 ;  d.  5,  n.  1,  2. 


38 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Even  the  later  commentators  of  the  Lombard  do  not  treat 
the  question  with  that  minute  attention  to  details  which  we 
are  accustomed  to  look  for  in  the  works  of  more  recent 
theologians.  They  all  show  that  God  has  the  reason  for  His 
being  within  Himself,  that  He  is  infinitely  perfect,  absolutely 
simple,  immutable,  eternal;  but  they  do  not  determine 
scientifically  which  of  these  perfections  must  be  considered 
as  the  metaphysical  essence  of  God.  This  is,  to  some  ex¬ 
tent,  also  true  of  St.  Thomas,  although  he  leaves  us  in  no 
doubt  concerning  his  own  views  on  the  matter. 

Arguing  from  the  established  fact  that  “  God  is  the  first 
efficient  cause,”  he  concludes  that  “  it  is  impossible  that  in 
God  His  existence  should  differ  from  His  essence.” 36 
Furthermore,  as  God  is  an  actus  purus,  without  all  potential¬ 
ity,  “  it  follows  that  in  Him  essence  does  not  differ  from 
existence.  Therefore  His  essence  is  His  existence.”  Now 
“  God  is  His  own  essence;  if  therefore  He  is  not  His  own 
existence,  He  will  not  be  the  First  Being  —  which  is  absurd. 
Therefore  God  is  His  own  existence,  and  not  merely  His  own 
essence.” 37  Moreover,  “  God’s  existence  includes  in  itself 
life  and  wisdom,”  and  all  other  perfection,  “  because  nothing 
of  the  perfection  of  being  can  be  wanting  to  Him  who  is  the 
Self-subsisting  Being.”  38 

That  he  regards  the  perfection  of  self-subsistence  as  the 
most  radical  of  all,  he  brings  out  more  clearly  when  he  speaks 
of  the  Divine  Names.  Putting  the  question,  “  whether  this 
name,  He  Who  Is,  is  the  most  proper  name  of  God,”  he 
answers  that  it  must  be  so  considered  for  three  reasons.  The 
first  of  these  reasons  is  taken  from  the  signification  of  the 
term.  “  It  does  not  signify  form,  but  simply  existence  it¬ 
self.  Hence  since  the  existence  of  God  is  His  essence  itself, 
which  can  be  said  of  no  other,  it  is  clear  that  among  other 
names  this  one  specially  denominates  God,  for  everything  is 
denominated  by  its  form.”  39  The  second  reason  is  derived 
from  the  universality  of  the  term.  “  By  any  other  name 
some  mode  of  substance  is  determined,  whereas  this  name, 

36  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  3,  a.  4.  38  Ibid,  ad  3. 

37  Ibid.  39  Ibid.  q.  13,  a.  11. 


THE  ESSENCE  OF  GOD 


39 


He  Who  Is,  determines  no  mode  of  being,  but  is  indeterminate 
to  all;  and  therefore  it  names  the  infinite  ocean  of  substance 
itself. 40  The  third  is  drawn  “  from  its  consignification,  for 
it  signifies  present  existence;  and  this  above  all  properly  ap¬ 
plies  to  God,  whose  existence  does  not  know  past  or  future.”  41 

Hence,  although  St.  Thomas,  when  speaking  about  the 
divine  intellect  and  will,  says  that  they  are  God’s  essence,42 
and  elsewhere  makes  the  general  statement  that  whatever  God 
has  He  is,43  it  is  sufficiently  evident  from  the  above  citations 
that  he  regards  self-subsistence,  the  esse  a  se,  as  that  which 
ultimately  distinguishes  God  from  every  other  being  and 
which  must  be  conceived  as  the  ontological  principle  of  all 
other  divine  perfections.  Hence,  according  to  St.  Thomas, 
self-subsistence,  or  aseity,  to  use  the  term  now  commonly  em¬ 
ployed  in  this  connection,  is  the  metaphysical  essence  of  God. 

Duns  Scotus  took  a  different  view.  He  looked  upon  in¬ 
finity  as  the  most  perfect  and  most  simple  notion  we  have 
of  God,  “  because  it  is  neither  an  attribute  nor  a  modifica¬ 
tion  of  him  of  whom  it  is  predicated.”  44  It  is  at  once  essen¬ 
tial,  distinctive,  and  underived.45  No  other  concept  of  the 
Godhead  can  be  compared  to  it  in  this  respect  —  not  even  that 
of  aseity.46  This  infinity  he  calls  fundamental  or  radical,  in 
contradistinction  to  formal  infinity  as  predicated  of  every 
other  divine  attribute ;  “  for  each  of  them  has  its  own  formal 
perfection  derived  from  the  infinity  of  the  essence  as  its  root 
and  foundation.” 47  Hence  this  radical  infinity  —  infinitas 
radicalis  —  is  that  fundamental  attribute  of  the  Godhead  in 
virtue  of  which  God  necessarily  possesses  all  other  perfec¬ 
tions,  and  in  this  sense  it  is  conceived  by  Scotus  and  his  fol¬ 
lowers  as  the  metaphysical  essence  of  God. 

An  entirely  different  view  was  taken  by  Ockam,  Biel,  and 
the  Nominalist  school  generally.  As  they  denied  the  objec¬ 
tive  value  of  universal  concepts,  they  held  that  all  divine 

40  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  13,  a.  11.  45  Miscel.  q.  5,  n.  25. 

41  Ibid.  46  Ibid.  n.  26,  27. 

42  Ibid.  q.  14,  a.  4;  q.  19,  a.  1.  47  In  IV  Sent.  IV,  d.  13,  q.  i,  n. 

43  Ibid.  q.  3,  a.  3.  31 ;  cfr.  Quodl.  q.  5. 

44  In  IV  Sent.  I,  d.  3,  q.  2,  n.  17. 


40 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


names  have  the  same  signification,  and  consequently  that  all 
attributes  of  the  Godhead  equally  designate  the  fullness  of 
divine  being.  Hence  they  made  no  distinction  between  the 
physical  and  metaphysical  essence  of  God.  They  described 
God’s  essence  simply  as  the  cumulus  omnium  perfectionum, 
the  sum  total  of  all  His  perfections.  From  this  sum  total, 
however,  they  excluded,  as  was  evidently  required  by  the 
teaching  of  the  Church,  the  divine  relations  and  hypostases. 

•!/  w  •vt*’ 

'J'  ^ 

Closely  connected  with  the  question  of  God’s  essence,  as 
treated  by  the  Scholastics  of  the  Middle  Ages,  are  the  con¬ 
siderations  of  His  simplicity,  spirituality,  unicity,  and  infinite 
perfection.  A  few  words  concerning  these  will  here  be  in 
place. 

i.  Simplicity.  —  That  there  can  be  no  real  distinction  in 
the  essence  of  the  Godhead,  and  consequently  no  physical 
composition,  was  clearly  taught  by  the  writers  of  the  Patristic 
period.  St.  Gregory  the  Great  neatly  summarized  their  teach¬ 
ing  in  this  one  sentence :  “  Whatever  God  has,  that  He  is ; 

in  Him  it  is  not  one  thing  to  be  and  another  to  have.”  48  This 
view  was  taken  over  by  the  early  Scholastics,  St.  Anselm,49 
Richard  of  St.  Victor,50  Peter  Lombard,51  Alanus  of  Lille,52 
and  also  by  St.  Bernard.53  At  the  same  time,  however,  ow¬ 
ing  to  the  dissentient  teaching  of  Gilbert  of  Porree,  the  matter 
became  the  subject  of  a  theological  discussion,  which  was 
finally  settled  by  an  ecclesiastical  definition. 

Gilbert’s  views  on  the  point  in  question  may  be  thus  sum¬ 
marized.  In  all  things  one  must  distinguish  between  what 
is  common  to  the  class  and  proper  to  the  individual.  Sub¬ 
stance  is  the  highest  genus  of  all  corporeal  and  spiritual  be¬ 
ings.  It  is  taken  in  a  two-fold  sense:  as  that  which  is,  quod 
est  subsistens,  and  as  that  by  reason  of  which  it  is,  quo  est 
subsistens.  The  latter  is  identical  with  nature,  and  this  is 
ultimately  the  substantial  form.54 

48  Moral.  XVI,  c.  43  ;  PL.  75,  1147.  52  Ars  Fidei,  I,  8. 

49  Monol.  c.  16;  Proslog.  c.  22.  53  De  Consid.  V,  c.  7. 

50  De  Trin.  I,  c.  13.  54  Gaufredi  Ep.  ad  Albinura  Card. 

51  Sent.  I,  d.  8,  c.  3. 


THE  ESSENCE  OF  GOD 


4i 


These  two  concepts  of  substances  —  quod  est  subsistens 
and  quo  est  subsistens  —  apply  also  to  God.  The  divine 
nature,  or  deltas ,  is  distinct  from  the  Self-subsisting  Being, 
or  Deus.  Nature  is  the  substantial  form  in  God,  through 
which  God  is  God,  even  as  man  is  man  through  his  humanity. 
Hence  such  forms  of  speech  as  the  Godhead  is  God,  wisdom 
is  God,  goodness  is  God,  and  also  such  as  God  is  wisdom, 
goodness,  truth,  are  theologically  incorrect. 

Gilbert  was  at  the  time  bishop  of  Poitiers,  and  exception 
was  first  taken  to  his  views  when  he  expressed  them  in  one 
of  his  sermons.  His  arch-deacon,  Arnaldus  “  qui  non  ridet 
pointed  out  to  him  that  his  teaching  was  untenable.  When 
that  had  no  effect,  appeal  was  made  to  Pope  Eugene  III, 
who  during  the  Eastertide  of  1146  was  staying  in  Paris.  The 
Pope  submitted  the  matter  to  a  council,  which  he  convened 
at  Paris  during  the  following  year,  and  over  which  he  him¬ 
self  presided.  But  as  Gilbert  denied  that  he  had  ever  taught 
the  errors  laid  to  his  charge,  Abbot  Gottschalk,  a  Premon- 
stratensian,  was  appointed  to  examine  his  writings  and  then 
report  to  the  council  which  was  shortly  to  be  held  at  Rheims.55 

Gottschalk  performed  the  task  assigned  to  him,  but  as  he 
was  unable  to  discuss  the  matter  properly  before  the  as¬ 
sembled  bishops,  that  part  was  entrusted  to  St.  Bernard. 
The  latter  marked  four  errors  as  opposed  to  the  common 
teaching.  They  are:  1.  The  divine  substance  or  nature  is 
not  God.  2.  The  three  persons  are  not  one  God,  one  sub¬ 
stance.  3.  The  persons  are  three  by  reason  of  three  unities 
(unitatibus) ,  and  are  different  on  account  of  three  proper¬ 
ties,  which  are  not  the  same  as  the  persons  themselves;  but 
they  are  three  eternal  differences,  both  in  respect  of  them¬ 
selves  and  of  the  divine  substance.  4.  The  divine  nature  did 
not  become  incarnate,  nor  did  it  assume  the  human  nature.56 

These  points  were  thoroughly  discussed  at  the  Council, 
which  was  held  in  1148.  As  the  cardinals  present  were  in 
favor  of  Gilbert,  it  was  feared  that  the  Pope  would  be  pre¬ 
vailed  upon  to  abstain  from  giving  a  decision  in  the  matter. 

56  Mansi,  21,  712. 


55  Ibid. 


42 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Hence  the  French  prelates  chose  a  committee  of  four,  which 
was  sent  to  the  Pope  with  the  following  confession  of  faith: 
i.  We  believe  that  the  simple  nature  of  the  Godhead  is  God, 
nor  can  it  in  any  Catholic  sense  be  denied  that  the  divinity 
is  God  and  God  the  divinity.  2.  When  we  speak  of  the  three 
persons,  Father  and  Son  and  Holy  Ghost,  we  confess  that 
the  three  persons  themselves  are  one  God,  one  divine  sub¬ 
stance.  3.  We  believe  that  only  God  the  Father  and  the 
Son  and  the  Holy  Ghost  are  eternal  and  that  there  is  no  prop¬ 
erty  in  God  which  is  eternal  and  not  God.  4.  We  believe 
that  the  Godhead  itself,  or  the  divine  substance  or  nature,  has 
become  incarnate,  but  in  the  Son.57 

When  the  Pope  had  read  this  confession  of  faith,  he  an¬ 
swered  the  deputation  that  the  articles  contained  therein  were 
in  conformity  with  the  teaching  of  the  Catholic  Church. 
Then  he  added  that  although  some  of  the  cardinals  were  in 
favor  of  the  person  of  Gilbert,  they  nevertheless  all  rejected 
his  teaching.  Thereupon,  in  a  plenary  session  of  the  Council, 
Gilbert  voluntarily  retracted  his  teaching  as  formulated  in  the 
four  articles,  which  were  then  publicly  condemned  by  the 
Pope.58 

This  is  the  account  given  by  Gaudefredus,  Abbot  of 
Clairveaux,  while  Otto  of  Freising  states  that  the  Pope  con¬ 
tended  himself  with  ruling,  “  ne  aliqua  ratio  in  theologia  inter 
naturam  et  personam  divideret,  neve  Deus  divina  essentia 
diceretur  ex  sensu  ablativi  tantum  sed  etiam  nominativi A59 
Nearly  seventy  years  later  (1215),  the  Fourth  Lateran 
touched  this  same  point  when  it  defined  the  Blessed  Trinity 
as  “  one  absolutely  simple  essence,  substance,  or  nature.”  60 

The  absolute  simplicity  of  God’s  essence  having  thus  been 
defined  by  the  Church,  the  great  theologians  of  the  thirteenth 
century,  Alexander  of  Hales,61  St.  Bonaventure,62  Albertus 
Magnus,63  and  St.  Thomas,64  set  forth  in  detail  how  this 

57  Mansi,  21,  712.  62  In  IV  Sent.  I,  d.  8,  p.  2,  q.  1. 

58Gaufredi,  loc.  cit.  63  Sum.  Theol.  I,  tr.  4,  q.  20,  m. 

59  Gest.  Frid.  I,  52.  1-4. 

60  Mansi,  22,  982  sqq  64  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  2,  a.  3-8. 

61  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  5,  m.  I,  2,  3. 


THE  ESSENCE  OF  GOD 


43 


simplicity  is  to  be  understood.  They  point  out  that  the  very 
concept  of  the  divine  essence  excludes  all  composition,  physi¬ 
cal,  metaphysical,  and  logical.  As  God  is  an  actus  purus ,  rea¬ 
sons  St.  Thomas,  there  is  in  the  Godhead  no  composition  of 
matter  and  form,  of  potency  and  act,  of  essence  and  existence, 
of  nature  and  personality,  of  substance  and  accident,  of 
genus  and  species,  of  general  and  particular;  for  all  these 
kinds  of  composition  presuppose  corresponding  potencies,  and 
every  potency  is  necessarily  excluded  from  the  Esse  Purum. 
Hence  God  is  His  own  essence,  and  whatever  He  has,  that  He 
is.  And  hence  also,  there  can  be  no  strict  definition  of  God.65 

Yet  this  absolute  simplicity  of  God  is  not  such  that  our 
concepts  of  His  perfections,  as  in  some  way  distinct,  are 
without  objective  value.  A  merely  mental  distinction,  dis- 
tinctio  rationis,  does  not  seem  sufficient,  nor  can  the  distinc¬ 
tion  which  we  make  between  them  be  based  solely  on  God’s 
relation  to  the  world  of  creatures.  For  God  is  good,  and 
wise,  and  all-powerful,  independently  of  creation.  Moreover, 
as  St.  Thomas  argues,66  in  Holy  Scripture  God  reveals  these 
different  perfections,  and  surely  He  does  not  reveal  mere 
names.  Hence  that  which  corresponds  to  our  concepts  is 
more  than  a  mere  mental  relation;  it  must  in  some  way  have 
a  foundation  in  God’s  being.  What  is  this  foundation? 

St.  Thomas  reduces  it  to  God’s  absolute  perfection  —  plena 
et  omnimoda  perfectio  —  which  no  single  concept  of  ours  can 
ever  adequately  express.  He  reasons  thus :  “  Those  things 

which  in  creatures  are  diverse,  are  one  in  God  on  account 
of  His  absolute  simplicity.  Thus  therefore  it  must  be  said, 
that  in  God  is  wisdom,  goodness  and  the  like,  each  one  of 
which  is  the  divine  essence  itself,  and  in  this  way  all  are  one 
in  re.  Then  because  each  one  of  them  is  in  God  after  its 
truest  significance,  and  because  the  nature  of  wisdom  is  not 
the  nature  of  goodness,  when  formally  considered  as  such, 
it  follows  that  they  are  diverse,  not  only  as  viewed  by  the 
reasoning  mind,  but  on  the  part  of  the  object  —  ^  parte  rei. 
.  .  .  And  thus  it  is  obvious  that  the  plurality  of  those  names 

66  Quaest.  Disp.  c.  i,  a.  6;  cfr.  c.  7. 


es  Ibid. 


44 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


is  not  derived  from  our  intellect  alone,  when  it  forms  diverse 
concepts'  of  God,  .  .  .  but  also  from  the  being  of  God  Him¬ 
self,  in  so  far,  namely,  as  there  is  something  in  God  corre¬ 
sponding  to  all  these  concepts,  that  is,  His  full  and  absolute 
perfection;  whence  it  comes  about  that  every  one  of  the  names 
signifying  these  concepts  is  truly  and  properly  predicated  of 
God :  not,  however,  in  such  a  way  that  any  diversity  or  multi¬ 
plicity  is,  by  reason  of  these  attributes,  affirmed  in  the  object, 
which  is  God.”  67 

Hence,  according  to  St.  Thomas,  that  which  corresponds  to 
our  different  concepts  of  God’s  perfections  is  more  than  a  pure 
relation;  it  is  something  objective,  something  virtually  distinct 
for  each  particular  concept.  This  virtual  distinction,  how¬ 
ever,  reduces  ultimately  to  God’s  infinite  perfection  and  the 
limitation  of  our  finite  minds. 

Henry  of  Ghent,  a  disciple  of  Albertus  Magnus,  comes 
practically  to  the  same  conclusion,  though  his  method  of  rea¬ 
soning  it  out  is  different.  He  admits,  however,  a  threefold 
plurality  in  God  —  plurality  of  ideas,  plurality  of  attributes, 
and  a  trinity  of  persons.08  This  peculiar  view,  at  least  as  re¬ 
gards  the  divine  intellect  and  will,  was  later  on  defended  by 
Dionysius  the  Carthusian.69 

Duns  Scotus  was  not  satisfied  with  these  explanations.  He 
regarded  them  as  placing  between  the  divine  attributes  a 
merely  mental  distinction,  a  distinctio  rationis  ratio cinantis, 
derived  from  God’s  relation  to  the  created  world.  After 
arguing  against  them  at  great  length,  he  states  his  own  view 
as  follows :  “  I  maintain  that  between  the  essential  perfec¬ 

tions  there  is  not  merely  a  mental  distinction,  that  is,  of  differ¬ 
ent  ways  of  conceiving  the  same  formal  object;  for  such  a 
distinction  there  is  between  the  person  who  has  wisdom  and 
wisdom  itself,  and  obviously  a  greater  distinction  between 
wisdom  and  truth :  nor  is  there  only  a  distinction  of  the  formal 
objects  as  they  are  in  the  intellect,  because,  as  was  shown  be¬ 
fore,  such  a  distinction  is  never  found  in  intuitive  cognition 
unless  it  is  also  in  the  object  intuitively  known.  .  .  .  Hence 

67  In  Sent.  I,  d.  2,  q.  i,  a.  2,  3;  68  Quodl.  5. 

cfr.  De  Poten.  q.  7,  a.  6.  69  jn  Sent.  g  2>  q  2> 


THE  ESSENCE  OF  GOD 


45 


there  is  a  third  distinction,  which  precedes  the  intellect  in 
every  way;  and  it  is  this,  that  wisdom  is  in  the  object  ob¬ 
jectively,  and  goodness  is  in  the  object  objectively.  But 
wisdom  in  the  object  is  formally  not  goodness  in  the  object. 
And  this  statement  is  thus  proved,  because  if  infinite  wisdom 
were  formally  infinite  goodness,  then  wisdom  in  general  would 
also  formally  be  goodness  in  general;  for  infinity  does  not 
destroy  the  formal  nature  of  that  to  which  it  is  added.  .  .  .” 

“  Hence  there  is  a  certain  formal  non-identity  of  wisdom 
and  goodness,  in  so  far  as  their  definitions  would  be  dis¬ 
tinct,  if  they  could  be  defined;  but  a  definition  does  not  in¬ 
dicate  that  alone  which  has  its  origin  from  the  intellect,  but 
also  the  nature  of  the  object  ( quidditatem  rei),  and  hence 
there  is  objectively  no  formal  identity.  I,  therefore,  under¬ 
stand  the  matter  thus :  The  intellect,  combining  the  ideas  of 
the  proposition,  wisdom  is  not  goodness  formally  considered, 
does  not  by  its  own  act  cause  the  truth  of  the  combination, 
but  finds  the  extremes,  on  account  of  whose  combination  its 
judgment  is  true,  in  the  object.  .  .  .  Thus  I  concede  that  by 
way  of  identity  truth  is  goodness  objectively,  but  formally 
truth  is  not  goodness.70 

This  “  third  distinction/’  which  Scotus  holds  to  lie  mid¬ 
way  between  a  real  and  a  purely  mental  distinction,  is  usually 
called  distinctio  formalis,  because  it  is  based  upon  certain  sup¬ 
posed  formalitates  in  the  absolutely  simple  essence  of  God. 
What  these  formalitates  really  are,  neither  Scotus  nor  his  fol¬ 
lowers  have  ever  made  clear.  That  they  are  not  distinct 
realities  is  conceded  by  all,  and  necessarily  so;  for  the  absolute 
simplicity  of  God,  as  taught  by  the  Church,  requires  that  what¬ 
ever  perfection  is  in  the  Godhead  is  God  Himself.  And  yet 
if  they  are  not  distinct  realities,  they  would  seem  to  be 
neither  more  nor  less  than  the  plena  et  omnimoda  perfectio 
of  which  St.  Thomas  speaks.  Hence  it  is  that,  although  the 
distinctio  formalis  of  Scotus  has  never  been  condemned,  nearly 
all  subsequent  theologians  teach  the  virtual  distinction  formu¬ 
lated  by  St.  Thomas  —  a  mental  distinction  which  is  based 


70  In  IV  Sent.  I,  d.  8,  q.  4. 


46 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


upon  God’s  infinite  perfection,  as  containing  via  eminentiae 
all  the  perfection  of  our  distinct  concepts. 

However,  this  virtual  distinction  was  rejected  by  the 
Nominalists  of  the  school  of  Ockam,  as  sinning  by  excess. 
According  to  them,  all  the  names  and  attributes  of  God  are 
synonymous  per  se,  and  offer  no  basis  for  a  distinction  except 
in  their  relation  to  the  world  of  creatures.  Hence  whatever 
distinctions  we  make  between  God’s  essence  and  His  attributes, 
or  between  His  attributes  referred  to  one  another,  can  in  the 
very  nature  of  things  be  only  logical,  a  purely  mental  distinc¬ 
tion  without  a  foundation  in  God’s  being.  This  exaggerated 
view  of  God’s  simplicity  has  not  been  explicitly  condemned 
by  the  Church,  but  it  is  universally  regarded  as  false  and 
dangerous  to  the  faith. 

2.  Spirituality. —  This  term  is  usually  taken  to  imply  three 
distinct  concepts :  immateriality,  superiority  to  matter,  and  in¬ 
tellectuality.  All  three  concepts  are  brought  out  by  the 
Scholastics  in  connection  with  God’s  essence.  Thus  St. 
Anselm  writes:  “No  nobler  essence  is  known  than  that  of 
spirit  or  body;  and  of  these  the  spirit  is  nobler  than  the  body: 
hence  it  is  to  be  held  that  the  divine  essence  is  a  spirit,  and 
not  a  body.”71  The  same  view  is  taken  by  Hugh  of  St. 
Victor,72  St.  Bernard,  Alanus  of  Lille,73  Peter  Lombard,74 
and  all  his  commentators.  The  only  exception,  leaving  aside 
Scotus  Erigena,  were  some  Theologians  of  the  pantheistic 
school  of  Chartres,  especially  Amalry  of  Bene  and  David  of 
Dinant.  Of  these  two  St.  Thomas  relates  that  the  former 
held  God  to  be  “  the  formal  constituent  principle  of  all  things,” 
whilst  the  latter  “  most  absurdly  taught  that  God  was  primary 
matter.” 75  The  spirituality  of  God,  which  was  always 
treated  as  a  matter  of  faith  by  theologians,  was  first  explicitly 
defined  by  the  Vatican  Council,  to  offset  the  vagaries  of 
modern  errors.76 

3.  Unicity. —  The  unity  of  God,  as  opposed  to  plurality, 
was  usually  considered  by  the  early  Scholastics  in  connection 

71  Monol.  c.  27.  74  Sent.  I,  d.  35,  45. 

72  Didascal.  VII,  c.  19.  75  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  3,  a.  8. 

73  Theol.  Reg.  7.  76  Sess.  3,  c.  1. 


THE  ESSENCE  OF  GOD 


47 


with  the  mystery  of  the  Blessed  Trinity.  They  pointed  out, 
as  the  Fathers  had  done  before  them,  that,  although  the  three 
divine  persons  are  really  distinct,  yet  there  is  only  one  God. 
Hence  in  that  connection  they  took  unity  in  the  sense  of 
unicity.  On  this  point  there  never  was  any  difference  of 
opinion ;  nor  could  there  be  among  Catholics,  since  the  unicity 
of  God  had  been  recognized  from  the  beginning  as  a  funda¬ 
mental  dogma  of  the  faith. 

Some,  moreover,  like  St.  Anselm,77  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,78 
and  Peter  Lombard,79  proved  this  doctrine  by  philosophical 
arguments.  Nearly  all  of  them  based  their  reasoning  upon 
the  obvious  necessity  of  one  sole  First  Cause.  The  same 
line  of  reasoning  was  followed  by  St.  Thomas  in  his  Com¬ 
mentary  on  the  Sentences /°  but  in  his  Summa  Theologica  he 
derives  the  unicity  of  God  from  the  attribute  of  infinity.81 
This  latter  method  was  also  adopted  by  Duns  Scotus.82 

4.  Infinity. —  St.  Anselm  puts  forward  the  idea  of  God’s 
infinity  in  his  ontological  argument  for  the  existence  of  God, 
which,  as  was  pointed  out  above,83  is  derived  from  the  con¬ 
cept  of  a  being  than  which  none  can  be  more  perfect.  But 
in  another  place  he  bases  the  infinite  perfection  of  God  upon 
His  sovereign  goodness,  which  necessarily  implies  plenitude 
of  being.84  St.  Thomas  takes  self-subsistence  as  the  basis  of 
his  argument.  He  reasons  in  this  way.  From  a  being  whose 
very  essence  is  self-subsistence  all  potentiality  is  necessarily 
excluded,  hence  it  “  must  contain  within  itself  the  whole  per¬ 
fection  of  being.”  85  A  being  is  called  infinite  because  it  is 
not  finite  —  its  perfection  is  without  limit ;  and  this  is  neces¬ 
sarily  implied  in  self-subsistence.  Consequently,  “  it  is  clear 
that  God  is  infinite  and  perfect.”  86  The  same  conclusion  is 
also  deduced  from  the  notion  of  first  cause;87  for  the  very 
idea  of  first  cause  implies  all  possible  perfections  and  that 
without  any  limitation  in  their  concept.  This  latter  argument 


77  Monol.  cc.  3,  4. 

78  Didascal.  VII,  c.  19;  cfr.  De 
Sacr.  I,  p.  3,  c.  12. 

79  Sent.  I,  d.  2;  II,  d.  1. 

80  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1. 

81  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  II,  a.  3,  4. 


82  In  IV  Sent.  I,  d.  10,  13,  q.  5. 
88  P.  XX. 

84  Monol.  c.  15. 

85  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  7. 

86  Ibid. 

87  Ibid. 


48 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


is  also  used  by  Scotus,88  who  deduces  God's  infinity  directly 
from  the  proofs  advanced  for  His  existence.  That  God  is 
infinite  in  every  line  of  perfection,  and  therefore  infinite  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  term,  is  one  of  the  doctrines  explicitly  de¬ 
fined  by  the  Vatican  Council.89 


88  Quodl.  q.  7,  n.  31. 


89  Sess.  3,  c.  1. 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD 

By  the  attributes  of  God  are  understood  essential  per¬ 
fections  of  the  divine  nature,  which,  in  our  human  way  of 
thinking,  are  conceived  as  emanating  from  God’s  metaphysical 
essence.  Objectively,  essence  and  attributes  are  indeed 
identical  in  the  Godhead,  so  that  it  is  perfectly  true  to  say, 
God  is  wisdom,  God  is  goodness,  God  is  justice;  but,  as  was 
pointed  out  in  the  preceding  chapter,  we  necessarily  place  a 
virtual  distinction  between  them,  and  thus  rightly  consider 
God’s  indivisible  essence  under  many  distinct  aspects.  These 
distinct  aspects,  based  upon  the  plenitude  of  divine  perfections, 
we  call  attributes. 

Bearing  in  mind  God’s  infinitude  and  our  mental  limita¬ 
tions,  it  is  obvious  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case  that  these 
attributes  are  exceedingly  numerous.  All  the  distinct  perfec¬ 
tions  which  we  observe  in  the  created  world,  and  others  which 
might  acquire  existence  in  any  possible  world,  must  necessarily 
be  found  in  the  Godhead.  Not  formally  as  created  perfec¬ 
tions,  but  as  self-subsistent  actuality,  whence  all  created  per¬ 
fections  are  derived. 

This  immediately  gives  rise  to  the  question,  how  are  we  to 
conceive  these  perfections  to  exist  in  the  Godhead?  Our 
concepts  of  them  are  derived  from  the  consideration  of 
creatures;  can  we  predicate  them  of  God  as  thus  derived,  or 
must  they  first  be  rectified  in  accordance  with  the  require¬ 
ments  of  the  divine  nature  ? 

In  answering  this  question,  it  is  customary  to  divide  created 
perfections  into  two  classes.  In  the  first  class  are  gathered 
together  all  such  as  imply  no  imperfection  in  their  concepts, 
and  are  therefore  called  simple  perfections.  In  the  other 
class  all  those  are  placed  whose  concepts  do  imply  certain 

49 


50 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


imperfections,  and  these  are  termed  mixed  perfections.  To 
the  former  belong  such  as  wisdom,  justice,  and  mercy;  to  the 
latter,  rationality,  animality,  and  in  general  all  those  that  are 
in  some  way  connected  with  matter.  Simple  perfections  are 
said  to  be  formally  in  God,  in  as  much  as  they  are  predicated 
of  Him  in  their  own  proper  sense.  Mixed  perfections  are 
attributed  to  God  only  eminent er ,  that  is,  whatever  actuality 
they  possess  is  in  God,  but  in  a  different  and  higher  sense. 
In  either  case,  as  attributed  to  God,  these  perfections  must  be 
conceived  as  infinite. 

A  further  distinction  must  be  made  between  these  perfec¬ 
tions  in  their  relation  to  the  divine  essence.  Some  of  them, 
as  simplicity,  unicity,  spirituality,  and  infinitude,  are  attributes 
only  in  a  wider  sense  of  the  term;  because  they  belong  to 
God’s  essence  as  such  and  cannot  be  conceived  as  emanating 
therefrom.  Others  are  of  a  transcendental  nature,  in  as  much 
as  their  formal  concept  lies  beyond  all  the  categories  of  being. 
They  are  oneness,  truth,  and  goodness.  The  former  class  has 
already  been  considered  in  connection  with  the  divine  es¬ 
sence;  of  the  latter  nothing  further  need  be  said  than  that 
their  existence  has  always  been  a  matter  of  faith. 

Besides  these  there  are  the  divine  attributes  strictly  so 
called,  which  are  conceived  by  us  as  superadded  to  God’s  es¬ 
sence,  or  as  perfections  emanating  from  the  divine  essence 
as  their  ontological  principle.  They  are  usually  divided  into 
negative  and  positive  attributes.  The  former  deny  in  God 
certain  imperfections  contained  in  their  concepts  as  derived 
from  creatures.  Thus  in  regard  to  time  and  place  God  is  said 
to  be  eternal,  immutable,  immense.  They  are  also  called  in¬ 
communicable,  as  they  can  in  no  true  sense  be  communicated 
to  creatures.  The  other  class  comprises  all  simple  perfections, 
which  may  be  referred  either  to  God’s  intellect,  will,  or  power. 
They  are  communicable,  in  as  much  as  they  may  be  imitated 
in  created  beings. 

Of  the  negative  attributes  little  need  be  said  in  the  present 
connection,  since  they  do  not  readily  lend  themselves  to 
doctrinal  development.  God’s  eternity  is  clearly  taught  in  the 
Athanasian  Symbol,  and  was  correctly  defined  by  Boethius  as 


THE  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOO 


51 


“  the  whole  and  simultaneous  possession  of  interminable 
life.”  1  It  is  not  merely  duration  without  beginning  and  with¬ 
out  end,  but  also  without  succession.  It  is  the  everlasting  and 
unchangeable  present,  excluding  from  its  concept  both  past 
and  future.  Hence  the  Scholastics  usually  derived  this  divine 
attribute  from  God’s  immutability.2 

The  immutability  or  unchangeableness  of  God  necessarily 
follows  from  the  fact  that  He  is  an  actus  pums,  pure  actuality, 
and  also  from  the  other  fact  that  He  is  infinitely  perfect. 
St.  Thomas  assigns  both  of  these  reasons,3  while  Scotus  in¬ 
sists  more  upon  the  latter.4  The  early  Scholastics  observed 
a  slightly  different  order  of  deduction.  Thus  St.  Anselm  de¬ 
rives  God’s  immutability  by  way  of  corollary  from  the  attri¬ 
butes  of  simplicity,  eternity,  and  omnipresence;5  whereas 
Hugh  of  St.  Victor  6  and  St.  Bernard  7  deduce  it  directly  from 
the  simplicity  of  the  divine  essence.  Peter  Lombard  bases  his 
arguments  for  its  existence  exclusively  upon  Holy  Scripture 
and  the  writings  of  the  Fathers.8 

God’s  immensity  may  be  viewed  under  a  twofold  aspect: 
First,  absolutely  as  it  is  in  itself ;  and  in  this  sense  it  excludes 
all  spatial  relations.  By  reason  of  His  immensity  God  is 
above  all  space,  as  by  reason  of  His  eternity  He  is  above  all 
time.  Secondly,  immensity  may  be  taken  in  a  relative  sense, 
as  omnipresence ,  in  as  much  as  God  is  intimately  present  to 
all  His  creatures,  and  thus  without  change  and  extension  fills 
all  space.  Under  the  former  aspect  God’s  immensity  was  ad¬ 
mitted  by  all  Scholastics,  while  under  the  latter  it  was  at 
various  times  made  a  matter  of  discussion. 

Thus  Honorius  of  Autun  answered  the  query,  “  where  does 
God  dwell?”  by  saying:  “Although  He  is  everywhere  by 
His  power,  still  by  His  substance  He  is  only  in  the  intellectual 
heaven,”  that  is,  in  the  place  where  He  is  seen  face  to  face 
by  the  blessed.9  A  similar  view  was  held  by  Theodoric  of 


1  De  Cons.  Phil.  V,  6 ;  ML.  63, 
858. 

2  Cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q. 
10,  a.  1 ;  Scot.  Quodl.  q.  6,  n.  13-15; 
De  Rerum  Princ.  q.  22,  n.  5. 

3  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  9,  a.  1,  2. 


4  In  TV  Sent.  I,  d.  8,  q.  5. 

5  Monol.  c.  25. 

6  De  Sacr.  I,  p.  3,  c.  13. 

7  In  Cant.  Serm.  80,  n.  5. 
8Sent.  I,  d.  8,  n.  2. 

9  Elucid.  3. 


52 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Chartres  10  although  he  is  quite  frequently  accused  of  having 
taught  pantheism.  Scotus  accepted  the  traditional  teaching  of 
the  Church,  that  God  is  everywhere  present  by  His  essence, 
but  he  denied  the  force  of  the  argument  commonly  advanced 
to  establish  this  truth.11  The  same  position  was  taken  by  the 
Nominalists.12 

Others,  however,  as  St.  Anselm,13  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,14 
Walter  de  Mortagne,15  Richard  of  St.  Victor,10  and  Peter 
Lombard,17  not  only  admitted  the  doctrine  as  contained  in 
the  teaching  of  the  Church,  but  also  assigned  reasons  for  their 
belief.  The  statement  of  the  Lombard,  quod  Dens  incommu- 
tabiliter  semper  in  se  existens,  praesentialiter,  potentialiter, 
essentialiter  est  in  omni  natura  sive  essentia  sine  sui  definitione, 
et  in  omni  loco  sine  circumscriptione ,  et  in  omni  tempore  sine 
mutabilitate ,  was  more  fully  developed  by  nearly  all  subse¬ 
quent  Scholastics.  St.  Thomas  thus  concludes  his  reasoning 
on  the  subject:  “  Therefore,  God  is  in  all  things  by  His 
power,  in  as  much  as  all  things  are  subject  to  His  power;  He 
is  in  all  things  by  His  presence,  in  as  much  as  all  things  are 
bare  and  open  to  His  eyes ;  He  is  in  all  things  by  His  essence, 
in  as  much  as  He  is  the  cause  of  existence  to  all  things.”  18 
And  again :  “  Indeed,  by  the  very  fact  that  He  gives  exist¬ 

ence  to  everything  in  every  place,  He  fills  every  place.”  19 

Of  the  positive  attributes  we  can  here  consider  only  God’s 
knowledge,  His  omnipotence,  and  the  freedom  of  His  will. 
The  following  is  a  brief  summary  of  the  most  important 
points  on  the  subject  as  treated  by  the  Scholastics. 

i.  Divine  Knowledge. —  As  God  is  self-subsistent  being 
and  the  first  cause  of  creatures,  it  necessarily  follows  that  in¬ 
tellect  and  understanding  must  be  predicated  of  Him  as  es¬ 
sential  attributes.  And  as  He  is  absolutely  simple,  it  also 
follows  that  He  is  His  own  intellect  and  His  own  under¬ 
standing.  On  these  points  there  never  was  any  difference  of 


10  Cfr.  d’Achery,  Spicil.  Ill,  p. 
522. 

11  Report.  I,  d.  37,  q.  1. 

12  Cfr.  Biel,  Collect.  I,  d.  38. 

13  De  Fide  Trin.  c.  4. 

14  Didasc.  VII,  c.  19. 


15  Cfr.  d’Archery,  op.  cit. 

16  De  Trin.  II,  22. 

17  Sent.  I,  d.  37. 

18  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  8,  a.  3. 

19  Ibid.  a.  2. 


THE  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD 


53 


opinion,  either  among  the  Fathers  or  the  Scholastics.  “  That 
which  is  knowledge  in  God,”  says  St.  Augustine,  “  the  same  is 
wisdom,  and  that  which  is  wisdom,  the  same  is  (His)  es¬ 
sence  or  substance.”  20  Peter  Lombard  repeats  this  state¬ 
ment  in  the  terse  sentence :  “  God’s  knowledge,  of  course, 

is  His  essence.”  21 

Assuming  the  fact  of  divine  knowledge  as  sufficiently  ob¬ 
vious,  most  of  the  Scholastics  limited  their  investigation  to 
its  nature  and  object.  How  does  God  know,  and  what  does 
God  know  ? 

In  answer  to  the  first  question  —  how  does  God  know  ?  — 
all  state,  either  explicitly  or  implicitly,  that  divine  cognition 
is  an  absolutely  simple  act,  in  which  intelligible  species,  in¬ 
tellect,  and  essence  are  all  identified.  St.  Thomas  puts  his 
reasoning  in  this  form:  “Since  God  has  nothing  of  poten¬ 
tiality,  but  is  pure  act,  the  intellect  and  its  object  in  Him  are 
altogether  the  same;  .  .  .  nor  does  the  intelligible  species  dif¬ 
fer  from  the  substance  of  the  divine  intellect.”  22  And  “  thus 
it  follows  that  in  God  the  intellect,  and  the  object  understood, 
and  the  intelligible  species,  and  His  understanding  act  are  en¬ 
tirely  one  and  the  same.”  23  In  substance  this  is  the  view  of 
all  Scholastics,  except  that  Scotus  introduces  here  his  dis- 
tinctio  formalist 

Furthermore,  the  one  medium  of  divine  cognition  is  God’s 
essence  itself,  in  the  sense  that  no  object  apart  from  God 
has  a  determining  influence  on  His  intellect.  “  As  existence 
follows  on  form,’  writes  St.  Thomas,  “  so  in  like  manner  to 
understand  follows  on  the  intelligible  idea.  In  God  there  is 
no  form  apart  from  His  existence.  Hence,  as  His  essence 
itself  is  also  His  intelligible  species,  it  necessarily  follows  that 
His  act  of  understanding  itself  must  be  His  essence  and  His 
existence.”  25  Scotus  puts  this  same  teaching  in  a  slightly 

different  form,  when  he  says :  “  Assuming  that  there  is  a 

passive  intellect  in  God,  which  needs  a  form  or  quasi  form 
for  its  operation,  this  form  may  be  said  to  be  His  own  es- 

20  De  Trin.  XV,  c.  13.  23  Ibid.  q.  14,  a.  4. 

21  Sent.  I,  d.  36,  n.  1.  24  Report.  I,  d.  35,  q.  1. 

22  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  14,  a.  2.  25  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  14,  a.  4. 


54 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


sence  as  such,  which  in  its  absolute  perfection  is  the  medium 
of  knowing,  not  only  itself,  but  also  everything  else  that  is 
in  any  way  knowable.”  20 

The  object  of  divine  cognition  —  what  God  knows  —  is  two¬ 
fold:  First,  His  own  being,  or  Himself  as  one  in  nature 
and  three  in  person;  secondly,  things  apart  from  Himself, 
whether  at  some  time  actually  existing  or  merely  possible. 

Regarding  the  first,  God’s  knowledge  of  Himself,  there 
never  was  any  difference  of  opinion.  St.  Thomas  only  formu¬ 
lates  the  common  teaching  on  this  point,  when  he  writes 
that  in  God  “  the  intelligible  idea  itself  is  the  divine  intellect 
itself,  and  thus  He  understands  Himself  by  Himself.”  27 
And  this  understanding  of  Himself  is  comprehensive,  or  as 
infinitely  perfect  as  is  the  divine  essence.  For  “  the  power  of 
God’s  own  knowledge  is  as  great  as  His  actual  existence; 
because  from  the  fact  that  He  is  actuality  separated  from  all 
matter  and  potentiality,  He  is  knowable  in  a  corresponding  de¬ 
gree.  It  is  manifest  that  He  knows  Himself  as  much  as  He 
is  knowable;  and  for  that  reason  He  perfectly  comprehends 
Himself.”  28 

Things  outside  God,  in  the  sense  that  they  are  not  identi¬ 
fied  with  His  being,  are  of  two  kinds:  First,  beings  which 
at  some  time  or  other  have  actual  existence;  secondly,  beings 
which  always  remain  in  the  state  of  mere  possibility.  The 
latter  are  subdivided  into  three  classes:  purely  possibles;  fu- 
turibles  whose  futurition  is  conditioned  by  the  action  of  nec¬ 
essary  causes;  and  futuribles  whose  futurition  depends  on 
the  self-determination  of  free  agents.  Concerning  divine 
cognition  of  these  various  classes  of  beings,  different  views 
were  held  by  different  theologians.  Only  a  brief  outline  of 
the  more  important  of  them  can  here  be  given. 

(a)  Regarding  the  mere  fact  that  God  knows  all  things, 
whether  actual  or  possible,  there  never  was  any  disagree¬ 
ment  among  the  Schoolmen;  but,  as  St.  Thomas  points  out, 
according  to  some  “  God  knows  other  things  (than  Himself) 
only  in  general,  that  is,  only  as  beings.”  29  Against  these  he 

26  Tn  Sent.  I,  d.  35,  q.  1.  28  Ibid.  a.  3. 

27  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  14,  a.  2.  29  Ibid.  a.  6. 


THE  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD 


55 


argues,  that  “  as  God’s  essence  contains  all  the  perfections 
contained  in  the  essence  of  any  other  being,  and  far  more, 
He  can  know  in  Himself  all  of  them  with  proper  knowledge.” 
The  same  position  had  already  been  taken  by  Peter  Lom¬ 
bard,  who  reasons  that  God’s  knowledge  is  necessarily  eter¬ 
nal,  essential,  unchangeable,  extending  itself  not  only  to  the 
things  that  are  or  shall  be,  but  also  to  such  as  are  possible 
indeed  yet  are  never  realized.30  St.  Bonaventure  expresses 
his  view  in  similar  terms ;  for  answering  the  question  whether 
God’s  knowledge  can  be  increased  or  diminished,  he  says: 
“  The  knowledge  of  God  is  unchangeable  as  is  His  essence, 
and  He  always  knows  all  things  by  one  and  the  same  act.31 
The  contrary  view  he  regards  as  heretical. 

(b)  All  are  agreed  that  God’s  knowledge  of  finite  beings, 
in  so  far  as  they  are  considered  in  the  state  of  possibility,  is 
necessarily  included  in  His  comprehensive  knowledge  of  His 
own  essence;  whether,  as  in  the  view  of  St.  Thomas,32  the 
possibles  as  such  are  conceived  to  be  by  supposition  prior  to 
divine  cognition,  or,  as  in  the  opinion  of  Scotus,33  they  are 
held  to  be  formally  constituted  in  the  state  of  possibility  by 
the  act  of  divine  knowledge.  This  cognition  theologians 
usually  call  the  knowledge  of  simple  intelligence,  to  distin¬ 
guish  it  from  the  knowledge  of  vision,  which  has  for  its  ob¬ 
ject  all  finite  beings  in  so  far  as  they  are  at  one  time  or  an¬ 
other  actually  existing. 

(c)  As  no  finite  beings  exist  from  all  eternity,  and  as  God’s 
knowledge  of  them  is  necessarily  eternal,  they  are  in  one 
sense  all  known  to  God  under  the  aspect  of  futurition ;  hence 
the  question  arises,  what  precise  relation  do  future  things 
bear  to  God’s  knowledge?  Is  God’s  knowledge  of  them  the 
cause  of  their  future  existence,  or  is  their  future  existence  the 
cause  of  God’s  knowledge?  Or  is  there  a  third  way  of  con¬ 
ceiving  the  matter  ? 

In  answering  the  first  question,  the  Scholastics  distinguish 
between  God’s  knowledge  taken  in  an  exclusive  sense,  simply 
as  knowledge,  and  God’s  knowledge  conceived  as  directive  of 

30  Sent.  I,  d.  39,  n.  5.  32  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  15,  a.  2. 

31  In  Sent.  I,  d.  39,  1,  4.  33  Report.  I,  d.  35. 


56 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


the  divine  will,  or  as  knowledge  of  approbation.  Taken  in 
the  former  sense,  divine  cognition,  as  all  are  agreed,  is  purely 
speculative,  and  as  such  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  the  cause  of 
anything;  in  the  latter  sense  it  is  practical,  and  may  be  de¬ 
nominated  the  cause  of  things,  but  only  on  account  of  its 
connection  with  the  will.34  It  is  in  this  sense  that  St.  Thomas 
writes :  “  It  is  manifest  that  God  causes  things  by  His  in¬ 

tellect,  since  His  existence  is  His  intelligence;  and  hence  His 
knowledge  must  be  the  cause  of  things,  in  so  far  as  His  will 
is  joined  to  it.  Therefore,  the  knowledge  of  God  as  the 
cause  of  things  is  commonly  called  the  knowledge  of  appro¬ 
bation.”  35 

In  this  connection  the  Scholastics  also  note  that  God’s 
foreknowledge  of  future  events  does  not  interfere  with  the 
free  action  of  secondary  causes.  What  God  foreknows  will 
come  to  pass,  but  as  determined  by  the  finite  causes  that  bring 
it  about.  Thus  God  foreknew  from  all  eternity  the  fall  of 
Peter,  and  His  foreknowledge  of  the  event  was  infallible; 
hence  as  the  object  of  God’s  eternal  prevision  the  fall  was 
inevitable,  yet  Peter  fell  by  freely  consenting  to  a  temptation 
which  he  then  and  there  might  have  resisted.  And  the  ulti¬ 
mate  explanation  is  that  God  foreknows  all  things  as  they 
are  in  themselves  and  in  their  relation  to  their  proximate 
causes  —  the  necessary  as  necessary,  and  the  contingent  as 
contingent.36 

The  second  question,  whether  future  things  are  the  cause 
of  God’s  knowledge,  is  by  all  Scholastics  answered  in  the 
negative.  They  usually  touch  this  point  in  explaining  an 
apparent  difficulty  drawn  from  a  text  of  Origen,  namely: 
“  A  thing  will  not  happen  because  God  knows  it  as  future ; 
but  because  it  is  future,  hence  it  is  that  it  is  known  by  God 
before  it  exists.”  Peter  Lombard 37  and  Alexander  of 
Hales38  call  future  events  a  causa  sine  qua  non  of  divine 
cognition,  in  the  sense  of  mere  concomitance.  The  fact  of 

34Lomb.  Sent.  I,  d.  38,  n.  5;  Hal-  36  Halens.  op.  cit.  q.  23,  m.  6. 

ens.  Sum.  I,  q.  33,  m.  2 ;  Bonavent.  37  Sent.  I,  d.  38,  4. 

In  Sent.  I,  d.  38,  1.  38  Sum.  I,  q.  23,  m.  2. 

35  Sum.  I,  q.  14,  a.  8. 


THE  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD 


57 


its  future  occurrence  is  in  a  manner  the  reason  why  an  event 
is  foreknown,  but  it  does  not  cause  God’s  foreknowledge. 
Practically  the  same  explanation  is  given  by  St.  Bonaven- 
ture.39  St.  Thomas  interprets  Origen  in  this  way :  “  When 

we  say  that  God  foreknows  some  things  because  they  are  in 
the  future,  this  must  be  understood  according  to  the  cause  of 
consequence;  and  not  according  to  the  cause  of  existence. 
If  things  are  in  the  future,  it  follows  that  God  knows  them; 
but  nevertheless  the  futurity  of  things  is  not  the  cause  of 
God’s  knowledge.” 40  Scotus  agrees  with  this  explanation, 
in  as  much  as  he  holds  that  things  apart  from  God  are  ob¬ 
jects  of  divine  cognition  only  terminative .41 

(d)  It  was  stated  above  that  the  sole  medium  of  divine 
cognition  is  God’s  essence;  and  from  what  is  said  in  the  pre¬ 
ceding  paragraph  it  necessarily  follows  that  God’s  essence  is 
also  its  sole  primary  object.  That  essence  is  the  archetype 
of  all  that  is  or  can  be,  and  as  a  species  intelligibilis  it  exhibits 
to  the  divine  intellect  all  that  is  knowable.  In  this  sense  St. 
Thomas  states:  “God  sees  Himself  in  Himself,  because  He 
sees  Himself  by  His  essence;  and  He  sees  other  things  not  in 
themselves,  but  in  Himself ;  in  as  much  as  His  essence  contains 
the  similitude  of  other  things  besides  Himself.”  42  And  the 
same  view  is  expressed  by  Scotus,  when  he  says  that  God  sees 
all  things  mediante  essentia  sua  infinitad 3  This  is,  however, 
not  merely  a  knowledge  of  the  divine  essence  as  imitable 
ad  extra,  but  also  of  the  things  themselves.  St.  Thomas, 
after  giving  a  rather  lengthy  illustration  drawn  from  human 
cognition,  arrives  at  this  conclusion :  “  Wre  must  say  there¬ 

fore  that  God  does  not  only  know  that  things  are  in  Himself ; 
but  by  the  fact  that  they  are  in  Him,  He  knows  them  in  their 
own  nature  and  all  the  more  perfectly,  the  more  perfectly 
each  one  is  in  Him.”  44 

Here,  however,  a  distinction  is  to  be  made  between  God’s 
knowledge  of  necessary  things  and  of  things  that  are  contin¬ 
gent.  Necessary  things  are  infallibly  known  by  Him  either 

39  In  Sent.  I,  d.  38,  1.  42  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  14,  a.  5. 

40  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  14,  a.  8  ad  lm.  43  Loc.  cit. 

41  Report.  I,  d.  36,  q.  1,  n.  5-7.  44  Sum.  Theol.  q.  14,  a.  6,  ad  im. 


58 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


because  they  flow  from  His  essence,  or  because  they  are  deter¬ 
mined  by  a  decree  of  His  will;  and  so  a  knowledge  of  them 
in  their  causes  is  sufficient.  But  the  same  does  not  hold  true 
of  contingent  things.  For  as  St.  Thomas  points  out: 
“  Whoever  knows  a  contingent  effect  in  its  cause  only,  has 
merely  a  conjectural  knowledge  of  it”;  but  divine  knowledge 
is  not  conjectural  —  it  is  infallible.  Hence,  “  God  knows  all 
contingent  things  not  only  in  their  causes,  but  also  as  each 
one  is  actually  in  itself.”  45 

In  this  connection  the  difficult  question  suggests  itself,  how 
does  God  know  these  contingent  things  in  themselves?  St. 
Thomas  answers :  “  Although  contingent  things  become  ac¬ 

tual  successively,  nevertheless  God  knows  contingent  things 
not  successively,  as  they  are  in  themselves,  as  we  do;  but  He 
knows  them  all  at  once ;  because  His  knowledge  is  measured 
by  eternity,  as  is  also  His  existence;  for  eternity  existing  all 
at  once  comprises  all  time.  Hence  all  temporal  things  are 
present  to  God  from  eternity,  not  only  in  such  wise  that  He 
has  the  ideas  of  all  things  before  Him,  as  some  say;  but 
because  His  glance  is  carried  from  eternity  over  all  things, 
as  they  are  in  their  presentiality.  Consequently,  it  is  mani¬ 
fest  that  contingent  things  are  infallibly  known  by  God,  in 
as  much  as  they  are  subject  to  the  divine  sight  in  their  presen¬ 
tiality;  still  they  are  really  future  contingent  things  in  relation 
to  their  own  proximate  causes.”  46 

Substantially  the  same  answer  is  given  by  St.  Bonaventure, 
who  says  that  all  things  are  present  to  God,  not  according  to 
the  truth  of  their  existence,  but  in  reference  to  perfect  cog¬ 
nition;  and  the  reason  of  this  intimate  presentiality  is  that 
God’s  eternity  comprises  in  the  indivisible  now  all  succession 
of  time.47 

However,  this  presentiality  by  itself  does  not  seem  to  solve 
the  difficulty,  since  it  must  always  be  held  that  the  divine  es¬ 
sence  is  the  primary  object  of  cognition.  For  how  can  that 
essence  represent  a  future  event  that  flows  from  a  free  cause? 
In  other  words,  what  is  the  ultimate  reason  of  the  eternal 

45  Ibid.  a.  13.  46  Ibid.  47  In  Sent.  I,  d.  35,  dub.  6. 


THE  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD 


59 


presentiality  of  contingent  events  to  the  divine  intellect?  No 
explicit  answer  is  given  by  any  of  these  writers,  but  they  all 
seem  to  fall  back  upon  some  kind  of  divine  causality  in  refer¬ 
ence  to  the  events  in  question.  Thus  St.  Thomas  says  that 
“  God  knows  all  things  apart  from  Himself  in  so  far  as  He 
is  their  cause”;48  and  St.  Bonaventure  holds  that  the  divine 
will,  fully  known,  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  His  knowledge 
of  all  other  things.49  Similar  statements  are  found  in  the 
works  of  Albertus  Magnus 50  and  Alexander  of  Hales.51 
Of  course,  this  causality  may  be  conceived  as  identical  with 
the  divine  concursus,  necessarily  postulated  for  every  finite 
action ;  but  modern  writers  are  not  agreed  in  their  interpreta¬ 
tion  of  the  old  Scholastic  teaching  on  this  point. 

The  position  of  Scotus  in  this  respect  is  not  altogether 
clear.  He  is  not  satisfied  with  the  explanation  given  by  St. 
Thomas  and  St.  Bonaventure,  but  postulates  for  the  divine 
cognition  of  future  contingent  events  a  decree  of  futurition. 
The  divine  essence,  he  maintains,  represents  all  things,  in  so 
far  as  they  are  future,  in  virtue  of  a  determination  of  the 
divine  will.52  Some  Scotists,  like  Mastrius,53  interpret  this 
decree  of  futurition  to  be  merely  concomitant,  but  others  look 
upon  it  as  antecedent  to  the  action  of  the  finite  cause.  And 
this,  it  seems,  Scotus  really  had  in  mind ;  for  he  says :  “  It 

may  be  assumed  that  the  divine  intellect  represents  simple 
ideas,  the  combination  of  which  is  contingent  in  its  actual  ex¬ 
istence;  or  that  it  represents  a  combination  of  ideas,  which  is 
still  indifferent  with  regard  to  its  actuality :  and  then  the  will, 
selecting  one  part  or  combination  of  ideas  for  actuation  at  a 
given  point  of  time,  makes  the  event  definitely  true.”  54  God 
has  indeed  a  certain  knowledge  of  contingent  events  ante¬ 
cedently  to  His  decree  of  futurition,  but  that  is  only  a  phase 
of  His  knowledge  of  purely  possible  events.  Contingent 
events  are  known  as  future  solely  in  virtue  of  a  determination 

48  Cont.  Gent.  I,  c.  49,  65 ;  Sum.  52  In  Sent.  I,  d.  39,  q.  unic.  n.  23 ; 


Theol.  I,  q.  14,  a.  11. 

49  Op.  cit.  d.  35,  q.  2,  a.  2  ad  4m. 

50  Sum.  I,  tr.  15,  q.  60,  m.  4. 

51  Sum.  I,  q.  23,  m.  3,  a.  4. 


d.  41,  q.  unic.  n.  10;  Report,  d.  40, 
q.  unica. 


53  Disp.  Theol.  I,  d.  3,  q.  3,  a.  8. 

54  In  Sent.  I,  d.  39,  n.  23. 


6o 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


of  the  divine  will,  although  that  determination  does  not  inter¬ 
fere  with  the  free  action  of  the  finite  agent. 

This  looks  very  much  like  the  teaching  of  the  later  Thom- 
ists,  yet  it  is  different  from  it  in  one  very  essential  point. 
Scotus,  as  appears  from  the  whole  trend  of  his  philosophical 
teaching,  was  decidedly  opposed  to  the  praemotio  physica 
which  is  inextricably  bound  up  with  the  decreta  voluntatis  Dei 
of  the  Thomists.  Hence  the  decree  of  futurition,  as  under¬ 
stood  by  Scotus,  would  seem  to  be  limited  to  the  concursus, 
although  his  words  cited  above  imply  more. 

The  Nominalists,  who  in  regard  to  many  other  points  de¬ 
velop  the  views  of  Scotus,  regard  divine  cognition  of  future 
contingent  events  as  an  inscrutable  mystery.  Hence  they  con¬ 
tent  themselves  with  pointing  to  the  infinite  perfection  of 
God’s  intellect,  which  in  some  way  must  be  able  to  know  all 
things,  whether  actual  or  purely  possible.55 

Finally,  it  may  be  added  that  although  the  Scholastics  speak 
of  God’s  knowledge  as  extending  to  all  contingent  future 
events,  they  do  not  explicitly  consider  the  question  of  divine 
cognition  in  reference  to  conditionally  free  actions  of  the 
future.  Consequently,  they  divide  God’s  knowledge  into 
knowledge  of  vision  and  knowledge  of  simple  intelligence, 
without  saying  anything  about  the  scientia  media  which 
played  such  an  important  part  in  later  theological  discussions. 
Still,  they  state  or  imply  all  the  principles  upon  which  that 
knowledge  is  founded. 

2.  The  Divine  Will . —  As  the  divine  intellect  and  cognition, 
so  are  also,  according  to  the  teaching  of  the  Scholastics,  the 
divine  will  and  volition  identified  with  God’s  essence.  Simi¬ 
larly,  as  God’s  essence  is  the  primary  object  of  divine  cogni¬ 
tion,  so  is  that  same  essence  also  the  primary  object  of  divine 
volition.  Lastly,  as  God  knows  things  apart  from  Himself, 
so  does  He  also  will  things  apart  from  Himself.  Still,  His 
knowledge  is  more  extensive  than  His  volition ;  for  while  He 
knows  evil,  He  cannot  will  evil  —  that  is,  in  the  moral  order. 

The  attributes  reducible  to  the  divine  will,  which  here  call 

55  Cfr.  Gregory  of  Rimini,  In  Sent.  I,  d.  39,  q.  2,  a.  2. 


THE  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD 


61 


for  special  consideration,  are  omnipotence  and  freedom.  For 
it  was  chiefly  in  regard  to  these  that  there  was  some  differ¬ 
ence  of  opinion  among  the  early  Schoolmen. 

(a)  Omnipotence. — Like  all  others  of  these  attributes, 
omnipotence  is  predicated  of  God  in  reference  to  His  actions 
ad  extra.  His  own  interior  life  does  not,  properly  speaking, 
come  within  the  sphere  of  His  power.  He  exists  necessarily, 
in  the  sense  that  He  is  self-subsistence;  and  by  His  very  es¬ 
sence  He  is  one  in  nature  and  three  in  person.  Hence  it  is 
only  in  regard  to  things  apart  from  Himself  that  His  power 
can  be  exerted  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term.  And  in  this 
sense  His  power  is  co-extensive  with  His  practical  knowledge; 
so  that  whatever  He  knows  to  be  operable  by  an  infinitely  per¬ 
fect  being,  the  same  He  has  power  to  execute  both  in  the  physi¬ 
cal  and  moral  order  of  things.  Now,  in  the  physical  order 
everything  is  operable  that  does  not  imply  a  contradiction  in 
terms;  and  in  the  moral  order,  everything  that  is  not  opposed 
to  God’s  sanctity.  In  respect  of  all  this,  therefore,  God  is 
called  omnipotent. 

God’s  omnipotence,  as  thus  understood,  was  first  called  in 
question  by  Abelard,  according  to  whom  God  can  do  only 
what  He  at  some  time  or  other  actually  does ;  because  God 
can  do  only  what  it  becomes  Him  to  do,  and  whatever  it 
becomes  Him  to  do  He  does  not  fail  to  do.56  Abelard  was 
strongly  attacked  by  William  of  Saint  Thierry,57  St.  Ber¬ 
nard,58  Robert  Pulleyn,59  and  Hugh  of  St.  Victor.90  His 
error  was  condemned  by  the  Council  of  Sens,  held  in  1140. 
In  his  Second  Apology  he  retracted  his  statements  and  sub¬ 
scribed  to  the  proposition :  “  I  believe  that  God  cannot  do 

anything  that  is  not  in  harmony  with  Himself,  but  that  He 
could  have  done  many  other  things  than  those  which  He  has 
done.” 

Omnipotence,  as  is  obvious,  may  be  viewed  under  a  two¬ 
fold  aspect:  First,  absolutely,  as  it  is  in  itself,  without  refer- 


56  Introd.  ad  Theol.  Ill,  c.  5  \ 
cfr.  Theol.  Christ.  5. 

57  Disp.  adv.  Abelard,  c.  6;  ML. 
180,  266. 


58  Ep.  190,  5. 

59  Sent.  I,  n.  16. 

60  De  Sacr.  I.  p.  2.  c.  22;  Sent.  tr. 
1,  c.  14;  Didasc.  VII,  c.  2. 


6  2 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


ence  to  any  decree  of  the  divine  will;  and  so  viewed  it  is 
called  potentia  absoluta.  Secondly,  relatively,  in  reference 
to  certain  divine  decrees,  by  which  it  is  restricted  in  its  opera¬ 
tion;  and  in  this  sense  it  is  termed  potentia  ordinata  or  or¬ 
dinance.  By  His  potentia  absoluta  God  could  have  decreed 
to  establish  a  different  order  of  things  from  that  which  He 
did  establish;  but  having  once  decreed  to  establish  this  par¬ 
ticular  order,  His  potentia  ordinata  is  limited  in  its  operation 
by  the  scope  of  His  decree. 

This  distinction  is  taken  account  of  by  all  the  early  Scholas¬ 
tics,  but  they  do  not  all  make  the  same  application  of  it  in 
their  reasoning  on  God’s  operations  ad  extra.  Thus  St. 
Thomas  emphasizes  God’s  wisdom  as  a  directive  norm  of  His 
power,61  while  Scotus  admits  no  other  norm  than  the  divine  na¬ 
ture  itself.62  In  the  theological  system  of  St.  Thomas,  as  is 
well  known,  it  is  the  intellect  that  holds  the  primacy  among 
attributes  and  faculties;  whereas  in  the  theology  of  Scotus 
this  primacy  is  assigned  to  the  will.  The  reasoning  of  St. 
Thomas,  that  in  command  and  execution  intellect  and  wisdom 
must  ever  be  regarded  as  a  directive  norm,  Scotus  tries  to 
refute  by  saying:  “The  divine  will,  which  is  the  first  rule 
of  all  that  is  operable  and  of  all  actions,  and  the  action  of  the 
divine  will  whence  the  first  rule  is  derived,  constitute  the 
first  rectitude.  .  .  .  But  whatever  does  not  include  a  con¬ 
tradiction  is  absolutely  not  repugnant  to  the  divine  will,  and 
therefore  whatever  God  does  or  effects  is  by  that  very  fact 
right  and  just.’’  63  Hence  Scotus  places  a  much  greater  em¬ 
phasis  upon  the  potentia  absoluta  than  does  St.  Thomas, 
though  not  to  such  an  extent  as  to  make  God’s  actions  arbi¬ 
trary.  For  they  must  always  be  in  harmony  with  the  sanc¬ 
tity  of  the  divine  nature. 

This  view  of  Scotus  in  reference  to  the  potentia  absoluta 
was  taken  over  by  the  Nominalists  and  carried  to  its  last  ex¬ 
treme.  Not  only  could  the  historical  facts  of  God’s  world- 
plan  have  been  different,  as  all  Scholastics  admitted,  but  the 

61  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  22,  a.  3;  ibid.  62  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  49;  Report.  I,  d. 
q.  19,  a.  4.  10;  Qtiodl.  q.  t6. 

63  Report.  IV,  d.  46,  q.  4. 


THE  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD 


63 


same  must  be  said  of  what  belongs  to  ethics  and  morality. 
Thus  Ockam  writes :  Odium  Dei ,  furari,  adult erari,  .  .  . 
quantum  ad  esse  absolute  in  illis  actibus,  .  .  .  etiam  meritorie 
possent  fieri  a  viatore,  si  caderent  sub  praecepto  divino,  sicut 
nunc  de  facto  eorum  opposita  cadunt  sub  praecepto  divino .G4 
This  teaching  is  only  one  short  step  removed  from  the  blas¬ 
phemous  utterance  of  Calvin,  that  “  God  not  only  foreknew 
the  fall  of  the  first  man  and  the  ruin  of  his  descendants,  but 
ordained  the  same  by  an  act  of  His  sovereign  will.”  65 

(b)  Freedom  of  the  Divine  Will. —  The  common  teaching 
of  the  early  Scholastics  in  reference  to  the  freedom  of  God’s 
will  is  thus  formulated  by  St.  Thomas :  “  The  divine  will 

has  a  necessary  relation  to  the  divine  goodness,  since  that  is 
its  proper  object.  Hence  God  wills  His  own  goodness  nec¬ 
essarily,  even  as  we  will  our  own  happiness  necessarily.”  .  .  . 
But  “  since  the  goodness  of  God  is  perfect  and  can  exist 
without  other  things,  in  as  much  as  no  perfection  can  accrue 
to  Him  from  them,  it  follows  that  His  willing  things  apart 
from  Himself  is  not  absolutely  necessary.  Yet  it  can  be 
necessary  by  supposition ;  for  supposing  that  He  wills  a  thing, 
then  He  is  unable  not  to  will  it,  as  His  will  is  not  mutable.”  66 
Hence  God’s  will  is  not  free  in  reference  to  its  primary  ob¬ 
ject,  which  is  His  own  goodness;  but  it  is  free  in  respect  of 
its  secondary  object,  which  includes  all  creatures  in  so  far  as 
they  are  expressions  of  His  goodness  in  their  being  and  ac¬ 
tions.67  This  freedom,  of  course,  does  not  suppose  passive 
indifference  on  the  part  of  God;  nor  does  it  extend  to  what 
is  morally  evil,  except  by  way  of  permission.68 

Scotus  conceives  the  freedom  of  God’s  will  in  a  somewhat 
different  way.  He  distinguishes  in  God  an  essential  and  a 
contingent  liberty.  The  former  consists  in  the  power  of  self- 
determination  and  of  dominion : 69  the  latter  is  a  volitional 
indifference,  not  in  respect  of  divine  volition  itself,  but  with 
regard  to  its  objects  or  effects.70  In  view  of  this  distinction 

64  In  Sent.  II,  q.  19,  litt.  O.  68  Thomas,  op.  cit.  q.  19,  a.  5,  9 ; 

65  Instit.  Ill,  c.  21,  n.  7.  Bonavent.  op.  cit.  d.  45,  a.  3.  q.  1,  2. 

66  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  19.  a.  3.  69  Report.  I,  d.  10;  Quodl.  q.  16. 

67  Cfr.  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  II,  d.  70  In  Sent.  I,  d.  39,  n.  21,  22. 

25,  p.  2,  q.  1,  2,  3 ;  d.  45,  a.  2,  q.  1. 


64 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


he  holds  that  God  wills  or  loves  freely,  not  only  His  crea¬ 
tures,  but  also  His  own  nature  and  purely  possible  entities. 
With  this  difference,  however,  that  His  love  of  Himself  pro¬ 
ceeds  from  His  essential  liberty  only,  whilst  His  inefficacious 
complacency  in  purely  possible  entities,  and  His  efficacious 
complacency  in  His  creatures  —  past,  present,  and  future  — 
proceed  both  from  His  essential  and  contingent  liberty. 
God’s  essential  liberty  is  perfectly  compatible  with  the  neces¬ 
sity  of  willing  and  loving  Himself,  though  this  necessity  ex¬ 
cludes  the  liberty  of  contingence  or  contradiction.71  In  some 
respects,  this  view  is  a  development  of  the  teaching  of  St. 
Bonaventure  on  the  freedom  of  immutability  as  predicated 
of  the  divine  will.72 

The  will  of  God  in  reference  to  creatures  and  their  actions, 
is  usually  divided  by  the  Scholastics  into  the  will  of  good 
pleasure  or  complacency  and  the  will  of  expression  —  volun¬ 
tas  beneplaciti  et  voluntas  signi.73  The  former  is  the  divine 
will  taken  in  its  proper  sense;  the  latter  is  attributed  to  God 
by  way  of  metaphor  and  comprises  the  various  outward  mani¬ 
festations  of  the  divine  will.  These  manifestations  are  com¬ 
monly  summed  up  as  prohibition,  precept,  counsel,  operation, 
and  permission.  Thus  St.  Thomas,  after  explaining  how 
these  “  five  expressions  of  will  are  rightly  assigned  to  the 
divine  will,”  concludes:  “  Or  it  may  be  said  that  permission 
and  operation  refer  to  present  time,  permission  being  with 
respect  to  evil,  operation  with  regard  to  good.  Whilst  as  to 
future  time,  prohibition  is  in  respect  to  evil,  precept  to  good 
that  is  necessary,  and  counsel  to  good  that  is  of  supereroga¬ 
tion.74 

God’s  will  of  good  pleasure  or  complacency  was  also  dis¬ 
tinguished  by  these  writers  into  antecedent  and  consequent 
—  voluntas  antecedens  et  voluntas  consequens .75  Antecedent 
and  consequent,  in  this  connection,  is  a  denomination  that  is 
taken,  not  from  the  will  itself,  but  from  the  different  condi- 

71  Quodl.  q.  16;  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  I.  q.  19,  a.  it  ;  Albert.  Sum.  I,  tr.  20, 

32,  n.  2,  5.  q.  80. 

72  In  Sent.  I,  d.  8,  p.  1,  a.  2,  q.  1,  2.  74  Sum.  I,  q.  19,  a.  12. 

73Halens.  Sum.  I,  q.  36,  m.  1;  75  Halens.  op.  cit.  I,  q.  36; 

Thomas,  In  Sent.  I,  q.  1,  a.  4;  Sum.  Thomas,  Sum.  I,  q.  19,  a.  6  ad  im. 


THE  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD 


65 


tions  of  the  object  of  divine  volition.  This  distinction  was 
already  frequently  made  use  of  by  Patristic  writers,  in  their 
efforts  to  uphold  and  explain  the  universality  of  God’s  sal- 
vific  will.  Thus  St.  John  Damascene  writes:  “Antece¬ 
dently  God  wills  all  men  to  be  saved;  for,  as  He  is  good,  He 
did  not  create  us  for  punishment,  but  that  we  might  share 
in  His  goodness.  However,  as  He  is  just,  He  wills  that  sin¬ 
ners  be  punished.  The  first  will,  therefore,  is  called  ante¬ 
cedent  and  of  good  pleasure,  and  this  proceeds  from  Him¬ 
self  ;  but  the  second  is  called  consequent  and  permissive,  and 
this  is  conditioned  by  our  own  action.”  76  The  Scholastics 
made  a  similar  application  of  this  distinction  when  treating 
the  question  of  predestination  and  reprobation,  as  will  be  set 
forth  in  another  chapter. 

The  nature  of  God  and  His  attributes,  which  forms  the 
subject-matter  of  this  and  the  preceding  chapter,  is  thus 
defined  by  the  Fourth  Lateran  Council,  held  in  1215:  “We 
firmly  believe  and  sincerely  confess  that  there  is  one  sole  true 
God,  eternal,  immense  and  immutable,  incomprehensible, 
omnipotent  and  ineffable,  .  .  .  one  essence,  substance,  or  na¬ 
ture,  altogether  simple.”  77 

76  De  Fide  Orth.  II,  c.  29;  ML.  94,  970. 

77  Mansi,  22,  982;  DB.  n.  428. 


CHAPTER  III 


PREDESTINATION 

PREDESTINARIAN  CONTROVERSY:  TEACHING  OF  THE 

SCHOLASTICS 

As  predestination  consists  in  a  divine  decree  which  or¬ 
dains  the  direction  of  rational  creatures  to  their  appointed 
end,  theologians  usually  investigate  this  difficult  question  in 
connection  with  their  treatises  on  the  intellect  and  will  of 
God.  It  is  not  the  most  logical  order  that  could  be  adopted, 
for  thus  the  fact  of  creation  and  elevation  must  be  presup¬ 
posed;  but  as  it  will  serve  our  present  purpose  sufficiently 
well,  there  appears  no  need  of  rearranging  what  has  the  sanc¬ 
tion  of  long  usage.  Hence  in  this  chapter  we  shall  give  a 
brief  review  of  both  the  historical  and  theological  aspect  of 
the  chief  points  involved  in  the  question  of  predestination. 

A - PREDESTINARIAN  CONTROVERSY 

Predestination  became  a  matter  of  controversy  as  early  as 
the  fifth  century,  owing  to  certain  statements  of  St.  Augus¬ 
tine  which  were  interpreted  as  implying  that  God  predestined 
some  men  to  eternal  punishment  by  refusing  to  give  them 
sufficient  grace  for  the  working  out  of  their  salvation.1  The 
Semi-Pelagians  of  Southern  Gaul  took  up  these  statements 
and  endeavored  to  show  that  they  were  out  of  harmony  with 
the  accepted  universality  of  God’s  salvific  will.  At  the  same 
time  a  certain  Lucidus,  a  priest  of  the  diocese  of  Riez,  openly 
taught  that  God  predestined  some  men  to  hell  as  He  predes¬ 
tined  others  to  heaven,  and  that  neither  the  one  class  nor  the 
other  could  do  aught  to  shape  their  eternal  destiny.  His 

1  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  379  sqq. 

66 


PREDESTINARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


67 


teaching  was  condemned  by  the  Council  of  Arles,  held  in  473. 
The  teaching  of  St.  Augustine  remained  meanwhile  some¬ 
what  uncertain,  but  his  friend  St.  Prosper  gave  the  following 
interpretation  of  it  in  regard  to  the  reprobate :  “  Of  their 

own  will  they  went  out;  of  their  own  will  they  fell,  and  be¬ 
cause  their  fall  was  foreknown,  they  were  not  predestined 
(to  eternal  life)  ;  they  would  however  be  predestined  if  they 
were  to  return  and  persevere  in  holiness.  Hence  God’s  pre¬ 
destination  is  for  many  the  cause  of  perseverance,  but  for  no 
one  the  cause  of  falling  away.”  2 

The  controversy  was  revived  towards  the  middle  of  the 
ninth  century  by  Gottschalk,  the  son  of  a  Saxon  nobleman. 
While  still  a  child  he  had  been  received  as  an  oblate  in  a  mon¬ 
astery  at  Fulda,  and  when  arrived  at  man’s  estate  he  was  re¬ 
fused  permission  to  return  to  the  life  of  a  secular.  Some¬ 
what  later  he  was  transferred  to  a  monastery  at  Orbais,  in  the 
diocese  of  Soissons.  There,  brooding  over  his  uncongenial 
life,  he  sought  consolation  in  the  study  of  St.  Augustine's 
teaching  on  predestination.  The  result  of  his  studies  is  em¬ 
bodied  in  these  three  propositions:  First,  God  predestines 
some  men  to  eternal  damnation  in  the  same  way  that  He  pre¬ 
destines  others  to  eternal  life.  Second,  God’s  salvific  will 
extends  only  to  those  who  are  saved.  Third,  Christ  did  not 
die  for  all  men,  but  only  for  the  predestined. 

The  first  of  these  three  points,  which  implicitly  contains  the 
other  two,  is  clearly  set  forth  in  his  Chartiila  Professions, 
drawn  up  in  848.3  However,  in  his  Confessio  Prolixior, 
composed  in  the  following  year,  occurs  the  sentence:  “I 
confess  that  Thou  hast  foreknown  all  future  things,  whether 
good  or  evil,  but  that  Thou  hast  predestined  only  what  is 
good.”  4  Hence  he  certainly  did  not  hold  that  God  had  pre¬ 
destined  the  reprobate  to  commit  sin. 

2  Resp.  ad  Cap.  Gall.  12.  constitntionem  omnes  electos  suos 

3  The  profession  reads:  “Ego  incommutabiliter  per  gratuitam  gra- 
Gotteschalcus  credo  et  confiteor  .  .  .  tiam  suam  praedestinavit  ad  vitam 
quod  gemina  est  praedestinatio,  sive  aeternam,  similiter  omnino  omnes 
electorum  ad  requiem,  sive  repro-  reprobos,  qui  in  die  judicii  damna- 
borum  ad  mortem.  Quia  sicut  buntur  propter  ipsorum  mala 
Deus  incommutabilis  ante  mundi  merita,  idem  ipse  incommutabilis 


68 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Protestants  usually  contend  that  Gottschalk’s  view  on 
reprobation  was  solidly  based  upon  the  writings  of  the 
Fathers.  Thus  St.  Fulgentius,  they  point  out,  uses  the  ex¬ 
pression  predestinatio  sive  praeparatio  ad  poenam;  5  and  St. 
Isidore  of  Seville  speaks  of  a  twofold  predestination,  that  is, 
a  predestination  of  the  elect  to  eternal  life  and  of  the  repro¬ 
bate  to  everlasting  death.6  Again,  St.  Augustine,  they  con¬ 
tend,  suggests  quite  definitely  that  Christ  died  only  for  the 
elect.7  However,  aside  from  a  certain  similarity  of  the  terms 
employed,  the  contention  has  no  value.  Thus  St.  Augustine 
states  very  clearly:  Pro  omnibus  passus  est  Christas ,  for  all 
men  did  Christ  suffer.8 

In  itself,  of  course,  the  twofold  predestination  —  gemina 
praedcstinatio  — •  may  be  understood  in  an  orthodox  sense,  in 
as  much  as  God  not  only  predestines  the  elect  to  eternal  life, 
but  also  predestines  the  reprobate  to  everlasting  death  by  wray 
of  punishment  for  their  sins.  It  is  not  here  that  the  diffi¬ 
culty  lies.  For  so  long  as  He  gives  sufficient  grace  to  all,  and 
only  decrees  eternal  punishment  for  those  who  culpably  fail 
to  cooperate  with  the  grace  that  is  given  them,  there  is  noth¬ 
ing  arbitrary  or  unjust  in  His  action.  Predestination  of  the 
reprobate  to  the  torments  of  hell  becomes  unintelligible  only 
when  it  is  taken  independently  of  their  evil  deeds;  or,  as 
modern  theologians  express  it,  wffien  it  is  held  to  be  ante 
praevisa  demerita.  And  this  appears  to  have  been  the  view 
of  Gottschalk.  For  he  says  that  God  predestines  the  repro¬ 
bate  in  precisely  the  same  wray  as  the  elect  —  similiter  om- 
nino  — ;  and  the  elect,  according  to  him,  are  predestined  ante 
praevisa  merit  a. 

At  all  events,  this  w?as  the  interpretation  put  upon  his  teach¬ 
ing  by  Hincmar,  archbishop  of  Rheims,  under  whose  presi¬ 
dency  the  Council  of  Ouiercy,  held  in  853,  condemned  the 
views  advanced  and  defended  by  Gottschalk.  And  the  same 

Dens  per  justum  indicium  smim  in-  5  De  Verit.  Praedest.  3,  5,  8; 

commutabiliter  praedestinavit  ad  ML.  65.  656. 

mortem  merito  sempiternam  ”  (ML.  6  Sent.  2,  6,  1 ;  ML.  83,  606. 

125,  89  sqq.).  7  In  Ps.  64,  2. 

4  Ibid.  12 1,  349  D.  8  Serm.  304,  3. 


PREDESTINARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


69 


position  was  taken  by  Rabanus  Maurus  of  Mayence,9  Amala- 
rius  of  Metz,10  and  Scotus  Erigena.11  Gottschalk  himself 
was  sentenced  to  lifelong  imprisonment  in  the  monastery  of 
Hautvilliers,  where  after  twenty  years  of  futile  efforts  to  re¬ 
gain  his  liberty  he  died  apparently  unrepentant. 

Hincmar’s  views  on  the  subject  of  predestination,  which 
were  adopted  by  the  Council  of  Quiercy,12  involve  the  follow¬ 
ing  points:  Through  the  sin  of  Adam  the  whole  human  race 
was  lost,  yet  God  desired  all  to  be  saved.  Hence  (a),  in  ac¬ 
cordance  with  His  foreknowledge,  He  chose  from  this  mass 
of  perdition  —  mass  a  pcrditionis  —  those  whom  through  His 
grace  He  predestined  to  life;  while  He  foreknew  that  the 
rest,  whom  by  the  judgment  of  His  justice  He  left  in  the  same 
mass  of  perdition,  would  perish  forever.  Yet  He  did  not 
predestine  them  to  perish;  but  because  of  His  justice  He  de¬ 
creed  for  them  eternal  punishment,  (b)  The  freedom  of 
the  will  in  regard  to  supernatural  actions,  which  had  been  lost 
through  sin,  was  restored  by  Christ;  consequently,  assisted 
by  grace,  we  all  have  the  power  to  do  good,  but  when  deserted 
by  grace,  we  are  capable  only  of  doing  evil,  (c)  God  has 
the  sincere  will  to  save  all  men.  (d)  Christ  died  for  all 
without  exception.13 

Meanwhile  many  other  bishops  and  theologians  had  been 
drawn  into  the  discussion,  and  not  a  few  of  them  defended 
Gottschalk’s  thesis  on  the  twofold  predestination.  The  most 
eminent  among  these  latter  were  Ratramnus  of  Corbie,14 
Servatus  Lupus  of  Ferrieres,15  Prudentius  of  Troyes,16 
Remigius  of  Lyons,17  and  Magister  Florus.18  It  must  be 
noted,  however,  that  the  point  at  issue  had  been  considerably 
modified  as  compared  with  the  statement  of  Gottschalk  that 
God  predestined  the  elect  and  the  reprobate  in  precisely  the 
same  way.  The  discussion  now  turned  about  the  propriety 
of  terms  rather  than  about  the  doctrine  itself.  For  both 
parties  admitted  that  God  decreed  eternal  punishment  for  the 


9  ML.  1 12,  1530  sqq. 

10  ML.  121,  1054. 

11  ML.  122,  347  sqq. 

12  Mansi,  14,  920  D  sqq. 

13  Mansi,  14,  920  D  sqq. 


14  ML.  121,  13  sqq. 

15  Ibid.  1 19,  606  sqq. 

16  Ibid.  115,  971  sqq. 

17  Ibid.  I2T,  985  sqq. 

18  Ibid.  1 19,  95  sqq. 


70 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


reprobate  only  in  view  of  their  evil  deeds;  but  while  Ratram- 
nus  and  his  side  affirmed  that  this  decree  must  be  called  pre¬ 
destination,  Hincmar  and  his  followers  contended  that  the 
term  as  used  in  this  connection  was  inappropriate.  Hence, 
while  the  one  side  defended  the  gemina  praedestinatio,  the 
other  rejected  it  as  inadmissible.19  The  former  appealed, 
among  others,  to  the  authority  of  St.  Augustine.20 

In  855,  the  party  opposed  to  Hincmar  held  a  synod  at 
Valence,  and  severely  criticized  the  decisions  given  at  Quiercy. 
These  decisions  are  said  to  be  inept,  useless,  harmful,  and 
opposed  to  the  truth.  Emphasis  is  placed  upon  the  fact  that 
God  foreknows  the  future  actions  of  men,  that  He  foresees 
how  the  good  will  cooperate  with  His  grace  and  be  saved, 
and  how  the  wicked  will  follow  their  own  evil  counsels  and 
be  lost.21  But  by  this  divine  foreknowledge,  it  is  pointed  out, 
the  free  will  of  man  is  in  no  wise  interfered  with.  Hence, 
if  the  wicked  are  lost,  it  is  not  because  they  were  unable  to 
lead  virtuous  lives,  but  because  they  freely  persevered  in  evil- 
doing.22 

With  regard  to  the  redemption  by  Christ,  the  Synod  es- 


19  Retramnus  sets  forth  his  views 

in  the  following  terms :  “  Sicut 

enim  novit  (Deus)  opera  singu- 
lorum,  id  est,  electorum  et  repro- 
borum,  sic  quoque  nec  numerum 
eorum  ignorat.  Quapropter  is  qui 
singulorum  actus  intuetur,  qui 
finem  aspicit  universorum,  qui  novit 
quid  singulis  retribuat,  jam  apud  se 
praedestinatum  habet,  quid  ex  ejs 
sit  acturus,  et  qui  in .  fine  gloria 
regni  donentur  vel  qui  poenarum 
supplicio  feriantur”  (De  Praedest. 
8;  Mansi,  121,  13). 

20  Thus  Ratramnus :  “  Hac  sen- 

tentia  ostendit  venerabilis  Augus¬ 
tinus  malos  propter  iniquitatem  su- 
perbiae  damnationi  praedestinatos, 
non  ad  peccatum,  quoniam  pecca- 
tum,  non  est  a  Deo.  Neque  enim 
auctor  mali  est  Deus,  poenae  vero 
redditio  ex  Deo  est”  (Ibid.). 

21  The  decision  of  the  Council 


reads  as  follows :  “  Fidenter  fate- 
mur  praedestinationem  electorum 
ad  vitam,  et  praedestinationem  im- 
piorum  ad  mortem :  in  electione 
tamen  salvandorum  misericordiam 
Dei  praecedere  meritum  bonum :  in 
damnatione  autem  periturorum 
meritum  malum  praecedere  justum 
Dei  judicium.  Praedestinatione  au¬ 
tem  Deum  tantum  statuisse,  quae 
ipse  vel  gratuita  misericordia  vel 
justo  judicio  facturus  erat”  (DB. 
322). 

22  The  Council  states  its  view  in 
these  terms:  “Verum  aliquos  ad 
malum  praedestinatos  esse  divina 
potestate,  videlicet  ut  quasi  alius 
esse  non  possint,  non  solum  non 
credimus,  sed  etiam  si  sunt,  qui 
tantum  mali  credere  velint,  cum 
omni  detestatione,  sicut  Arausicana 
synodus,  illis  anathema  dicimus  ” 
(Ibid.  322). 


PREDESTINARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


7i 


tablishes  the  following  three  points:  First,  Christ  did  not 
die  for  those  who  were  already  condemned  to  eternal  punish¬ 
ment  at  the  time  of  His  passion.  Second,  all  those  who  are 
at  any  time  baptized  and  incorporated  into  the  Church,  were 
truly  redeemed  and  obtained  the  forgiveness  of  their  sins. 
Third,  some  of  these  latter  may  fall  away  and  be  eternally 
lost,  while  others  are  saved  by  reason  of  their  free  cooperation 
with  the  grace  of  God.23 

At  the  suggestion  of  Charles  the  Bald,  Hincmar  next  ex¬ 
plained  his  position  in  the  treatise  De  Praedestinatione,  which 
is  now  lost;  and  three  years  later  in  a  similar  work  entitled, 
Posterior  Dissertatio  de  Praedestinatione ,24  in  which  he  de¬ 
fends  his  view  as  formulated  at  the  Council  of  Quiercy. 
Thereupon,  the  matter  was  again  discussed  at  the  National 
Synod  of  Savannierres,  but  without  definite  results.  Finally 
the  Synod  of  Toucy,  in  860,  commissioned  Hincmar  to  com¬ 
pose  a  synodal  letter,  which  was  to  be  directed  to  all  the 
faithful  of  France,  so  as  to  counteract  the  religious  dis¬ 
turbances  that  had  been  occasioned  by  the  discussions  of  the 
last  few  years.  In  this  letter  the  Capitula  of  Quiercy  were 
approved,  and  thus  Hincmar’ s  party  carried  the  day.  It  was 
inevitable  that,  in  spite  of  local  opposition,  this  result  should 
finally  be  reached;  because  Hincmar’s  view  coincided  with 
the  traditional  teaching  of  the  Church. 

Thereafter  the  term  gemina  praedestinatio  was  set  aside, 
and  in  its  stead  were  used  praedestinatio  and  reprobatio  as 
referred  respectively  to  the  elect  and  the  reprobate.  Thereby 
all  confusion  of  ideas  was  avoided,  and  so  peace  was  re¬ 
stored  to  the  theological  world.  Incidentally  it  may  be  noted 
here,  although  the  matter  did  not  form  a  part  of  the  discus¬ 
sion  at  the  time,  that  most  of  the  men  engaged  in  the  con¬ 
troversy  regarded  predestination  to  eternal  life  as  absolute, 
that  is,  ante  praevisa  merita.  In  the  order  of  execution  merit 
must  indeed  come  first;  but  in  the  order  of  divine  decrees 
election  of  certain  individuals  to  eternal  life  takes  precedence, 
and  thereupon  follows  the  bestowal  of  efficacious  graces  from 


23  Ibid.  321,  324. 


24  ML.  125,  55  sqq. 


72 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


which  merit  results  through  the  free  cooperation  of  the  hu¬ 
man  will.  Hence  the  Synod  of  Valence  makes  the  unquali¬ 
fied  statement:  In  electione  tamen  salvandorum  misericor- 
diam  Dei  praecedere  meritum  bonum.  Another  statement 
of  the  same  Synod,  namely,  that  Christ  did  not  die  for  all, 
was  corrected  in  the  sense  that  God  sincerely  desired  the  sal¬ 
vation  of  all  men,  even  after  Adam’s  fall  into  sin.25 

B  —  Teaching  of  the  Scholastics 

It  was  in  this  condition  that  the  Scholastic  theologians 
found  the  doctrine  of  predestination  when  they  began  to  sys¬ 
tematize  the  theological  teaching  of  preceding  ages.  They 
developed  it  considerably,  but  mostly  along  lines  of  subor¬ 
dinate  importance.  The  solution  of  the  real  difficulty  con¬ 
nected  with  predestination  lay  beyond  the  reach  of  even  their 
giant  intellects.  Nor  could  it  be  otherwise;  for  when  all  is 
said,  only  God  knows  why  He  deigns  to  save  the  one  and 
suffers  the  other  to  perish.  The  following  brief  outline  of 
Scholastic  teaching  on  the  subject  of  predestination  will  suf¬ 
fice  for  our  purpose.  In  presenting  this  outline  we  shall  fol¬ 
low  the  chronological  order,  as  that  will  enable  us  to  notice 
more  readily  what  development  took  place. 

The  first  theologian  to  be  considered  in  this  connection  is 
St.  Anselm,  who  sets  forth  his  views  in  a  work  entitled,  De 
Concordia  Praescientiae  Dei  cum  Libero  Arbitrio.  In  the 
first  part  of  this  treatise  he  endeavors  to  show  that  the  eternal 
and  infallible  prevision  of  God  does  not  interfere  with  the 
actions  of  man’s  free  will,  while  in  the  second  part  he  brings 
his  conclusions  to  bear  upon  predestination.  He  sums  up  the 
result  of  his  inquiry  in  regard  to  this  latter  point  as  follows: 
“  Just  as  foreknowledge  in  God,  which  is  not  deceived,  does 
not  foreknow  anything  else  than  the  truth  precisely  as  it  will 
be  in  its  future  existence,  flowing  either  from  a  necessary  or 
free  cause;  so  in  like  manner  does  predestination,  which  is 
not  changed,  not  predestine  anything  else  than  what  is  con¬ 
tained  in  God’s  foreknowledge.  And  as  that  which  is  fore- 

25  Cfr.  Hinkmar,  De  Praedest.  c.  26. 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PREDESTINATION 


73 


known,  although  unchangeable  in  its  eternal  prevision,  may 
nevertheless  admit  of  change  in  time  before  it  comes  to  pass; 
so  it  is  also  with  regard  to  predestination/'  2ti 

This  obviously  makes  the  final  status  of  free  beings,  as 
foreknown  and  fore-ordained  by  God,  dependent  upon  their 
own  free  actions  under  the  influence  of  divine  grace.  Hence, 
according  to  St.  Anselm,  both  predestination  and  reprobation 
follow  upon  God's  prevision  of  each  one’s  merits  or  demerits ; 
so  that  both  are  post  praevisa  merita.  In  this  sense  the  au¬ 
thor  uses  the  term  predestination  in  reference  to  the  repro¬ 
bate  as  well  as  to  the  elect;  for  he  says:  “  It  must  be  under¬ 
stood  that  there  is  not  only  a  predestination  of  the  good,  but 
also  of  the  wicked;  just  as  God  is  said  to  cause  evil,  not  that 
He  really  causes  it,  but  He  permits  it  to  come  to  pass.  For 
He  is  said  to  harden  a  person’s  heart  when  He  does  not  soften 
it,  and  to  lead  some  one  into  temptation  when  He  does  not 
free  him  therefrom.  It  is  therefore  no  impropriety  of  lan¬ 
guage  when  God  in  this  manner  is  said  to  predestine  the 
wicked,  and  also  their  evil  deeds,  since  He  does  not  correct 
the  one  or  impede  the  other.  But  He  is  said  in  a  special 
sense  to  foreknow  and  predestine  what  is  good,  because  He 
effects  that  it  is  good;  in  regard  to  what  is  evil,  on  the  other 
hand,  He  is  indeed  the  cause  of  its  physical  entity,  but  not  of 
its  being  evil.27 

Peter  Lombard  follows  closely  in  the  footsteps  of  St. 
Augustine,  and  states  the  problem  in  this  way:  “Predes¬ 
tination  bears  reference  to  all  that  is  connected  with  salva¬ 
tion,  and  is  said  of  men  who  are  to  be  saved.  For  as  St. 
Augustine  says:  Predestination  signifies  the  preparation  of 
grace,  which  is  impossible  without  foreknowledge  on  the  part  of 
God.  However,  foreknowledge  is  possible  without  predes¬ 
tination.  By  predestination  indeed  God  foreknew  what  He 
would  do  at  any  future  time;  but  He  also  foreknew  what  He 
would  not  do,  that  is,  all  the  evils  that  ever  come  to  pass. 
He  predestined  those  whom  He  had  chosen;  but  the  others 
He  reprobated,  that  is,  He  foreknew  the  eternal  death  of 


26  Op.  cit.  c.  3. 


27  Ibid.  c.  2. 


74 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


sinners.”  28  Hence  the  author  seems  to  regard  reprobation  as 
a  simple  passing  by  on  the  part  of  God  when  He  chose  His 
elect. 

The  effects  of  predestination  have  a  bearing  upon  both  the 
good  and  the  bad;  but  in  a  different  way,  as  is  thus  explained 
by  the  author :  “  While  predestination  is  the  same  as  the 

preparation  of  grace,  that  is,  a  divine  election  by  which  God 
chose  before  the  foundation  of  the  world  whomsoever  it 
pleased  Him  to  choose;  reprobation,  on  the  contrary,  must  be 
understood  as  a  divine  foreknowledge  of  the  wickedness  of 
some,  and  as  a  preparation  of  eternal  punishment  for  their 
evil  deeds.  For  just  as  the  effect  of  predestination  is  the 
grace  by  which  we  are  justified  in  the  present  life,  and  are 
enabled  to  live  virtuously  and  to  persevere  in  good ;  so  repro¬ 
bation  on  the  part  of  God,  who  from  all  eternity  rejected 
some  by  not  choosing  them,  has  a  twofold  effect,  one  of  which 
He  foreknew  and  did  not  prepare,  that  is,  their  wickedness ; 
the  other  He  foreknew  and  prepared,  namely,  their  eternal 
punishment.”  29 

Developing  the  subject  still  further,  the  author  finally  comes 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  predestination  of  the  elect  is  with¬ 
out  any  merit  of  theirs,  while  the  reprobation  of  the  wicked 
is  consequent  upon  their  iniquity  as  foreknown  by  God.  He 
sums  up  in  these  terms:  “  Just  as  predestination  on  the  part 
of  God  is,  properly  speaking,  God’s  foreknowledge  and  His 
preparation  of  divine  favors,  by  reason  of  which  the  elect 
are  most  certainly  saved;  so  reprobation  on  the  part  of  God 
is  the  same  as  His  foreknowledge  of  the  never  ending  wicked¬ 
ness  of  some,  and  the  consequent  preparation  of  everlasting 
punishment.  And  as  the  effect  of  predestination  is  the  be¬ 
stowal  of  grace,  so  in  a  manner  the  effect  of  eternal  reproba¬ 
tion  seems  to  consist  in  the  obduration  of  the  sinner.  Not 
that  God  effects  this  obduration  by  the  causing  of  malice, 
but  rather  by  not  bestowing  His  grace ;  as  indeed  they  are  not 
worthy  to  receive  it.”  30 

Alexander  of  Hales  examines  the  question  of  predestina- 

28  Sent.  I,  d.  40,  n.  1.  29  Ibid.  n.  4.  30  Ibid.  n.  4. 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PREDESTINATION 


7  5 


tion  under  a  threefold  aspect.  First  he  inquires  what  the 
name  itself  imports;  next  he  tries  to  determine  the  formal 
concept  of  predestination;  lastly  he  investigates  what  it  is  in 
itself  —  secundum  rem.  The  name,  he  says,  imports  two 
things:  priority  and  destination.  By  reason  of  priority,  pre¬ 
destination  is  eternal;  under  the  aspect  of  destination  it  is  a 
divine  decree  in  reference  to  some  good  that  is  to  be  con¬ 
ferred  in  time.  Considered  in  its  formal  concept,  predestina¬ 
tion  is  in  the  order  of  divine  knowledge  of  good  pleasure  or 
approbation  —  in  genere  scientiae  beneplaciti  sive  approba- 
tionis.  In  itself  it  is  the  preparation  of  grace  for  the  pres¬ 
ent  and  of  glory  for  the  future.31 

Hence,  predestination  necessarily  implies  an  act  of  fore¬ 
knowledge  and  an  act  of  the  divine  will.  The  relation  of 
these  two  acts  is  thus  explained  by  the  author:  “  Divine 
knowledge  is  the  same  with  regard  to  all  men :  the  divine  will 
by  itself  is  also  the  same  in  regard  to  all:  but  the  divine  will 
in  conjunction  with  foreknowledge  is  not  the  same  in  respect 
to  all  men.  However,  this  is  not  owing  to  any  difference 
that  results  in  the  divine  foreknowledge  from  the  aforesaid 
conjunction;  but  it  arises  from  the  fact  that  we  are  not  all  in 
the  same  condition  as  known  by  God.  Hence,  predestina¬ 
tion  does  not  stand  for  the  will  of  God  alone,  but  for  the  will 
as  guided  by  foreknowledge  of  the  use  which  men  will  make 
of  His  gifts.  Consequently,  as  John  Damascene  remarks,  we 
must  distinguish  two  wills  in  God :  one  that  is  antecedent  and 
another  that  is  consequent.  By  His  antecedent  will  God  wills 
all  men  to  be  saved;  for  this  will  regards  the  rational  crea¬ 
ture  as  capable  of  salvation :  but  by  His  consequent  will,  which 
is  guided  by  His  foreknowledge  of  the  use  which  rational 
creatures  will  make  of  His  gifts,  He  does  not  will  all  men  to 
be  saved,  but  only  the  elect.  And  in  this  sense  the  will  of 
God  is  said  to  be  rational;  for  if  He  willed  the  final  salvation 
of  one  who  abused  his  freedom  of  choice,  He  would  not  be 
just.”  32 

Then  examining  the  question  whether  a  person’s  merits 

31  Sum.  I,  q.  28,  m.  1,  2,  3.  32  Ibid.  q.  28,  m.  2. 


76 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


are  the  cause  of  his  predestination,  he  comes  to  this  conclu¬ 
sion  :  “  The  terms  predestination  and  reprobation  signify 

several  different  things.  For  in  predestination  is  included  not 
only  foreknowledge,  but  also  grace  and  glory,  which  are  the 
effects  of  predestination.  So  too  are  there  three  things  to 
be  considered  in  reprobation :  foreknowledge,  present  wicked¬ 
ness,  and  future  punishment.  Hence,  when  we  find  it  stated 
in  the  writings  of  saints  that  predestination  and  reprobation 
depend  on  the  merits  of  the  persons  in  question,  we  must 
make  this  distinction.  If  predestination  be  considered  pre¬ 
cisely  as  it  is  in  God,  it  is  not  caused  by  the  merits  of  those 
who  are  predestined;  but  if  it  be  considered  as  it  is  in  the 
persons  themselves,  it  is  the  result  of  their  merits.  However, 
even  in  this  latter  case  there  is  a  difference  between  predes¬ 
tination  and  reprobation.  For  predestination,  in  so  far  as 
it  is  in  God  or  signifies  the  bestowal  of  grace,  is  not  of  merit; 
but  it  is  of  merit  only  in  so  far  as  the  conferring  of  final  glory 
comes  in  question.  Now  in  reprobation  the  matter  is  differ¬ 
ent:  for  there  we  have  the  act  of  reprobation  itself  as  it  is  in 
God,  the  present  iniquity  of  the  sinner,  and  his  future  punish¬ 
ment.  The  first  of  these  is  not  caused  by  the  demerits  of  the 
reprobate,  since  it  is  identified  with  God’s  essence;  but  the 
other  two-  are  caused  by  these*  same  demerits.”  33 

St.  Bonaventure  repeats  this  reasoning  of  his  master  almost 
word  for  word,  and  makes  it  his  own.34  Then  he  proceeds 
to  show  that  the  fact  of  predestination  and  reprobation  does 
not  interfere  with  the  freedom  of  man’s  will  in  regulating 
his  moral  conduct.  He  sums  up  in  these  terms :  “  The  di¬ 

vine  foreknowledge  is  of  such  a  kind  that  God  knows  from 
all  eternity  what  each  one  of  us  is  able  to  think  and  to  will, 
and  together  with  this  He  sees  in  what  direction  our  choice 
lies,  and  what  manner  of  works  we  perform  in  the  course 
of  our  lives.  And  because  He  sees  all  this  together,  what  we 
can  accomplish,  what  we  actually  choose,  and  what  we  doq 
hence  it  is  that  He  cannot  be  deceived.  Consequently,  as 

33  Ibid.  q.  28,  m.  3. 

34  In  Sent.  I,  d.  40,  a.  1,  q.  1 ;  q.  41,  a.  1. 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PREDESTINATION 


77 


predestination  includes  divine  foreknowledge,  it  must  be  in 
conformity  with  our  free  will.”  35 

Finally,  touching  the  heart  of  the  mystery,  namely,  why 
God  elects  one  to  eternal  life  and  passes  by  the  other,  he  says : 
“  Care  must  be  taken  lest,  while  we  desire  to  exalt  the  will 
of  God,  we  rather  dishonor  it.  For  if  there  were  no  reason 
why  He  chose  the  one  and  not  the  other,  except  that  it  so 
pleased  Him,  there  surely  would  be  nothing  hidden  about  the 
divine  judgments;  on  the  contrary,  all  would  be  manifest, 
since  every  one  can  understand  that  reason.  Nor  would  the 
divine  judgments  be  in  any  way  wonderful,  but  merely  arbi¬ 
trary.  Consequently,  it  must  be  held,  as  St.  Augustine  points 
out,  that  the  eternal  decree  of  predestination  and  the  divine 
will  are  most  reasonable,  and  are  based  upon  the  best  of  rea¬ 
sons;  and  as  they  are  from  all  eternity,  so  too  is  there  for 
them  an  eternal  reason — -not  as  regards  the  act  itself  in 
God,  but  in  respect  of  its  term  in  the  creature.  .  .  .  And  this 
may  be  shown  by  an  example.  Thus  if  it  be  asked,  why  does 
God  wish  that  it  should  rain  in  winter  rather  than  in  summer, 
the  answer  is:  Because  in  winter  there  is  a  greater  abun¬ 
dance  of  watery  vapor  than  there  is  in  summer.  In  a  simi¬ 
lar  way,  if  it  be  asked,  why  did  God  wish  that  Peter  should 
be  saved  rather  than  Judas,  we  answer:  Because  Peter  gath¬ 
ered  merits  for  heaven,  but  Judas  laid  up  punishment  for 
hell.”  36 

Albertus  Magnus  gives  substantially  the  same  exposition 
as  the  preceding  two.  “  By  His  antecedent  will,”  he  says, 
“  God  wills  the  salvation  of  all  men.  .  .  .  But  by  His  conse¬ 
quent  will,  which  takes  account  of  our  deeds,  He  wills  the 
good  to  be  saved  and  the  wicked  to  be  condemned.  And  this 
is  the  will  that  reference  is  made  to  in  the  definition  of  pre¬ 
destination  ;  for  it  is  by  this  that  He  wills  only  the  good  to  be 
saved,  because  they  alone  are  pleasing  to  Him.” 37  And 
again :  “  Two  things  are  to  be  noted :  divine  foreknowledge 

of  those  who  are  to  be  saved  and  the  will  of  God  predestinat¬ 
ing  just  so  many  to  salvation.  This  will  of  God  has  regard 

35  Tbid.  d.  40,  a.  2,  q.  i.  37  Sum.  I,  tr.  1 6,  q.  63,  a.  2,  1. 

36  Ibid.  d.  41,  a.  1,  q.  2. 


78 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


to  our  works,  because  He  wills  to  save  as  many  as  make  a 
good  use  of  His  grace,  and  not  more;  but  if  more  were  to 
make  a  good  use  of  that  same  grace,  then  He  would  also  from 
all  eternity  have  willed  that  they  should  be  saved.”  38 

St.  Thomas  first  shows  that  it  belongs  to  the  providence  of 
God  to  direct  created  beings  toward  their  proper  end,  and 
then  points  out  that  predestination  is  a  part  of  Providence. 
He  reasons  in  this  way :  “  The  end  towards  which  created 

things  are  disposed  by  God  is  twofold:  one  that  exceeds  all 
proportion  and  faculty  of  created  nature ;  and  this  end  is  life 
eternal,  consisting  in  the  beatific  vision,  which  is  above  the 
nature  of  every  creature.  The  other  end  is  proportionate  to 
created  nature,  and  this  end  created  beings  can  attain  accord¬ 
ing  to  their  natural  powers.  To  that,  however,  which  a  crea¬ 
ture  cannot  attain  by  the  power  of  its  own  nature,  it  must  be 
directed  by  some  one  else ;  thus  an  arrow  is  shot  by  the  archer 
towards  a  mark.  Hence,  properly  speaking,  a  rational  crea¬ 
ture,  capable  of  eternal  life,  is  led  towards  it,  as  it  were,  di¬ 
rected  by  God.  The  reason  of  that  direction  pre-exists  in 
God;  as  in  Him  is  the  plan  of  the  order  of  all  things  towards 
an  end,  which  we  proved  above  to  be  Providence.  The  plan 
of  something  to  be  done,  existing  in  the  mind  of  the  doer,  is 
a  certain  pre-existence  in  him  of  the  thing  to  be  done.  Hence 
the  plan  of  the  above-mentioned  direction  of  a  rational  crea¬ 
ture  towards  the  end  of  life  eternal  is  called  predestination. 
For  to  destine,  is  to  direct  or  send.  Thus  it  is  clear  that  pre¬ 
destination,  as  regards  its  object,  is  a  part  of  Providence.”  39 

As  predestination  is  a  part  of  Providence,  it  is,  properly 
speaking,  “  not  anything  in  the  person  predestined ;  but  only 
in  the  person  who  predestines.  ...  It  is  a  kind  of  plan  of 
the  ordering  of  some  persons  towards  eternal  salvation,  ex¬ 
isting  in  the  divine  mind.  The  execution,  however,  of  this 
order  is  in  a  passive  way  in  the  predestined,  but  actively  in 
God.” 40  And  as  it  is  in  God,  predestination  is  from  all 
eternity,  although  its  effects  belong  to  time.41  Neither  grace 
nor  glory  come  into  the  definition  of  predestination,  as  some- 

38  In  Sent.  I,  d.  40,  a.  II.  40  Ibid.  a.  2. 

39  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  23,  a.  1.  41  Ibid.  a.  2  ad  3m. 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PREDESTINATION 


79 


thing  belonging  to  its  essence;  but  they  are  related  to  it  as 
effect  to  cause  and  object  to  act.42 

To  the  predestination  of  the  just  corresponds  the  reproba¬ 
tion  of  the  wicked.  This  too  is  a  part  of  Providence.  For 
to  Providence  it  belongs  to  permit  certain  defects  in  those 
things  which  are  directed  towards  their  end.  “  Thus,  as  men 
are  ordained  to  eternal  life  through  the  providence  of  God, 
it  likewise  is  part  of  that  providence  to  permit  some  to  fall 
away  and  be  lost.  This  is  called  reprobation.  .  .  .  There¬ 
fore,  as  predestination  includes  the  will  to  confer  grace  and 
glory;  so  also  reprobation  includes  the  will  to  permit  a  per¬ 
son  to  fall  into  sin,  and  to  impose  the  punishment  of  damna¬ 
tion  of  account  of  that  sin.”  43  However,  “  reprobation  acts 
quite  differently  in  its  causality  from  predestination.  This 
latter  is  the  cause  both  of  what  is  expected  in  the  future  life 
by  the  predestined  —  namely,  glory  —  and  of  what  is  received 
in  this  life  —  namely,  grace.  Reprobation,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  not  the  cause  of  what  is  in  the  present  —  namely,  sin ; 
but  it  is  the  cause  of  abandonment  by  God.  And  so  too  is  it 
the  cause  of  what  is  assigned  in  the  future  —  namely,  eternal 
punishment.  But  guilt  proceeds  from  the  free  will  of  the 
person  who  is  reprobated  and  deserted  by  grace.”  44 

The  predestination  of  some  and  the  reprobation  of  others 
necessarily  implies  election  on  the  part  of  God.  He  chooses 
some  whom  He  will  save,  and  passes  by  others  whom  He 
suffers  to  be  lost.  From  this,  however,  it  must  not  be  in¬ 
ferred  that  He  does  not  sincerely  desire  the  salvation  of  all 
men.  In  this  connection  the  author  brings  in  the  distinction 
between  the  antecedent  and  consequent  will  of  God.  “  God 
wills  all  men  to  be  saved  by  His  antecedent  will,  which  is  not 
to  will  absolutely  but  relatively;  but  not  by  His  consequent 
will,  which  is  to  will  absolutely.”  45 

St.  Thomas  considers  the  relation  of  merit  to  predestina¬ 
tion  under  the  heading,  whether  God’s  foreknowledge  of  fu¬ 
ture  merits  is  the  cause  of  predestination.  After  rejecting 
several  obviously  false  views,  he  answers  with  this  distinc- 

42  Ibid.  a.  2  ad  4m.  44  Ibid.  a.  3  ad  2m. 

43  Ibid.  a.  3.  45  Ibid.  a.  4  et  ad  3™. 


8o 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


tion:  “We  must  say,  therefore,  that  the  effect  of  predes¬ 
tination  may  be  considered  in  a  twofold  light  —  in  one  way, 
in  particular;  and  thus  there  is  no  reason  why  one  effect  of 
predestination  should  not  be  the  reason  or  cause  of  another; 
a  subsequent  effect  of  a  previous  effect,  as  regards  the  final 
cause ;  and  the  previous  of  those  that  follow,  as  regards  the 
meritorious  cause,  which  is  reduced  to  the  disposition  of  the 
matter;  as  if  we  were  to  say  that  God  preordained  to  give 
glory  on  account  of  merit,  and  that  He  preordained  to  give 
grace  to  merit  the  glory.  In  another  way,  the  effect  of  pre¬ 
destination  may  be  considered  in  general.  And  so  considered, 
it  is  impossible  that  the  whole  of  the  effect  of  predestination 
should  have  any  cause  as  coming  from  us;  because  whatso¬ 
ever  is  in  man  disposing  him  towards  salvation,  is  all  in¬ 
cluded  under  the  effect  of  predestination;  even  the  prepara¬ 
tion  for  grace.  For  neither  does  this  happen  otherwise  than 
by  divine  help,  according  to  the  Prophet  Jeremias:  *  Con¬ 
vert  us,  O  Lord,  to  Thee,  and  we  shall  be  converted/  Yet 
predestination  has  in  this  way,  in  regard  to  its  effect,  the  good¬ 
ness  of  God  for  its  reason ;  towards  which  the  whole  effect  of 
predestination  is  ordained  as  to  an  end,  and  from  which  it 
proceeds  as  from  its  first  moving  principle.”  46 

From  this  it  is  quite  obvious  that  according  to  St.  Thomas 
predestination  in  its  adequate  sense  is  not  caused  by  the  merits 
of  the  predestined.  Nor  is  any  other  view  possible;  because 
considered  adequately,  predestination  includes  all  graces,  even 
the  first,  and  without  grace  no  one  can  merit.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  equally  obvious  that  according  to  St.  Thomas  predes¬ 
tination  in  an  inadequate  sense,  in  so  far  as  it  signifies  the  be¬ 
stowal  of  graces  subsequent  to  the  first  and  of  final  glory, 
may  be  merited.  And  this  he  teaches  in  many  other  places, 
as  for  instance  in  his  Commentary  on  the  Sentences,  where 
he  says :  “  In  regard  to  final  glory,  predestination  is  in  the 

order  of  distributive  justice,  and  therefore  we  may  say  that 
God  gives  glory  to  this  one  and  not  to  that  one,  because  the 
former  merited  it  and  the  latter  did  not;  and  in  like  manner 
does  He  will  that  this  one  should  have  glory  and  the  other 

46  Ibid.  a.  5. 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PREDESTINATION 


81 


should  not,  because  this  one  was  worthy  and  the  other  was 
not.”  47  Many  Thomists,  however,  refer  all  this  exclusively 
to  the  order  of  execution,  while  on  the  other  hand  they  limit 
predestination  to  the  order  of  intention,  and  thence  they  con¬ 
clude  that  St.  Thomas  taught  predestination  ante  praevisa 
merit  a. 48 

In  regard  to  the  reprobate,  St.  Thomas  makes  some  state¬ 
ments  from  which  it  has  been  inferred  that  he  held  negative 
reprobation.  Thus  he  says:  “  God  wills  to  manifest  His 
goodness  in  men;  in  respect  of  those  whom  He  predestines, 
by  means  of  His  mercy,  by  sparing  them;  and  in  respect  of 
others,  whom  He  reprobates,  by  means  of  His  justice,  in 
punishing  them.  This  is  the  reason  why  God  elects  some, 
and  rejects  others.  .  .  .  Why  He  chooses  some  for  glory, 
and  reprobates  others,  has  no  reason ;  except  the  divine 
will.” 49  And  again :  “  Although  anyone  reprobated  by 

God  cannot  acquire  grace,  nevertheless  that  he  falls  into  this 
or  that  particular  sin  comes  from  the  use  of  his  free  will. 
Hence  it  is  rightly  imputed  to  him  as  guilt.”  50 

Others,  however,  contend  that  all  these  statements  refer  to 
positive  reprobation,  which  follows  upon  the  prevision  of  sin. 
And  this  they  prove  from  the  author’s  own  teaching.  Thus 
he  states  quite  clearly :  “  As  far  as  in  Him  lies,  God  is  ready 

to  give  grace  to  all ;  for  He  wills  that  all  should  be  saved  and 
come  to  a  knowledge  of  the  truth.  And  those  only  are  de¬ 
prived  of  grace  who  put  an  obstacle  in  its  way;  and  this  is 
imputed  to  them  as  guilt,  just  as  in  the  case  of  a  person  who 
shuts  his  eyes  while  the  sun  is  shining  and  thereby  causes 
some  harm  to  follow :  he  is  guilty  by  his  own  action,  although 
without  the  sunlight  he  cannot  see.”  51  Again:  “It  must 
be  held  that  those  conditions  by  reason  of  which  man  fails  to 
attain  his  end,  and  under  which  God  does  not  will  him  to  be 
saved,  are  of  man’s  own  making,  and  therefore  all  that  fol¬ 
lows  is  imputed  to  him  as  a  sin.”  52 

Duns  Scotus  takes  a  somewhat  different  view  of  predes- 

47  Op.  cit.  T.  d.  41,  q.  1.  a.  4  ad  2™  50  Tbid.  a.  3  ad  3m. 

48  Cfr.  Gotti,  I,  tr.  6,  q.  3.  51  Contra  Gent.  Ill,  c.  159- 

49  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  23,  a.  5  ad  3™  52  In  Sent.  I,  d.  46,  q.  1,  a.  1  ad  5™ 


82 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


tination.  He  is  above  all  concerned  about  safeguarding  the 
liberty  of  God  to  ordain  what  He  pleases.  This  is  entirely 
in  harmony  with  the  superiority  of  the  will  as  compared  to 
the  intellect,  both  in  the  divine  and  the  created  order  of  things. 
Hence  he  is  inclined  to  favor  predestination  ante  praevisa 
merit  a. 03  But  he  staunchly  defends  the  freedom  of  the  hu¬ 
man  will  in  regulating  its  own  choice.  He  also  contends  that 
sufficient  grace  is  given  to  all,54  and  that  no  one  is  cast  off  by 
God  except  in  view  of  final  impenitence.55  After  trying  to 
refute  the  opinion  of  Henry  of  Ghent,  which  is  substantially 
the  same  as  that  of  St.  Bonaventure  noted  in  a  preceding 
paragraph,  he  concludes  in  these  terms:  “Therefore,  lest 
one  in  his  search  of  these  deep  matters  plunge  beyond  his 
depth,  it  is  better  for  him  to  choose  that  opinion  which  finds 
greater  favor  with  him,  making  certain,  however,  that  through 
it  divine  liberty  suffer  no  injustice  and  that  God’s  bounty  in 
preelecting  be  given  just  play.  Should  one  make  choice  of 
any  other  view  (than  the  one  here  proposed),  he  must  meet 
the  difficulties  which  have  been  urged  against  it.”  66 

In  regard  to  other  points  more  or  less  intimately  connected 
with  predestination  there  was  hardly  any  difference  of  opin¬ 
ion  among  the  Scholastics.  Thus  all  are  agreed  that  no  one 
can  be  certain  of  his  being  among  the  predestined,  unless  he 
receives  a  special  divine  revelation  to  that  effect.57  They  are 
also  agreed  that  predestination  is  unchangeable,  and  that 
therefore  no  one  of  the  predestined  can  ever  be  lost.58  How¬ 
ever,  this  does  not  make  prayers  and  good  works  useless;  be¬ 
cause  it  is  only  they  that  can  make  our  salvation  certain,  as 
on  account  of  them  salvation  is  ultimately  conferred.59  Ac¬ 
cording  to  the  more  common  opinion  the  number  of  the  pre¬ 
destined  is  absolutely  fixed  by  God,  so  that  when  this  number 
is  actually  saved  the  world  will  come  to  an  end.60  What  this 
number  is,  no  one  can  tell.  St.  Thomas  speaks  of  it  as  fol- 

53  In  Sent.  I,  d.  41.  57  Cfr.  Thomas,  In  Sent.  I,  q.  23, 

54  Ibid.  q.  46,  n.  3.  a.  1  ad  4m. 

55  Ibid.  d.  41,  n.  11.  58  Sum.  Theol.  q.  23,  a.  6. 

se  Ibid.  59  Ibid.  a.  8. 

60  Ibid.  a.  7. 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PREDESTINATION  83 

lows :  “  Concerning  the  number  of  all  the  predestined,  some 

say  that  so  many  men  will  be  saved  as  angels  fell;  some, 
however,  so  many  as  there  were  angels  left;  others,  in  fine, 
so  many  as  the  number  of  angels  who  fell,  added  to  that  of 
all  the  angels  created  by  God.  It  is,  however,  better  to  say 
that  to  God  alone  is  known  the  number  for  whom  is  reserved 
eternal  happiness,  as  the  prayer  for  the  living  and  dead  ex¬ 
presses  it.”  61 

61  Loc.  cit. 


CHAPTER  IV 


THE  BLESSED  TRINITY1 

All  that  is  essential  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Blessed  Trinity 
was  already  clearly  taught  in  the  Patristic  age  —  the  unity  of 
the  divine  nature,  the  trinity  of  persons,  the  generation  of 
the  Son,  the  procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  the  nature 
of  the  divine  hypostases  as  relationes  subsistentes .2  On  these 
points  the  East  and  the  West  were  in  full  doctrinal  agree¬ 
ment,  although  in  course  of  time  a  difference  arose  in  regard 
to  the  principium  quod  in  the  procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit.3 
When  the  Scholastics  began  their  great  work  of  doctrinal 
synthesis,  the  Church’s  teaching  on  this  fundamental  mystery 
of  the  Christian  faith  was  almost  fully  developed,  so  that 
little  remained  to  be  done  save  along  the  lines  of  properly  co¬ 
ordinating  the  different  parts  of  the  doctrines.  However, 
along  with  this,  there  were  a  number  of  subordinate  points 
that  admitted  of  still  further  development,  and  these  were 
investigated  and  discussed  by  nearly  all  the  theologians  of 
the  Middle  Ages.  The  following  brief  review  of  mediaeval 
teaching  on  the  mystery  of  the  Blessed  Trinity  will  be  suf¬ 
ficient  to  bring  out  what  is  of  special  interest  to  the  history 
of  dogmas. 

i.  Existence  of  the  Mystery. —  In  order  to  prove  the  truth 
that  in  the  unity  of  the  Godhead  there  are  three  persons,  the 
Scholastics  use  two  distinct  series  of  arguments,  one  of  which 
is  drawn  from  Ploly  Scripture  and  tradition,  and  the  other 
from  the  principles  of  natural  reason.  The  former  series 
is  regarded  by  them  as  absolutely  conclusive,  so  that  the  truth 
thus  established  is  held  to  be  of  faith;  whilst  the  latter  is 

1  Cfr.  Schwane,  Histoire  des  III ;  Hefele,  Conciliengeschichte,  V. 
Dogmes,  t.  IV,  p.  I,  c.  2;  De  Reg-  2  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  260  sqq. 

non,  Etudes  sur  la  Trinite,  t.  II,  3  Ibid.  p.  490  sqq. 

84 


THE  BLESSED  TRINITY 


85 


looked  upon  as  having  only  suasive  force,  confirming  in  a 
manner  by  reason  what  is  already  known  by  revelation.  The 
truth  in  question  is,  therefore,  by  all  of  them  considered  as 
a  mystery  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term  —  a  truth,  that  is, 
whose  existence  cannot  be  discovered  by  unaided  reason,  and 
whose  intimate  nature  cannot  be  understood  even  when  its 
existence  is  made  known  by  revelation.  It  is  in  this  sense 
that  St.  Thomas  writes :  “  By  natural  reason  we  can  know 

what  belongs  to  the  unity  of  essence,  but  not  what  belongs 
to  the  distinction  of  persons.  Whoever,  then,  tries  to  prove 
the  trinity  of  persons  by  natural  reason,  derogates  from  the 
faith.” 4  And  St.  Bonaventure:  “  The  trinity  of  persons 
can  in  no  way  be  known  by  reasoning  from  the  creature  to 
God.’’ 5  Even  Abelard,  who  frequently  speaks  of  this 
mystery  as  if  it  were  a  natural  truth,  explicitly  states  that 
the  arguments  drawn  from  reason  cannot  produce  super¬ 
natural  faith,  but  can  only  make  the  teaching  of  faith  more 
acceptable.0 

2.  Errors  of  Some  Early  Scholastics. —  The  very  concept 
of  the  Trinity,  according  to  the  teaching  of  the  Church,  implies 
not  only  distinction  of  persons,  but  also  numerical  identity 
of  nature.  This  last  point  was  denied  by  Roscelin,  canon  of 
Compiegne,  who  towards  the  end  of  the  eleventh  century 
taught  in  that  city,  and  also  at  Besangon  and  Tours.  His 
own  writings,  with  the  exception  of  a  letter  to  Abelard,7  have 
not  been  preserved,  but  his  teaching  on  the  point  in  ques¬ 
tion  can  be  gathered  from  the  refutation  of  it  by  St.  Anselm,8 
Abelard,9  John  of  Salisbury,10  and  Otto  of  Freising.11 

Being  a  Nominalist  in  philosophy,  he  logically  maintained 
that  the  idea  of  person  can  be  realized  only  in  an  individually 
existing  nature,  distinct  from  all  others  of  its  kind,  not  only 
in  personality,  but  also  in  substance.  Hence  he  argued : 
“If  there  are  in  God  three  persons  and  only  one  substance 
(ana  res),  and  not  three  substances,  each  one  separately  by 

4  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  32,  a.  1.  8  De  Fide  Trin.  c.  1. 

5  In  Sent.  I,  d.  3,  p.  t,  q.  4.  9  Ep.  21. 

6  Introd.  ad  Theol.  II,  c.  3.  10  Metalog.  II,  17. 

7  Opp.  Abelard,  t.  II,  ed.  Cousin.  11  De  Gest.  Fred.  I,  c.  47. 


86 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


itself,  even  as  in  the  case  with  three  angels  or  three  souls, 
yet  in  such  a  manner  that  they  are  altogether  the  same  by 
way  of  power  and  will,  then  the  Father  and  the  Holy  Spirit 
have  become  incarnate  together  with  the  Son.”  12  And 
again :  “  Whoso  says  that  the  Father  is  the  Son,  and  that 

the  Son  is  the  Father,  as  he  necessarily  must  if  he  holds 
that  the  three  names  signify  the  same  substance,  he  con¬ 
founds  the  persons.  For  all  names  of  one  and  the  same 
individual  thing  are  predicated  of  one  another.  .  .  .  The 
substance  of  the  Father  is  nothing  else  than  the  Father,  and 
the  substance  of  the  Son  is  nothing  else  than  the  Son,  even 
as  the  city  of  Rome  is  Rome  and  the  creature  of  water  is 
water.  Hence  as  the  Father  begot  the  Son,  the  substance 
of  the  Father  begot  the  substance  of  the  Son.  Hence  as  the 
substance  of  him  who  begets  is  one  and  the  substance  of  him 
who  is  begotten  is  another  one,  the  one  must  be  different 
from  the  other;  .  .  .  and  therefore  we  cannot  avoid  making 
a  separation  in  the  substance  of  the  Holy  Trinity.”  13 

This  teaching,  which  is  tritheism  pure  and  simple,  was 
condemned  by  the  Council  of  Soissons  (1093),  which  had 
been  convened  by  Archbishop  Raynold  of  Rheims.  Rosce¬ 
lin  retracted  his  error  under  the  pressure  of  popular  indigna¬ 
tion,  but  shortly  after  he  relapsed,  as  appears  from  his  letter 
to  Abelard.  There  he  cites  a  large  number  of  extracts  from 
the  writings  of  the  Fathers,  all  of  which,  he  contends,  show 
that  Christian  antiquity  never  understood  God  to  be  only 
one  being,  numerically  one  nature  subsisting  in  three  per¬ 
sons.  His  error  was  thoroughly  refuted  by  St.  Anselm  in 
his  work  De  Fide  Trinitatis ,  which  was  primarily  written  for 
that  purpose. 

About  the  same  time  Abelard  fell  into  error  by  going  to 
the  other  extreme,  in  as  much  as  he  seemed  to  identify  the 
three  divine  persons  with  the  attributes  of  power,  wisdom, 
and  goodness.  In  his  Introductio  ad  Theologiam,  he  states 
the  problem  in  this  way:  Christian  faith  teaches  that  there 
is  only  one  God  —  not  several  gods  —  one  Lord  of  all,  one 

12  Cfr.  Anselm,  De  Fide  Trin.  c.  13  Ep.  ad  Abelard.,  op.  cit.  p.  799, 

800. 


1. 


THE  BLESSED  TRINITY 


87 


Creator,  one  Principle,  one  Supreme  Good.  Hence  the  two 
questions:  What  distinction  is  there  between  the  three  per¬ 
sons  in  the  one  divine  nature?  How  is  the  trinity  of  persons 
compatible  with  the  unity  of  nature? 

He  answers:  The  names  of  the  three  persons  seem  to 
express  the  perfection  of  the  Supreme  Good.  The  name  of 
Father  stands  for  power,  that  of  Son  for  wisdom,  and  that 
of  Holy  Ghost  for  goodness  or  love.  These  are  three  funda¬ 
mental  concepts  of  the  Divine  Being.  In  their  unity  and 
distinction  consists  the  Trinity.  This,  however,  must  not  be 
so  understood  that  the  Father  only  is  power,  the  Son  only 
is  wisdom,  and  the  Holy  Ghost  only  is  goodness;  but  these 
attributes  are  peculiar  to  the  three  persons  respectively,  and 
so  are  distinctive  of  the  same.  The  Father  is  power,  be¬ 
cause  He  is  the  unbegotten  and  absolute  principle;  the  Son  is 
wisdom,  because  He  is  the  W ord ;  the  Holy  Ghost  is  love 
or  goodness,  because  He  is  the  fountain  of  divine  grace: 
yet  the  Son  and  the  Holy  Ghost,  though  derived  from  the 
Father,  are  also  power.14 

Then,  to  illustrate  his  teaching  by  examples,  he  makes  use 
of  expressions  and  comparisons  which  caused  him  to  be  ac¬ 
cused  of  Modalism.  A  piece  of  brass,  he  says,  upon  which 
an  artist  engraves  the  likeness  of  the  king,  is  essentially  the 
same  as  the  image,  and  the  image  is  essentially  the  same  as 
the  brass;  yet  they  are  distinct  in  their  properties  as  metal 
and  image.  Something  very  similar  to  this  we  find  in  the 
Trinity.  For  even  as  the  seal  is  of  the  brass  and  has  in 
a  certain  sense  its  origin  therein,  so  has  the  Son  His  being 
of  the  substance  of  the  Father,  and  in  so  far  is  He  begotten 
of  the  Father.  Then,  as  regards  the  Holy  Spirit,  some  ec¬ 
clesiastical  teachers  indeed  hold  that  He  is  also  of  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  the  Father,  in  as  much  as  He  is  of  one  substance 
with  Him;  but  this  is  not  strictly  true.  Because  if  it  were 
true,  it  would  follow  that  He  was  begotten  by  the  Father 
and  the  Son,  whereas  He  only  proceeds  from  them.15  Since, 
then,  both  the  Son  and  the  Holy  Spirit  are  of  the  Father  — 

14  Introd.  ad  Theol.  I,  5-10. 

15  Ibid.  II,  13,  16;  cfr.  Theol.  Christ.  IV. 


88 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


the  one  begotten,  the  other  proceeding  —  generation  differs 
from  procession  in  this,  that  He  who  is  begotten  is  of  the 
very  substance  of  the  Father,  as  it  is  in  the  nature  of  wisdom, 
that  is,  of  being,  that  it  should  be  a  certain  power;  whereas 
the  effect  of  love  is  classed  as  goodness  rather  than  as  power.16 

The  first  one  in  France  to  oppose  Abelard  was  William  of 
St  Thierry,  who  was  soon  joined  by  St.  Bernard,  Hugh  of 
St.  Victor,  and  others.  St.  Bernard  sums  up  the  errors  in 
question  as  follows :  “  Denique  constituit  Deum  Patrem 

plenani  esse  potentiam ,  Filium  quamdam  potentiam,  Spiritum 
Sanctum  nullam  potentiam:  atque  hoc  esse  Filium  ad  Patrem, 
quod  quamdam  potentiam  ad  potentiam,  quod  speciem  ad 
genus,  quod  materiatum  ad  materiam,  quod  hominem  ad 
animal,  quod  aereum  sigillum  ad  aes 17  These  errors  were 
condemned  by  the  Council  of  Soissons  (1121),  and  again  by 
the  Council  of  Sens  (1141),  which  at  the  same  time  deprived 
Abelard  of  his  license  to  teach.18 

3.  Definition  of  Person. —  Early  in  the  sixth  century, 
Boethius  had  defined  person  as  an  individual  substance  of 
a  rational  nature  —  Persona  est  naturae  rationalis  individua 
substantia.  Some  of  the  early  Scholastics  found  fault  with 
this  definition  as  applied  to  the  three  persons  in  the  God¬ 
head.  Thus  Richard  of  St.  Victor  argued,  since  the  divine 
nature  is  an  individual  substance,  it  ought,  according  to  the 
Boethian  definition,  be  a  person;  yet  this  conclusion  runs 
counter  to  the  teaching  of  the  Church.  Hence  to  make  the 
definition  applicable  to  divine  persons,  it  should  be  modified 
in  this  way:  Persona  divina  est  divinae  naturae  incommuni- 
cabilis  existentia  —  a  divine  person  is  the  incommunicable 
existence  of  the  divine  nature.19  Alexander  of  Hales  views 
the  matter  in  practically  the  same  light;  hence  he  gives  the 
following  defintion :  Persona  est  existentia  incommunicabilis 
intellectualis  naturae  vel  existens  per  se  solum  secundum 
quemdam  modum  exist endi. 20  The  same  definition  is  later 

16  Introd.  ad  Theol.  II,  Martene,  18  Mansi,  21,  568;  Hefele,  V,  476. 

1085.  19  De  Trin.  IV,  c.  22;  cfr.  c.  21. 

17  Tract,  de  Error.  Abelard,  c.  1,  20  Sum.  I,  q.  56,  m.  4. 


THE  BLESSED  TRINITY 


89 


on  given  by  Scotus,  who  points  out  that  incommunicability, 
taken  as  the  ratio  formalis  of  personality,  implies  not  merely 
a  negation  of  actual  and  aptitudinal  communication,  but  a 
positive  repugnance  to  the  same;  and  therefore  the  concept 
of  personality  is  not  negative,  but  positive.21 

However,  the  greater  number  of  Scholastics  accepted  the 
Boethian  definition,  but  in  their  application  of  it  to  the  three 
divine  persons  they  explained  the  two  terms  substantia  and 
individua.  The  former  term,  they  say,  is  taken  in  a  general 
sense,  prescinding  from  first  and  second,  or  singular  and 
universal;  whilst  the  other  is  added  to  restrict  this  general 
signification  and  at  the  same  time  to  convey  the  idea  of  in¬ 
communicability.22 

This  more  common  view  is  thus  expressed  by  St.  Thomas : 
“  In  the  opinion  of  some,  the  term  substance  in  the  definition 
of  person  stands  for  first  substance,  which  is  the  hypostasis; 
nor  is  the  term  individual  superfluously  added,  for  as  much 
as  by  the  name  of  hypostasis  or  first  substance  the  idea  of 
universality  and  of  part  is  excluded.  For  we  do  not  say  that 
man  in  general  is  an  hypostasis ;  nor  the  hand,  since  it  is  only 
a  part.  But  where  individual  is  added,  the  idea  of  as- 
sumptibility  is  excluded  from  person;  for  the  human  nature 
in  Christ  is  not  a  person,  since  it  is  assumed  by  a  greater, 
that  is,  by  the  Word  of  God.  It  is,  however,  better  to  say 
that  substance  is  here  taken  in  a  general  sense,  as  divided  into 
first  and  second,  and  when  individual  is  added,  it  is  restricted 
to  first  substance.”  23 

4.  Principles  of  Divine  Processions. —  According  to  the 
unanimous  teaching  of  Patristic  writers,  the  Son  is  begotten 
of  the  substance  of  the  Father,  and  the  Holy  Spirit  proceeds 
of  the  substance  of  the  Father  and  the  Son.  In  view  of  this 
teaching,  Peter  Lombard  opens  his  treatise  on  the  Trinity 
with  the  question,  “  Whether  the  Father  begot  the  divine  es¬ 
sence,  or  whether  the  divine  essence  begot  the  Son,  or  whether 

21  In  Sent.  I,  d.  23,  n.  4;  ibid.  Ill,  Thom.  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  29,  a.  1  ad 

d.  1,  q.  1,  n.  10.  2m;  Albert.  Magn.  Sum.  p.  1,  tr.  10, 

22  Halens.  Sum.  p.  1,  q.  56,  m.  3 ;  q.  44,  m.  2. 

Bonavent.  In  Sent.  I,  d.  25,  a.  1,  q.  2;  23  Sum.  Theol.  loc.  cit. 


90 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


the  essence  begot  the  essence,  or  whether  the  essence  neither 
begot  nor  was  begotten.24  His  answer  is :  “  In  full  agree¬ 

ment  with  Catholic  writers  on  this  subject,  we  say  that  the 
Father  did  not  beget  the  divine  essence,  nor  did  the  divine 
essence  beget  the  Son,  nor  did  the  divine  essence  beget  the 
divine  essence,”  25  but  the  Father  begot  the  Son,  and  the 
Father  and  the  Son  breathed  forth  the  Holy  Spirit. 

This  teaching  was  attacked  by  some  of  Peter’s  contem¬ 
poraries,  and  among  others  by  Abbot  Joachim  de  Floris.  He 
contended  that  thus  there  was  a  fourth  term  introduced  into 
the  Trinity,  which  would  necessarily  result  in  a  quaternity. 
The  contention  was  settled  by  the  Fourth  Lateran  Council, 
held  in  1215.  The  Council  sustained  the  Lombard,  whom  it 
mentioned  by  name,  and  defined  that  the  essence  “  is  neither 
begetting,  nor  begotten,  nor  proceeding;  but  it  is  the  Father 
who  begets,  the  Son  who  is  begotten,  and  the  Holy  Spirit  who 
proceeds.”  26 

Taking  this  definition  as  their  starting  point,  all  subsequent 
Scholastics  held  that  the  principium  quod  —  that  which  begets 
or  breathes  —  is  not  the  divine  essence  as  such,  but  as  it  is 
found  in  the  persons  concerned,  or  rather  the  persons  them¬ 
selves  to  whom  the  productive  actions  are  attributed.  But 
there  remained  the  further  question  about  the  principium 
quo  —  the  power  by  which  the  persons  are  constituted  pro¬ 
ductive  principles.  Is  this  something  absolute  or  relative? 
Peter  Lombard  had  already  pointed  out  that  it  could  not 
be  anything  purely  absolute,  but  must  in  some  way  include 
a  relation  —  posse  generare  dicit  quid ,  sed  secundum  re - 
spectum  ad  aliquid.  Others,  among  them  William  of 
Auxerre  and  Durandus  of  Saint  Pourqain,  considered  it  to 
be  something  purely  relative.  In  his  Summa ,  St.  Bona- 
venture  pronounces  this  last  view  as  more  probable,27  but  in 
his  Prologus  ad  II  Sent,  he  declares  himself  in  favor  of  the 
Lombard.  This  latter  position  is  also  taken  by  Albertus 
Magnus,  who  holds  that  the  potentia  generativa  is  something 
intermediate  between  what  is  essential  and  what  is  per- 

24  Sent.  I,  d.  5.  26  Mansi,  22,  982;  DB.  431. 

25  Ibid.  27  D.  7,  a.  unic.  q.  1. 


THE  BLESSED  TRINITY 


9i 


sonal.28  St.  Thomas  expresses  the  same  view,  when,  after 
a  somewhat  lengthy  disquisition  on  the  point,  he  concludes : 
“  And  therefore  the  power  of  begetting  signifies  the  divine 
nature  directly,  but  the  relation  indirectly.” 29  Finally, 
Scotus  thinks  that  the  different  views  on  this  subject  may  be 
brought  into  agreement,  and  that  the  chief  difference  con¬ 
sists  in  the  terms  employed.30 

A  further  question  is,  what  is  the  principium  quo  of  the 
two  divine  processions  in  itself,  and  how  does  it  differ  in  the 
generation  of  the  Son  and  the  procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit? 
Leaving  aside  the  peculiar  view  of  Richard  of  St.  Victor,  who 
looked  upon  divine  love  as  the  common  source  of  the  Son 
and  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  unanimous  answer  of  the  Scholastics 
to  this  question  is  that  the  Son  is  begotten  by  way  of  nature 
or  intellect,  and  that  the  Holy  Spirit  proceeds  from  the 
divine  will.  On  this  they  are  all  agreed,  but  in  their  explana¬ 
tion  of  this  answer  there  is  manifest  a  considerable  differ¬ 
ence  of  views.  Thus  Alexander  of  Hales  makes  the  act 
of  the  notional  intellect  merely  concomitant  to  the  fecundity 
of  the  divine  nature.  Hence  he  says:  Cum  ergo  dicitur,  in - 
telligendo  generat,  vel  intelligere  est  speciem  generare,  in - 
telligitur  per  concomitantiamP 1  Very  much  the  same  view 
is  taken  by  St.  Bonaventure.32  St.  Thomas,  on  the  other 
hand,  places  a  special  emphasis  on  the  divine  intellect. 
“  Procession,”  he  says,  “  always  supposes  action,  and  as 
there  is  a  procession  ad  extra  corresponding  to  the  act  tend¬ 
ing  to  external  matter,  so  there  must  be  a  procession  ad  intra 
corresponding  to  the  act  remaining  within  the  agent.  This 
applies  most  conspicuously  to  the  intellect,  the  action  of 
which  remains  in  the  intelligent  agent.  Whenever  we 
understand,  by  the  very  fact  of  understanding  there  proceeds 
something  within  us,  which  is  a  conception  of  the  object 
understood,  a  conception  issuing  from  our  intellectual  power 
and  proceeding  from  our  knowledge  of  that  object.  This 
conception  is  signified  by  the  spoken  word,  and  it  is  called 

t 

28  In  Sent.  I,  d.  7,  a.  2.  31  Sum.  q.  42,  m.  2. 

29  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  41,  a.  5.  32  In  Sent.  I,  d.  6,  a.  unic. 

30  Report,  d.  7,  q.  1. 


92 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


the  word  of  the  heart  signified  by  the  word  of  the  voice.”  33 
In  this  manner  the  Son  “  proceeds  by  way  of  intelligible  ac¬ 
tion,  which  is  a  vital  operation.”  34 

Scotus  adopts  the  terminology  of  St.  Bonaventure,  stating 
that  the  divine  processions  are  via  naturae  and  via  volnnta- 
tis .35  In  opposition  to  St.  Thomas,  he  denies  that  the  act 
of  simple  cognition,  even  in  so  far  as  it  connotes  paternity, 
constitutes  the  generation  of  the  Son.  That  generation,  he 
contends,  is  logically  posterior  to  cognition  and  proceeds  from 
the  memoria  fecunda,  that  is,  from  the  intelligence  already 
in  possession  of  its  essential  object.36  Furthermore,  whilst 
St.  Thomas  holds  that  the  Son  proceeds  from  the  intellect 
in  so  far  as  it  is  expressive  of  all  that  is  knowable,37  Scotus 
restricts  the  generative  action  of  the  intellect  to  its  cognition 
of  the  divine  essence  and  attributes,  including  probably  also 
a  quasi  abstract  cognition  of  the  persons.38 

There  is  a  similar  difference  of  views  with  regard  to  the 
procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  All  are  agreed  that  the  Holy 
Ghost  proceeds  by  way  of  the  will,  and  that  this  is  a  proces¬ 
sion  of  love.  St.  Thomas  describes  it  as  follows:  “We 
must  consider  each  procession  similarly.  For  as  when  a 
thing  is  understood  by  any  one,  there  results  in  the  intelligent 
agent  a  conception  of  the  object  understood,  which  concep¬ 
tion  we  call  word;  so  when  any  one  loves  an  object,  a  cer¬ 
tain  impression  results,  so  to  speak,  of  the  thing  loved  in 
the  affection  of  the  lover.  And  by  reason  of  this  the  object 
loved  is  said  to  be  in  the  lover,  as  also  the  thing  understood 
is  in  the  one  who  understands;  so  that  when  any  one  under¬ 
stands  and  loves  himself  he  is  in  himself,  not  only  by  real 
identity,  but  also  as  the  object  understood  is  in  the  one  who 
understands,  and  the  thing  loved  is  in  the  lover.”  39 

Scotus  admits  this  reasoning  in  so  far  as  it  affirms  that 
the  Holy  Spirit  proceeds  from  an  act  of  love,  but  he  divides 
that  love  into  two  formally  distinct  acts.  The  first  follows 

33  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  27,  a.  1.  37  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  34,  a.  3 ;  cfr. 

34  Ibid.  a.  2.  Cont.  Gent.  IV,  c.  13. 

35  In  Sent.  I,  d.  2,  q.  7,  n.  18-33.  38  In  Sent.  I,  d.  10;  Report.  I,  d. 

36  In  Sent.  I,  d.  2,  q.  7,  n.  2-16.  6,  q.  2 ;  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  q.  1,  a.  2. 

39  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  37,  a.  1. 


THE  BLESSED  TRINITY 


93 


upon  God’s  essential  cognition  and  precedes  both  the  gener¬ 
ation  of  the  Son  and  the  procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  The 
second  corresponds  to  the  memoria  fecunda  in  the  generation 
of  the  Word,  and  constitutes  the  active  spiration  which  is 
common  to  the  Father  and  the  Son.40  Moreover,  God’s  love 
of  Himself  is  both  free  and  necessary.  It  is  free  in  so  far 
as  it  comes  within  the  scope  of  God’s  power  and  dominion, 
and  it  is  necessary  in  as  much  as  its  object  is  infinite.41 

That  the  Holy  Spirit  proceeds  both  from  the  Father  and 
the  Son  was  conceded  by  all  to  be  an  article  of  faith,  as  it 
had  been  authoritatively  inserted  in  the  Creed  at  the  begin¬ 
ning  of  the  eleventh  century.42  On  account,  however,  of  the 
opposition  of  the  Greeks,  both  St.  Anselm  and  St.  Thomas 
wrote  special  treatises  in  support  of  the  doctrine.  Moreover 
all  were  agreed  that  the  Father  and  the  Son  constitute  only 
one  principle  of  spiration,  yet  so  that  there  are  said  to  be  two 
persons  of  whom  the  act  of  spiration  is  predicated.43  St. 
Thomas  puts  his  explanation  in  this  form:  “  If  we  consider 
the  spirative  power,  the  Holy  Ghost  proceeds  from  the  Father 
and  the  Son  as  they  are  one  in  the  power  of  spiration,  which 
in  a  certain  way  signifies  the  nature  with  the  property.  .  .  . 
Nor  is  there  any  reason  against  one  property  being  in  two 
subjects  that  possess  one  common  nature.  But  if  we  con¬ 
sider  the  subjects  —  supposita  —  of  the  spiration,  then  we 
may  say  that  the  Holy  Ghost  proceeds  from  the  Father 
and  the  Son  as  distinct;  for  He  proceeds  from  them  as  the 
unitive  love  of  both.”  44 

The  teaching  here  set  forth  was  thus  defined  by  the  Coun¬ 
cil  of  Lyons,  held  in  1274:  “We  profess  that  the  Holy 
Spirit  proceeds  eternally  from  the  Father  and  the  Son,  not 
as  from  two  principles,  but  as  from  one  principle,  not  by 
two  spirations,  but  by  one  spiration.  .  .  .  But  because  some, 
through  ignorance  of  the  aforesaid  irrefragable  teaching,  have 


40  Report.  I,  d.  6,  q.  11. 

41  In  Sent.  I,  d.  2.  q.  7 ;  Report.  I, 
d.  10,  q.  3 ;  Quodl.  1,  16. 

42  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  497. 

43  Cfr.  Halens.  Sum.  p.  I,  q.  70, 
m.  3;  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  d.  11,  a. 


unic.  q.  1,  2;  Albert.  Magn.  In 
Sent.  d.  11,  a.  3,  4,  5;  Henr.  Gand. 
Sum.  a.  54,  q.  6;  Thom.  In  Sent.  d. 
11,  q.  1,  a.  2;  Scot.  In  Sent.  d.  12, 
q.  1. 

44  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  36,  a.  4  ad  im. 


94 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


fallen  into  various  errors,  we,  wishing  to  close  the  way  to 
these  errors,  with  the  approval  of  the  sacred  Council,  con¬ 
demn  and  reprobate  those  who  presume  to  deny  that  the  Holy 
Spirit  proceeds  eternally  from  the  Father  and  the  Son;  and 
also  those  who  temerariously  assert  that  the  Holy  Spirit  pro¬ 
ceeds  from  the  Father  and  the  Son  as  from  two  principles, 
and  not  as  from  one.”  45  A  similar  definition  was  given  by 
the  Council  of  Florence  in  1439, 46  both  definitions  being  oc¬ 
casioned  by  the  attempted  reunion  of  the  Greek  Church  with 
the  Holy  See. 

5.  Divine  Relations. —  As  there  are  processions  in  God,  it 
necessarily  follows  that  there  are  also  divine  relations.  For, 
says  St.  Thomas,  “  when  something  proceeds  from  a  prin¬ 
ciple  of  the  same  nature,  then  both  the  one  proceeding  and 
the  source  of  procession  agree  in  the  same  order;  and  then 
they  have  real  relations  to  each  other.”  47  Now  as  there  are 
two  processions  in  the  Godhead,  each  involving  a  principle 
and  a  term,  there  must  be  four  relations,  two  of  origination 
and  two  of  procession.  The  former  two  are  paternity  and 
spiration,  the  later  filiation  and  procession.48  These  relations 
are,  on  the  one  hand,  really  identified  with  the  divine  essence ; 
yet,  on  the  other  hand,  as  relations  they  are  really  distinct 
from  one  another.49  Their  real  identity  with  the  divine  es¬ 
sence  was  affirmed  by  the  Council  of  Rheims  against  Gilbert 
de  la  Porree,  who  held  that  they  were  merely  assistant  or 
externally  affixed  to  the  nature  of  the  Godhead;  while  their 
real  distinction  from  one  another  is  necessarily  implied  in 
the  distinction  of  the  persons.  However  in  regard  to  both 
points  there  was  some  difference  of  views  among  the 
Scholastics,  as  there  is  among  theologians  to-day. 

The  first  point  is  thus  explained  by  St.  Thomas:  “  It  is 
manifest  that  relation  really  existing  in  God  is  really  the  same 
as  His  essence:  and  only  differs  in  its  mode  of  intelligibility, 
in  as  much  as  it  imports  regard  to  its  opposite  which  is  not 
expressed  in  the  name  of  essence.” 50  Hence  he  holds  a 

45  Mansi,  24,  81B  ;  DB,  460.  48  Ibid.  a.  4. 

46  Mansi.  31,  765 E  ;  DB,  691.  49  Ibid.  a.  3. 

47  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  28,  a.  1.  50  Ibid.  a.  2. 


THE  BLESSED  TRINITY 


95 


virtual  distinction,  which  is  based  upon  the  different  modes 
of  intelligibility  as  proper  to  the  essence  and  the  relations.  St. 
Bonaventure  conceives  the  matter  in  very  much  the  same  way, 
but  he  contends  that  the  distinction  is  more  than  merely  vir¬ 
tual.  He  calls  it  a  distinction  of  attribution,  in  as  much  as 
the  concept  of  relation  adds  to  the  concept  of  essence  a  re¬ 
gard  to  something  else.51  Scotus  introduces  here  his  formal 
distinction  —  distinctio  formalis  cx  natura  rei ,52  which,  ac¬ 
cording  to  some,  is  only  a  logical  development  of  the  distinctio 
attributions  of  St.  Bonaventure.  The  Nominalists,  on  the 
other  hand,  rejected  all  virtual  distinction,  contending  that 
essence  and  relations,  as  also  all  absolute  perfections  in  the 
Godhead,  are  distinguished  only  mentally  —  distinctione  ra- 
tionis  ratio cinantis.  This  view,  which  St.  Bonaventure  and 
Alexander  of  Hales  attribute  also  to  Praepositivus,  Chancellor 
of  the  Paris  University  early  in  the  thirteenth  century,  was 
rejected  by  all  the  other  Scholastics.  And,  in  fact,  it  cannot 
be  admitted  without  destroying  the  foundation  of  the  real 
distinction  of  the  divine  persons. 

The  second  point  at  issue,  that  the  relations  are  really 
distinct  from  one  another,  was  held  by  all  Scholastics  out¬ 
side  the  Nominalist  School.  It  is  precisely  the  relations  that 
constitute  the  distinction  between  the  divine  persons.  For 
according  to  the  fundamental  law  of  the  Trinity,  first 
definitely  formulated  by  St.  Anselm 53  and  later  formally 
approved  by  the  Council  of  Florence,  in  the  Godhead  all  per¬ 
fections  are  identical  save  where  there  is  relative  opposition 
—  in  divinis  omnia  sunt  unum  ubi  non  obviat  relations  op¬ 
position  The  reason  for  the  distinction  is  thus  given  by 
St.  Thomas :  “  The  idea  of  relation  necessarily  means  re¬ 

gard  of  one  to  another,  according  as  one  is  relatively  op¬ 
posed  to  another.  So  as  in  God  there  is  real  relation,  there 
must  also  be  real  opposition ;  but  the  very  nature  of  relative 
opposition  includes  distinction.  Hence  there  must  be  real 
distinction  in  God;  not,  indeed,  according  to  that  which  is 

51  In  Sent.  d.  26,  a.  unic.  q.  1.  53  Monol.  c.  2. 

52  In  Sent.  d.  2,  q.  7,  n.  41;  54  Decret.  pro  Jacob.;  Mansi,  31, 

Quodl.  5.  1735D ;  DB,  703. 


96 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


absolute  —  that  is  the  essence,  wherein  there  is  supreme  unity 
and  simplicity  —  but  according  to  that  which  is  relative.”  55 

6.  Divine  Persons. —  That  the  Father,  the  Son,  and  the 
Holy  Spirit  are  in  a  true  sense  divine  persons,  was  accepted 
by  the  Scholastics  as  clearly  contained  in  the  teaching  of  the 
Church.  This  point  had  been  firmly  established  by  the  great 
Fathers  of  the  fourth  century,  and,  in  fact,  had  always  been 
a  matter  of  faith.  Furthermore,  that  the  divine  persons  are 
not  something  absolute  but  relative,  was  also  admitted  with¬ 
out  controversy.  In  keeping  with  the  teaching  of  St. 
Augustine,  it  was  generally  assumed  that  the  persons  in  the 
Godhead  are  subsisting  relations  —  relationes  subsistentes. 
Hence  St.  Thomas  writes :  “  Relation  in  God  is  not  as  an 

accident  in  a  subject,  but  is  the  divine  essence  itself;  and 
so  it  is  subsistent,  for  the  divine  essence  subsists.  There¬ 
fore,  as  the  Godhead  is  God,  so  the  divine  paternity  is  God  the 
Father,  who  is  a  divine  person.  Therefore  a  divine  person  sig¬ 
nifies  a  relation  as  subsisting.  And  this  is  to  signify  relation 
by  way  of  substance,  and  such  a  relation  is  a  hypostasis  subsist¬ 
ing  in  the  divine  nature,  although  in  truth  that  which  sub¬ 
sists  in  the  divine  nature  is  the  divine  nature  itself.”  56 

However,  as  the  divine  relations  may  be  viewed  either  in 
their  origin  or  in  themselves,  the  question  arose,  under  what 
aspect  are  they  constitutive  -and  distinctive  of  the  per¬ 
sons?  Are  the  persons  constituted  and  distinguished  from 
one  another  solely  by  their  origin,  or  by  the  relations  them¬ 
selves,  or  by  the  two  together?  On  this  point  the  Scholastics 
entertained  different  views. 

Praepositivus  and  others,  whose  view  appears  acceptable  to 
the  Lombard,  held  the  divine  persons  to  be  distinguished  by 
their  origin  only,  so  that  the  relations  must  be  regarded  as 
mere  manifestations  of  the  distinction  already  presupposed. 
St.  Bonaventure  also  approves  of  this  view,  although  he 
modifies  it  somewhat  before  he  makes  it  his  own.  The  per¬ 
sons  are  distinguished,  he  says,  by  their  origin  inchoative,  and 
by  the  relations  formaliter;  or,  which  comes  to  the  same,  they 

55  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  28,  a.  3.  56  Ibid.  q.  29,  a.  4. 


THE  BLESSED  TRINITY 


97 


are  distinguished  by  each  separately,  but  only  in  so  far  as  the 
one  includes  the  other.57 

St.  Thomas  rejects  the  opinion  of  Praepositivus  and  his 
followers  “  for  two  reasons :  Firstly,  because,  in  order  that 
two  things  may  be  understood  as  distinct,  their  distinction 
must  be  conceived  as  resulting  from  something  intrinsic  to 
both;  as  in  created  things  it  results  from  their  matter  and 
form.  But  origin  of  a  thing  does  not  designate  anything  in¬ 
trinsic;  it  means  the  way  from  something  or  to  something. 
.  .  .  Secondly,  because  the  distinction  of  the  divine  persons 
is  not  to  be  so  understood  as  if  what  is  common  to  them  all 
is  divided,  because  the  common  essence  remains  undivided; 
but  the  distinguishing  principles  themselves  must  constitute 
the  things  which  are  distinct.  Now  the  relations  or  the  prop¬ 
erties  distinguish  or  constitute  the  hypostases  or  persons,  in 
as  much  as  they  are  themselves  the  subsisting  persons;  as 
paternity  is  the  Father,  and  filiation  is  the  Son,  because  in 
God  the  abstract  and  the  concrete  do  not  differ.  But  it  is 
against  the  nature  of  origin  that  it  should  constitute  hyposta¬ 
sis  or  person.  For  origin  taken  in  an  active  sense  signifies 
proceeding  from  a  subsisting  person,  so  that  it  presupposes 
the  latter;  while  in  a  passive  sense  origin,  as  nativity,  signi¬ 
fies  the  way  to  a  subsisting  person,  and  as  not  yet  constitut¬ 
ing  the  person.”  58  Hence  he  concludes :  “  It  is  therefore 
better  to  say  that  the  persons  or  hypostases  are  distinguished 
by  relations  rather  than  by  origin.”  59 

Scotus  also  rejects  the  opinion  of  Praepositivus,  and  holds 
with  St.  Thomas  that  the  divine  persons  are  constituted  and 
distinguished  by  the  relations.60  However,  as  he  regards  in¬ 
communicability,  in  which  he  places  the  formal  reason  of 
personality,  as  something  absolute,  he  holds  that  in  so  far 
even  the  absolute  properties  may  be  considered  as  constitut¬ 
ing  the  divine  persons.61 

The  fact  that  there  are  only  three  persons  in  the  Godhead 
is,  of  course,  an  article  of  faith ;  for  therein  consists  the 

67  In  Sent.  d.  26,  a.  unic.  q.  3.  60  In  Sent.  I,  d.  26;  Report.  I,  d. 

58  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  40,  a.  2.  2,  q.  7. 

59  Ibid.  61  In  Sent.  I,  d.  26,  n.  23-40. 


98 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


mystery  of  the  Blessed  Trinity.  But  the  Scholastics  went 
beyond  the  mere  fact  and  inquired  into  the  reasons  why  there 
can  be  only  three  divine  persons.  Almost  without  excep¬ 
tion,  they  find  the  explanation  in  the  processions  themselves. 
Only  two  processions  are  possible  in  the  Godhead,  because 
there  are  only  two  immanent  actions  in  God  from  which 
divine  processions  can  be  derived  —  that  of  the  intellect  and 
will.62  From  these  two  processions  there  can  result  only 
three  really  distinct  and  subsisting  relations,  because  real  dis¬ 
tinction  between  divine  relations  supposes  relative  opposition. 
This  opposition  is  found  between  paternity  and  filiation,  and 
between  active  and  passive  spiration.  But  active  spiration 
is  common  to  the  Father  and  the  Son,  and  hence,  although  it 
is  a  relation,  it  is  not  a  personal  property  and  therefore  does 
not  constitute  a  person.  Consequently,  there  can  be  only 
three  really  distinct  and  subsisting  relations  —  paternity, 
filiation,  and  procession;  and  these  are  respectively  the  Father, 
the  Son.  and  the  Holy  Spirit.63  Furthermore,  as  the  acts 
of  God's  intellect  and  will  are  infinite,  each  procession 
necessarily  exhausts  the  fecundity  of  its  own  principle,  both 
proximate  and  remote.64 

From  the  nature  of  the  divine  processions  it  necessarily 
follows  that  the  three  divine  persons  are  at  once  really  dis¬ 
tinct,  consubstantial,  and  intimately  present  to  one  another. 
This  threefold  consequence  is  usually  expressed  by  the  term 
circuminccssio ;  or  as  modern  usage  seems  to  prefer,  by  the 
term  circuminsessio.  “  In  the  divine  order,”  says  St.  Bona- 
venture,  “  there  is  a  perfect  circumincession.  And  the  mean¬ 
ing  of  circumincession  is  this,  that  one  is  in  the  other  and 
conversely.  Properly  speaking  and  in  its  perfection,  this 
can  have  place  only  in  God;  because  circumincession  implies 
both  distinction  and  unity.  And  because  in  God  alone  is 
found  the  most  perfect  unity  together  with  distinction  —  so 
that  the  distinction  is  without  confusion  and  the  unity  with- 

62  Thom.  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  30,  a.  63  Ibid. 

2 ;  Scot.  Report.  I,  d.  2.  q.  7 :  Quodl.  64  Cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q. 
q.  2;  Albert.  Magn.  In  Sent.  I,  d.  41,  a.  6;  Scotus,  Report.  I,  d.  2,  q. 
10,  a.  12;  Halens.  Sum.  I,  q.  45,  7;  Quodl.  q.  2. 

m.  7. 


THE  BLESSED  TRINITY 


99 


out  distinction  —  hence  it  is  that  in  God  alone  perfect  cir- 
cumincession  can  be  found.  The  reason  of  this  is  obvious; 
because  the  formal  concept  of  circumincession  implies  identity 
of  essence  and  real  distinction  of  persons.”  65 

St.  Thomas  uses  somewhat  different  terms,  but  comes  to 
substantially  the  same  result.  Answering  the  question, 
whether  the  Son  is  in  the  Father  and  conversely,  he  says: 
“  There  are  three  points  of  consideration  as  regards  the  Father 
and  the  Son :  the  essence,  the  relation,  and  the  origin ;  and 
according  to  each  the  Son  and  the  Father  are  in  each  other. 
The  Father  is  in  the  Son  by  His  essence,  forasmuch  as  the 
Father  is  His  own  essence,  and  communicates  His  essence  to 
the  Son  not  by  any  change  on  His  part.  Hence  it  follows 
that  as  the  Father’s  essence  is  in  the  Son,  the  Father  Him¬ 
self  is  in  the  Son;  likewise,  since  the  Son  is  His  own  es¬ 
sence,  it  follows  that  He  Himself  is  in  the  Father  in  whom 
is  His  essence.  ...  It  is  also  manifest  as  regards  the  re¬ 
lations,  each  of  two  relative  opposites  is  in  the  concept  of 
the  other.  Regarding  origin  also,  it  is  clear  that  the  proces¬ 
sion  of  the  intelligible  word  is  not  outside  the  intellect,  in 
as  much  as  it  remains  in  the  utterer  of  the  word.  What  also 
is  uttered  by  the  word  is  therein  contained.  And  the  same 
applies  to  the  Holy  Ghost.”  66 

65  In  Sent.  I,  d.  19,  p.  1,  a.  unic.  q.  4. 

66  Sum.  Theol.  I,  a.  42,  a.  5. 


CHAPTER  V 


CREATION  OF  THE  WORLD 

The  Church’s  teaching  on  the  origin  of  the  world,  like  that 
on  the  mystery  of  the  Blessed  Trinity,  was  bequeathed  to  the 
Scholastics  of  the  Middle  Ages  in  an  almost  fully  developed 
state.  The  absence  of  a  material  cause,  the  unity  of  the  ef¬ 
ficient  cause,  and  the  transcendence  of  the  final  cause  of  crea¬ 
tion  were  as  fully  understood  and  as  clearly  demonstrated  by 
the  theologians  of  the  Patristic  period  as  by  their  successors 
during  the  golden  age  of  Scholasticism.  Much  work  still 
remained  to  be  done  by  way  of  synthesis  and  proper  evalua¬ 
tion  of  the  various  subordinate  parts  of  the  doctrine,  but  the 
doctrine  itself  stood  in  no  need  of  further  elucidation.1 

Still  on  the  very  threshold  of  Scholasticism  the  doctrine 
of  creation  was  attacked  by  a  man  who  was  perhaps  the  most 
original  thinker  of  his  time.  This  was  John  Scotus  Erigena, 
“  vir  per  omnia  sanctus,  qui  potuit  err  are,  haereticus  esse 
noluit Most  probably  a  native  of  Ireland,  he  was  towards 
the  middle  of  the  ninth  century  called  to  the  court  of  Charles 
the  Bald,  where,  besides  being  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
palace  school,  he  was  asked  by  his  royal  patron  to  translate 
the  works  of  Pseudo-Dionysius  and  of  Maximus  Confessor. 
Having  accomplished  this,  he  composed  several  original 
works,  the  most  important  of  which  is  his  treatise  De  Dizri- 
sione  Naturae.  It  is  practically  a  reconstruction  of  Neo- 
Platonism,  with  little  more  than  a  mere  veneering  of  Christian 
teaching.  His  views  touching  the  origin  of  the  world,  as 
there  expressed,  are  plainly  pantheistic.  God,  he  says,  is  the 
essence  of  all  things,  because  He  alone  has  existence  in  the 
true  sense  of  the  term.  The  being  of  all  things  is  the  su- 
pereminent  being  of  the  Godhead.2  Hence  when  we  hear  it 

1  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  284  sqq. 


100 


2  Op.  cit.  c.  3. 


CREATION  OF  THE  WORLD 


IOI 


said  that  God  made  all  things  out  of  nothing,  we  must  not 
understand  this  in  any  other  sense  than  that  God  is  in  all 
things,  that  is,  He  subsists  as  the  essence  of  all  things.”  3 
Some  have  tried  to  interpret  these  and  many  similar  expres¬ 
sions  in  an  orthodox  sense,  but  the  whole  trend  of  the  book 
militates  against  such  an  interpretation.4 

However  this  teaching  of  Erigena  found  no  followers  in 
the  schools,  except  in  that  of  Chartres,  and  there  only  in¬ 
directly  and  to  a  very  limited  extent.  It  is  true,  many  of  the 
Scholastics,  and  among  them  St.  Thomas  himself,  speak  of 
creation  as  a  processio  vel  emanatio  crcaturarum  a  Deo ;  they 
say  that  the  universe  proceeded  from  God  even  as  a  river 
flows  from  its  source,  as  a  shadow  is  cast  by  the  substance, 
as  an  image  is  reflected  in  a  mirror :  but  at  the  same  time  they 
are  careful  to  insist  that  God  can  in  no  sense  be  regarded 
as  the  material  cause  of  creatures,  and  that  no  reality  passes 
from  the  Creator  into  the  created  object.  Even  St.  Anselm, 
whose  realism  in  philosophy  might  easily  have  led  him  into 
error  on  this  point,  is  a  staunch  defender  of  creation  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  term.  He  holds,  indeed,  that  creatures 
had  a  certain  preexistence  in  the  mind  and  power  of  God, 
but  only  in  so  far  as  the  Creator  is  the  exemplary  and  efficient 
cause  of  all  that  exists.  Before  their  creation  all  finite  beings 
were  simply  nothing  in  the  order  of  their  own  reality  —  non 
erant  quod  nunc  sunt ,  nec  erat  ex  quo  tierent .5 

The  principal  points  to  be  considered  in  the  Church’s  teach¬ 
ing  on  the  origin  of  the  world  are  the  following:  The  crea¬ 
tive  act,  the  efficient  cause,  the  exemplary  cause,  the  final 
cause,  creation  in  time,  creation  and  conservation. 

i.  The  Creative  Act. —  The  two  definitions  of  creation 
given  by  St.  Thomas  —  creation  is  the  production  of  being 
as  being,  and,  creation  is  the  production  of  the  whole  sub¬ 
stance  of  a  thing,  with  nothing  presupposed  6 — were,  with 
some  slight  verbal  modifications,  defended  by  all  Scholastics.7 


3  Op.  cit.  c.  72. 

4  Cfr.  W.  Turner,  The  Irish 

Theological  Quarterly,  October, 

1910,  p.  391-401. 


5  Monol.  c.  8,  9 ;  cfr.  c.  3,  4. 

6  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  44,  a.  2 ;  Ibid, 
q.  65,  a.  3. 

7  Cfr.  Halens.  Sum.  p.  II,  q.  6,  m. 


102 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


The  two  definitions  are  essentially  the  same,  and  both  empha¬ 
size  the  most  fundamental  concept  of  creation  —  the  produc¬ 
tion  of  something  from  nothing,  or  of  being  from  not-being. 
This  constitutes  the  specific  difference  between  the  creative 
act  and  all  other  modes  of  production.  In  creation  there  is 
no  transition  from  one  mode  of  real  being  to  another;  there 
is  simply  an  inception  of  the  reality  itself  in  obedience  to  the 
command  of  an  omnipotent  will.  As  St.  Bonaventure  words 
it :  “  The  world  was  called  into  being,  not  only  in  its  entirety, 

but  in  respect  of  its  intrinsic  principles,  which  are  not  from 
something  else,  but  from  nothing.”  8 

St.  Thomas,  comparing  creation  to  other  modes  of  pro¬ 
ductions,  describes  it  in  this  way:  “  We  must  consider  not 
only  the  emanation  of  a  particular  being  from  a  particular 
agent,  but  also  the  emanation  of  all  being  from  the  universal 
cause,  which  is  God.  Now  what  proceeds  by  particular 
emanation,  is  not  presupposed  to  that  emanation ;  as  when 
a  man  is  generated,  he  was  not  before,  but  man  is  made  from 
not-man,  and  white  from  not-zvhite.  Hence  if  the  emanation 
of  the  whole  universal  being  from  the  first  principle  be  con¬ 
sidered,  it  is  impossible  that  any  being  should  be  presupposed 
before  this  emanation.  For  nothing  is  the  same  as  no  being. 
Therefore  as  the  generation  of  a  man  is  from  the  not-being 
which  is  not-man,  so  creation,  which  is  the  emanation  of  all 
being,  is  from  the  not-being  which  is  nothing !’  9 

The  creative  act  has  for  its  proximate  principles  the  divine 
intellect  and  will,  the  one  as  directive  and  the  other  as  execu¬ 
tive  principle.  The  ultimate  principle  is  the  divine  nature, 
with  which  the  act  itself  is  identified.  On  this  all  Scholastics 
are  agreed,  though  with  some  slight  shades  of  difference  in 
their  views  respecting  the  function  of  the  intellect.  But  on 
two  other  points  there  was  considerable  difference  of  opinion, 
namely,  whether  the  creative  act  should  be  called  immanent, 
or  transient,  or  a  mere  relation;  and,  whether  the  dependence 

I,  2;  Scotus,  In  Sent.  II,  d.  I,  q.  2;  8  Loc.  cit. 

Bonavent.  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  p.  1,  a.  9  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  45,  a.  1. 

1,  q.  1. 


CREATION  OF  THE  WORLD 


103 


of  the  creature  on  the  Creator  must  be  conceived  as  some¬ 
thing  superadded  to  its  being. 

In  answer  to  the  first  question,  all  state  that  the  creative 
act  is  not  transient  in  the  sense  that  there  is  any  change  or 
imperfection  in  the  Creator.  Hence  some  call  the  act  simply 
immanent;  while  others  prefer  to  regard  it  as  formally  im¬ 
manent  and  virtually  transient,  because  whilst  the  action  it¬ 
self  remains  entirely  in  God,  its  term  is  placed  ad  extra.10 
St.  Thomas  words  his  explanation  somewhat  differently, 
although  his  view  does  not  seem  to  differ  materially  from  the 
second  one  here  given.  “  Creation,”  he  says,  “  places  some¬ 
thing  in  the  being  created  according  to  relation  only;  be¬ 
cause  what  is  created  is  not  made  by  motion  or  by  change. 
For  what  is  made  by  motion  or  by  change  is  made  from  some¬ 
thing  preexisting.  And  this  happens,  indeed,  in  the  particu¬ 
lar  productions  of  some  beings,  but  cannot  happen  in  the 
production  of  all  beings  by  the  universal  cause  of  all  beings, 
which  is  God.  Hence  God  by  creation  produces  things  with¬ 
out  motion.  Now  when  motion  is  removed  from  action  and 
passion,  only  relation  remains.  .  .  .  Hence  creation  in  the 
creature  is  only  a  certain  relation  to  the  Creator  as  to  the 
principle  of  its  being.”  11 

There  was  a  similar  difference  of  views  with  regard  to  the 
second  question.  Some  there  were  who  regarded  the  relation 
of  the  creature  to  the  Creator  as  something  really  distinct  from 
the  created  essence.  This  view  is  also  taken  by  St.  Thomas, 
who  says  that  it  is  a  relative  accident  superadded  to  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  the  creature.12  St.  Bonaventure  holds  that  it  is  really 
identical  with  the  essence,  but  formally  distinct  from  it  as  a 
relation.13  Scotus,  after  a  lengthy  discussion  of  the  point, 
comes  to  the  same  conclusion,  holding  that  this  is  an  instance 
where  his  distinctio  formalis  ex  natura  rei  finds  its  proper 
application.14 


10  Cfr.  Bonavent.  loc.  cit.  a.  3,  q. 
2;  Albert.  Magn.  Sum.  I,  tr.  13,  q. 
53,  m.  2. 

11  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  45,  a.  3. 


12  In  Sent.  II,  q.  1,  a.  2  ad  4m; 
De  Potent,  q.  3,  a.  3  ad  3m. 

13  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  p.  1,  a.  3,  q.  2. 

14  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  q.  2;  Report. 
II,  d.  1,  q.  5,  6. 


104 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


As  creation  is  thus  not  a  processus  physicus,  but  simply  an 
act  of  the  divine  will  ad  extra,  God  was  free  to  create  or  not 
to  create,  to  create  this  world  or  any  other  world,  according 
to  His  own  good  pleasure.  This  was  denied  by  Abelard,  who 
contended  that  God  was  necessitated  by  His  own  goodness 
and  perfection,  not  only  to  create,  but  to  create  the  best  pos¬ 
sible  world.15 

This  teaching  of  Abelard  was  immediately  attacked  by 
William  of  Saint  Thierry,  St.  Bernard,  and  Hugh  of  St. 
Victor,  and  together  with  his  many  other  errors  was  con¬ 
demned  by  the  Council  of  Sens.  Alexander  of  Hales,  dis¬ 
cussing  the  matter  of  freedom  in  reference  to  the  creative 
act,  points  out  that  God  cannot  be  dependent  on  anything  out¬ 
side  Himself,  and  therefore  it  follows  that  He  was  free  in 
creating  the  world  and  in  giving  it  what  perfection  He 
pleased ;  but  having  once  decreed  to  call  the  world  into  being, 
the  manner  of  accomplishing  His  work  was  most  perfect.16 
Albertus  Magnus  distinguishes  betwen  the  order  of  the  uni¬ 
verse  as  a  whole  and  the  perfection  of  individual  creatures: 
in  the  former  sense  the  world  is  most  perfect,  but  not  in  the 
latter.17 

The  view  of  St.  Thomas  on  this  matter  may  be  summed 
up  as  follows:  In  the  first  place,  we  must  distinguish  be¬ 
tween  the  idea  of  the  world  in.  the  mind  of  God  and  its 
realization  in  the  order  of  things.  The  former  has  a  neces¬ 
sary  existence,  since  it  is  identified  with  God’s  essence ;  but 
the  latter  depends  on  God’s  free  determination,  since  He  is 
sovereignly  independent  of  all  that  can  have  existence  outside 
Himself.  Then,  as  God  creates  by  an  act  of  His  free  will, 
He  can  communicate  His  goodness  and  perfections  in  what¬ 
ever  degree  He  chooses,  and  consequently  create  a  world  more 


15  He  put  his  teaching  in  this 
form:  “  Necessario  itaque  Deus 
mundum  esse  voluit  ac  fecit,  nec 
otiosus  extitit,  qui  eum,  priusquam 
fecit,  facere  non  potuit,  quia  prius¬ 
quam  fecit,  fieri  eum  non  oportuit. 
Si  enim  prius  fecisset,  utique  et 
prius  eum  fieri  oportuisset,  quia 


facere  quidquam  nisi  opportunum 
non  potest,  immo  nisi  optimum,  id 
est,  tarn  bonum  quantumcumque 
convenit,  quod  suo  alto  reservatur 
consilio  ”  (Theol.  Christ.  V;  cfr. 
Introd.  ad  Theol.  Ill,  c.  5). 

16  Sum.  II,  q.  21,  m.  3,  a.  1,  2. 

17  Sum.  I,  tr.  19,  q.  77,  m.  3,  a.  1. 


CREATION  OF  THE  WORLD 


105 


or  less  perfect  according  to  His  own  good  pleasure.  More¬ 
over,  a  world  that  could  in  no  sense  be  more  perfect,  a  mundus 
absolute  0 primus,  would  be  a  contradiction  in  terms.18 

This  careful  analysis  of  the  creative  act,  under  all  its  dif¬ 
ferent  aspects,  was  at  the  time  of  great  importance.  For 
although  the  Neo-Platonic  pantheism  of  Scotus  Erigena  had 
been  condemned  by  the  Church,19  there  was  danger  of  a 
similar  error  finding  its  way  into  the  schools  through  the  Ara¬ 
bian  philosophers,  especially  Avicenna  (  +  1036)  and  Aver- 
roes  (-(-1198),  who  were  held  in  great  esteem  during  the 
twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries.  It  was  especially  through  a 
corrupted  text  of  Aristotle  that  they  propagated  their  panthe¬ 
istic  views.  Postulating  the  existence  of  eternal  matter,  they 
at  the  same  time  explained  the  origin  of  the  world  by  a  series 
of  emanations  from  the  Supreme  Intelligence,  thus  completely 
setting  aside  the  idea  of  creation  as  contained  in  the  teaching 
of  the  Church.20  St.  Thomas  wrote  special  treatises  to  re¬ 
fute  Averroes,  but  for  all  that  he  spoke  of  him  with  great 
respect  and  used  his  Grand  Commentary  on  Aristotle  as  his 
model. 

2.  Efficient  Cause  of  Creation. —  That  God  is  the  author  of 
all  things,  visible  and  invisible,  is  a  truth  that  was  defined 
by  the  First  General  Council.  It  was,  moreover,  fully  ex¬ 
plained  and  proved  by  many  of  the  Fathers,  especially  St. 
Augustine,  in  their  struggles  against  Manichaeism.  In  the 
early  Middle  Ages  it  was  again  denied  by  the  Cathari,  an 
heretical  sect  which  under  various  names  gained  a  strong 
foothold  in  France  and  Italy.  In  regard  to  creation  they 
revived  the  Manichaean  teaching  that  there  are  two  First 
Principles,  one  being  the  author  of  what  is  good  in  the  world, 
and  the  other  of  what  is  evil.  They  were  condemned  by 
several  local  synods,  and  finally  by  the  Third  and  Fourth 
Lateran  Councils.  The  latter  thus  defines  Catholic  teaching 
on  the  point  in  question:  a  We  believe  that  there  is  one  sole 
true  God,  .  .  .  three  persons  indeed,  but  one  essence,  sub- 

18  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  14,  a.  8;  q.  19  Mansi,  22,  1211. 

19,  a.  4;  q.  46,  a.  6;  q.  104,  a.  3;  20  Cfr.  Albert.  Magn.  In  Sent.  II, 

QQ.  DD.  3,  a.  15.  d.  1. 


io6 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


stance,  or  nature  altogether  simple,  .  .  .  one  principle  of  all 
things,  creator  of  all  things  visible  and  invisible,  spiritual  and 
corporeal,  who  by  His  omnipotent  power,  simultaneously  with 
the  beginning  of  time,  created  a  twofold  nature,  spiritual  and 
corporeal,  namely,  the  nature  of  the  angels  and  that  of  ma¬ 
terial  things,  and  then  human  nature,  which  partakes  of  both, 
in  that  it  consists  of  soul  and  body.  For  the  devil  and  other 
demons  were  indeed  good  in  their  nature  as  created  by  God, 
but  they  made  themselves  bad  by  their  own  conduct;  man 
sinned  at  the  suggestion  of  the  devil.”  21 

The  position  of  the  Scholastics  in  this  matter  is  clearly 
revealed  by  the  following  characterization  of  the  Manichaean 
error  by  St.  Bonaventure :  “  Every  system  of  philosophy 

condemns  the  fundamental  principle  of  this  error  —  that 
there  are  two  First  Principles  of  things.  For  this  being  ad¬ 
mitted,  the  order  of  the  universe  is  destroyed  and  the  power 
of  God  is  limited;  .  .  .  and  thence  it  follows  that  God  is  not 
God,  and  that  there  is  nothing  good.”  22  In  addition  to  this 
they  pointed  out  that  whatever  is  good  in  creatures  comes 
from  God,  and  what  is  bad  results  either  from  the  limitation 
of  finite  natures  or  from  the  abuse  of  a  created  free  will.23 

As  creation  proceeds  ad  extra,  the  principium  quod  of  the 
creative  action  is  the  whole  Trinity,  but  so  that  there  is  only 
one  Creator.  St.  Thomas  explains  this  as  follows:  “To 
create  is,  properly  speaking,  to  cause  or  produce  the  being 
of  things.  And  as  every  agent  produces  its  like,  the  prin¬ 
ciple  of  action  can  be  considered  from  the  effect  of  the  ac¬ 
tion;  for  it  must  be  fire  that  generates  fire.  And  therefore 
to  create  belongs  to  God  according  to  His  being,  that  is,  His 
essence,  which  is  common  to  the  three  persons.  Hence  to 
create  is  not  proper  to  any  one  person,  but  is  common  to  the 
whole  Trinity.  .  .  .  Nevertheless  the  divine  persons,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  nature  of  their  procession,  have  a  causality  respect¬ 
ing  the  creation  of  things.  For  .  .  .  God  is  the  cause  of 
things  by  His  intellect  and  His  will,  just  as  a  craftsman  is  the 
cause  of  things  by  his  craft.  Now  the  craftsman  works 

21  Mansi,  22,  982;  DB.  428.  23  Cfr.  St.  Thom.  Sum.  Theol.  I, 

22  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  p.  1,  a.  2,  q.  1.  q.  49. 


CREATION  OF  THE  WORLD 


107 


through  the  word  conceived  in  his  mind,  and  through  the  love 
of  his  will  regarding  some  object.  Hence  also  God  the 
Father  made  the  creature  through  His  Word,  which  is  the 
Son;  and  through  His  love,  which  is  the  Holy  Ghost.  And 
so  the  processions  of  the  persons  are  the  rati  ones  of  the  pro¬ 
ductions  of  creatures  in  as  much  as  they  include  the  essential 
attributes,  knowledge  and  will.”  24 

What  St.  Thomas  here  says  about  the  part  of  the  persons 
in  the  creative  act  because  of  the  processions,  is  denied  by 
Scotus,  who  regards  the  essential  attributes  of  intellect  and 
will  as  the  proximate  principle  of  the  creative  act,  in  so  far 
as  they  are  common  to  the  three  persons.  Hence  the  mode 
of  all  production  ad  extra  is  independent  of  the  processions.25 

In  connection  with  their  speculations  on  the  efficient  cause 
of  creation,  the  Scholastics  considered  the  subordinate  ques¬ 
tion,  whether  God  can  make  use  of  instrumental  causes  in 
the  creation  of  things.  All  admitted  that  creative  power  is 
exclusively  proper  to  God,  and  also  that  God  did  not  employ 
instrumental  causes  in  creating  the  world;  but  in  regard  to 
the  possibility  of  it  opinions  were  divided.  Thus  an  affirma¬ 
tive  answer  was  given  by  Peter  Lombard  and  some  others ;  26 
whilst  Durandus  contended  that  the  impossibility  of  a  creature 
acting  as  the  instrumental  cause  of  creation  cannot  be 
demonstrated  by  any  conclusive  argument,  so  long  as  there 
is  question  only  of  some  particular  effect.27  The  more 
common  view,  however,  subscribed  to  by  Alexander  of 
Hales,28  St.  Bonaventure,29  St.  Thomas,30  and  Scotus,31 
denies  that  creative  power  can  in  any  sense  be  communicated 
to  creatures.  The  principal  reason  of  this  denial  is  based 
upon  the  nature  both  of  instrumental  causality  and  of  the 
creative  act.  St.  Thomas,  refuting  the  opinion  of  the  Lom¬ 
bard,  puts  his  view  in  this  way :  “  The  secondary  instru¬ 

mental  cause  does  not  participate  in  the  action  of  the  superior 
cause,  except  as  much  as  by  something  proper  to  itself  it  acts 

24  Ibid.  q.  45,  a.  6.  28  Sum.  p.  2,  q.  9,  m.  7,  8. 


25  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  q.  I,  n.  19-23. 

26  Sent.  IV,  d.  5,  n.  3. 

27  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  q.  4. 


29  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  p.  1,  a.  2,  q.  2. 

30  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  45,  a.  5. 

31  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  1,  q.  1,  n.  28. 


io8 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


dispositively  to  the  effect  of  the  principal  agent.  .  .  .  Now 
the  proper  effect  of  God  creating  is  what  is  presupposed  to 
all  other  effects,  and  that  is  absolute  being.  Hence  nothing 
else  can  act  dispositively  and  instrumentally  to  this  effect, 
since  creation  is  not  from  anything  presupposed,  which  can 
be  disposed  by  the  action  of  the  instrumental  agent.  So 
therefore  it  is  impossible  for  any  creature  to  create,  either  by 
its  own  power,  or  instrumentally,  that  is,  ministerially.”  32 

3.  Exemplary  Cause  of  Creation. —  That  God  is  the 

exemplary  cause  of  all  things  created  is  the  common  teach¬ 
ing  of  the  Scholastics.  They  usually  treat  the  subject  in 
connection  with  the  question  of  divine  ideas.  “  As  the  world 
was  not  made  by  chance,”  says  St.  Thomas,  “  but  by  God 
acting  by  His  intellect,  .  .  .  there  must  exist  in  the  divine 
mind  that  form  to  the  likeness  of  which  the  world  was 
made.”  33  This  form  or  idea  is,  of  course,  identical  with  the 
divine  essence,  but  as  it  is  in  the  divine  mind  it  exhibits  the 
various  modes  in  which  that  essence  may  be  imitated  in 
creatures.  St.  Thomas  explains  this  by  saying :  “  The 

divine  essence  is  not  called  an  idea  in  so  far  as  it  is  that  es¬ 
sence,  but  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  likeness  or  type  of  this 
or  that  created  thing.  Hence  ideas  are  said  to  be  many, 
in  as  much  as  many  types  are  understood  by  the  self-same 
essence.”  34  The  substance  of  this  explanation  is  admitted 
by  all  Scholastics,  but  there  is  among  them  a  considerable 
difference  of  opinion  concerning  points  of  minor  import¬ 
ance.35 

4.  The  Final  Cause  of  Creation. —  The  final  cause  of  a 
thing,  taking  the  term  in  the  strict  sense,  is  that  which  the 
agent  intends  to  attain  and  by  which  he  is  moved  to  act.  In 
this  sense  there  can  be  no  final  cause  of  creation,  as  God  can 
be  moved  to  act  neither  by  His  own  goodness  nor  by  any 
good  apart  from  Himself.  But  taking  cause  in  a  wider  sense, 


32  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  45,  a.  5* 

33  Ibid.  q.  15,  a.  1. 

34  Ibid.  a.  2  ad  Tm. 

35  Cfr.  Halens.  Sum.  p.  1,  q.  23, 
m.  4,  a.  1 ;  Albert.  Magn.  Sum.  p.  1, 


tr.  13,  q.  55,  m.  2,  a.  4;  Bonavent. 
In  Sent.  I,  d.  35,  a.  unic.  q.  1 ;  Sco- 
tus,  In  Sent.  I,  q.  unic.;  Durand. 
Sent.  1,  d.  36,  q.  3. 


CREATION  OF  THE  WORLD 


109 


as  a  sufficient  reason  for  an  end  freely  willed,  the  term  is 
applicable  to  God  in  respect  of  His  creative  work.  Not  only 
did  He  ordain  the  attainment  of  His  own  extrinsic  glory  as 
the  end  to  which  all  creation  is  directed,  but  He  had  a  suffi¬ 
cient  reason  for  willing  this  end.  With  the  exception  of 
Durandus,36  all  Scholastics  are  at  one  on  the  question  so 
understood.  And  as  such  a  sufficient  reason  they  assign 
God’s  own  goodness  or  glory  —  not  to  be  acquired  or  in¬ 
creased,  but  to  be  manifested.  As  St.  Thomas  words  it: 
“  Every  agent  acts  for  an  end;  .  .  .  but  it  does  not  belong 
to  the  First  Agent,  who  is  agent  only,  to  act  for  the  acquisi¬ 
tion  of  some  end;  He  intends  only  to  communicate  His  per¬ 
fection,  which  is  His  goodness;  .  .  .  Therefore  the  divine 
goodness  is  the  end  of  all  things.”  37 

Subordinated  to  this  primary  end,  and  materially  identi¬ 
fied  with  God’s  extrinsic  glory,  is  the  utility  and  happiness 
of  rational  creatures.  In  this  sense  St.  Bonaventure  writes: 
“  The  principal  end  of  things  created  is  God’s  glory  or  good¬ 
ness,  rather  than  the  utility  of  creatures.  .  .  .  Therefore  on 
account  of  His  own  glory  did  He  create  —  not,  indeed,  that 
He  might  augment  His  glory,  but  that  He  might  manifest  and 
communicate  it;  and  in  this  manifestation  and  participation 
consists  the  highest  good  of  His  creatures,  namely,  their  glori¬ 
fication  and  beatitude.”  38  Six  hundred  years  later  the  doc¬ 
trine  thus  set  forth  was  defined  in  almost  identical  terms  by 
the  Vatican  Council.39 

5.  Creation  in  Time . —  Whether  the  world  existed  from  all 
eternity,  or  was  created  in  time,  was  during  the  Middle  Ages 
a  very  live  question;  because  the  disciples  of  Avicenna  and 
Averroes,  who  followed  in  this  the  teaching  of  pagan  philoso¬ 
phers,  stood  strongly  for  the  eternity  of  the  world,  at  least  in 
its  material  substratum.  The  Scholastics,  with  the  exception 
of  Abelard,  were  agreed  on  two  points :  First,  that  the  cre¬ 
ated  world  is  not  necessarily  from  all  eternity;  secondly,  that 
this  world  was  de  facto  created  in  time.  The  first  conclusion 
they  derived  from  the  freedom  of  the  creative  act,  which  is  by 

36  Sent.  II,  q.  2,  a.  1.  38  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  p.  2,  a.  2,  q.  1. 

37  Sum.  Theol.  q.  44,  a.  4.  39  Cap.  1,  can.  5 ;  DB,  1783,  1805. 


IIO 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


its  very  nature  independent  of  time  as  well  as  of  material 
causes.  The  second  they  proved  directly  from  revelation,  al¬ 
though  the  majority  held  that  the  same  conclusion  could  also 
be  derived  from  the  principles  of  reason,  as  brought  to  bear 
upon  the  world  in  its  concrete  reality. 

But  there  was  a  third  question  involved,  namely,  the  pos¬ 
sibility  of  eternal  creation.  On  this  point  a  sharp  controversy 
was  carried  on  for  many  years.  Alexander  of  Hales,40  St. 
Bonaventure,41  Albertus  Magnus,42  Henry  of  Ghent,43  Rich¬ 
ard  of  Middleton,44  and  the  vast  majority  of  Scholastics  de¬ 
nied  absolutely  that  eternal  creation  was  possible;  whilst  St. 
Thomas,45  Scotus,46  Durandus,47  Biel,48  and  many  Nominal¬ 
ists  held  that  the  impossibility  of  eternal  creation  could  not  be 
demonstrated  with  any  degree  of  certainty.  Most  of  these 
latter,  however,  limited  their  discussion  to  beings  that  are  not 
subject  to  motion  or  change.  St.  Thomas  is  usually  inter¬ 
preted  as  holding  the  possibility  of  eternal  creation  in  regard  to 
changeable  beings  as  well. 

The  arguments  commonly  adduced  to  show  the  impossibility 
of  eternal  creation  are  of  two  kinds.  First,  the  very  nature 
of  finite  beings  is  such  that  they  cannot  be  from  all  eternity. 
For  their  very  finiteness  involves  succession,  and  whatever  in¬ 
volves  succession  is  temporal  in  its  beginning.49  Secondly, 
creation  is  a  productio  ex  nihilo,  so  that  being  necessarily  fol¬ 
lows  upon  not-being,  and  therefore  creatures  cannot  be  co¬ 
extensive  in  duration  with  the  Creator.50 

St.  Thomas  examines  these  arguments  very  carefully,  and 
then  points  out  how  they  fail  to  prove  the  contention  of  the 
Murmurantcs.  The  first  argument,  he  says,  would  be  con¬ 
clusive  in  regard  to  changeable  things,  if  it  were  evident  that 
an  infinite  number  is  repugnant  to  reason;  but  as  this  is  not 


40  Sum.  p.  i,  q.  12,  m.  8;  p.  2,  q. 
14,  m.  1,  a.  1 ;  q.  9,  m.  9. 

41  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  p.  1,  a.  2,  q.  2. 

42  Quodl.  1,  q.  7. 

43  Sum.  p.  2,  tr.  1,  q.  4,  m.  2,  a.  5. 

44  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  q.  3,  a.  4. 

45  Cont.  Gent.  II,  c.  18,  c.  31-38; 
Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  46,  a.  1,  2. 


40  Report,  d.  1,  q.  4;  In  Sent.  II, 

q.  3- 

47  In  Sent.  IT,  d.  1,  q.  4,  a.  1. 

48  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  q.  3. 

49  Cfr.  Albert.  Magn.  Sum.  tr.  1, 
q.  t,  a.  3. 

50  Cfr.  Middl.  In  Sent.  II,  d.  2,  a. 
3,  1,  4- 


CREATION  OF  THE  WORLD 


hi 


evident,  the  argument  has  no  force.  The  other  contention, 
that  in  creation  being  follows  upon  not-being,  rests  upon  the 
false  supposition  that  this  order  of  succession  necessarily  im¬ 
plies  on  the  part  of  not-being  priority  of  duration.  This  sup¬ 
position  is  false,  because  priority  of  nature  is  quite  sufficient 
to  establish  the  required  order  of  succession.  Hence  both 
arguments  are  inconclusive.51 

With  this  reasoning  Scotus  was  in  full  agreement,  and  in 
some  ways  even  went  beyond  it,  in  as  much  as  he  held  that  rea¬ 
son  cannot  prove  that  the  present  world,  with  all  its  various 
changes,  was  created  in  time.52  Subsequently  most  Thomists 
followed  the  teaching  of  St.  Thomas  on  this  point,  but  the 
greater  number  of  theologians  and  philosophers  preferred  the 
view  of  Albertus  Magnus  and  St.  Bonaventure.  The  fact  of 
creation  in  time  or  with  time  was  defined  by  the  Fourth 
Lateran,  and  more  recently  by  the  Vatican  Council.53 

6.  Creation  and  Conservation. —  There  was  also  some  dif¬ 
ference  of  views  on  the  nature  of  God’s  conservative  action  as 
distinguished  from  His  productive  act.  All,  indeed,  admitted 
the  fact  and  necessity  of  conservation;  but  whilst  some  re¬ 
garded  the  conservative  action  of  God  as  a  mere  continuation 
of  His  creative  activity,  others  made  a  real  distinction  between 
the  two.  The  matter  is  thus  explained  by  St.  Thomas :  “  As, 

then,  it  is  impossible  that  the  production  of  a  thing  should 
continue,  when  the  action  of  the  agent  producing  it  ceases; 
so  is  it  impossible  that  the  being  of  the  thing  should  continue, 
when  the  action  of  the  agent  ceases :  for  that  action  is  not 
only  the  cause  of  the  production  of  the  thing,  but  of  its  being 
itself/’  54  .  .  .  “  Flowever,  the  conservation  of  things  by  God 
is  not  by  way  of  a  new  action,  but  is  a  continuation  of  the 
action  by  which  He  gave  existence  to  things;  for  that  action 
is  without  motion  and  time,  even  as  the  conservation  of  light 
in  the  air  is  effected  by  a  continued  activity  exercised  by  the 
sun.55 

51  Opusc.  22. 

52  Oxon.  II,  d.  i,  q.  3. 

53  DB,  428,  1783. 


54  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  104,  a.  1. 

55  Ibid.  a.  1  ad  4m. 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


1 12 

Alexander  of  Hales,56  St.  Bonaventure,57  Albertus  Mag¬ 
nus,58  and  Scotus59  took  practically  the  same  view ;  but  Henry 
of  Ghent,60  Durandus,61  Richard  of  Middleton,62  and  others 
argued  that  if  conservation  and  creation  were  not  different 
actions  in  so  far  as  they  terminate  at  creatures,  created  beings 
would  always  be  in  a  state  of  being  produced,  which  is  against 
common  sense.  As  an  ultimate  reason  for  this  conclusion  they 
assign  the  fact  that  in  created  beings  essence  and  existence  are 
identified  in  re,  and  only  ratione  distinct. 

56  Sum.  p.  2,  q.  13,  m.  3,  4.  60  Quodl.  10,  q.  7;  Quodl.  1,  q.  9. 

57  In  Sent.  II.  d.  47,  a.  1,  q.  2.  61  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  q.  2. 

5S  Sum.  II,  tr.  4,  q.  3,  m.  3.  a.  2.  62  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  a.  2,  q.  1-4. 

69  In  Sent.  II,  d.  2,  q.  1,  n.  3  sqq. 


CHAPTER  VI 


ANGELOLOGY 

In  their  teaching  on  the  angels,  the  Scholastics  developed 
to  a  considerable  extent  what  had  been  handed  down  to  them 
in  the  writings  of  the  Fathers.  Yet,  with  the  exception  of  a 
few  points,  all  this  development  remained  more  or  less  a 
matter  of  speculation.  Nothing  has  been  defined  in  regard 
to  the  angels  that  was  not  already  of  faith  before  the  end  of 
the  Patristic  age.  Their  existence,  their  creation  by  God,  the 
spirituality  of  their  nature,  the  fact  that  some  fell  into  sin  and 
were  lost,  whilst  others  remained  faithful  and  were  saved; 
and  the  further  fact  th’at  the  fallen  angels  are  bent  upon  bring¬ 
ing  about  man’s  ruin,  whereas  the  good  angels  are  appointed 
bv  Providence  to  be  his  faithful  guardians  —  these  points  con¬ 
stitute  the  sum-total  of  the  explicit  teaching  of  the  Church 
in  reference  to  this  part  of  God’s  creation.  And  all  of  these 
truths,  except  the  spirituality  of  the  angelic  nature  as  now 
understood,  were  universally  believed  in  the  earliest  ages  of 
the  Church.  The  Scholastics  took  these  same  truths  as  the 
starting  points  of  their  speculations  and  deduced  from  them 
conclusions  of  varying  degrees  of  certitude.  Some  of  the 
more  important,  together  with  the  reasoning  that  led  up  to 
them,  may  here  be  briefly  stated. 

i.  Creation  of  the  Angels. —  That  the  angels  were  created 
by  God  is  usually  touched  upon  only  in  connection  with  the 
question  of  creation  in  general.  No  special  treatise  was  de¬ 
voted  by  the  Scholastics  to  this  subject.  Some,  however,  gave 
considerable  space  to  the  consideration  of  the  subordinate  ques¬ 
tion,  at  what  particular  time  the  angels  were  created.  Noth¬ 
ing  very  definite  had  been  established  with  regard  to  this  point 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


1 14 

by  Patristic  writers.1  Nor  did  the  Scholastics  come  to  any 
general  agreement,  except  that  the  angels  were  not  created 
from  all  eternity.  And  this  was  defined  by  the  Fourth  Lat- 
eran,  chiefly  to  counteract  the  growing  influence  of  Averroism 
in  Christian  schools.  St.  Thomas  states  this  point  of  doctrine 
as  follows :  “  God  alone,  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost,  is 

from  eternity.  Catholic  faith  holds  this  without  doubt,  and 
everything  to  the  contrary  must  be  rejected  as  heretical.  For 
God  so  produced  creatures  that  He  produced  them  from  noth¬ 
ing;  that  is,  after  there  had  been  nothing.”  2 

The  more  common  opinion  among  the  Scholastics  was 
that  the  angels  were  created  at  the  same  time  as  the  material 
universe.  This  view  was  based  partly  upon  authority  and 
partly  upon  reason.  The  authority  specially  appealed  to  was 
the  statement  of  Holy  Writ,  that  God  “created  all  things 
together,”  3  which  expression  was  incorporated  in  the  defini¬ 
tion  of  the  Fourth  Lateran  Council.  However,  neither  Holy 
Scripture  nor  the  Council  seem  to  use  the  expression  in  refer¬ 
ence  to  time.  The  principal  argument  from  reason  is  thus 
stated  by  St.  Thomas,  in  his  answer  to  the  question  whether 
the  angels  were  created  before  the  corporeal  world :  “  There 

is  a  twofold  opinion  on  this  point  to  be  found  in  the  writings 
of  the  Fathers.  The  more  probable  one  holds  that  the  angels 
were  created  at  the  same  time  a-s  corporeal  creatures.  For 
the  angels  are  part  of  the  universe ;  they  do  not  constitute  a 
universe  of  themselves ;  but  both  they  and  corporeal  natures 
unite  in  constituting  one  universe.  This  stands  in  evidence 
from  the  relationship  of  creature  to  creature;  because  the 
mutual  relationship  of  creatures  makes  up  the  good  of  the 
universe.  But  no  part  is  perfect  if  separate  from  the  whole. 
Consequently,  it  is  improbable  that  God,  whose  works  are 
perfect,  .  .  .  should  have  created  the  angelic  creature  before 
other  creatures.  At  the  same  time  the  contrary  is  not  to  be 
deemed  erroneous;  especially  on  account  of  the  opinion  of 
Gregory  Nazianzen.”  4 

2.  Elevation  of  the  Angels. —  The  only  two  points  on  which 

1  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  293  sqq.  3  Eccli.  18,  1. 

2  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  61,  a.  2.  4  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  61,  a.  3. 


ANGELOLOGY 


US 


all  the  Scholastics  were  agreed,  as  regards  the  elevation  of 
the  angels,  are  these:  First,  that  they  were  all  created  for 
eternal  happiness;  secondly,  that  they  had  at  least  sufficient 
actual  graces  to  merit  heaven.  On  everything  else  widely 
different  opinions  were  entertained.  However,  leaving  aside 
the  peculiar  view  of  a  few  of  the  earlier  Scholastics,  all  these 
opinions  turn  about  the  question  whether  the  angels  received 
sanctifying  grace  at  the  moment  of  their  creation  or  some  time 
later,  after  they  had  disposed  themselves  for  its  reception. 
The  two  different  views  held  at  the  time  are  thus  indicated 
by  St.  Thomas  in  his  Commentary  on  the  Sentences:  “  On 
this  point  there  are  two  opinions :  Some  there  are  who  say 
that  the  angels  were  not  created  in  the  state  of  grace,  but  of 
natural  perfection  only,  and  this  opinion  is  the  more  common. 
Others,  however,  say  that  the  angels  were  created  in  the  state 
of  grace.  Which  of  these  two  views  is  the  truer  one,  cannot 
be  shown  by  any  conclusive  reason.”  5  However  he  adds 
that  the  second  view,  according  to  which  the  angels  were 
created  in  the  state  of  grace,  pleases  him  more,  though  without 
prejudice  to  the  other. 

The  first  opinion,  that  the  angels  were  created  in  the  state 
of  natural  perfection  only,  was  defended  by  Peter  Lombard,6 
Alexander  of  Hales,7  Henry  of  Ghent,8  St.  Bonaventure,9 
Richard  of  Middleton,10  and  not  a  few  others.  The  principal 
advocates  of  the  other  view,  besides  St.  Thomas,11  were  Al- 
bertus  Magnus,12  Durandus,13  and  Dionysius  the  Carthusian.14 
Scotus  considered  both  opinions  as  probable.15 

Those  who  held  that  the  angels  were  created  in  the  state 
of  merely  natural  perfection,  rested  their  view  chiefly  on  two 
principles:  First,  that  rational  creatures  must  dispose  them¬ 
selves,  under  the  influence  of  God’s  special  assistance,  for  the 


5  II.  d.  4,  q.  unic.  a.  3. 

6  Sent.  II,  d.  4. 

7  Sum.  p.  2,  q.  IQ,  m.  2. 

8  Quodl.  8,  q.  10. 

9  In  Sent.  II,  d.  4,  a.  1,  q.  2. 

10  Sent.  II,  d.  4,  a.  2,  q.  2. 

11  In  Sent.  loc.  cit. ;  Sum.  Theol. 
I,  q.  62,  a.  3. 


12  In  Sent.  II,  d.  3,  a.  12;  Sum.  p. 
2,  tr.  4,  q.  18,  m.  1. 

13  In  Sent.  II,  d.  4,  q.  2. 

14  In  Sent.  II,  d.  4,  q.  2. 

15  In  Sent.  II  et  Report,  d.  4,  q. 
unica. 


n6 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


reception  of  sanctifying  grace;  secondly,  that  in  the  very  act 
of  being  created  such  a  disposition  is  impossible  on  the  part 
of  the  creature.  For  the  disposition  must  be  positive,  and  for 
that  there  is  need  of  free  election,  which  necessarily  presup¬ 
poses  actual  existence.  Hence  at  least  one  moment  must 
elapse  after  the  creative  act,  before  sanctifying  grace  can  be 
infused  according  to  God’s  ordinary  law  of  sanctification. 

St.  Thomas  and  his  followers  grant  the  first  contention,  but 
they  point  out  that  free  election  on  the  part  of  the  creature 
may  loe  simultaneous  with  creation.  No  priority  of  time  is 
required  in  this  matter,  but  only  of  nature;  so  that,  at  the  very 
moment  of  its  creation,  the  free  will,  supported  by  actual  grace, 
turned  deliberately  to  God  as  its  supernatural  end.  The  posi¬ 
tive  reasons  for  this  second  view  are  thus  stated  by  St. 
Thomas :  “  Although  there  are  conflicting  opinions  on  the 

point,  some  holding  that  the  angels  were  created  only  in  a 
natural  state,  while  others  maintain  that  they  were  created 
in  grace ;  it  seems  more  probable,  however,  and  more  in  keep¬ 
ing  with  the  sayings  of  the  Saints,  that  they  were  created  in 
sanctifying  grace.  For  we  see  that  all  things  which,  in  the 
process  of  time,  were  produced  by  the  work  of  Divine  Prov¬ 
idence,  the  creature  operating  under  the  direction  of  God, 
were  produced  in  the  first  fashioning  of  things  according  to 
seedling  forms,  as  Augustine  says,  such  as  trees,  and  animals, 
and  the  rest.  Now  it  is  evident  that  sanctifying  grace  bears 
the  same  relation  to  beatitude  as  the  seedlike  form  in  nature 
does  to  the  natural  effect;  hence  in  the  First  Epistle  of  John 
(3,  9)  grace  is  called  the  seed  of  God.  As,  then,  in  Augus¬ 
tine’s  opinion  it  is  contended  that  the  seedlike  forms  of  all 
natural  effects  were  implanted  in  the  creature  when  corporeally 
created,  so  straightway  from  the  beginning  the  angels  were 
created  in  grace.”  16 

On  the  further  question,  whether  the  fallen  angels  as  well 
as  those  who  remained  faithful  received  sanctifying  grace, 
there  was  likewise  a  difference  of  opinion,  though  not  to  the 
same  extent  as  on  the  preceding  point.  All  those  who  held 


16  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  62,  a.  3. 


ANGELOLOGY 


ii  7 

that  the  angels  were  created  in  the  state  or  grace,  gave  an 
affirmative  answer.  Those,  however,  who  favored  the  other 
opinion  generally  taught  that  Lucifer  and  his  followers  fell 
into  sin  before  they  had  disposed  themselves  for  the  reception 
of  sanctifying  grace,  and  consequently  never  received  that 
gift  of  God  intended  for  all.  This  latter  view  has  been  set 
aside  by  most  subsequent  theologians. 

3.  Nature  of  the  Angels. —  Both  the  Fathers  and  the  Scho¬ 
lastics  are  at  one  in  teaching  that  the  angels  are  spirits  en¬ 
dowed  with  intellect  and  free  will.  However  the  term 
“  spirit  ”  was  not  by  all  of  them  taken  in  the  same  sense  in 
which  it  is  understood  in  this  connection  to-day.  Not  a  few 
Fathers  taught  that  the  angels  had  bodies,  which  were  com¬ 
posed  of  some  kind  of  ethereal  substance,  ordinarily  invisible 
to  human  eyes.17  This  view  was  taken  over  by  many  of  the 
earlier  Scholastics,  whose  teaching  on  the  angels  was  little 
more  than  a  restatement  of  what  they  found  in  Patristic  writ¬ 
ings.  Rupert  of  Deutz,18  St.  Bernard,19  and  Peter  Lombard  20 
are  quite  definite  on  this  point.  Robert  Pulleyn  21  and  Hugh 
of  St.  Victor,22  on  the  other  hand,  contended  that  the  angels 
must  be  regarded  as  pure  spirits. 

During  the  first  part  of  the  thirteenth  century  this  latter 
view  became  more  common,  possibly  owing  to  the  position 
taken  by  the  Fourth  Lateran  Council.  The  doctrine  was  not 
directly  defined,  but  as  the  Council  divided  all  creatures  into 
three  classes  —  spiritual  beings,  beings  composed  of  spirit  and 
matter,  and  purely  material  beings  —  its  mind  on  the  point  in 
question  was  made  sufficiently  clear.  However  the  Franciscan 
school,  represented  by  Alexander  of  Hales,23  St.  Bona- 
venture,24  and  Scotus  25  still  continued  to  ascribe  bodies  to 
the  angels,  but  in  a  somewhat  different  sense.  Their  position 
is  most  clearly  explained  by  Scotus,  who  brought  the  theory 
to  its  last  stage  of  development. 

17  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  293  sqq.  21  Sent.  IT,  c.  2. 

18  De  Victoria  Verbi,  I,  c.  28;  22  De  Sacram.  c.  J. 

ML,  169,  1262.  23  Sum.  p.  2,  q.  20,  m.  2;  q.  61, 

19  Serm.  5  in  Cant.  n.  2 ;  ML,  182,  m.  1. 

790.  24  In  Sent.  II,  d.  3,  p.  1,  q.  1  et  2. 

20  Sent.  II,  d.  8.  25  De  Rerum  Principiis,  q.  7,  8. 


n8 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


According  to  Scotus  all  created  beings  —  angels,  human 
souls,  and  material  substances  —  are  composed  of  potency 
and  act.  This  potency,  which  he  calls  a  potentia  passiva,  is 
material  in  its  nature.  It  is  of  three  kinds,  designated  re¬ 
spectively  as  materia  primo  prima,  secundo  prima ,  tcrtio  prima. 
The  materia  primo  prima  is  absolutely  indeterminate,  and  is 
in  a  condition  to  be  ultimately  the  foundation  or  subject  of 
any  form  whatever.  In  material  substances  it  receives  the 
forma  corporeitatis,  and  together  with  this  constitutes  the 
materia  secundo  prima.  When  still  further  determined  by  a 
specific  form,  either  spiritual  or  material,  the  result  is  the 
materia  tertio  prima ,  which  exists  in  the  natural  order  of 
things  as  a  complete  substance,  and  is  not  further  determinable 
except  by  accidental  forms.20 

Now  it  is  the  materia  primo  prima  that  enters  into  the  com¬ 
position  of  angels  and  of  human  souls.  As  it  is  thus  not  com¬ 
pleted  by  the  forma  corporeitatis ,  neither  angels  nor  human 
souls  are  corporeal ;  they  are  spirits,  but  at  the  same  time  they 
are  composed  of  matter  and  form.  Hence  according  to 
Scotus,  and  the  same  is  true  in  respect  of  the  others  mentioned 
above,  God  alone  is  a  pure  spirit.  All  other  beings  are  in  one 
way  or  another  fashioned  out  of  matter  by  the  hand  of  God.27 

The  more  common  view,  however,  which  had  as  its  chief 
advocates  Albertus  Magnus,28  St.  Thomas,29  Henry  of 
Ghent,30  Durandus,31  SEgidius  Romanus,32  and  Dionysius  the 
Carthusian,33  was  entirely  in  favor  of  the  spirituality  of  the 
angels  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term.  All  these  writers  re- 

o 


20  De  Rerum  Principiis,  q.  7>  a-  L 
2,  3* 

27  Thus  all  creation  is  closely 
bound  together  by  the  materia 
primo  prima,  as  he  himself  de¬ 
scribes  it  in  the  following  passage: 
“  Mundus  est  arbor  quaedam  pul- 
cherrima,  cujus  radix  et  semina- 
rium  est  materia  prima,  folia 
fluentia  sunt  accidentia;  frondes  et 
rami  sunt  creata  corruptibilia ;  flos 
rationalis  anima;  fructus  naturae 
consimilis  et  perfectionis  natura 
angelica.  Unicus  autem  hoc  semi- 


narium  dirigens  et  formans  a  prin- 
cipio  est  manus  Dei”  (Ibid.  q.  7, 
a.  4,  n.  30). 

28  Sum.  tr.  1,  q.  3,  m.  3,  a.  2 ;  q. 
incid.  4. 

29  In  Sent.  II,  d.  3,  q.  1,  a.  1 ; 
Sum.  Theol.  q.  50,  a.  2 ;  q.  75,  a.  5 ; 
Cont.  Gent.  II,  c.  50;  De  Spiritual. 
Creat.  a.  1 ;  De  Substant.  Separat. 
c.  5-8. 

30  Quodl.  4,  q.  16. 

31  In  Sent.  II,  d.  3,  q.  1. 

32  In  Sent.  d.  3,  p.  1,  q.  i,  a.  I. 

83  In  Sent.  II,  d.  3,  q.  1. 


ANGELOLOGY 


119 

garded  materia  prima  as  a  constitutive  principle  that  is  es¬ 
sentially  limited  to  bodily  substances.  They  did  not  admit 
the  distinction  between  materia  primo  prima  and  materia 
secundo  prima,  and  consequently  destroyed  the  foundation 
upon  which  the  Scotist  reasoning  was  based.  Their  principle 
was :  Materia  et  forma  dividunt  substantiam  materialem  — 
material  substances,  and  material  substances  only,  are  com¬ 
posed  of  matter  and  form. 

St.  Thomas,  after  giving  an  exposition  of  the  opinion  held 
by  the  Arabian  philosopher  Avicebron,  which  is  essentially  the 
same  as  that  of  Scotus,  refutes  it  in  this  way:  “  One  glance 
is  enough  to  show  that  there  cannot  be  one  matter  of  spiritual 
and  of  corporeal  things.  For  it  is  not  possible  that  a  spiritual 
and  a  corporeal  form  should  be  received  into  the  same  part 
of  matter,  otherwise  one  and  the  same  thing  would  be  cor¬ 
poreal  and  spiritual.  ...  It  is,  further,  impossible  for  an  in¬ 
tellectual  substance  to  have  any  kind  of  matter.  For  the 
operation  belonging  to  anything  is  according  to  the  mode  of 
its  substance.  Now  to  understand  is  an  altogether  immaterial 
operation,  as  appears  from  its  object,  whence  any  act  receives 
its  species  or  nature.  For  a  thing  is  understood  according 
to  its  degree  of  immateriality;  because  forms  that  exist  in 
matter  are  individual  forms  which  the  intellect  cannot  ap¬ 
prehend  as  such.  Hence  it  must  be  that  every  intellectual 
substance  is  altogether  immaterial.”  34  “  In  material  things 

there  is  one  thing  which  determines  to  a  special  grade,  and 
that  is  the  form ;  and  another  thing  which  is  determined,  and 
this  is  the  matter;  .  .  .  whereas  in  immaterial  things  there  is 
no  separate  determinator  and  thing  determined ;  each  thing 
by  its  own  self  holds  a  determinate  grade  of  being.”  35 

However,  “  although  there  is  no  composition  of  matter  and 
form  in  an  angel,  yet  there  is  act  and  potentiality.”  For 
“  there  still  remains  the  relation  of  the  form  to  its  very  ex¬ 
istence,  as  of  potentiality  to  act.  And  such  a  kind  of  com¬ 
position  is  understood  to  be  in  the  angels;  and  this  is  what 
some  say,  that  an  angel  is  composed  of  that  whereby  he  is 

34  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  50,  a.  2.  35  Ibid.  a.  2  ad  im. 


120 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


and  that  which  is ,  or  existence  and  essence,  as  Boethius  says. 
For  essence  is  the  form  itself  subsisting;  and  existence  is  that 
whereby  the  substance  is,  as  the  running  is  that  whereby  the 
runner  runs.  But  in  God  existence  and  essence  are  not  dif¬ 
ferent.  .  .  .  Hence  God  alone  is  pure  act.”  36 

The  discussion  about  the  spirituality  of  the  angels  led  to 
another  inquiry,  namely,  what  is  the  relation  of  the  angels  to 
place  ?  As  they  have  no  bodies,  at  least  not  in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  term,  can  they  be  said  to  be  in  a  place?  To  this  ques¬ 
tion  all  Scholastics  gave  an  affirmative  answer,  and  St.  Thomas 
considered  the  contrary  opinion  as  heretical.37  However,  this 
local  presence  is  not  circumscriptive,  as  is  that  of  bodies;  it 
is  a  definitive  presence,  which  is  indeed  limited  to  a  certain 
portion  of  space,  but  without  correspondence  of  parts  to  parts. 
The  whole  substance  is  in  the  whole  place,  and  the  whole  is  in 
every  part  thereof.  This  presence,  moreover,  the  Scholastics 
derive,  not  from  the  exigencies  of  the  angelic  substance  itself, 
but  rather  from  the  free  ordination  of  the  Creator.  As  the 
angelic  substance  is  without  extension,  it  is  of  its  own  nature 
outside  the  category  of  space.  Hence  its  relation  to  place 
must  ultimately  come  from  the  will  of  God.38 

On  these  several  points  there  was  hardly  any  difference  of 
views  among  the  Scholastics;  but  on  the  further  question,  in 
what  precisely  does  this  relation  to  place  consist,  opinions  dif¬ 
fered.  St.  Thomas,  with  many  others,  held  that  it  must  be 
reduced  to  an  application  of  the  angelic  power.  Comparing 
the  local  presence  of  angels  to  that  of  bodies,  he  says :  “  A 

body  is  said  to  be  in  a  place  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  applied 
to  it  according  to  the  contact  of  dimensive  quantity;  but  there 
is  no  such  quantity  in  the  angels,  for  theirs  is  a  virtual  one. 
Consequently  an  angel  is  said  to  be  in  a  corporeal  place  by 
application  of  the  angelic  power  in  any  manner  whatever  to 
any  place.  Accordingly  there  is  no  need  for  saying  that  an 
angel  can  be  deemed  commensurate  with  a  place,  or  that  he 
occupies  a  space  in  the  continuous;  for  this  is  proper  to  a 

36  Ibid.  a.  2  ad  3m.  d.  37,  a.  26 ;  Scot.  In  Sent.  II,  d.  2, 

37  In  Sent.  I,  d.  3 7,  q.  3,  a.  1.  q.  6;  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  II,  p.  2,  a. 

38  Cfr.  Albert.  Magn.  In  Sent.  I,  2,  q.  1. 


ANGELOLOGY 


121 


located  body  which  is  endowed  with  dimensive  quantity.  In 
similar  fashion  it  is  not  necessary  on  this  account  for  the  angel 
to  be  contained  by  a  place;  because  an  incorporeal  substance 
virtually  contains  the  thing  with  which  it  comes  into  contact, 
and  is  not  contained  by  it ;  for  the  soul  is  in  the  body  as  con¬ 
taining  it,  not  as  contained  by  it.  In  the  same  way  an  angel 
is  said  to  be  in  a  place  which  is  corporeal,  not  as  the  thing 
contained,  but  as  somehow  containing  it.”  39 

Scotus,  on  the  other  hand,  favored  the  opinion  defended 
by  Richard  of  Middleton,  that  the  formal  reason  of  this  pres¬ 
ence  in  a  particular  place  is  neither  the  angelic  substance  nor 
its  operation,  but  a  sort  of  local  simultaneity  ( simultas ),  even 
as  the  formal  reason  of  the  application  of  a  body  to  a  place 
is  its  circumscription.40  This  view  also  had  a  considerable 
number  of  advocates,  but  none  of  them  give  a  clear  exposition 
of  what  the  simultas  really  is  in  itself. 

4.  Knowledge  of  the  Angels. —  With  the  exception  of 
Durandus,  William  of  Auxerre,  and  some  Nominalists,  the 
Scholastics  were  agreed  that  the  angels  know  things  apart 
from  their  own  being  by  means  of  species  or  intellectual  repre¬ 
sentations,  and  not  directly  by  way  of  their  own  essence.  As 
regards  the  origin  of  these  species  there  was  some  difference 
of  opinion.  All  admitted  that  the  angels  received  infused 
knowledge  of  things  at  the  moment  of  their  creation,  and  that 
this  knowledge  consisted  in  the  intelligible  species  of  the  things 
known.  But  whilst  many  held  with  St.  Thomas  that  the 
angels  are  incapable  of  acquiring  new  intelligible  species 
through  their  own  intellectual  activity,  St.  Bonaventure, 
Scotus,  and  others  contended  that  the  acquisition  of  such  new 
species  on  the  part  of  the  angels  must  necessarily  be  admitted. 
The  ultimate  reason  of  this  difference  of  views  is  based  upon 
the  difference  of  concepts  in  regard  to  the  angelic  nature, 
about  which  something  was  said  in  the  preceding  number. 
Presupposing  that  difference  of  concepts,  the  twro  views  of 
angelic  cognition  may  here  be  briefly  stated.41 

39  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  5 2,  a.  1.  2,  3 ;  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  II,  d.  3,  p. 

40  In  Sent.  I,  d.  37,  a.  2,  q.  1.  2,  a.  2,  q.  1  ;  Scotus,  In  Sent.  II,  d. 

41  Cfr.  Halens.  Sum.  p.  2,  q.  24,  m.  30,  q.  10,  n ;  d.  9,  q.  2;  Thom.  In 


122 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


As  St.  Thomas  holds  that  the  angels  are  pure  spirits, 
as  was  explained  above,  he  establishes  an  absolute  difference 
between  angelic  and  human  cognition.  All  human  cognition 
is  ultimately  derived  from  sense  perception,  and  the  proper 
object  of  the  human  intellect  is  the  essence  of  material  things, 
considered  in  its  universality  and  necessary  predicates.  Hence 
in  man  there  is  an  active  and  a  passive  intellect.  The  active 
intellect  abstracts  the  intelligible  idea  from  the  sensible  repre¬ 
sentation  of  material  things  as  contained  in  the  phantasm, 
while  the  passive  intellect  receives  the  idea  thus  abstracted  and 
expresses  it  immanently  in  the  form  of  knowledge.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  proper  object  of  the  angelic  intelligence  is 
wholly  immaterial,  being  necessarily  in  the  same  order  with 
the  nature  of  the  angelic  substance.  Hence  in  the  angels  there 
is  no  active  intellect,  nor  can  they  abstract  any  intelligible 
species  from  the  material  world.  But  neither  is  there  in  them 
a  passive  intellect,  in  the  sense  that  they  are  sometimes  under¬ 
standing  only  in  potentiality  the  things  which  they  naturally 
apprehend.  Their  knowledge  is  always  actual,  in  virtue  of 
the  intelligible  species  of  things  which  they  received  from  God 
together  with  their  intellectual  nature;  and  it  is  the  more  uni¬ 
versal  in  proportion  as  the  perfection  of  their  being  is  more 
exalted.42 

In  accord  with  these  fundamental  principles,  St.  Thomas 
outlines  the  contents  of  angelic  cognition  as  follows:  The 
angels  have  actual  knowledge  of  their  own  being  and,  in  the 
natural  order,  also  of  God,  by  means  of  their  essence,  without 
needing  any  intelligible  species.  They  know  each  other  by 
the  help  of  intelligible  species  infused  by  God  at  the  moment 
of  creation.  In  the  same  way  they  also  know  human  souls 
and  material  objects,  both  in  their  individual  existence  and. in 
their  universal  concepts.  But  they  have  no  natural  knowledge 
of  future  free  actions,  nor  of  the  secrets  of  hearts,  nor  of  the 
mysteries  of  grace.  Their  knowledge  is  not  discursive,  but 
intuitive.  They  apprehend  in  one  glance  all  the  principles  and 

Sent.  II,  q.  3,  a.  1,  2,  3 ;  Sum.  Theol.  42  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  54-56 ;  Cont. 
I,  q.  55,  56;  Albert.  Magn.  In  Sent.  Gent.  I,  c.  95-100;  De  Verit.  q.  8, 
d.  3,  q-  5,  6.  a.  8,  9. 


ANGELOLOGY 


123 


particular  applications  of  universal  propositions.  However 
their  knowledge  of  things  is  not  simultaneous,  in  the  sense  that 
they  actually  know  all  things  at  once  or  by  one  idea.  They 
know  objects  successively,  by  actuating  any  intelligible  species 
they  choose.  In  regard  to  the  proper  objects  of  their  natural 
knowledge  they  cannot  fall  into  error;  but  whilst  they  were 
in  via  they  could  err  in  reference  to  truths  belonging  to  the 
supernatural  order.  This  possibility  of  error,  of  course,  still 
obtains  in  the  case  of  the  fallen  angels.43 

From  this  exposition  of  angelic  cognition  as  given  by 
St.  Thomas,  that  of  Scotus  and  his  school  differs  considerably. 
Scotus  also  holds  that  there  is  a  specific  difference  between 
angels  and  human  souls,  but  not  in  that  absolute  sense  insisted 
on  by  St.  Thomas.  His  materia  primo  prima  runs  through 
the  whole  of  God’s  creation.  This  brings  the  angelic  and  the 
human  natures  much  closer  to  each  other.  He  admits  with 
St.  Thomas  the  infusion  of  intelligible  species,  by  reason  of 
which  angels  have  a  much  greater  and  higher  natural  knowl¬ 
edge  than  is  attainable  by  man ;  but  with  regard  to  every  other 
point  he  takes  opposite  views.  According  to  him,  the  proper 
object  of  the  human  intellect  is  being  itself,  without  connota¬ 
tion  of  particular  or  universal,44  and  this  is  also  the  proper 
object  of  the  angelic  intelligence.  As  there  is  a  passive  and 
an  active  intellect  in  man,  so  is  there  in  angels.  Hence  they 
can  abstract  intelligible  ideas  from  particular  things ;  not  by 
means  of  phantasms,  but  simply  by  making  these  things  the 
object  of  their  intelligence.45  Moreover,  angelic  cognition  is 
not  necessarily  intuitive;  it  may  also  be  discursive.  Nor  is  it 
limited  to  things  present  and  past,  and  to  future  events  that 
proceed  from  necessary  causes ;  but  it  extends  to  all  free  acts 
of  the  present,  to  the  secrets  of  hearts,  and  to  all  past  and 
present  mysteries  of  grace.46  The  knowledge  of  the  fallen 
angels,  however,  is  less  extensive;  not  on  account  of  any 
natural  incapacity,  but  because  in  regard  to  some  things,  as 


43  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  54-58 ;  Cont. 
Gent.  I,  c.  95. 

44  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  14,  q.  7;  IV, 
d.  45,  q.  3;  Quodl.  q.  13,  n.  9;  In 
Metaphys.  VII,  q.  15,  22. 


45  In  Sent.  II,  d.  9,  q.  2,  n.  439, 
130. 

46  In  Sent.  II,  d.  1,  q.  5,  n.  3; 
Ibid.  d.  9,  q.  2,  n.  27. 


124 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


the  secrets  of  hearts,  God  withholds  His  concur sus  from  such 
cognition.47 

5.  Volition  of  the  Angels. —  As  angels  are  intellectual  beings 
created  by  God  for  the  attainment  of  eternal  happiness  as  a 
reward  of  their  merit,  it  necessarily  follows  that  they  are  en¬ 
dowed  with  free  will.  About  this  there  never  was  any  dif¬ 
ference  of  opinion  among  the  Scholastics.  Views  began  to 
differ  only  when  the  nature  of  angelic  volition  came  up  for 
consideration.  And  in  regard  to  this  the  same  two  schools 
of  thought  were  opposed  to  one  another  as  on  the  subject  of 
angelic  knowledge.  In  fact,  one  difference  is  necessarily  con¬ 
nected  with  the  other,  and  both  harken  back  to  a  different  con¬ 
ception  of  the  angelic  nature,  as  was  indicated  above.  It  will 
be  sufficient  here  to  indicate  a  few  of  the  more  important 
points. 

St.  Thomas  and  his  school  conceive  the  will  as  a  natural 
tendency  towards  good,  which  finds  expression  in  love.  In 
human  beings  this  tendency  is  of  a  higher  and  lower  order,  in 
keeping  with  man’s  composite  nature;  but  in  angels  only  the 
higher  spiritual  tendency  is  found,  and  this  has  for  its  object 
the  universal  good.48  There  exists  in  angels  both  a  natural 
love  and  a  love  of  choice.  The  former  has  for  its  proper  ob¬ 
ject  their  own  happiness  as  their  last  end,  which  they  will  and 
love  by  a  necessity  of  their  nature;  the  latter  is  directed  to¬ 
wards  the  means  by  which  their  last  end  is  attained,  and  in 
regard  to  them  they  enjoy  freedom  of  election.49  They  can 
not  turn  away  from  their  last  end  in  the  natural  order,  but 
they  can  turn  away  from  their  supernatural  last  end.  Hence, 
whilst  they  were  still  on  probation,  they  could  sin  by  seeking 
their  own  good  in  opposition  to  the  order  established  by  God.50 
As  they  apprehend  by  one  glance  both  their  last  end  and  the 
means  thereto,  any  sin  committed  by  them  was  necessarily 
opposed  to  their  last  end,  and  therefore  mortal.51  Their  first 
choice,  whether  for  good  or  for  evil,  determined  their  fate 
for  all  eternity;  because  their  will  attached  itself  to  the  object 

47  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  10,  q.  8,  ad  3m.  50  Ibid.  a.  1  ad  3m;  De  Malo,  q. 

48  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  60.  16,  a.  5. 

49  Ibid.  a.  1,  2,  3.  51  Ibid,  ad  4m;  Sum,  Theol  I.  II, 

q.  89,  a.  4. 


ANGELOLOGY 


125 


of  their  choice  with  full  knowledge,  uninfluenced  by  passion, 
very  much  the  same  way  as  the  intellect  attaches  itself  to  evi¬ 
dent  first  principles  in  the  order  of  truth.  Hence  those  who 
fell  were  thereby  confirmed  in  evil,  and  irrevocably  lost ;  while 
those  who  remained  faithful  were  by  that  one  act  forever 
established  in  good,  and  forthwith  admitted  to  eternal  beati¬ 
tude.  In  their  present  state,  the  good  angels  love  God  neces¬ 
sarily,  and  the  bad  angels  hate  God  necessarily ;  hence  in  neither 
case  is  there  further  room  for  merit  or  demerit.52 

The  view  of  Scotus  is  opposed  to  this  in  nearly  every  par¬ 
ticular.  He  holds  that  there  is  in  the  angels  both  a  higher  and 
a  lower  tendency  towards  good,  as  there  is  in  human  beings.53 
Moreover  their  will  enjoys  freedom  of  choice  with  regard  to 
every  object,  and  their  free  will  must  direct  their  natural 
inclination  in  its  tendency  towards  good.54  Their  eternal  con¬ 
dition  was  not  irrevocably  decided  by  one  act.  The  fallen 
angels  committed  many  sins,  of  which  they  might  have  re¬ 
pented  whilst  still  in  via .55  They  retained  their  free  will  even 
after  they  had  been  condemned  to  eternal  punishment;  but 
their  inveterate  malice  prevents  them  from  doing  any  good.55 
Conversion  is  indeed  impossible  for  them,  not  because  they 
haven’t  the  exercise  of  their  free  will,  but  because  God  has 
decreed  that  there  should  be  no  conversion  after  the  final  sen¬ 
tence  was  passed ;  hence  He  now  withholds  His  grace.57  A 
similar  condition  obtains  in  the  case  of  the  good  angels.  Al¬ 
though  they  are  in  possession  of  their  last  end,  nevertheless 
they  still  remain  free.  There  is,  however,  no  longer  room  for 
merit  or  demerit  in  either  case,  because  the  time  of  probation 
is  past.58 

6.  Mutual  Relation  of  the  Angels. —  Following  the  teaching 
of  the  Pseudo-Areopagite,  the  Scholastics  commonly  held  that 
the  nine  choirs  of  angels,  which  are  mentioned  in  Holy  Scrip¬ 
ture,  constitute  a  celestial  hierarchy,  corresponding  to  the  ec- 

52  Ibid.  I,  q.  62,  a.  8;  q.  63,  a.  2;  65  In  Sent.  II,  d.  6,  q.  2,  n.  16. 

De  Malo,  q.  16,  a.  5;  Sum.  Theol.  56  Ibid.  n.  24. 

I,  q.  62,  a.  8;  q.  60,  a.  5  ad  5m.  57  In  Sent.  II,  d.  6. 

53  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  35.  58  Ibid.  d.  7,  q.  unic.  n.  28. 

54  In  Sent.  II,  d.  6,  q.  2,  n.  8,  9; 

Report.  II,  d.  6,  q.  2,  n.  9. 


126 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


clesiastical  hierarchy  on  earth.  There  are  three  divisions, 
each  comprising  three  choirs.  To  the  highest  division  belong 
the  Seraphim,  Cherubim,  and  Thrones;  to  the  second,  the 
Dominations,  Virtues,  and  Powers;  to  the  third,  the  Princi¬ 
palities,  Archangels,  and  Angels.  The  principle  underlying 
this  division  is  variously  assigned  by  the  different  authors. 
The  more  common  opinion  points  to  the  relation  of  the  angels 
to  God  in  respect  of  their  ministry  and  to  the  imparting  of 
knowledge  by  the  higher  to  the  lower  orders.  However  all 
this  is  more  or  less  a  matter  of  speculation;  the  only  certain 
point  is  that  there  is  a  division  into  choirs,  although  even  this 
has  not  been  defined.59 

In  connection  with  this  grouping  of  the  angelic  host  into 
certain  divisions,  the  Scholastics  also  speculated  about  the 
specific  difference  of  the  angels.  St.  Thomas,  assigning  quan¬ 
tified  matter  —  materia  signata  —  as  the  principle  of  indi¬ 
viduation,  consequently  held  that  each  angel  constitutes  a  dis¬ 
tinct  species,  whereas  Scotus  and  others  contended  that  the 
principle  of  individuation  must  be  either  the  concrete  nature 
itself  or  a  perfection  formally  distinct  from  nature,  and  hence 
in  either  case  several  individual  angels  may  belong  to  the 
same  species.00 

There  was  a  similar  difference  of  opinion  about  illumination 
and  locution .  All  were  agreed  that  one  angel  can  communi¬ 
cate  with  another,  and  therefore  impart  knowledge  and  reveal 
his  own  mind  after  the  manner  of  speech ;  but  they  differed 
considerably  in  their  explanation  of  the  admitted  fact.  Illumi¬ 
nation,  in  the  sense  of  instruction,  was  commonly  restricted 
to  the  higher  orders  in  respect  to  the  lower;  while  locution 
was  held  to  be  common  to  all.  It  was  particularly  this  latter 
which  they  found  difficult  to  explain.  St.  Thomas  makes 
locution  exclusively  a  matter  of  the  will.  The  mere  fact  that 
one  angel  wishes  to  communicate  with  another  arouses  the 
intellectual  attention  of  the  angel  so  addressed,  no  matter  in 

59  Cfr  St.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  60  Sum.  Theol.  T,  q.  50,  a.  3;  In 

I,  q.  108,  106,  107 ;  Scotus,  In  Sent.  Sent.  II,  d.  3,  q.  7. 

II,  d.  9,  q.  2 ;  Report,  d.  9,  q.  2. 


ANGELOLOGY 


127 


what  part  of  space  he  may  happen  to  be.61  St.  Bonaventure 
agrees  with  this  in  so  far  as  locution  depends  on  the  will  of 
the  speaker,  but  thinks  that  distance  must  be  taken  into  con¬ 
sideration.02  Others  require,  over  and  above  a  simple  act  of 
the  will,  some  kind  of  spiritual  sign,  capable  of  attracting  the 
attention  of  the  one  spoken  to.63  Scotus  holds  that  angels 
can  read  one  another’s  mind  independently  of  any  act  of  the 
will ;  but  for  locution,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  it  is 
required  that  the  speaker  produce  in  the  mind  of  the  one  ad¬ 
dressed  a  concept  of  the  matter  he  wishes  to  communicate. 
And  this  the  angels  can  do  in  the  same  way  as  they  produce  a 
concept  in  their  own  mind.04 

7.  Ministry  of  the  Angels. —  That  the  good  angels  are  the 
ministers  of  God  in  the  government  of  the  world  is  a  matter 
of  faith,  and  was  accepted  as  such  by  the  Scholastics.  It  is 
also  a  matter  of  faith  that  some  angels  are  deputed  by  God  to 
be  the  guardians  of  men,  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  and 
assisting  them  in  the  attainment  of  their  last  end.  Neither  of 
these  truths  has  been  defined  by  the  Church,  but  both  are 
clearly  contained  in  Holy  Scripture  and  tradition.  That 
each  and  every  person  has  his  own  special  guardian  angel  is 
not  of  faith,  but  the  doctrine  was  commonly  held  by  the 
Scholastics.65  St.  Thomas  states  this  common  teaching  as 
follows:  “  In  this  life  man  is  on  his  way  to  heaven,  along 
which  way  he  is  threatened  by  many  dangers,  both  interior  and 
exterior.  .  .  .  And  thus  in  the  same  manner  as  guards  are 
given  to  a  wayfarer  who  must  travel  along  dangerous  roads, 
so  to  each  human  being,  whilst  still  on  the  way,  a  guardian 
angel  is  assigned;  but  when  the  end  of  the  journey  is  reached, 
he  will  no  longer  have  a  guardian  angel;  instead,  if  in  heaven, 
he  will  have  an  angel  reigning  with  him  in  glory,  or,  if  in  hell, 
a  demon  inflicting  punishment/’  66 


61  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  107,  a.  1 ;  In 
Sent.  II,  q.  2,  a.  3. 

62  In  Sent.  II,  d.  10,  a.  3,  q.  2. 

63  Cfr.  Richard  of  Middleton,  In 
Sent.  II,  d.  9,  a.  2,  q.  I. 

«4In  Sent.  II,  d.  9,  q.  2,  n.  27; 
Ibid.  n.  15,  28,  24. 


65  Cfr.  Halens.  Sum.  p.  2,  q.  41, 
m.  4,  a.  1,  3;  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  II, 
d.  11,  a.  1,  q.  1;  Scotus,  In  Sent.  II, 
d.  11,  q.  unica;  Thomas,  In  Sent. 
II,  d.  11,  q.  1. 

66  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  113,  a.  4. 


128 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


As  guardian  angels  are  the  ministers  of  Divine  Providence 
in  behalf  of  their  wards,  they  assist  those  entrusted  to  their 
care  in  various  ways.  They  are  indeed  incapable  of  acting 
in  opposition  to  the  laws  of  nature,  and  therefore  unable  to 
work  miracles,  nevertheless  they  have  the  power  of  acting 
upon  both  body  and  soul.  By  an  application  of  their  natural 
activities  to  bodies,  they  can  move  them  locally,  cause  alter¬ 
ations  in  their  composition,  and  thus  use  them  for  the  produc¬ 
tion  of  effects  that  lie  beyond  the  power  of  man.  They  can 
also  act  upon  the  imagination,  and  thereby  indirectly  enlighten 
the  mind  and  fortify  the  will.  Besides,  God  permitting,  they 
may  on  occasions  assume  bodies  and  so  appear  in  visible 
forms,  without,  however,  informing  these  bodies  after  the 
manner  of  human  souls.67 

A  similar  influence  upon  human  affairs  can  also  be  exerted 
by  evil  spirits,  who  are  always  intent  upon  bringing  about 
man’s  ruin.  By  their  action  upon  the  senses  they  can  suggest 
temptations,  obscure  man’s  spiritual  vision,  and  thus  incline 
his  will  to  evil.  On  rare  occasions  God  permits  them  even 
to  take  possession  of  men’s  bodies,  and  cause  the  unfortunate 
victims  of  their  malice  to  act  as  if  they  were  bereft  of  reason. 
When  their  power  thus  exercised  extends  to  the  whole  bodily 
organism,  it  is  called  possession;  when  only  to  a  part,  it  is 
termed  obsession.  However  in  neither  case  do  the  evil  spirits 
have  direct  power  over  man’s  will;  hence  although  they  can 
cause  him  to  utter  blasphemous  and  indecent  expressions, 
and  to  perform  actions  that  are  materially  sinful,  they  can 
never  force  him  to  sin.  He  is  still  the  object  of  a  wise  and 
loving  Providence;  and  although  his  body  be  given  over  to 
Satan,  his  soul  ever  remains  in  the  hands  of  God.68 


67  Ibid.  q.  in,  a.  1-4;  Scotus,  In 
Sent.  II,  d.  11,  q.  unica ;  Report.  II, 
d.  11,  q.  1 ;  Halens.  Sum.  p.  2,  q.  41, 
m.  4;  Albert  Magn.  In  Sent.  d.  11, 
a.  6. 


68  Halens.  Sum.  p.  2,  q.  100,  m.  1, 
2 ;  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  II,  d.  8,  p.  2, 
a.  unic.  q.  1-4;  Thom.  In  Sent.  II, 
d.  8,  a.  unic.  q.  5 ;  Albert.  Magn. 
Sum.  p.  2,  tr.  7,  q.  29. 


CHAPTER  VII 


ANTHROPOLOGY 

In  their  dissertations  on  the  creation  of  man,  the  Scholastics 
were  agreed  on  the  following  three  points  :  First,  man  was 
made  to  the  image  and  likeness  of  God;  second,  the  soul  of 
the  first  man  owed  its  origin  to  a  creative  act;  -third,  man’s 
body  was  the  immediate  result  of  a  divine  operation.  These 
points  are  all  contained  in  Holy  Scripture,  and  the  Scholas¬ 
tics,  following  the  example  of  the  Fathers,  accepted  them  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  obvious  meaning  of  the  sacred  text. 

In  reference  to  the  first  point,  that  man  is  the  image  of  God, 
they  distinguish  between  image  and  trace  —  imago  et  vesti¬ 
gium.  The  latter  is  found  in  all  creatures,  in  as  much  as  they 
are  the  effects  of  a  divine  causality;  for  every  effect  is  as¬ 
similated  to  its  cause.  But  the  concept  of  image  implies  over 
and  above  mere  similarity  an  express  intention  in  the  agent 
to  make  the  effect  a  formal  representation  of  his  own  nature 
and  personal  being.  This  is  called  a  specific  likeness.  Now 
this  specific  likeness  to  God  can  be  realized  only  in  rational 
beings  —  angels  and  men.  God  made  them  of  express  pur¬ 
pose  like  unto  Himself  in  that  He  gave  them  being,  life,  and 
the  power  of  understanding.1 

Moreover,  man  is  not  only  the  image  of  the  divine  nature, 
but  also  of  God  as  He  exists  in  three  persons  —  of  the  Blessed 
Trinitv.  St.  Thomas  explains  this  as  follows :  “  Some  ef¬ 

fects  represent  only  the  causality  of  the  cause,  but  not  its  form ; 
as  smoke  represents  fire.  Such  a  representation  is  called  a 
trace ;  for  a  trace  shows  that  some  one  has  passed  by  but  not 
who  it  is.  Other  effects  represent  the  cause  as  regards  the 
similitude  of  its  form,  as  fire  generated  represents  fire  gen- 

1  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  93,  a.  2. 

129 


130 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


erating;  and  a  statue  of  Mercury  represents  Mercury;  and 
this  is  called  the  representation  of  image.  Now  the  proces¬ 
sions  of  the  divine  persons  are  referred  to  the  acts  of  intellect 
and  will,  as  was  said  above.  For  the  Son  proceeds  as  the 
word  of  the  intellect;  and  the  Holy  Ghost  proceeds  as  the  love 
of  the  will.  Therefore  in  rational  creatures,  possessing  intel¬ 
lect  and  will,  there  is  found  the  representation  of  the  Trinity 
by  way  of  image,  in  as  much  as  there  is  found  in  them  the 
word  conceived,  and  the  love  proceeding.”  2 

Scotus  words  this  somewhat  differently,  though  he  comes  to 
practically  the  same  result.  Man  is  the  image  of  the  Trinity, 
he  says,  not  only  in  so  far  as  he  has  an  intellect  and  will,  but 
also  because  the  first  man,  at  the  first  instant  of  his  existence, 
elicited  an  act  of  understanding  and  love ;  and  so  in  the  fecun¬ 
dity  of  his  nature,  through  his  intellect  and  will,  he  represented 
the  Father,  the  Son,  and  the  Holy  Spirit.  These  three,  the 
memory  —  memoria  fecunda  —  the  intellect,  and  the  will,  are 
consubstantial  on  the  part  of  the  soul,  yet  they  are  distinct  in 
their  acts.3 

The  creation  of  the  first  soul  is  necessarily  implied  in  the 
creation  of  all  things  by  God,  and  about  this  there  was  no 
difference  of  views  among  the  Scholastics.  The  production 
of  the  human  body  by  a  special  divine  operation  was  also  com¬ 
monly  accepted.  Some  of  the  Franciscan  school  still  harked 
back  to  the  rationes  seminales  made  rather  much  of  by  St. 
Augustine,  but  even  they  attributed  the  formation  of  the  body 
of  Adam  to  the  immediate  operation  of  God.4  St.  Thomas 
explains  the  statement  of  St.  Augustine,  that  the  body  of  the 
first  man  was  produced  according  to  its  causales  rationes  in 
the  work  of  the  six  days,  in  this  way:  “  That  which  is  said 
to  exist  in  creatures  according  to  their  causal  reasons  may  be 
understood  in  two  ways.  One  way  in  respect  of  active  and 
passive  potency,  so  that  there  is  not  merely  an  objective  pos¬ 
sibility  of  something  being  produced  from  preexisting  matter, 
but  that  there  also  preexists  a  creature  which  can  produce 

2  Ibid.  q.  65,  a.  7.  18,  a.  I,  q.  3,  Scholion  —  Quaracchi 

3  In  Sent.  I,  d.  3,  q.  9.  Ed. 

4  Cfr.  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  II,  d. 


ANTHROPOLOGY 


131 

this  something.  Another  way  in  respect  of  passive  potency 
only,  so  that  this  something  can  be  produced  from  preexisting 
matter  by  God  alone ;  and  in  this  way  does  St.  Augustine  say 
that  the  body  of  man  preexisted  in  the  works  already  pro¬ 
duced  according  to  its  causal  reasons.”  5 

His  own  reasons  for  the  production  of  the  first  human  body 
by  God  Himself  he  states  in  this  way:  “The  formation  of 
the  human  body  could  not  be  effected  by  any  created  power, 
but  only  by  the  immediate  intervention  of  God.  .  .  .  For  as 
God  alone  by  His  omnipotent  power  can  create  matter,  He 
alone  can  produce  a  form  in  matter  without  the  help  of  any 
preceding  material  form.  And  hence  it  is  that  the  angels 
cannot  so  change  bodies  as  to  fit  them  for  any  particular  form, 
except  in  so  far  as  the  form  already  preexists  by  way  of 
seed.  Consequently,  since  there  was  not  as  yet  a  human  body, 
in  virtue  of  whose  generative  power  a  similar  body  might  be 
formed,  it  was  necessary  that  the  first  human  body  should 
be  formed  immediately  by  God.”  6  However  “  it  may  well  be 
that  the  angels  performed  some  ministerial  function  in  the 
formation  of  the  body  of  the  first  man,  as  they  will  also  do  in 
the  final  resurrection,  by  gathering  together  the  dust.”  7 

Closely  connected  with  the  question  of  man's  origin  is  that 
of  his  essential  constitution.  For  clearness’  sake,  the  subject 
may  here  be  divided  into  these  three  points:  First,  the  es¬ 
sential  identity  of  the  rational  and  sensitive  soul  in  man ;  sec¬ 
ondly,  the  origin  of  individual  souls;  thirdly,  the  union  of  soul 
and  body. 

1.  Essential  Identity  of  the  Rational  and  Sensitive  Soul. — 
This  question,  about  which  there  had  been  some  difference  of 
views  in  Patristic  times,  was  to  all  intents  and  purposes  closed 
by  the  Eight  General  Council,  held  in  869.  For  in  its  eleventh 
canon,  the  Council  declares  that  both  the  Old  and  the  New 
Testament,  and  also  the  Fathers  of  the  Church,  teach  that  man 
has  only  one  “  rational  and  intellectual  soul  ” ;  and  then  it 
condemns  those  who  foolishly  maintain  that  “  he  has  two 
souls.”  It  anathematizes  not  only  the  authors  and  propagators 

5  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  91,  a.  2  ad  4“  7  Ibid.  a.  2  ad  im. 

6  Ibid.  a.  2. 


132 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


of  “  this  impiety,”  but  also  all  others  who  entertain  similar 
views.8 

Whether  this  declaration  of  the  Council  was  directly  in¬ 
tended  as  a  definition  of  the  essential  identity  of  the  rational 
and  sensitive  principle  in  man,  or  merely  of  the  oneness  of 
the  rational  soul,  is  not  altogether  clear.  Some  theologians 
think  that  we  have  here  nothing  more  than  a  condemnation 
of  Manichaean  dualism;  while  others  are  of  opinion  that  the 
absolute  oneness  of  the  human  soul  was  defined,  but  that  there 
are  no  proofs  to  establish  the  fact  as  a  certainty.  Aside  from 
this,  however,  the  doctrine  itself  is  sufficiently  certain  from  an 
earlier  definition  of  the  Church,  which  was  directed  against 
the  Origenists  and  Apollinarians.  In  it  Christ  as  man  is  de¬ 
clared  to  be  consubstantial  with  us,  being  composed  of  a  ra¬ 
tional  soul  and  a  body.9  Hence  the  rational  soul  is  evidently 
assumed  to  be  the  only  vital  principle  in  man. 

And  this  was  accepted  by  the  Scholastics  as  the  teaching  of 
the  Church.  Several  of  them  defended  the  doctrine  against 
the  error  of  Averroes,  according  to  which  all  men  have  numeri¬ 
cally  the  same  rational  soul,  so  that  only  the  sensitive  soul  is 
multiplied  in  individuals.  Under  a  somewhat  different  form, 
this  teaching  of  Averroes  was  condemned  by  the  Fifth  Lateran 
Council,  which  sat  from  1512  to  1517.10 

Although  the  intellectual  soul  is  thus  the  sensitive  and 
vegetative  principle,  it  is  nevertheless  incorruptible.  St. 
Thomas  gives  three  reasons  for  this.  First,  the  soul  is  a  pure 
spirit,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  composed  of  matter  and  form. 
It  is,  therefore,  a  subsisting  form;  and  as  a  form  cannot  be 
separated  from  itself,  it  is  impossible  that  the  soul  should  be 
subject  to  corruption.  Secondly,  although  some  hold  that  the 
soul  is  in  a  manner  composed  of  matter  and  form,  yet  even 
so  it  must  be  incorruptible.  For  corruption  can  only  result 
from  contrary  elements,  and  from  the  intellectual  soul  as  such 
contrary  elements  are  necessarily  excluded.  This  is  manifest 
from  its  highest  operation,  which  is  altogether  spiritual. 
Thirdly,  as  the  intellect  apprehends  being  under  an  absolute 

8  Mansi,  15,  403B,  432C;  DB,  338.  10  Mansi,  32,  842A;  DB,  738. 

9  Mansi,  9,  533A. 


ANTHROPOLOGY 


133 


form,  the  soul  naturally  desires  to  exist  forever;  and  as  this 
natural  desire  cannot  be  of  anything  unattainable,  its  very 
presence  indicates  that  the  soul  is  an  incorruptible  sub¬ 
stance.11 

2.  Creation  of  Individual  Souls. —  In  Patristic  times,  the 
question  of  the  creation  of  individual  souls  was  regarded  as 
still  open  for  discussion,  although  the  weight  of  authority  was 
in  favor  of  Creatianism.12  But  when  the  Scholastics  began 
to  write  their  Siimmae  and  Commentaries ,  all  discussion  of  the 
matter  had  come  to  an  end.  This  was  owing,  in  part  at  least, 
to  the  position  taken  by  the  Church,  as  indicated  by  the  symbol 
which  Leo  IX,  in  1050,  presented  to  Bishop  Peter  of  Antioch 
for  subscription.  It  contains  this  confession  of  faith  con¬ 
cerning  the  point  in  question:  “I  believe  and  profess  that 
the  soul  is  not  a  part  of  God,  but  is  created  out  of  nothing, 
and  that,  without  baptism,  it  is  in  original  sin.”  13  As  the 
soul  “  in  original  sin  ”  is  said  to  be  created,  the  Pope  evidently 
refers,  not  to  the  soul  of  Adam,  but  to  individual  souls. 

Hence,  although  a  few  of  the  earlier  Scholastics  still  re¬ 
garded  Creatianism  as  only  more  probable,  the  general  con¬ 
sensus  was  that  the  creation  of  individual  souls  could  not  be 
called  in  question.  Thus  Peter  Lombard  states  quite  defi¬ 
nitely  :  “  The  Church  teaches  that  souls  are  created  at  their 

infusion  into  the  body.”  14  St.  Thomas  is  still  more  emphatic ; 
for  he  says :  “  It  is  heretical  to  say  that  the  intellectual  soul 

is  transmitted  by  way  of  generation.”  15  Others  do  not  give 
the  same  theological  note  to  the  doctrine  of  creation  as  here 
set  forth,  but  they  entertain  no  doubt  regarding  its  truth. 

St.  Thomas  thus  indicates  the  various  opinions  that  had 
been  held  on  the  subject  at  different  times:  “  Regarding  this 
question  various  opinions  were  expressed  in  times  past.  Some 
held  that  the  soul  of  the  child  is  propagated  by  the  soul  of  the 
parent,  just  as  the  body  is  propagated  by  the  body.  Others 
said  that  all  souls  are  created  apart ;  but  maintained  that  they 
were  all  created  together  in  the  beginning,  and  afterwards 

11  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  75*  a-  6.  14  Sent.  II,  d.  18,  n.  8. 

12  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  299  sqq.  15  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  118,  a.  2. 

13  Mansi,  19,  662B ;  DB,  348. 


134 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


were  united  to  procreated  bodies,  either  by  their  own  free 
volition,  or,  as  others  would  have  it,  by  the  command  and 
action  of  God.  Others,  again,  declared  that  the  soul  at  the 
moment  of  its  creation  is  infused  into  the  body.  Though  for 
a  time  these  several  views  were  upheld,  and  though  it  was 
doubtful  which  came  nearest  the  truth,  .  .  .  nevertheless  the 
Church  subsequently  condemned  the  first  two,  and  approved 
the  third.”  16 

3.  Union  of  Soul  and  Body. —  On  this  point  there  was  con¬ 
siderable  discussion,  and  also  some  difference  of  opinion, 
among  the  Scholastics.  All  agreed,  however,  in  rejecting 
Plato's  theory  of  a  merely  mechanical  union  per  modum 
motoris.  And  to  this  they  were  necessarily  led  by  their  teach¬ 
ing  on  the  oneness  of  the  vital  principle  in  man.  For  not  only 
man’s  thoughts  and  volitions,  but  also  his  sensations  are  im¬ 
manent  actions,  and  consequently  there  must  be  an  intrinsic 
union  between  soul  and  body.  It  is  indeed  true  that  intel¬ 
lectual  activity  is  intrinsically  independent  of  the  bodily  or¬ 
ganism;  but  that  is  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  soul  is  a  sub¬ 
sisted  form,  which  in  being  and  activity  transcends  the  limita¬ 
tions  of  material  substances.  By  reason  of  its  sensitive  powers 
the  soul  constitutes  with  the  body  one  principle  of  action;  and 
by  reason  of  its  spiritual  faculties  it  forms  a  principle  of 
action  by  itself,  except  in  so  far  as  it  needs  the  presence  of 
phantasms  for  its  spiritual  operations.  The  one  does  not  in¬ 
terfere  with  the  other.17 

As  the  intrinsic  union  of  the  soul  with  the  body  requires 
that  the  material  element  be  specifically  determinable,  all  Scho¬ 
lastics  admitted  some  kind  of  materia  prima;  but  there  was  no 
agreement  in  regard  to  its  nature.  Alexander  of  Hales,  St. 
Bonaventure,  Scotus,  and  the  whole  Franciscan  school  held 
that  both  soul  and  body  are  composed  of  potency  and  act,  or 
of  matter  and  form;  while  Albertus  Magnus,  St.  Thomas, 
and  very  many  others  denied  the  composition  of  both  soul 
and  body.  This  point  has  already  been  touched  upon  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  where  a  short  explanation  is  given  of  the 

16  De  Potentia,  q.  3,  a.  9. 

17  Cfr.  St.  Thom.  Sum.  Theol.  q.  76,  a.  1. 


ANTHROPOLOGY 


135 


Scotistic  view  on  the  nature  of  the  angels.  The  same  princi¬ 
ples  there  set  forth  are  applied  by  the  Franciscan  school  to  the 
two  constitutive  elements  of  human  nature.  Hence  a  few  ex¬ 
tracts  from  their  writing  will  here  suffice  to  give  us  a  fair 
understanding  of  their  teaching  on  the  subject  now  under  con¬ 
sideration. 

Alexander  of  Hales,  speaking  of  the  human  soul,  thus  states 
his  view  regarding  its  nature :  “  It  must  be  held  that  the  hu¬ 

man  soul  is  composed  of  matter  and  form;  but  it  can  in  nowise 
be  said  that  it  has  matter  and  form  in  the  same  sense  as  bodies 
have.  .  .  .  For  corporeal  matter  is  the  foundation  of  magni¬ 
tude;  not  so  spiritual  matter.  .  .  .  Still  nothing  can  be  the 
agent  and  the  receiver  of  one  and  the  same  thing  in  itself. 
Hence  as  to  act  is  proper  to  the  form  and  to  receive  is  proper 
to  matter,  it  follows  that  the  human  soul,  which  performs  both 
functions,  is  composed  of  matter  and  form.18  .  .  .  Besides, 
it  seems  very  probable  that  all  corporeal  substances,  as  regards 
their  matter,  were  produced  in  the  six  days  of  creation ;  hence 
for  the  same  reason  the  soul  also,  as  it  is  not  entirely  simple, 
was  then  produced  as  regards  its  matter:  but  that  matter  can 
only  be  spiritual,  and  therefore  the  soul  was  then  produced  as 
regards  its  spiritual  matter.”  19 

Then,  referring  to  the  union  of  soul  and  body,  he  says: 
“  It  must  be  noted  that  there  is  a  first  form  whose  function  it 
is  to  perfect  matter;  as,  for  instance,  elementary  forms;  and 
in  their  case  the  form  directly  perfects  the  whole  matter  and 
its  every  part.  .  .  .  But  the  soul  has  something  over  and 
above  its  own  matter,  which  cannot  be  said  of  the  first  form; 
hence  the  soul  does  not  actuate  the  matter  of  the  body,  but 
the  natural  body  itself  already  complete  in  respect  of  its  natural 
form :  and  this  form  is  called  the  corporeal  form  —  forma 
c or p oralis”  20 

St.  Bonaventure  followed  the  teaching  of  his  master,  and 
expresses  it  in  almost  identical  terms.  The  soul,  he  says,  is 
a  something  that  acts  and  is  acted  upon,  that  moves  and  is 
moved,  and  therefore  there  is  in  it  a  material  principle  from 

18  Sum.  II,  q.  61,  m.  1.  20  Ibid.  q.  63,  m.  3. 

19  Sum.  II,  q.  60,  m.  2,  a.  1. 


136 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


which  it  has  its  existence,  and  a  formal  principle  from  which 
it  has  its  being.  However,  that  material  substratum  is  outside 
the  category  of  extension,  and  above  all  tendency  to  privation 
and  corruption;  and  therefore  it  is  called  spiritual  matter.21 
In  regard  to  the  union  of  the  soul  with  the  body  he  states : 
“  Although  the  rational  soul  is  composed  of  matter  and  form, 
nevertheless  it  has  a  tendency  to  perfect  corporeal  nature ; 
similarly  as  the  organic  body,  composed  of  matter  and  form, 
has  a  tendency  to  receive  the  soul.”  22 

Henry  of  Ghent  defended  the  same  doctrine,  and  advanced 
a  number  of  theological  arguments  in  support  of  his  view. 
Thus  he  pointed  out,  that,  if  the  forma  corporeitatis  be  ad¬ 
mitted,  it  is  much  easier  to  explain  the  identity  of  Christ’s 
body  during  the  triduum  mortis ,  to  defend  Mary’s  title  of 
Mother  of  God,  and  to  give  a  reasonable  exposition  of  other 
facts  belonging  to  the  faith.23 

Scotus,  as  was  explained  in  the  preceding  chapter,  divides 
the  material  elements  of  things  into  materia  primo  prima,  ma¬ 
teria  secundo  prima,  and  materia  tertio  prima.  The  first  is 
pure  potency  devoid  of  all  forms,  and  as  such  it  is  the  sub¬ 
stratum  of  all  created  beings.  The  second  is  actuated  by  a 
substantial  form,  the  forma  corporeitatis ,  which  determines 
it  quantitatively  and  makes  it  a  fit  substratum  for  specific 
organic  and  inorganic  beings.  The  third  is  the  complete  sub¬ 
stance,  specifically  determined  by  an  ultimate  substantial  form. 
This  is  not  subject  to  further  determination,  except  by  way  of 
accidental  forms.24 

It  is,  therefore,  the  materia  secundo  prima  which  constitutes 
the  body  of  which  the  rational  soul  is  the  substantial  form.  It 
has  already  been  placed  in  the  order  of  bodies  by  the  forma 
corporeitatis,  but  it  becomes  a  human  body  by  being  still  fur¬ 
ther  determined  by  the  spiritual  soul.  So  determined,  it  con¬ 
stitutes  together  with  the  soul  the  compositum  humanum, 
which  is  truly  an  nnum  per  se.  The  soul  does  not  communi¬ 
cate  to  this  body  being  simply,  but  specific  being;  and  in  so 
far  only  can  it  be  called  the  substantial  form  of  the  body. 

21  In  Sent.  II,  d.  17,  a.  1,  q.  2.  23  Quodl.  4,  q.  13. 

22  Ibid.  q.  2  ad  6m.  24  De  Rerum  Princ.  q.  8,  a.  3. 


ANTHROPOLOGY 


137 


Over  against  this  somewhat  theoretical  exposition,  which 
is  still  advocated  by  many,  stands  the  more  direct  and  simple 
explanation  of  Albertus  Magnus  and  St.  Thomas.  Both  of 
them  follow  closely  the  teaching  of  the  Stagirite,  but  neither 
of  them  simply  transcribes  his  thoughts.  The  views  of  Al¬ 
bertus  on  the  matter  now  under  consideration  may  be  reduced 
to  the  following  points.  1.  The  soul  is  essentially  simple,  and 
therefore  not  composed  of  a  really  distinct  act  and  potency.25 
2.  The  rational  soul  is  immediately  united  to  the  body  as  its 
substantial  form.26  3.  The  soul  gives  to  the  body  its  spe¬ 
cific,  numerical,  and  substantial  unity.27  4.  The  soul  is  the 
actus  corporis  in  the  sense  that  it  communicates  to  the  materia 
prima  the  esse  corporis  as  well  as  the  esse  vivum  et  sensi¬ 
tive  um. 28 

St.  Thomas  takes  this  teaching  of  his  master  and  develops 
it  in  his  own  inimitable  way.  “To  seek  the  nature  of  the 
soul/’  he  says,  “  we  must  premise  that  the  soul  is  defined  as 
the  first  principle  of  life  in  those  things  which  live:  for  we  call 
living  things  animate  (souled)  ;  and  not-living  things  inani¬ 
mate  (soulless).”  29  Now,  “it  must  necessarily  be  admitted 
that  the  principle  of  intellectual  operation,  which  we  call  the 
soul,  is  a  principle  both  incorporeal  and  subsistent.”  .  .  .  For 
it  “  has  an  operation  of  its  own  apart  from  the  body.  But 
only  a  self-subsisting  thing  can  have  an  operation  of  its  own; 
for  nothing  can  operate  but  what  is  actual. ” 30  Moreover, 
“  the  intellectual  soul  itself  is  an  absolute  form,  and  not  some¬ 
thing  composed  of  matter  and  form.  For  if  the  intellectual 
soul  were  composed  of  matter  and  form,  the  forms  of  things 
would  be  received  into  it  as  individuals,  and  so  it  would  know 
only  the  individual ;  just  as  it  happens  with  the  sensitive  powers 
which  receive  forms  in  a  corporeal  organ.  ...  It  follows, 
therefore,  that  the  intellectual  soul,  and  every  intellectual  sub¬ 
stance  which  has  knowledge  of  forms  absolutely,  is  exempt 
from  composition  of  matter  and  form.”  31 

25  Sum.  II,  tr.  T2,  q.  2,  m.  2.  29  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  75,  a.  I. 

26  Ibid.  q.  72,  m.  2.  30  Ibid.  a.  2. 

27  De  Creat.  IT,  tr.  1,  q.  4,  a.  5.  31  Ibid.  a.  5. 

28  De  Horn.  tr.  1,  q.  7,  a.  1. 


138 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Again,  “it  is  well  to  remark  that  if  anyone  holds  that  the 
soul  is  composed  of  matter  and  form,  it  would  follow  that  in 
no  way  could  the  soul  be  the  form  of  the  body.  For  since 
the  form  is  an  act,  and  matter  is  only  a  potentiality,  that  which 
is  composed  of  matter  and  form  cannot  be  the  form  of  another 
by  virtue  of  itself  as  a  whole.  But  if  it  is  a  form  by  virtue  of 
some  part  of  itself,  then  that  part  which  is  the  form  we  call 
the  soul,  and  that  of  which  it  is  the  form  we  call  the  primary 
animate.”  32  Yet  “we  must  assert  that  the  intellect,  which 
is  the  principle  of  intellectual  operation,  is  the  form  of  the 
human  body.  For  that  whereby  primarily  anything  acts  is  a 
form  of  the  thing  to  which  the  act  is  to  be  attributed.  .  .  . 
But  the  soul  is  the  primary  principle  of  our  nourishment,  feel¬ 
ing,  and  local  movement;  and  likewise  the  primary  principle 
whereby  we  understand.  Therefore  this  principle  by  which 
we  primarily  understand,  whether  it  be  called  the  intellect  or 
the  intellectual  soul,  is  the  form  of  the  body.”  33 

This  excludes,  first  of  all,  Plato’s  idea  of  a  merely  extrinsic 
union  per  modum  motoris.  “  For  that  which  is  moved  is 
neither  generated  by  the  application  of  the  moving  power,  nor 
does  it  corrupt  by  the  withdrawal  of  that  power ;  because  there 
is  no  dependence  in  respect  of  being,  but  only  in  respect  of 
movement.  If,  therefore,  the  soul  be  united  to  the  body  only 
in  the  function  of  mover,  it  follows  that  in  the  union  of  soul 
and  body  there  is  no  generation,  nor  in  their  separation  is  there 
corruption ;  and  thus  death,  which  consists  in  the  separation  of 
soul  and  body,  does  not  mean  a  corruption  of  the  animal 
nature ;  which  is  obviously  false.”  34 

Hence  the  union  of  soul  and  body  is  necessarily  intrinsic; 
and  this  follows  obviously  from  the  nature  of  the  composition 
that  is  formed  by  their  union.  “  For  to  be  and  to  act  is  not 
predicated  of  the  form  alone,  nor  of  the  matter  alone,  but  of 
the  composite  resultant:  to  be  and  to  act  is  attributed  to  both 
in  common,  in  so  far  as  the  one  discharges  the  functions  of 
form  and  the  other  that  of  matter.  For  we  say  that  a  man 
is  healthy  in  respect  of  his  body  and  health,  and  that  he  is 

32  Ibid.  q.  76,  a.  1.  34  Cont.  Gent.  II,  57. 

33  Ibid. 


ANTHROPOLOGY 


139 


wise  in  respect  of  his  soul  and  wisdom ;  in  which  predication 
wisdom  is  taken  as  the  form  of  him  who  is  wise,  and  health 
as  the  form  of  him  who  is  healthy.  But  to  live  and  to  feel 
is  attributed  to  soul  and  body;  for  we  are  said  to  live  and  to 
feel  by  reason  of  our  soul  and  our  body,  but  so  that  the  soul 
is  the  formal  principle  of  life  and  sensation.  Therefore  the 
soul  is  the  form  of  the  body,”  and  this  by  intrinsic  union.35 

From  this  intrinsic  union  of  soul  and  body  it  necessarily  fol¬ 
lows  that  “  it  is  impossible  for  another  substantial  form  be¬ 
sides  the  soul  to  be  found  in  man  ”  .  .  .  For  “  the  substantial 
form  gives  simple  existence;  therefore  by  its  coming  a  thing  is 
said  to  be  generated  simply ;  and  by  its  removal  to  be  corrupted 
simply.”  .  .  .  But,  “  if  besides  the  intellectual  soul  there  pre¬ 
existed  in  matter  another  substantial  form  by  which  the  sub¬ 
ject  of  the  soul  were  made  an  actual  being,  it  would  follow  that 
the  soul  does  not  give  existence  simply ;  and  consequently  that 
it  is  not  the  substantial  form :  and  so  at  the  advent  of  the  soul 
there  would  not  be  simple  generation,  nor  at  its  removal  simple 
corruption;  all  of  which  is  clearly  false.  Whence  we  must 
conclude,  that  there  is  no  other  substantial  form  in  man  be¬ 
sides  the  intellectual  soul ;  and  that,  as  the  soul  virtually  con¬ 
tains  the  sensitive  and  nutritive  souls,  so  does  it  virtually  con¬ 
tain  all  inferior  forms,  and  itself  alone  does  whatever  the  im¬ 
perfect  forms  do  in  other  things.”  36 

A  little  later,  Peter  John  Olivi,  a  Franciscan  and  opponent 
of  St.  Thomas,  explained  the  union  of  soul  and  body  in  a 
manner  that  induced  the  Council  of  Vienne  to  define  at  least 
one  part  of  the  teaching  set  forth  in  the  preceding  paragraphs, 
namely,  that  the  rational  soul  is  of  itself  and  essentially  the 
true  form  of  the  body  —  per  se  et  essentialiter  vera  forma  cor¬ 
poris.  Whether  the  Council  meant  also  to  define  the  essential 
identity  of  the  rational  and  sensitive  soul,  is  not  quite  clear; 
although  many  theologians  interpret  the  definition  in  this 
sense. 

The  principal  difficulty  experienced  in  determining  the  full 
meaning  of  the  definition  given  by  the  Council  arises  from  the 

36  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  76,  a.  4. 


35  Ibid. 


140 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


uncertainty  about  the  exact  import  of  Olivi’s  teaching.  There 
are  no  Acts  of  the  Council,  and  Olivi’s  own  works  have  per¬ 
ished.  However  some  years  ago  a  copy  of  his  Quodlibeta  was 
found,  and  from  them  some  idea  may  be  obtained  as  regards 
the  general  trend  of  his  thoughts  on  the  point  in  question. 
Speaking  of  the  union  of  soul  and  body,  he  says :  “  Their  un¬ 
ion  is  intimate,  but  not  immediate;  because  by  the  mediation 
of  the  sensitive  soul  they  are  inclined  to  one  another,  and  so 
they  are  united.  .  .  .  But  how  this  union  can  be  understood 
and  be  consubstantial  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  be  formal, 
may  easily  be  gathered  from  this,  that  the  sensitive  soul  is 
united  with  the  intellectual  soul  in  a  common  spiritual  matter ; 
or,  so  to  speak,  in  one  subject  of  the  rational  soul.”  37 

This  can  hardly  mean  anything  else  than  that  the  rational 
and  sensitive  soul  in  man  are  really  distinct;  and  so  Olivi's 
teaching  was  understood  by  Scotus,  who  was  practically  his 
contemporary.  He  does  not  mention  Olivi  by  name,  but  he 
cites  his  words  and  then  points  out  that  they  imply  a  real  dis¬ 
tinction  between  the  rational,  sensitive,  and  vegetative  prin¬ 
ciples  in  man.38  Most  modern  theologians  give  the  same  in¬ 
terpretation. 

Against  this  teaching,  whatever  way  it  was  then  understood, 
the  Council  of  Vienne,  convened  in  13 n,  issued  the  following 
definition:  “Whosoever  shall  hereafter  pertinaciously  pre¬ 
sume  to  assert,  defend,  or  teach,  that  the  rational  or  intellec¬ 
tual  soul  is  not  per  se  and  essentially  the  form  of  the  human 
body,  shall  be  considered  a  heretic.” 39  This  definition 
clearly  lays  down  three  points.  1.  That  the  rational  soul  is 
in  a  true  sense  the  substantial  form  of  the  body.  It  is  not  an 
accidental  or  mere  assistant  form.  2.  It  is  the  form  of  the 
body  per  se;  that  is,  of  itself,  and  not  through  the  instrumen¬ 
tality  of  the  sensitive  or  vegetative  soul.  3.  It  is  the  form 
of  the  body  essentially,  or  by  reason  of  its  essence;  not  merely, 
therefore,  through  some  accidental  influence  it  may  be  said  to 
exercise  on  the  body.  In  more  recent  years  the  definition  was 

37  Cfr.  Palmieri,  De  Deo  Creante,  38  De  Rerum  Princ.  q.  9,  a.  2,  s.  I. 

p.  772  sqq;  Zigliara,  De  Mente  Con-  39  Mansi,  25,  410E;  DB,  481. 

cilii  Viennensis,  p.  115  sqq. 


ANTHROPOLOGY 


141 

interpreted  by  Pius  IX  in  the  sense  that  there  is  only  one  prin¬ 
ciple  of  life  in  man,  and  that  this  is  the  rational  soul,  “  from 
which  the  body  also  receives  movement  and  life  and  every 
sense.”  And  this  teaching,  he  declares,  “  is  in  such  wise  con¬ 
nected  with  the  dogma  of  the  Church,  that  it  is  its  only  legiti¬ 
mate  and  true  interpretation,  and  consequently  cannot  be  de¬ 
nied  without  an  error  in  faith.”  40 

It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  the  Council  did  not  touch 
the  further  question,  whether  the  rational  soul,  as  the  form 
of  the  body,  is  united  to  the  materia  prima  in  the  Thomistic 
or  Scotistic  sense  of  that  term.  It  did  not  condemn  the  teach¬ 
ing  of  Scotus  and  his  Franciscan  brethren  on  the  forma  cor- 
poreitatis.  In  the  definition  the  rational  soul  is  said  to  be 
the  forma  corporis ,  not  the  forma  materiae  primae.  It  re¬ 
mains  for  theologians  to  determine  what  is  meant  by  corpus 
in  this  connection. 

40  Ep.  “  Dolore  hand  mediocri,”  ad  Episc.  Wratislaviensem,  30  Apr. 
i860;  DB,  1655,  note  1. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


STATE  OF  ORIGINAL  JUSTICE 

In  reference  to  the  primitive  condition  of  our  first  parents, 
the  early  Scholastics  did  little  more  than  restate  the  teaching 
of  the  Fathers.  Thus  St.  Anselm  followed  closely  the  lines 
of  thought  marked  out  by  St.  Augustine,  and  hardly  any¬ 
where  reached  beyond  the  results  already  achieved  bv  that 
profound  thinker.  Both  regarded  original  justice  primarily 
as  a  supernatural  rectitude  of  the  will,  which  manifested  itself 
in  a  fixed  tendency  towards  God  as  the  object  of  eternal  bless¬ 
edness.  This  rectitude,  however,  they  conceived  to  be  based 
upon  a  gratuitous  intrinsic  gift,  which  by  its  own  nature  and 
by  the  will  of  the  Giver  permanently  inhered  in  the  soul,  yet 
could  be  preserved  only  by  the  free  subjection  of  the  creature 
to  the  Creator.  It  was  the  gratia  justitiae ,  or  sanctifying 
grace,  whereby  human  nature  was  elevated  to  a  condition  of 
divine  sonship.1 

Furthermore,  along  with  this  rectitude  of  the  supernaturally 
elevated  will,  Adam  received,  according  to  both  authors,  cer¬ 
tain  prerogatives  that  perfected  his  lower  nature,  and  made 
his  existence  on  earth  a  life  of  singular  blessedness.  Among 
these  prerogatives  were  especially  freedom  from  inordinate 
concupiscence,  immunity  from  bodily  infirmities,  and  immor¬ 
tality  of  the  body.  And  all  these  gifts  were  bestowed  upon 
Adam,  not  only  as  a  personal  possession,  but  as  a  sacred 
heirloom  of  the  whole  race,  which  it  was  his  duty  to  transmit 
intact  to  his  posterity.  This  transmission,  however,  as  also 
his  own  permanent  possession  of  these  prerogatives,  was  made 
dependent  on  Adam’s  fidelity  to  his  Creator.2 

Practically  the  same  view  was  taken  by  Hugh  of  St.  Victor, 

1  De  Cone.  Grat.  et  Lib.  Arbit.  13.  2  De  Cone.  Virg.  2. 

142 


STATE  OF  ORIGINAL  JUSTICE 


143 


except  that  he  entertained  some  doubt  as  to  whether  Adam 
had  infused  charity  before  the  fall,  although  he  held  that  the 
moral  virtues  were  certainly  connected  with  the  other  gifts  re¬ 
ceived  by  our  first  parents.3  By  way  of  knowledge,  more¬ 
over,  Adam  was  gifted  with  an  intuition  of  divine  things,  a 
power  of  contemplation  which  held  a  middle  place  between 
faith  and  the  beatific  vision.  By  this  intuition  Hugh  seems 
to  have  understood  that  enlightened  knowledge  of  God  and 
divine  things  which  the  mystic  school  in  general  looked  upon 
as  the  special  privilege  of  perfect  souls.4 

Peter  Lombard  restated  and  somewhat  developed  the  same 
doctrine.  With  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,  he  held  that  Adam  en¬ 
joyed  the  privilege  of  contemplating  God  in  a  very  special 
manner;  by  a  vision,  not  indeed  so  perfect  as  that  of  the  blessed 
in  heaven,  but  neither  so  imperfect  as  that  which  is  granted 
to  us  here  on  earth.5  When  speaking  of  the  graces  that  were 
bestowed  upon  Adam,  he  follows  St.  Augustine’s  exposition 
step  by  step.  Adam  was  made  right,  and  by  the  grace  of  his 
state  he  could  live  without  sin,  although  he  needed  another 
grace  in  order  to  merit  eternal  life.6 

Great  progess  along  these  lines  was  made  by  Alexander  of 
Hales,  who  considered  the  state  of  original  justice  under  all 
its  different  aspects.  Accepting  the  teaching  of  his  predeces¬ 
sors  as  regards  the  fact  of  original  justice,  he  inquired  more 
deeply  into  its  inmost  nature.  Our  first  parents,  he  notes, 
were  free  from  inordinate  concupiscence,7  immune  from  bod¬ 
ily  sufferings  and  death,8  and  endowed  with  a  high  degree  of 
the  knowledge  of  God.9  It  was  in  these  prerogatives  that 
original  justice  properly  consisted.  But  along  with  them, 
though  not  as  forming  an  essential  part  of  original  justice, 
our  first  parents  also  received  the  gratia  gratum  faciens ,  or 
sanctifying  grace,  which  must  be  considered  as  a  gratuitous 
gift  of  God,  exceeding  all  natural  exigencies  and  capacities  of 
human  nature.  In  order  to  preserve  this  grace,  there  was 

3  De  Sacr.  VI,  c.  17.  7  Sum.  II,  q.  87,  m.  1. 

4  Ibid.  c.  14.  8  Ibid.  q.  88,  m.  1-4. 

5  Sent.  II,  d.  23,  n.  4.  9  Ibid.  q.  92,  m.  1-4. 

6  Ibid.  d.  24,  n.  1. 


144 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


placed  at  their  disposal  the  gratia  gratis  data,  which,  besides 
the  virtues  proper  to  their  state,  included  also  a  special  help 
of  God,  enabling  them  to  persevere  in  good  and  to  merit  eter¬ 
nal  life.10 

Sanctifying  grace  the  author  speaks  of  as  a  sublimatio 
creaturae  rationalis  —  an  elevation  of  the  rational  creature 
above  its  own  nature.  Referring  to  the  complacency  which 
the  Creator  takes  in  the  creatures  of  His  hands,  he  says  that 
this  complacency  is  of  three  degrees.  First,  all  creatures  are 
acceptable  to  God  in  as  much  as  by  their  nature  they  are  all 
good ;  secondly,  rational  creatures  are  more  acceptable  to  God, 
precisely  in  so  far  as  they  are  rational;  thirdly,  rational 
creatures  are  in  a  very  special  and  most  proper  sense  accept¬ 
able  to  God  because  they  are  consecrated  to  Him,  so  that  they 
are  His  temple,  His  children,  and  united  to  Him  as  His  spouses. 
“  And  this  sublimation  of  the  rational  creature,”  he  continues, 
“  is  a  supra  naturale  complementum  —  a  perfection  that  is 
above  the  nature  of  the  recipient;  and  therefore  neither  the 
aforesaid  consecration,  nor  the  adoption,  nor  the  assumption, 
is  effected  through  the  instrumentality  of  anything  that  be¬ 
longs  to  nature,  but  by  means  of  a  gift  that  is  superadded  to 
nature,  which  consecrates  the  soul,  makes  it  into  a  temple,  as¬ 
similates  it  to  God,  to  the  end  that  it  may  be  His  son  or  daugh¬ 
ter —  links  or  unites  it  to  God  -through  conformity  of  the 
will,  so  that  it  may  be  His  spouse.”  11 

This  sanctifying  grace  was  possessed  by  our  first  parents  in 
the  state  of  original  justice,  but  not  from  the  very  beginning. 
It  was  not  communicated  to  them  at  the  moment  of  their  crea¬ 
tion,  but  only  some  time  before  their  fall  into  sin.  On  this 
point,  the  author  says,  there  were  two  contrary  opinions  in 
his  day.  His  own  words  are :  “  Some  hold  that  the  first  man 
was  created  in  the  state  of  sanctifying  grace.  And  the  reason 
which  moves  them  to  hold  this  view  is  God’s  perfect  liberality 
and  man’s  sufficient  disposition.  Others  hold  that  he  was 
created  only  in  his  natural  state,  not  in  the  state  of  sanctifying 
grace ;  and  this  opinion  is  to  be  adopted  rather  than  the  other, 


10  Ibid.  q.  91,  m.  1,  2. 


11  Ibid.  q.  91,  m.  1,  a.  2  ad  im. 


STATE  OF  ORIGINAL  JUSTICE 


145 


because  it  is  more  in  conformity  with  reason,  is  supported  by 
the  weight  of  authority,  and  manifests  more  clearly  the  di¬ 
vine  excellence.”  12  God  could  indeed  have  adorned  human 
nature  with  sanctifying  grace  at  the  moment  of  its  creation; 
but  it  was  more  in  harmony  with  His  general  way  of  acting  in 
the  supernatural  order,  that  He  should  require  some  kind  of 
positive  disposition  produced  by  man’s  free  cooperation  with 
actual  grace.13 

For  the  necessity  of  grace,  both  actual  and  habitual,  Alex¬ 
ander  assigns  these  two  reasons:  First,  human  nature,  be¬ 
cause  of  its  animal  proclivities,  does  not  readily  and  expedi¬ 
tiously  tend  toward  God  as  its  last  end,  even  in  the  natural 
order;  secondly,  as  man  was  destined  for  a  supernatural  end, 
he  had  need  of  supernatural  means.  “  He  could,  indeed,  reach 
out  to  the  things  that  were  within  the  order  of  nature;  but  he 
could  do  nothing  towards  attaining  the  end  that  was  above 
nature.”  14  For  that  he  needed  a  bonnm  ultra  terminos  na¬ 
turae  sive  supra  omnem  naturam  —  a  help  that  was  strictly 
supernatural.15 

Along  with  sanctifying  grace,  Adam  received  also  the  in¬ 
fused  virtues  of  faith,  hope,  and  charity,  as  without  them  it 
would  have  been  impossible  for  him  to  merit  heaven.  The 
knowledge  of  God  is  twofold :  natural  and  supernatural.  The 
former  we  gather  from  God’s  creatures  around  us,  and  by 
it  we  apprehend  God  as  the  highest  natural  good;  the  latter 
comes  to  us  by  way  of  revelation,  and  leads  us  to  some  under¬ 
standing  of  the  inner  life  of  God.  And  so  is  there  a  twofold 
love  of  God :  one  that  is  natural,  in  as  much  as  it  flows  from 
our  natural  knowledge  of  God;  and  another  that  is  super¬ 
natural,  and  this  has  its  source  in  the  supernatural  knowledge 
of  faith.16  Unlike  the  Lombard  and  Scotus,  Alexander 
places  a  real  distinction  between  charity  and  sanctifying  grace. 

St.  Bonaventure  follows  rather  closely  the  lines  of  thought 
traced  out  by  his  master.  Like  him,  he  understands  by  the 
justitia  originalis  the  gift  of  integrity,  in  virtue  of  which  hu- 

12  Ibid.  q.  90,  m.  1,  a.  1.  15  Ibid.  m.  2,  a.  3. 

13  Ibid.  16  Ibid.  q.  92,  m.  1,  2. 

14  Sum.  II,  q.  91,  m.  3,  a.  2. 


146 


MEDI/EVAL  THEOLOGY 


man  nature  was,  in  all  its  faculties  and  powers,  properly  dis¬ 
posed  in  itself  and  in  reference  to  God  as  its  last  end.  This 
gift  consisted  principally  in  the  prerogatives  of  bodily  im¬ 
mortality  and  of  freedom  from  concupiscence.17  They  were 
not  strictly  supernatural,  since  there  is  an  aptitude  for  them  in 
nature;  but  they  were  nevertheless  a  largess  of  grace — quan¬ 
tum  ad  aptitudinem  fuit  (imniortalitas)  a  natura,  quantum  ad 
complemcntum  fuit  a  gratia.18  Together  with  these  preroga¬ 
tives,  Adam  possessed  a  special  knowledge  of  God,  which  was 
more  perfect  than  the  knowledge  derived  from  creatures  and 
less  perfect  than  the  knowledge  of  vision.  The  author  calls 
it  scientia  apparitionis  et  content  plationis.  Owing  to  the  per¬ 
fection  of  his  state,  Adam  did  not  have  the  knowledge  of 
faith.19 

In  his  explanation  of  the  gratia  gratum  faciens  which  was 
conferred  upon  our  first  parents,  St.  Bonaventure  uses  the 
identical  terms  employed  by  Alexander.  Through  it  the  soul 
is  consecrated  as  a  temple  of  the  Godhead,  is  adopted  as  God's 
own  child,  and  is  received  by  Him  as  His  spouse.  Thus  the 
soul  is  intrinsically  sanctified,  is  made  like  unto  God,  and  en¬ 
dowed  with  a  most  surpassing  spiritual  beauty.  In  itself  this 
sanctifying  grace  is  a  supra  naturale  complemcntum  omnis 
creaturae  —  a  gratuitous  gift  that  is  in  no  sense  due  to  any 
created  nature.29  Without  it  man  is  neither  acceptable  to  God 
in  the  supernatural  order,  nor  can  he  merit  eternal  life.  How¬ 
ever,  this  gift  was  not  bestowed  at  the  moment  of  creation,  but 
only  after  our  first  parents  had  disposed  themselves  for  its 
reception  by  faithful  cooperation  with  God’s  helping  grace.21 

Albertus  Magnus  also  distinguished  between  the  justitia 
originalis  and  the  gratia  gratum  faciens ,  understanding  by  the 
former  a  preternatural  order  and  harmony  of  all  the  faculties 
and  powers  of  human  nature,  and  bv  the  latter  an  elevating 
principle  whereby  Adam  became  capable  of  supernatural 
merit.22  The  gift  of  integrity  or  original  justice  was  con- 

17  In  Sent.  II,  d.  19,  a.  3,  q.  i,  2.  20  Ibid.  d.  29,  q.  1;  cfr.  d.  26,  a. 

18  Ibid.  q.  1.  unic.  q.  1. 

19  Ibid.  q.  23,  a.  2,  q.  1,  3.  21  Ibid.  d.  29.  q.  2. 

22  Sum.  II,  tr.  14,  q.  85. 


STATE  OF  ORIGINAL  JUSTICE 


147 


f erred  at  the  moment  of  creation,  and  if  Adam  had  remained 
faithful  it  would  have  been  bestowed  upon  all  his  descendants  ; 
but  sanctifying  grace  was  not  given  until  Adam  had  disposed 
himself  for  its  reception.23  However,  he  received  it  before 
the  fall,  and  thus  was  placed  in  a  condition  in  which  he  could 
have  remained  faithful  to  God  and  merited  eternal  life.24 
Sanctifying  grace  is  a  universal  habit  or  quality,  which  inheres 
both  in  the  soul  and  all  its  faculties;  although  in  the  latter 
it  inheres  rather  by  reason  of  the  accompanying  virtues.25 
These  virtues  are  intimately  connected  with  sanctifying  grace, 
as  are  also  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit.20 

St.  Thomas  developed  this  teaching  of  his  predecessors  in 
his  own  clear  way,  and  on  some  points  departed  from  their 
views.  Speaking  of  original  justice  and  sanctifying  grace,  he 
says :  “  It  must  be  noted  that  in  relation  to  the  first  man  there 

is  question  of  a  twofold  justice:  The  one  is  original  justice, 
which  bears  reference  to  the  due  subordination  of  the  body 
to  the  soul,  and  of  the  lower  powers  to  the  higher,  and  of  the 
higher  powers  to  God.  In  the  primitive  state,  this  justice 
was  by  the  divine  goodness  conferred  upon  human  nature  it¬ 
self ;  and  therefore,  if  Adam  had  remained  faithful,  he  would 
have  transmitted  it  to  his  descendants.  There  is  also  another 
gratuitous  justice,  which  is  the  principle  of  supernatural  merit; 
and  in  regard  to  this  there  is  a  twofold  opinion.”  27 

This  “  twofold  opinion  ”  refers  both  to  the  time  when  sanc¬ 
tifying  grace  was  bestowed  on  Adam  and  to  its  transmission 
to  his  posterity.  He  states  the  two  views  in  this  way :  “  Some 
say  that  the  first  man  was  created  only  in  the  state  of  perfect 
nature,  and  not  in  the  state  of  grace.  The  reason  assigned 
for  this  view  is,  that  for  the  reception  of  such  a  grace  there 
was  need  of  a  personal  preparation  on  the  part  of  the  recipient. 
As  a  necessary  consequence,  in  this  opinion  the  grace  thus 
conferred  was  a  personal  gift  to  the  soul,  and  therefore  would 
in  no  sense  have  been  transmitted,  except  in  so  far  as  there 

would  have  been  an  aptitude  in  all  to  receive  it.  But  others 

23  Ibid.  q.  90,  m.  I.  26  Ibid.  tr.  14,  q.  90,  m.  4,  5. 

24  Ibid.  m.  3.  27  In  Sent.  II,  d.  20,  q.  2,  a.  3. 

25  Ibid.  tr.  16,  q.  98,  m.  4. 


148 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


say  that  man  was  created  in  the  state  of  grace,  and  according 
to  this  view  the  gift  of  grace  was  conferred  on  human  nature 
itself :  hence  grace  would  have  been  transmitted  together  with 
nature.”  28  This  latter  view  St.  Thomas  definitely  adopted 
in  his  Snmma  Theologica,  where  he  says :  “  But  since  the  root 

of  original  justice,  which  conferred  righteousness  on  the  first 
man  when  he  was  made,  consists  in  the  supernatural  subjection 
of  reason  to  God,  which  subjection  results  from  sanctifying 
grace,  .  .  .  we  must  conclude  that  if  children  were  born  in 
original  justice,  they  would  also  have  been  born  in  grace.”  29 

Hence  St.  Thomas  established  a  much  closer  connection  be¬ 
tween  sanctifying  grace  and  the  preternatural  gifts  of  original 
justice  than  any  of  his  predecessors  had  attempted.  Alex¬ 
ander  of  Hales  and  Albertus  Magnus  considered  these  gifts 
as  standing  by  themselves ;  and  the  same  view  was  taken  by 
St.  Bonaventure:  while  St.  Thomas  makes  them  rest  upon 
sanctifying  grace  as  their  supernatural  foundation.  Hence 
he  gives  this  reason  for  holding  that  Adam  received  sanctify¬ 
ing  grace  at  the  moment  of  creation :  “  The  very  rectitude  of 

the  primitive  state,  wherewith  man  was  endowed  by  God, 
seems  to  require  that,  as  others  say,  he  was  created  in  grace. 

.  .  .  For  this  rectitude  consisted  in  his  reason  being  subject 
to  God,  the  lower  powers  to  reason,  and  the  body  to  the  soul : 
and  the  first  subjection  was  the  cause  of  both  the  second  and 
the  third.”  .  .  .  For  “  if  the  loss  of  grace  dissolved  the  obe¬ 
dience  of  the  flesh  to  the  soul,  we  may  gather  that  the  inferior 
powers  were  subject  to  the  soul  through  grace  existing 
therein.”  30 

The  following  is  a  brief  outline  of  the  teaching  of  St. 
Thomas  on  the  various  perfections  with  which  Adam  was  en¬ 
dowed  in  the  state  of  original  justice.  He  studies  successively 
the  perfections  of  the  intellect,  of  the  will,  and  of  the  body. 

1.  Perfections  of  the  Intellect. — “  The  first  man  did  not  see 
God  through  His  essence  if  we  consider  the  ordinary  state  of 
that  life ;  unless,  perhaps,  it  be  said  that  he  saw  God  in  a  vision, 
when  God  cast  a  deep  sleep  upon  Adam.  .  .  .  Nevertheless  he 

28  Tbid.  q.  1,  a.  1.  30  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  95,  a.  1. 

29  Op.  cit.  I,  q.  100,  a.  1  ad  2m. 


STATE  OF  ORIGINAL  JUSTICE 


149 


knew  God  with  a  more  perfect  knowledge  than  we  do.  Thus 
in  a  sense  his  knowledge  was  midway  between  our  knowledge 
in  the  present  state  and  the  knowledge  we  shall  have  in  heaven, 
when  we  see  God  through  His  essence.”  And  the  reason  for 
this  higher  knowledge  must  be  sought  in  the  fact  that  “  the 
first  man  was  not  impeded  by  exterior  things  from  a  clear  and 
steady  contemplation  of  the  intelligible  effects  which  he  per¬ 
ceived  by  the  radiation  of  the  first  truth,  whether  by  a  natural 
or  by  a  gratuitous  knowledge.”  31 

Adam’s  knowledge  was  intended  not  only  for  his  own  per¬ 
sonal  ends,  but  also  for  the  instruction  and  government  of 
others ;  hence  he  “  was  established  by  God  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  have  knowledge  of  all  those  things  for  which  man  has  a 
natural  aptitude.  And  such  are  whatever  are  virtually  con¬ 
tained  in  the  first  self-evident  principles,  that  is,  whatever 
truths  man  is  naturally  able  to  know.  Moreover,  in  order  to 
direct  his  own  life  and  that  of  others,  man  needs  not  only 
those  things  which  can  be  naturally  known,  but  also  things 
surpassing  natural  knowledge;  because  the  life  of  man  is  di¬ 
rected  to  a  supernatural  end:  just  as  it  is  necessary  for  us  to 
know  the  truths  of  faith  in  order  to  direct  our  own  lives. 
Wherefore  the  first  man  was  endowed  with  such  a  knowledge 
of  these  supernatural  truths  as  was  necessary  for  the  direction 
of  human  life  in  that  state.  But  those  things  which  cannot 
be  known  by  merely  human  effort,  and  which  are  not  neces¬ 
sary  for  the  direction  of  human  life,  were  not  known  by  the 
first  man;  such  as  the  thoughts  of  men,  future  contingent 
events,  and  some  individual  facts.”  32  However,  “  as  long  as 
the  state  of  innocence  continued,  it  was  impossible  for  the 
human  intellect  to  assent  to  falsehood  as  if  it  were  truth,” 
even  as  regarded  things  to  which  man’s  knowledge  did  not 
extend ;  for  such  possibility  of  deception  would  not  have  been 
befitting  the  integrity  and  rectitude  of  the  primitive  state.33 
Hence,  “  although  the  woman  was  deceived  before  she  sinned 
in  deed,  still  it  was  not  till  she  had  already  sinned  by  interior 


pride.”  34 


31  Ibid.  q.  94,  a.  1. 

32  Ibid.  a.  3. 


33  Ibid.  a.  4. 

34  Ibid.  a.  4  ad  im. 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


150 

2.  Perfections  of  the  Will. —  As  the  lower  powers  were 
subject  to  the  higher,  and  the  higher  powers  were  subject  to 
God,  the  will  of  the  first  man,  so  long  as  he  continued  in  the 
state  of  innocence,  was  never  disturbed  or  weakened  by  the 
influence  of  passions.  In  their  actual  tendency  towards  their 
proper  object,  they  existed  only  as  consequent  upon  the  judg¬ 
ment  of  reason.  And  even  in  this  sense  there  were  no  pas¬ 
sions  save  those  only  that  “  are  ordered  to  wrhat  is  good  ” ; 
“  such  as  joy  and  love,  desire  and  hope  that  casteth  not 
down.” 35  Hence  the  will  could  always  exercise  its  full 
power  in  the  pursuit  of  virtue. 

The  perfection  of  the  primitive  state  required  also  that  the 
first  man  should  in  a  certain  sense  possess  all  the  virtues.  For 
“  the  virtues  are  nothing  but  those  perfections  whereby  reason 
is  directed  to  God,  and  the  inferior  powers  are  regulated  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  dictate  of  reason.”  Here,  however,  a  distinc¬ 
tion  is  to  be  made  as  regards  habit  and  act.  Some  of  these 
virtues  involve  no  imperfection  in  their  nature,  such  as  faith, 
hope,  charity,  and  justice;  and  they  existed  “  in  the  primitive 
state  absolutely,  both  in  habit  and  in  act.  But  other  virtues 
are  of  such  a  nature  as  to  imply  imperfection  either  in  their 
act,  or  on  the  part  of  the  matter.  If  such  imperfection  be 
consistent  with  the  perfection  of  the  primitive  state,  the  vir¬ 
tues  necessarily  existed  in  that  state ;  as  faith  which  is  of  things 
not  seen,  and  hope  which  is  of  things  not  yet  possessed.  For 
the  perfection  of  that  state  did  not  extend  to  the  vision  of  the 
divine  essence,  and  the  possession  of  God  with  the  enjoyment 
of  final  beatitude.  .  .  .  But  any  virtue  which  implies  imper¬ 
fection  incompatible  with  the  perfection  of  the  primitive  state, 
could  exist  in  that  state  as  a  habit,  but  not  as  to  the  act ;  for  in¬ 
stance  penance,  which  is  sorrow  for  sins  committed ;  and 
mercy,  which  is  sorrow  for  another’s  misery ;  because  sorrow, 
guilt,  and  misery  are  incompatible  with  the  perfection  of  the 
primitive  state.”  36 

As  man  in  the  state  of  innocence  had  a  free  will,  and  also 
the  assistance  of  God’s  grace,  he  could  perform  meritorious 


35  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  95,  a.  2. 


36  Ibid.  a.  3. 


STATE  OF  ORIGINAL  JUSTICE 


J5i 

actions.  In  one  sense  these  actions  were  more  meritorious 
than  corresponding  actions  in  the  state  of  reparation,  and  in 
another  sense  they  were  less  so.  For  merit  as  regards  degree 
may  be  gauged  either  by  the  grace  and  charity  of  the  agent, 
or  by  the  proportionate  difficulty  of  the  action.  “  We  con¬ 
clude  therefore  that  in  the  state  of  innocence  man’s  works 
were  more  meritorious  than  after  sin  was  committed,  if  the 
degree  of  merit  on  the  part  of  grace  be  considered;  which 
would  have  been  more  copious  as  meeting  with  no  obstacle 
in  human  nature:  and  in  like  manner,  if  we  consider  the  ab¬ 
solute  degree  of  action;  because,  as  man  could  attain  to  greater 
virtue,  he  would  perform  greater  actions.  But  if  we  consider 
the  proportionate  degree,  a  greater  reason  for  merit  exists 
after  sin,  on  account  of  man’s  weakness;  for  a  small  deed  is 
more  beyond  the  capacity  of  one  who  works  with  difficulty 
than  a  great  deed  is  beyond  that  of  one  who  performs  it 
easilv.”  37 

J 

3.  Perfections  of  the  Body. —  The  chief  perfections  of 
man’s  body  in  the  primitive  state  were  immortality  and  im¬ 
passibility.  The  former  was  a  posse  non  mori  —  the  per¬ 
petual  preservation  from  death  of  a  mortal  nature.  Man  did 
not  possess  the  natural  incorruptibility  of  the  angels,  nor  the 
incorruptibility  of  glory  enjoyed  by  the  blessed  in  heaven; 
but  an  incorruptibility  of  a  lower  order  gratuitously  conferred 
on  him  by  his  Creator.  “  For  man’s  body  was  indissoluble 
not  by  reason  of  any  intrinsic  vigor  of  immortality,  but  by 
reason  of  a  supernatural  force  given  by  God  to  the  soul, 
whereby  it  was  enabled  to  preserve  the  body  from  corruption 
so  long  as  it  remained  itself  subject  to  God.  This  entirely 
agrees  with  reason;  for  since  the  rational  soul  surpasses  the 
capacity  of  corporeal  matter,  ...  it  was  most  properly  en¬ 
dowed  at  the  beginning  with  the  power  of  preserving  the  body 
in  a  manner  surpassing  the  capacity  of  corporeal  matter.”  38 

Impassibility  is  divided  by  St.  Thomas  into  two  kinds,  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  nature  of  the  passion  or  suffering  it  excludes 
from  its  subject.  “  For  passion  may  be  taken  in  two  senses. 

38  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  97,  a.  1. 


37  Ibid.  a.  4. 


152 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


First,  in  its  proper  sense,  and  thus  a  thing  is  said  to  suffer 
when  changed  from  its  natural  disposition.  For  passion  is 
the  effect  of  action ;  and  in  nature  contraries  act  on,  or  suffer 
from,  one  another,  accordingly  as  one  thing  changes  another 
from  its  natural  disposition.  Secondly,  passion  can  be  taken 
in  a  general  sense  for  any  kind  of  change,  even  if  belonging 
to  the  perfecting  process  of  nature.  Thus  to  understand  and 
to  feel  are  said  in  a  sense  to  be  passive.  In  this  second  sense, 
man  was  passible  in  the  state  of  innocence,  and  was  passive 
both  in  soul  and  body.  In  the  first  sense  man  was  impassible, 
both  in  soul  and  body,  as  he  was  likewise  immortal;  for  he 
could  curb  his  passion,  as  he  could  avoid  death,  so  long  as  he 
refrained  from  sin.”  39 

Scotus  agreed  with  this  teaching  of  St.  Thomas  in  its  main 
outlines,  but  departed  from  it  on  some  minor  points.  Fie 
held  that  Adam  was  created  in  the  state  of  original  justice, 
and  this  state  was  not  merely  a  condition  of  natural  rectitude, 
but  was  the  result  of  preternatural  prerogatives  gratuitously 
bestowed  on  human  nature  by  the  Creator.  It  consisted  in  a 
perfect  tranquillity  of  the  soul  and  all  its  powers,  so  that  man’s 
inferior  nature  did  not  tend  to  go  contrary  to  the  dictate  of 
reason;  or  if  of  itself  it  was  inclined  so  to  do,  it  could  easily 
be  regulated  and  reduced  to  order,  without  causing  any  diffi¬ 
culty  to  his  higher  nature,  or  any  sadness  to  his  lower  na¬ 
ture.40 

The  proximate  cause  of  the  condition  of  perfect  tranquillity 
was  a  complexus  liabituum  —  so  many  particular  gratuitous 
gifts,  which  resided  in  the  will  and  the  other  faculties.  Thus 
the  will  was  so  disposed  by  an  inherent  power,  that  it  could 
withdraw  itself  with  pleasure  from  any  object  craved  by  the 
lower  appetite.41  These  permanent  dispositions  of  the  facul¬ 
ties  must,  however,  not  be  confounded  with  the  infused  vir¬ 
tues  ;  nor  with  habitual  grace.  They  were  special  virtues,  en¬ 
tirely  proper  to  the  state  of  innocence.  Hence  the  state  of 
original  justice  as  such  was  independent  of  sanctifying  grace. 
In  fact,  however,  sanctifying  grace  was  an  integral  part  of 

39  Ibid.  a.  2.  40  In  Sent.  II,  d.  29,  n.  2,  4. 


STATE  OF  ORIGINAL  JUSTICE 


153 


that  state  as  ordained  by  God.41  Whether  Adam  was  created 
in  sanctifying  grace,  is  not  clearly  stated  by  Scotus.  Some 
interpret  his  teaching  in  this  sense,  although  he  is  usually 
cited  as  an  authority  for  the  contrary  view.42 

In  explaining  man  s  bodily  immortality  in  the  primitive 
state,  Scotus  rejects  the  teaching  of  St.  Thomas,  that  its  proxi¬ 
mate  cause  was  an  intrinsic  power  of  the  soul  over  matter, 
communicated  to  it  by  God.  According  to  him,  Adam  always 
retained  the  potentia  ad  mori,  but  by  a  special  intervention  of 
Providence  that  potentia  could  not  be  reduced  to  act,  so  long 
as  the  state  of  innocence  continued.  Hence  in  his  own  being 
Adam  was  simply  mortal;  but  whilst  he  remained  faithful, 
God  warded  off  all  danger  to  his  life,  and  before  the  time  of 
natural  dissolution  approached,  He  would  have  taken  him  up 
to  heaven.43 

Finally,  all  these  prerogatives  of  original  justice  were  in¬ 
tended  for  the  entire  human  race,  although  their  transmission 
was  made  dependent  on  Adam’s  fidelity.  Each  human  being 
was  to  have  received  them  at  the  moment  of  birth,  not  as  an 
inheritance  from  Adam,  but  as  a  free  gift  of  God.  However, 
all  would  have  been  subjected  to  a  probation,  with  the  same 
chances  of  failure  that  proved  the  undoing  of  the  first  man.44 

Comparing  now  the  teaching  of  the  most  representative 
Scholastics,  as  outlined  in  the  preceding  paragraphs,  we  may 
put  down  the  following  points  as  common  to  all. 

1.  Man’s  primitive  condition  was  a  state  of  righteousness, 
which  resulted  from  certain  gifts  of  God  not  due  to  human 
nature. 

2.  These  gifts  affected  both  soul  and  body,  and  all  man’s 
faculties.  They  included  enlightenment  of  the  intellect  by 
infused  knowledge,  steadfastness  of  the  will  under  the  in¬ 
fluence  of  grace,  a  perfect  harmony  between  man’s  higher 
and  lower  nature  through  immunity  from  concupiscence,  im¬ 
mortality  of  the  body,  and  a  corresponding  freedom  from 
suffering. 

41  Ibid.  n.  5 ;  I,  d.  32,  n.  19.  43  In  Sent.  II,  d.  19. 

42  Cfr.  In  Sent.  II,  d.  29,  q.  unic.  44  Ibid.  d.  20,  q.  1. 

n.  7;  Report,  q.  2. 


154 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


3.  Over  and  above  these  preternatural  gifts,  the  first  man 
received  sanctifying  grace,  which  is  strictly  supernatural. 
Through  it  he  became  an  adopted  son  of  God,  with  the  right 
and  title  to  an  eternal  inheritance.  By  it  he  was  also  placed 
in  a  position  to  perform  meritorious  actions,  to  persevere  in 
his  happy  state,  and  finally  to  claim  heaven  as  his  reward. 
With  sanctifying  grace  were  connected  all  those  virtues  that 
were  not  repugnant  to  the  state  of  innocence,  and  also  a  right 
to  necessary  actual  graces. 

4.  In  one  sense  all  these  gifts  and  graces  were  bestowed 
upon  Adam  as  personal  favors,  in  as  much  as  he  could  enjoy 
and  use  them  for  his  own  advantage;  but  in  another  sense  they 
were  the  property  of  the  whole  human  race,  since  by  the  in¬ 
tention  of  the  Giver  Adam  was  to  transmit  them,  with  the 
one  exception  of  infused  knowledge,  to  all  his  descendants. 
Their  bestowal  upon  Adam  was  absolute,  yet  their  continuance 
in  his  own  case  and  their  transmission  to  his  posterity  was 
conditioned  by  his  own  fidelity. 

These  four  points,  leaving  aside  all  explanations  as  regards 
details,  constitute  the  common  teaching  of  the  Schoolmen. 
They  had  been  taken  over  by  the  Scholastics  from  the  works 
of  the  Fathers,  and  somewhat  later,  at  the  Council  of  Trent, 
they  received  the  solemn  approval  of  the  Church.45 

45  Sess.  5,  Decretum  de  Pecc.  Original ;  Mansi,  33,  27  A  sqq. ;  DB.  787 
sqq. 


CHAPTER  IX 


ORIGINAL  SIN 

The  existence  of  original  sin  had  been  defined  against  the 
Pelagians  of  the  fifth  century,1  and  no  subsequent  theologian 
called  it  in  question.  Nor  was  there  among  the  Schoolmen 
any  serious  doubt  in  regard  to  its  being  a  sin  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  term.  Abelard,  indeed,  held  that  nothing  was 
transmitted  by  Adam  to  his  posterity  except  the  reatus  poenae 
—  a  mere  liability  to  punishment;  but  his  view  was  condemned 
by  the  Council  of  Sens,  in  1141,  and  also  by  Pope  Innocent 
II.2  There  was,  however,  among  the  Scholastics  no  agree¬ 
ment  about  the  precise  nature  of  this  sin,  nor  about  the  manner 
of  its  transmission.  The  following  outline  will  be  sufficient 
to  indicate  the  historical  development  of  the  doctrine  in  ques¬ 
tion. 

1.  The  Nature  of  Original  Sin. —  St.  Augustine  had  de¬ 
fined  original  sin  as  a  reatus  concupiscentiac  —  the  guilt  of 
concupiscence,  without  making  it  altogether  clear  in  what  ob¬ 
jective  reality  or  condition  this  guilt  must  be  conceived  to 
consist.  This  guilt,  moreover,  he  held  to  be  transmitted 
through  concupiscence,  which  accompanies  the  act  of  procrea¬ 
tion.3  His  teaching  was  restated  in  practically  the  same  terms 
by  Pope  Gregory  I,  and  thenceforth  it  was  universally  accepted 
and  defended  by  Western  theologians  until  the  end  of  the 
eleventh  century. 

The  first  one  to  break  with  this  traditional  teaching,  and 
to  place  the  nature  of  original  sin  in  a  somewha4:  clearer  light, 
was  St.  Anselm.  He  subjected  the  whole  question  of  original 
sin  to  a  thorough  examination  in  his  treatise  De  Conceptu 
Virginali  et  Peccato  Originali,  in  connection  with  the  sinless 

1  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  358.  3  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  364  sqq. 

2  Mansi,  21,  568C;  DB.  376. 

155 


156 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


conception  of  the  Savior.  Setting  aside  the  teaching  of  St. 
Augustine,  without,  however,  mentioning  his  name,  he  thus 
proposes  his  own  view :  “  By  original  sin,  then,  I  understand 

nothing  else  than  the  sin  that  is  in  the  child  as  soon  as  it  has 
a  rational  soul.  .  .  .  And  this  sin,  which  I  call  original,  I 
cannot  understand  in  these  children  in  any  other  sense  than 
that  it  is  a  privation  of  original  justice,  brought  about  by  the 
disobedience  of  Adam.  Through  this  privation  all  are  chil¬ 
dren  of  wrath,  because  the  deliberate  casting  off  of  justice 
rendered  guilty  the  nature  which  God  had  made  in  Adam.”  4 
This  view  of  the  matter  places  the  essence  of  original  sin 
in  the  privation  of  original  justice,  in  so  far  as  that  justice  had 
been  conferred  by  God  as  a  prerogative  of  human  nature  itself. 
Original  justice,  however,  is  here  not  taken  as  designating 
sanctifying  grace,  but  as  standing  for  the  preternatural  pre¬ 
rogatives  which  formally  constituted  the  state  of  innocence.5 
Hence  the  author  defines  justice,  in  this  connection,  as  a  recti¬ 
tude  of  the  will  preserved  for  its  own  sake  —  rectitudo  vol¬ 
untatis  propter  se  seruata .  In  this  rectitude  Adam  was 
created,  and  God  willed  that  it  should  be  the  prerogative  of 
Adam’s  posterity.  Hence  the  privation  of  it  is  against  the 
will  of  God,  and  constitutes  in  every  one  of  Adam’s  descend¬ 
ants  a  sin  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term.  “  In  Adam  the  per¬ 
son  made  human  nature  sinful,  because  when  Adam  sinned, 
man  sinned.  ...  In  children  it  is  human  nature  that  makes 
the  person  sinful,”  because  that  nature  is  against  the  will  of 
God  deprived  of  original  justice.6  “  In  this  manner  the  per¬ 
son  despoiled  human  nature  of  justice  in  Adam;  and  thus 
despoiled,  human  nature  causes  all  persons,  whom  it  begets  of 
itself,  to  be  sinful  and  unjust.”  7 

Hence  St.  Anselm’s  formal  concept  of  original  sin  differs 
considerably  from  that  of  St.  Augustine,  but  it  also  differs 
considerably  from  that  of  present  day  theologians.  He  made 
a  great  advance  over  his  predecessors  by  placing  the  essence 
of  original  sin  in  the  privation  of  justice,  but  he  retarded,  and 
to  some  extent  rendered  futile,  his  own  advance,  by  failing  to 

6  Ibid.  c.  23. 

7  Ibid. 


4  Op.  cit.  c.  27. 
6  C.  3,  5,  7,  19. 


ORIGINAL  SIN 


157 


make  this  justice  chiefly  consist  in  sanctifying  grace.  Hence 
he  experienced  the  same  difficulty,  as  did  St.  Augustine  before 
him,  in  explaining  the  blotting  out  of  original  sin  by  baptism. 
He  states  the  difficulty  in  this  way :  “  I  said  that  the  inability 

of  possessing  justice  does  not  excuse  the  injustice  of  children. 
Hence  some  one  will  perhaps  ask:  If  sin,  that  is  injustice, 
is  in  the  child  before  baptism,  and  the  child’s  inability  of  pos¬ 
sessing  justice,  as  you  say,  is  no  excuse,  and  yet  in  baptism 
no  sin  is  remitted  except  that  which  existed  before,  then,  since 
the  child  after  baptism,  so  long  as  it  is  a  child,  is  without 
justice,  nor  can  be  understood  to  preserve  justice,  how  is  it 
not  still  unjust,  although  it  has  been  baptized?  ”  8 

This  is  a  fair  statement  of  the  difficulty,  which  was  neces¬ 
sarily  involved  in  his  theory  on  the  nature  of  original  sin.  If 
original  sin  is  a  privation  of  some  perfection  that  God  willed 
to  be  in  human  nature,  then  it  can  be  removed  only  by  supply¬ 
ing  that  perfection.  Yet  baptism  does  not  restore  original 
justice,  hence  it  would  seem  that  baptism  does  not  remove 
original  sin. 

St.  Anselm’s  answer  is  this :  “  I  answer  this  question  by 

saying  that  the  sins  which  existed  before  baptism  was  received, 
are  entirely  blotted  out  by  baptism.  Hence  the  original  in¬ 
ability  of  possessing  justice  is  not  imputed  as  a  sin  to  those 
who  are  baptized,  as  it  was  imputed  to  them  before.  Just 
as  the  inability  of  not  possessing  justice  did  not  excuse  its 
absence  before  baptism,  because  this  absence  was  real  guilt ; 
so  it  does  altogether  excuse  the  same  after  baptism,  because 
it  remains  without  any  guilt.  Hence  it  is  that  the  justice 
which  was  demanded  of  children  before  baptism,  without  ad¬ 
mitting  any  excuse  on  their  part,  is  not  exacted  of  them  after 
baptism  assomething  which  they  owed/’  9  This  answer,  as  is 
obvious,  really  explains  nothing.  It  makes  the  blotting  out 
of  original  sin  consist  in  a  mere  non-imputation  of  guilt. 

Anselm’s  teaching  on  original  sin  was  taken  but  little  notice 
of  by  the  theologians  of  the  twelfth  century.  Only  two  of 
them,  Odo  of  Cambrai  (+  1113)  and  Honorius  of  Autun 


8  Ibid.  c.  29. 


8  Ibid. 


158 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


(1150),  adopted  his  views.  All  the  other  more  notable  writ¬ 
ers  of  that  period,  such  as  Robert  Pulleyn,10  Hugh  of  St.  Vic¬ 
tor,11  Peter  Lombard,12  and  Pope  Innocent  III,13  followed  the 
lead  of  St.  Augustine.  They  all  regarded  original  sin  as  a 
recitus  vel  vitium  concupiscentiae,  which  is  propagated  per 
libidinem,  in  some  mysterious  way  stains  the  semen ,  and  then 
in  a  still  more  mysterious  way  infects  the  soul  at  its  union 
with  the  body.  Thus  the  Lombard  writes :  “  What,  then,  is 

original  sin?  It  is  the  touch-wood  of  sin,  namely,  concupis¬ 
cence  or  the  concupiscible  power,  which  is  called  the  law  of 
the  members,  or  the  languor  of  nature,  or  the  tyrant  which  is 
in  our  members,  or  the  law  of  the  flesh.”  14  It  is  not  the  act 
of  concupiscence,  but  the  habit  —  a  radical  vice  that  inclines 
to  evil.  “  And  that  this  vice  exists  as  a  corruption  in  the  flesh 
before  its  union  with  the  soul  is  proved  by  the  effect  produced 
in  the  soul  upon  its  infusion  into  the  body;  for  it  is  stained 
by  the  corruption  of  the  flesh  —  just  as  it  is  known  that  there 
was  impurity  in  the  vessel,  when  the  wine  which  is  poured 
into  it  becomes  sour.”  15 

A  slight  change  was  introduced  into  this  teaching  by  Alex¬ 
ander  of  Hales,  who  sought  to  combine  the  views  of  St. 
Anselm  and  St.  Augustine.  With  this  object  in  view,  he 
writes :  “  Original  sin  is  guilt  which  consists  in  the  privation 

of  a  justice  that  is  due,  or  a  certain  deformity  by  which  the 
soul  itself  is  deformed.  Concupiscence  is  the  punishment  of 
sin,  .  .  .  original  sin  is  the  privation  or  absence  of  a  justice 
that  is  due.”  16  “  This  definition,”  he  says,  “  is  formal,  drawn 

from  the  efficient  cause ;  while  the  other  definition  usually  given 
— -  original  sin  is  a  vice  resulting  from  the  corruption  of  the 
semen  in  man  —  is  material  or  taken  from  the  material  cause.17 
Here  appears  for  the  first  time  the  famous  distinction  between 
the  formal  and  material  element  of  original  sin,  which  finally 
enabled  the  Scholastics  to  get  away  from  the  view  of  St. 

10  Sent.  VI,  1.  14  Sent.  II,  d.  30,  c.  7. 

11  De  Sacr.  I,  p.  7,  c.  28;  Sent.  15  Ibid.  d.  31,  c.  6. 

Ill,  11.  16  Sum.  II,  q.  106,  m.  2,  n.  I,  3. 

12  Sent.  II,  d.  30,  c.  7;  d.  31,  c.  6.  17  Ibid. 

13  In  VII  Ps.  Poenit.  4;  ML,  218, 

1058. 


ORIGINAL  SIN 


159 

Augustine,  without  placing  themselves  in  open  contradiction 
with  his  theory. 

The  distinction  thus  introduced  was  taken  up  by  St.  Bona- 
venture,  who  tried  to  explain  the  nature  of  original  sin  by 
comparing  it  to  actual  sin.  “  As  actual  sin,”  he  says,  “  does 
not  consist  exclusively  in  privation,  since  it  is  not  only  an 
aversion  but  also  a  conversion,  ...  so  the  same  must  in  its 
own  way  be  held  in  regard  to  original  sin.  .  .  .  Thus  original 
sin  is  said  to  be  in  a  person,  not  only  because  he  is  deprived  of 
original  justice,  but  also  because  he  has  a  certain  inclination 
to  evil  and  is  under  the  power  of  concupiscence.  .  .  .  Hence 
when  it  is  asked,  what  is  original  sin?  it  is  perfectly  correct 
to  answer  that  it  is  concupiscence;  and  it  is  also  perfectly  cor¬ 
rect  to  answer  that  it  is  the  privation  of  original  justice:  for 
the  one  answer  is  contained  in  the  other;  although  the  one 
emphasizes  the  inclination  to  evil  that  is  in  original  sin,  and 
the  other  that  of  privation.  .  .  .  Hence  it  must  be  conceded 
that  original  sin  is  concupiscence,  not  any  concupiscence  what¬ 
ever,  but  the  concupiscence  that  includes  the  privation  of 
original  justice.”  18 

It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  St.  Bonaventure,  like  St. 
Anselm,  the  Lombard,  and  Alexander  of  Hales  before  him, 
understands  by  original  justice  merely  the  aggregate  of  pre¬ 
ternatural  gifts  proper  to  the  state  of  innocence,  without  in¬ 
cluding  sanctifying  grace.  Hence  his  difficulty  in  explaining 
the  blotting  out  of  original  sin  by  baptism.  In  regard  to  this 
he  writes :  “  Hence  it  is  that,  as  the  Master  says,  in  baptism 

original  sin  passes  away  as  to  its  guilt,  but  remains  as  regards 
its  reality  —  transit  reatu  et  remanet  actio;  because  although 
concupiscence  remains,  yet  it  does  not  remain  in  so  far  as  it 
implies  guilt  and  a  liability  to  punishment.  .  .  .  When,  there¬ 
fore,  original  sin  is  blotted  out,  it  is  not  blotted  out  in  such  a 
way  that  it  does  not  at  all  exist,  but  only  in  such  wise  that 
it  is  not  a  sin.  ...  Nor  must  it  be  imagined  “  that  original 
justice  itself  is  restored,  but  rather  that  a  certain  compensa¬ 
tion  is  made  by  way  of  conferring  sanctifying  grace.”  19 

19  In  Sent.  II,  d.  32,  a.  1,  q.  1. 


18  In  Sent  II,  d.  30,  a.  2,  q.  1. 


i6o 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Albertus  Magnus  made  a  similar  attempt  to  reconcile  the 
two  opposite  views,  although  his  dissertation  on  the  nature  of 
original  sin  is  almost  entirely  taken  up  with  its  material  ele¬ 
ment.  He  defines  original  sin  as  “  a  proneness  to  evil  which 
includes  the  privation  of  a  justice  that  is  due.”  20  And  of 
concupiscence,  as  found  in  the  members  of  the  body,  he  says: 
“  This  concupiscence  is  in  the  body  as  a  punishment  only,  for 
the  reason  that  the  body  is  not  a  rational  substance  and  there¬ 
fore  not  susceptible  of  guilt.  And  hence  when  concupiscence 
infects  a  subject  that  is  susceptible  of  guilt,  the  latter  is  im¬ 
mediately  present  together  with  the  former.  Thus  it  is  that 
the  soul  becomes  infected,  and  is  made  subject  both  to  guilt  and 
punishment.”  21 

As  will  have  been  noted,  all  the  writers  thus  far  mentioned, 
with  the  sole  exception  of  St.  Anselm,  conceived  original  sin 
to  consist  in  some  kind  of  physical  stain,  which  is  first  in  the 
body  and  then  in  some  inexplicable  way  transmitted  to  the  soul. 
That  this  was  a  fundamentally  wrong  concept  is  sufficiently 
obvious;  for  the  soul,  as  a  spiritual  substance,  cannot  be  de¬ 
filed  by  a  bodily  stain.  Concupiscence  is  indeed  also  in  the 
soul,  but  it  is  there  independently  of  the  body.  Hence  it  was 
necessary  to  eliminate  this  theory  of  defilement  by  contact, 
before  real  progress  could  be  made  in  the  rational  exposition 
of  the  nature  of  original  sin.  And  this  elimination  was  ef¬ 
fected  by  St.  Thomas,  who  subjected  the  whole  question  of 
original  sin  to  a  very  thorough  investigation.  The  following 
is  a  brief  summary  of  his  views  on  the  nature  of  original  sin. 

He  first  rejects  the  view  of  his  predecessors,  that  original 
sin  is  connected  with  a  physical  stain  in  the  body,  whereby  the 
soul  is  contaminated.  All  such  explanations,  he  says,  are  ne¬ 
cessarily  insufficient,  since  the  stain  in  question,  whatever  may 
be  said  about  its  transmission  to  the  soul,  lacks  the  formal 
element  of  sin,  which  is  obviously  a  deordination  in  the  moral 
order.22  Next  he  gives  a  general  definition  of  original  sin, 
pointing  out  that  it  must  in  some  way  be  a  habitus ,  in  as  much 
as  it  is  a  certain  inordinate  disposition,  resulting  from  the 

20  In  Sent.  II,  30,  3.  22  Sum.  Theol.  I.  II,  q.  81,  a.  1. 

21  Ibid.  a.  1. 


ORIGINAL  SIN 


161 


dissolution  of  that  harmony  in  which  original  justice  consisted. 
In  this  sense,  original  sin  is  called  a  languor  of  nature.23  It 
is  not  an  infused  habit;  nor  one  that  is  personally  acquired, 
except  on  the  part  of  our  first  parent:  but  it  is  inborn  in  us 
because  of  our  vitiated  origin.24 

After  this  general  description  of  original  sin,  he  proceeds 
to  an  investigation  of  its  intrinsic  constituents.  He  accepts 
the  definition  given  by  St.  Augustine  —  Concupiscentia  est 
reatus  peccati  originalis,  but  he  explains  it  in  his  own  way. 
“  The  species  of  a  thing,”  he  says,  “  is  taken  from  its  form. 
Now,  as  was  said  above,  the  species  of  original  sin  is  derived 
from  its  cause ;  hence  it  follows  that,  what  is  formal  in  original 
sin,  must  be  derived  from  the  cause  whence  this  sin  originated. 
But  of  opposites  there  are  opposite  causes ;  and  therefore  it 
must  be  noted  that  the  cause  of  original  sin  is  bound  up  with 
the  cause  of  original  justice,  but  by  way  of  opposition.  Now 
the  orderly  condition  of  original  justice  had  its  source  in  this, 
that  the  will  of  man  was  subject  to  God.  And  the  whole  sub¬ 
jection  was  first  and  chiefly  brought  about  by  the  will,  whose 
function  it  is  to  direct  all  other  powers  to  their  proper  end. 
Hence,  because  of  the  turning  away  of  the  will  from  God, 
there  followed  a  corresponding  insubordination  in  all  the  other 
powers  of  the  soul.  Thus,  therefore,  the  privation  of  original 
justice,  through  which  the  will  was  subject  to  God,  is  the 
formal  element  in  original  sin;  and  every  other  kind  of  in¬ 
ordination  of  the  powers  of  the  soul  belongs  to  the  material 
element.  But  the  inordination  of  the  other  powers  of  the 
soul  consists  chiefly  in  this,  that  they  tend  inordinately  to¬ 
wards  the  attainment  of  what  is  passing  and  changeable ;  and 
therefore  this  inordination  may  well  be  called  concupiscence. 
And  thus  original  sin,  considered  in  its  material  element,  is 
concupiscence;  but  considered  in  its  formal  element,  it  is  the 
privation  of  original  justice.”  25 

Now  the  material  element  of  original  sin,  which  is  here  said 
to  be  concupiscence,  may  be  considered  in  one  of  two  ways: 
either  as  something  consequent  upon  the  formal  element,  or 

23  Ibid.  q.  82,  a.  1.  25  Sum.  Theol.  I.  II,  q.  82,  a.  3. 

24  Ibid.  a.  1  ad  3m. 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


162 

as  a  constituent  part  of  original  sin  itself.  In  what  sense  the 
term  is  used  by  St.  Thomas  is  not  altogether  clear.  His  mod¬ 
ern  followers  usually  hold  that  he  took  it  in  the  former  sense, 
and  the  text  cited  above  may  well  be  adduced  in  support  of 
that  interpretation.  For  it  was  “  because  of  the  turning  away 
of  the  will  from  God  that  there  followed  a  corresponding  in¬ 
subordination  in  all  the  other  powers  of  the  soul  ” ;  and  “  this 
insubordination  may  well  be  called  concupiscence.”  But  in 
not  a  few  other  texts  he  speaks  of  concupiscence  as  if  it  were 
a  constituent  part  of  original  sin.  Thus,  for  instance,  he 
says:  “  Just  as  in  artificial  things  .  .  .  the  matter  is  pre¬ 
dicated  of  the  whole,  so  that  one  may  say,  the  knife  is  iron; 
even  in  such  wise  is  concupiscence  said  to  be  original  sin.”  26 
Again :  “  Ignorance  and  the  inclination  to  evil  are  the  ma¬ 

terial  element  in  original  sin,  just  as  the  turning  to  a  change¬ 
able  good  is  the  material  element  in  actual  sin.”  27  And  still 
more  explicitly :  “  Concupiscence  in  the  newly  born  is  the 

cause  of  original  sin  by  way  of  matter,  which  is  of  the  essence 
of  a  thing.”  28  Hence  all  his  followers  before  the  Council  of 
Trent,  among  them  Capreolus,  Ferrariensis,  and  Cajetanus, 
interpreted  him  as  having  taken  the  material  element  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  term,  or  as  a  constituent  part  of  original 
sin. 

There  is  also  some  difficulty -in  connection  with  the  formal 
element,  in  so  far  as  it  is  at  first  sight  not  clear  what  exact 
meaning  St.  Thomas  attached  to  the  term  “  original  justice,” 
as  used  in  this  connection.  All  his  predecessors  had  taken  it 
in  an  exclusive  sense,  as  distinct  from  sanctifying  grace;  and 
he  himself,  in  those  places  where  he  explicitly  treats  of  the 
nature  of  original  sin,  seems  to  prescind  from  sanctifying 
grace  altogether.  However  this  difficulty  is  more  apparent 
than  real.  For  according  to  him,  sanctifying  grace  is  the  root 
and  foundation  of  original  justice,  so  that  all  other  super¬ 
natural  gifts  in  the  state  of  innocence  depended  for  their  con¬ 
tinuance  upon  the  presence  of  sanctifying  grace  in  the  soul. 
Hence  he  says  quite  explicitly:  “  The  root  of  original  justice, 

26  In  Sent.  II,  30,  q.  1,  a.  3.  28  Ibid.  q.  4,  a.  2. 

27  De  Malo.  q.  3,  a.  7. 


ORIGINAL  SIN 


163 

in  whose  rectitude  man  was  made,  consists  in  a  supernatural 
subjection  of  his  reason  to  God,  and  this  is  brought  about  by 
sanctifying  grace.”  29  And  again:  “Hence  if  the  loss  of 
grace  dissolved  the  obedience  of  the  flesh  to  the  soul,  we  may 
gather  that  the  inferior  powers  were  subjected  to  the  soul 
through  grace  existing  therein.”  30  Consequently,  he  must 
have  held  that  the  formal  element  of  original  sin  consisted 
ultimately  in  the  privation  of  sanctifying  grace,  although  he 
does  not  state  this  explicitly  in  his  exposition  of  the  nature  of 
original  sin.  At  all  events,  he  laid  down  the  principles  which 
were  adopted  by  the  Council  of  Trent,  and  which  enabled  later 
theologians  to  work  out  a  consistent  theory  on  this  difficult 
matter. 

Still  further  progress  was  made  by  Scotus,  who  likewise 
adopted  St.  Anselm’s  view  as  his  own.  Rejecting  the  opinion 
of  those  who  held  that  original  sin  consisted  in  concupiscence, 
he  says :  “  In  regard  to  this  matter  there  is  another  way, 

which  was  followed  by  Anselm  in  the  whole  first  book  of  his 
work  De  Conceptu  Virginali,  where  he  treats  the  subject  of 
original  sin.  ...  I  say,  therefore,  that  original  sin,  which  is 
the  privation  of  original  justice,  is  nothing  else  than  the  priva¬ 
tion  of  a  justice  that  is  due.  And  if  it  be  objected  that  some 
saints  seem  to  say  that  original  sin  is  concupiscence,  my  answer 
is  this:  Concupiscence  in  the  sensitive  appetite  cannot  in 
itself  be  sin;  and  concupiscence  in  the  will  is  a  merely  material 
element  of  sin.”  31  And  this  material  element  can  only  be 
taken  as  such  in  a  wider  sense  of  the  term,  as  simply  an  in¬ 
ordinate  disposition  of  the  will  resulting  from  original  sin. 
The  material  element  in  the  strict  sense  is  the  obligation  man 
is  under  to  possess  justice  —  debitum  habendi  justitiam. 
Hence  “  in  the  constitution  of  original  sin  two  elements  con¬ 
cur:  The  privation  of  justice  as  its  formal  element,  and  the 
obligation  of  possessing  justice  as  its  material  element;  just 
as  in  the  constitution  of  other  privations,  there  is  a  concur¬ 
rence  of  the  privation  itself  and  of  the  aptitude  for  the  op¬ 
posite  perfection.”  32 

29  Sum.  Theol.  I.  II,  q.  100,  a.  I.  81  In  Sent.  II,  d.  32,  n.  7. 

30  Ibid.  q.  95,  a.  1.  32  Ibid.  n.  15,  7. 


164 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Thus  Scotus  definitely  eliminated  concupiscence  as  a  con¬ 
stituent  element  of  original  sin,  and  this  was  a  decided  step 
forward.  But  his  teaching  on  the  nature  of  the  privation  in 
which  original  sin  formally  consists  is  less  satisfactory.  In¬ 
stead  of  adopting  the  view  of  St.  Thomas,  he  returned  to  that 
of  St.  Anselm.  Although  he  admitted,  as  was  shown  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  that  in  its  adequate  sense  original  justice 
included  sanctifying  grace,  yet  in  connection  with  original  sin 
he  took  it  inadequately,  as  exclusive  of  the  gratia  gratum 
faciens.  This  appears  especially  in  his  exposition  of  the  ef¬ 
fect  of  baptism,  where  he  says:  “  I  say  that  in  baptism  the 
obligation  of  possessing  original  justice  is  taken  away,  and  is 
commuted  into  an  obligation  of  having  an  equivalent  gift, 
namely,  sanctifying  grace.  And  this  second  obligation  there¬ 
after  always  remains,  nor  does  the  first  ever  return ;  and  he 
who  is  without  the  second  gift,  thus  due  to  him,  sins  more 
grievously  than  he  who  is  without  the  first ;  but  he  is  not  now 
a  sinner  because  of  original  sin,  for  the  obligation  of  possessing 
that  justice  does  not  return.”  33 

2.  The  Transmission  of  Original  Sin. —  In  reference  to  the 
transmission  of  original  sin,  the  followers  of  St.  Augustine 
assumed  the  principle  that  it  is  not  generation  but  actual  con¬ 
cupiscence  which  transmits  original  sin  —  non  generatio  scd 
libido  transmittit  peccatum  originale.  This  libido  was  sup¬ 
posed  to  stain  the  semen  in  the  act  of  procreation,  and  that 
stain  would  in  some  way  defile  the  soul  on  its  union  with  the 
body.  This  view  was  defended  by  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,  Rob¬ 
ert  Pulleyn,  Peter  Lombard,  Henry  of  Ghent,  and  Pope  In¬ 
nocent  III.  The  last  named  writes :  “  Therefore  of  the  de¬ 

filed  and  corrupt  seed  a  corrupt  and  defiled  body  also  is 
conceived,  and  when  the  soul  is  finally  infused  into  this,  it 
likewise  becomes  corrupt  and  defiled.  .  .  .  Just  as  a  liquid 
is  corrupted  when  it  is  poured  into  an  unclean  vessel.”  34  It 
was  at  best  a  very  unsatisfactory  theory,  and  its  abandonment 
was  only  a  question  of  time. 

St.  Anselm,  consistently  with  his  view  on  the  nature  of 

33  Ibid.  n.  16.  34  In  VII  Ps.  Poenit.  4;  ML,  218, 

1058. 


ORIGINAL  SIN 


165 

original  sin,  offered  a  better  explanation.  Setting  aside  the 
libido  as  a  cause  of  transmission,  he  had  recourse  to  the  con¬ 
nection  which  exists  between  the  person  of  Adam  and  human 
nature  on  the  one  hand,  and  human  nature  and  the  persons  of 
Adam’s  descendants  on  the  other.  The  person  of  Adam  de¬ 
spoiled  human  nature,  and  that  despoiled  human  nature  made 
all  his  descendants  sinners.  Generation  was  thus  conceived 
as  a  conditio  sine  qua  non  of  transmission,  a  bond  that  links 
Adam  and  all  his  descendants  together  in  the  common  misery 
of  sin.  In  the  last  instance,  of  course,  it  was  the  will  of  God 
that  ordained  the  law  of  transmission;  but  in  this  matter  the 
will  of  God  is  the  final  explanation  of  every  other  law  that 
one  may  try  to  establish.35  God  so  ordained  that  Adam 
should  transmit  the  prerogatives  of  original  justice  to  all  his 
descendants  by  way  of  generation,  and  hence  when  he  had 
despoiled  himself  of  these  gifts,  he  transmitted  a  despoiled 
nature  bv  the  same  way.36  And  this  despoiled  nature,  be¬ 
cause  of  its  spoliation,  is  infected  with  original  sin. 

Alexander  of  Hales  cites  the  definition  given  by  St.  Anselm, 
that  original  sin  is  the  privation  of  a  justice  which  by  the  will 
of  God  was  due  to  human  nature,  and  in  connection  with  that 
gives  this  exposition  of  the  way  in  which  original  sin  is  trans¬ 
mitted:  “  The  reason  underlying  the  transmission  of  original 
sin  seems  to  be  this:  The  prohibition  was  put  upon  Adam 
in  as  far  as  he  contained  the  whole  human  nature  in  himself, 
since  all  others  were  to  descend  from  him  by  way  of  genera¬ 
tion.  And  thus  the  prohibition  extended  not  to  him  alone, 
but  also  to  those  others  who  were  seminally  contained  in 
him.”  37  Hence  Adam  was  the  head  of  the  whole  race,  not 
only  in  the  physical  but  also  in  the  moral  order.  His  dis¬ 
obedience,  therefore,  was  not  merely  a  personal  act ;  it  was  the 
disobedience  of  the  entire  human  race  as  seminally  contained 
in  him.  Just  as  the  obedience  of  Christ,  the  moral  head  of 
mankind  in  the  order  of  redemption,  was  the  obedience  of 
all.38 

Thus  the  ultimate  reason  for  the  transmission  of  original 

35  Op.  cit.  c.  23 ;  cfr.  c.  29.  37  Sum.  II,  105,  m.  3. 

36  Ibid.  c.  10.  38  Ibid. 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


1 66 

sin  is  the  divine  decree  which  constituted  Adam  the  moral  head 
of  his  descendants.  But  the  means  or  the  instrumental  cause 
of  the  transmission  is  the  act  of  procreation.  This  the  author 
explains  in  his  answer  to  the  question,  whether  original  sin  is 
transmitted  through  the  flesh.  He  says :  “  As  original  sin 

involves  both  guilt  and  punishment,  it  is  transmitted  in  a  dif¬ 
ferent  way  in  regard  to  each  of  the  two.  In  so  far  as  it 
involves  punishment  it  results  from  the  defilement  which  is 
in  the  flesh;  for  as  soon  as  the  soul  is  infused  into  the  defiled 
flesh,  so  soon  is  itself  defiled;  just  as  wine  becomes  corrupt 
through  the  impure  condition  of  the  vessel  into  which  it  is 
poured.  But  in  so  far  as  it  involves  guilt,  it  proceeds  from 
the  privation  of  that  justice  which  should  have  been  in  the 
nature  thus  generated.”  39 

Practically  the  same  position  was  taken  by  St.  Bonaventure, 
who  took  special  pains  to  explain  the  connection  between  the 
defilement  of  the  flesh  and  the  resultant  guilt  in  the  soul.  “  In 
order  to  understand,”  he  says,  “  how  from  the  defilement  of 
the  flesh  there  can  arise  a  culpable  corruption  in  the  soul,  these 
three  points  must  be  presupposed  as  evidently  true:  First, 
that  the  defilement  of  the  flesh  can  cause  the  body  to  rise  in 
rebellion  against  the  spirit;  secondly,  that  the  soul  united  to 
the  body  either  lifts  it  up  or  is  dragged  down  by  it,  on  account 
of  the  intimate  union  that  exists  between  the  two;  thirdly,  that 
the  soul  by  its  own  power  cannot  rule  the  rebellious  flesh, 
unless  it  be  assisted  by  divine  grace.  From  these  three  pre¬ 
suppositions  it  necessarily  follows,  that  if  the  soul  be  united 
to  a  body  thus  defiled,  it  is  dragged  down  by  it  and  is  through 
concupiscence  inclined  to  evil.  But  being  inclined  to  evil  is 
nothing  else  than  being  in  a  state  of  perversion;  and  perver¬ 
sion  in  a  rational  substance,  which  is  capable  of  possessing 
justice,  is  nothing  else  than  injustice  and  guilt.  From  this, 
therefore,  it  is  clear  that  the  defilement  which  is  in  the  flesh 
can  bring  it  about  that  the  soul,  united  to  it,  is  sinful.  And 
because  this  defilement  is  derived  from  the  first  parent,  from 
whom  all  his  descendants  have  their  origin  according  to  the 


39  Sum.  II,  q.  105,  m.  4. 


ORIGINAL  SIN  167 

law  of  propagation,  hence  it  is  that  by  way  of  the  flesh  original 
sin  is  transmitted  to  all.”  40 

The  most  serious  drawback  of  this  teaching  is  the  undue 
emphasis  it  places  upon  concupiscence  in  the  transmission  of 
original  sin.  Concupiscence  in  the  parent  defiles  the  flesh  in 
the  child,  and  the  flesh  thus  defiled  in  its  turn  through  con¬ 
cupiscence  defiles  the  soul.  The  whole  process  of  transmission 
is  thus*  limited  to  the  physical  order.  Excepting  St.  Anselm, 
all  these  theologians  commit  themselves  to  the  same  untenable 
view.  And  to  some  extent,  this  is  also  true  of  St.  Thomas, 
especially  in  his  earlier  works.  Thus  in  his  Commentary  on 
the  Sentences  he  says :  “  The  soul  is  not  infected  by  the  in¬ 

fection  of  the  body,  in  the  sense  that  the  body  acts  upon  the 
soul;  but  by  way  of  the  intimate  presence  of  the  one  to  the 
other.”  41  For  the  rest  he  gives  the  following  very  clear  ex¬ 
position  of  the  law  of  transmission. 

“  The  guilt  of  original  sin  comes  from  this,  that  the  gift 
which  was  gratuitously  conferred  on  Adam,  namely,  original 
justice,  was  not  conferred  on  him  personally,  but  in  so  far  as 
he  had  such  a  nature ;  so  that  all  those  in  whom  the  same  nature 
should  exist  as  derived  from  him,  should  be  entitled  to  the 
same  gift;  and  hence  original  justice  should  have  been  propa¬ 
gated  together  with  the  flesh.  Hence  it  was  in  the  power  of 
nature  always  to  preserve  original  justice  in  itself;  and  there¬ 
fore  the  want  of  it,  considered  in  reference  to  that  nature, 
constitutes  guilt  in  all  those  who  derive  their  nature  from  the 
person  who  sinned.  Now  as  this  want  of  justice,  together 
with  the  nature  itself,  is  through  the  origin  of  the  flesh  de¬ 
rived  by  way  of  generation,  hence  the  person  is  said  to  have 
infected  nature.  But  because  in  these  other  persons  original 
sin  is  present -as  derived  from  the  first  person  who  generated, 
it  does  not  have  the  formality  of  guilt  from  themselves,  since 
they  do  not  incur  this  sin  by  their  own  personal  will,  but  it 
has  this  formality  only  in  so  far  as  they  receive  the  nature  to¬ 
gether  with,  the  guilt.  Hence  it  is,  in  the  second  place,  that 
the  person  is  said  to  infect  the  nature.”  42 

40  In  Sent.  II,  d.  31,  a.  2,  q.  1.  41  In  Sent.  II,  d.  30,  q.  1,  a.  2  ad 

42  In  Sent.  II,  d.  31,  q.  1,  a.  1.  5m;  cfr.  De  Malo,  IV,  6  ad  i6m. 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


1 68 

In  his  Summa  Theologica  he  places  a  much  stronger  em¬ 
phasis  upon  the  solidarity  of  human  nature  as  the  proximate 
reason  of  the  transmission  of  original  sin  by  way  of  genera¬ 
tion.  After  eliminating  altogether  the  physical  transmission 
of  guilt,  he  continues:  “  Hence  we  must  proceed  along  an¬ 
other  way,  which  comes  to  this,  that  all  men,  who  are  born 
of  Adam,  can  be  considered  as  one  man,  in  so  far  as  they 
have  a  common  nature  which  they  received  from  their  first 
parent ;  on  the  same  principle  as  in  the  civil  order  all  men 
belonging  to  the  same  community  are  considered  as  one  body, 
and  the  whole  community  as  one  man.  .  .  .  Thus,  therefore, 
many  human  beings  have  descended  from  Adam  as  so  many 
members  of  one  body.  Blit  the  act  of  any  one  bodily  member, 
as  for  instance  the  hand,  is  not  voluntary  by  the  will  of  the 
hand  itself,  but  by  the  will  of  the  soul,  which  imparts  motion 
to  the  member;  and  hence  homicide,  committed  by  the  hand, 
is  not  imputed  to  the  hand  as  a  sin,  if  the  hand  be  considered 
in  itself  as  distinct  from  the  body;  but  the  homicide  is  imputed 
to  it  in  so  far  as  the  hand  is  a  part  of  man  which  is  moved 
by  the  first  motive  principle  of  man.  .  .  .  And  just  as  actual 
sin,  which  is  committed  by  some  member,  is  not  the  sin  of 
that  member,  except  in  so  far  as  that  member  is  a  part  of  the 
man  himself,  on  account  of  which  connection  it  is  called  a 
human  sin ;  so  is  original  sin  not-  the  sin  of  the  person,  except 
in  so  far  as  that  person  received  his  nature  from  the  first  par¬ 
ent  :  hence  it  is  called  the  sin  of  nature.”  43 

He  further  emphasizes  the  fact  that  only  those  contract 
original  sin  who  descend  from  Adam  by  way  of  the  active 
principle  of  generation  —  per  virtutem  activam  in  yeneratione. 
This  is  what  is  understood  by  being  seminally  contained  in 
Adam.  “  But  if  any  one  were  formed  from  human  flesh  by 
divine  power,  it  is  manifest  that  in  such  a  case  the  active 
principle  of  generation  was  not  derived  from  Adam ;  and  hence 
that  person  would  not  contract  original  sin.”  44 

Scotus  viewed  the  law  of  transmission  in  a  somewhat  differ¬ 
ent  light.  The  inclusion  of  human  nature  as  a  whole  in 

44  Ibid.  a.  4. 


43  Op.  cit.  I.  II,  q.  81,  a.  I. 


ORIGINAL  SIN 


169 


Adam,  emphasized  both  by  St.  Anselm  and  St.  Thomas,  ac¬ 
cording  to  him  does  not  explain  anything.  “  For  this  numeri¬ 
cal  nature  which  is  in  the  child  was  not  in  Adam,  although 
there  was  in  him  a  nature  of  the  same  species.  Therefore 
that  particular  nature  was  not  endowed  with  original  justice; 
and  therefore  it  cannot  be  held  responsible  for  its  loss.”  45 
His  own  explanation  is  this:  “When  the  gift  (of  original 
justice)  was  made  to  the  will  of  Adam,  it  was  made  in  such 
a  way,  that  by  the  same  act  of  giving,  so  far  as  it  came  in 
question,  it  was  made  likewise  to  every  single  will  of  all  his 
descendants,  with  the  proviso  that  no  obstacle  should  be  put 
in  the  way  of  its  being  actually  received  by  them.”  46 

Fie  rejects  very  definitely  the  teaching  of  St.  Bonaventure, 
Alexander  of  Hales,  and  others  in  regard  to  the  part  played  by 
concupiscence  in  the  transmission  of  original  sin.  He  accepted 
and  used  the  expression,  anima  contrahit  me  diant  e  came,  but 
he  explained  it  in  his  own  way.  Thus  he  writes :  “  It  is  said 

that  the  soul  contracts  original  sin  by  way  of  the  flesh,  but 
this  is  not  to  be  understood  as  if  the  flesh,  through  a  certain 
quality  caused  in  it,  were  the  cause  of  original  sin ;  but  in  this 
other  sense,  that  from  the  flesh  conceived  under  the  influence 
of  concupiscence  there  is  formed  an  organic  body,  into  which 
the  soul  is  infused  and  thereby  constitutes  a  person,  which 
person  is  the  child  of  Adam;  and  for  this  reason  said  person 
is  under  obligation  of  possessing  original  justice,  which  was 
given  to  Adam  himself  for  all  his  descendants,  and  yet  is  de¬ 
prived  of  it.  I  say,  then,  that  original  sin  does  not  result 
from  the  action  of  the  flesh  upon  the  soul.  .  .  .  From  the 
flesh  nothing  else  results  in  the  child  than  the  relation  of 
being  by  nature  the  son  of  Adam;  and  upon  this  relation  is 
consequent  the  obligation  that  was  imposed  by  the  divine 
law.”  47 

Thus  the  teaching  of  the  Scholastics  on  the  subject  of  origi¬ 
nal  sin  ran  through  its  successive  stages  of  development.  One 
by  one  its  inconsistent  elements  were  eliminated,  divergent 
views  were  drawn  more  closely  together,  obscure  concepts 

45  In  Sent.  II,  d.  32,  n.  9.  47  In  Sent.  II,  d.  32,  n.  4-1 1. 

46  Ibid.  d.  33,  n.  18. 


170 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


were  clarified,  the  various  details  were  duly  coordinated,  and 
so  there  finally  resulted  a  theory  that  satisfied  the  demands 
of  reason  and  was  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  data  of  revela¬ 
tion.  All  the  essential  parts  of  the  doctrine  thus  retained  in 
its  ultimate  development  —  the  nature  of  original  sin  as  a 
privation  of  justice,  its  presence  in  every  one  as  his  own 
proper  sin,  its  voluntariness  as  derived  from  the  will  of  the 
first  parent,  its  transmission  by  way  of  generation,  Adam’s 
moral  headship  of  the  race- — all  these  were  incorporated  by 
the  Council  of  Trent  in  its  decree  on  the  nature  and  propaga¬ 
tion  of  original  sin.48  Some  minor  points  still  remained  in¬ 
volved  in  obscurity,  as  for  instance  the  vulneratio  humanae 
naturae  in  naturalibus ,  but  all  that  is  essential  was  clearly 
set  forth  and  firmly  established  for  all  times. 

48  Sess.  V,  Mansi,  33,  27 A  sqq. ;  DB,  787  sqq. 


CHAPTER  X 


CHRISTOLOGY 

SOME  CHRISTOLOGICAL  ERRORS :  CHRISTOLOGY  OF  THE 

SCHOLASTICS 

There  is  no  doctrine  of  our  holy  faith  that  was  so  thor¬ 
oughly  investigated  during  Patristic  times  as  that  of  the  In¬ 
carnation.  And  for  this  fact  two  reasons  may  be  assigned. 
First,  the  doctrine  is  so  fundamental  that  with  it  Christianity 
must  either  stand  or  fall.  Secondly,  no  other  doctrine  was 
so  fiercely  and  so  constantly  attacked  by  men  of  heretical 
tendencies,  who  called  in  question  now  one  now  another  truth 
connected  with  this  central  mystery  of  Christian  belief.  As 
a  consequence,  when  the  Patristic  age  came  to  a  close,  Christ- 
olcgy  had  been  fully  developed,  and  at  the  same  time  there 
seemed  to  be  no  room  left  for  new  heresies  to  spring  up  along 
the  lines  of  Christological  teaching.  Nor  did  really  new  here¬ 
sies  arise  in  this  matter  during  all  the  centuries  that  followed, 
but  some  old  errors  were  revived  and  presented  in  a  new  form. 
One  or  two  of  them  may  be  briefly  noted,  before  we  proceed 
to  review  the  Christology  of  the  Scholastics. 

A  —  Some  Christological  Errors 

Spanish  Adoptionism,  which  was  really  a  recrudescence  of 
the  Nestorian  heresy,1  was  condemned  by  the  Council  of 
Frankford  in  794.  However,  in  one  form  or  another,  traces 
of  it  continued  to  appear  for  hundreds  of  years  after  its  formal 
condemnation.  Thus  Roscelin  contended  that,  as  nature  and 
person  are  identical,  one  must  necessarily  admit  a  human  per¬ 
son  in  Christ,  since  it  is  of  faith  that  He  has  a  human  nature. 

1  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  498  sqq. 

171 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


172 

His  error,  which  is  Nestorianism  pure  and  simple,  was  com¬ 
batted  by  St.  Anselm,  in  his  treatise  De  Fide  Trinitatis.2 
“  The  Word  made  flesh,”  St.  Anselm  argues,  “  assumed  an¬ 
other  nature,  not  another  person.  For  when  the  term  man  is 
used,  it  signifies  the  nature  which  is  common  to  all  men ;  but 
when  we  denominate  in  the  concrete  this  or  that  man  by  the 
name  of  Jesus,  we  designate  the  person,  having  together  with 
nature  an  aggregate  of  properties  by  which  man,  taken  in  a 
general  sense,  becomes  an  individual  and  is  distinguished  from 
other  individuals.”  3  And  Christ  is  only  one  such  individual; 
hence  He  is  only  one  person. 

However,  it  was  principally  by  Abelard  and  his  school  that 
Adoptionism  was  revived.  This  revival  seems  to  have  been 
the  outcome  of  a  wrong  conception  of  the  hypostatic  union, 
through  which  the  humanity  of  Christ  was  assumed  into  the 
unity  of  person.  According  to  Abelard,  the  hypostatic  union 
is  neither  intrinsic  nor  substantial.  A  truly  substantial  union, 
he  contends,  would  lead  to  an  identification  of  the  humanity 
with  the  Godhead  of  the  Word,  and  thus  introduce  a  created 
and  finite  person  into  the  Trinity.  Hence  such  expressions 
as  God  is  man,  this  man  is  God,  must  always  be  taken  in  an 
improper  or  figurative  sense.4  The  connection  between  sub¬ 
ject  and  predicate  in  these  propositions  is  purely  accidental;  it 
does  not  imply  a  communication  of  properties  in  any  true 
meaning  of  the  term. 

It  was  this  misconception  of  the  nature  of  the  hypostatic 
union  that  gave  rise  to  the  doctrinal  error  known  in  history  as 
Christ ological  Nihilism.  Its  teaching  is  summed  up  in  the 
phrase,  Christus  in  quantum  homo  non  est  aliquid  —  Christ 
as  man  is  not  anything.  It  was  not  meant  as  a  denial  of  the 
reality  of  Christ's  body  or  soul,  but  of  the  substantial  union 
between  His  human  nature  and  the  person  of  the  Word,  by 
reason  of  which  the  one  can  in  the  concrete  be  predicated  of 
the  other.  The  Word  took  a  real  body  and  a  real  soul,  but 
did  not  assume  them  into  the  unity  of  person.  They  are 

2  Op.  cit.  c.  6.  4  Introd.  ad  Theol.  Ill ;  ML.  178, 

3  ibiJ  1107;  cfr.  Bach,  Dogmengeschichte, 

II,  P-  391-395- 


CHRISTOLOGICAL  ERRORS 


173 


realities,  but  not  a  substantial  reality  of  the  Word  Incarnate. 
They  are  in  the  Word,  but  not  one  with  the  Word.  The  Son 
of  God  clothed  Himself  with  the  humanity  as  with  a  garment, 
that  He  might  appear  to  men;  He  used  the  humanity  as  an 
instrument,  that  He  might  perform  human  actions.  Hence 
the  expression,  Deus  factus  est  homo ,  can  only  mean,  Deus 
accepit  hominem;  and  the  corresponding  expression,  Deus  est 
homo,  merely  stand  for,  Deus  est  habens  hominem .6 

Furthermore,  the  better  to  uphold  this  peculiar  view  of  the 
hypostatic  union,  not  a  few  of  its  defenders  denied  that 
Christ’s  human  soul  and  body  were  united  so  as  to  form  a 
complete  human  substance.  For  the  result  of  such  a  union 
would  necessarily  be  an  individual  substance  of  rational  na¬ 
ture,  and  therefore  a  person.  But  in  Christ  there  is  no  human 
person,  and  consequently  there  can  be  no  complete  human 
substance.  The  two  constituent  elements  of  such  a  substance 
are  there,  but  in  a  state  of  separation.  Hence  the  Word  In¬ 
carnate  is  in  no  sense  a  new  reality;  He  is  only  the  recipient 
of  a  new  modus  —  habitu  inventus  ut  homo? 

Logically  this  view  of  the  humanity  of  Christ  excludes  all 
filiation,  so  that  Christ  as  man  is  neither  the  Son  of  God  by 
nature  nor  by  adoption;  and  not  a  few  theologians  of  the 
school  of  Abelard  drew  that  inference.  If  the  humanity  was 
not  even  a  complete  rational  substance,  adoption  in  the  true 
sense  of  the  word  was  obviously  out  of  the  question.  For 
adoption  means  the  free  assumption  of  an  extraneous  person 
to  the  right  of  inheritance;  but  where  there  is  no  complete 
rational  substance,  there  is  no  person.7 

Although  this  Christological  error  was  most  widespread  in 
France,  owing  to  the  many  disciples  and  admirers  of  Abelard, 
it  found  followers  also  in  other  countries  of  Europe.  Abbot 
Gerhoh  of  Reichersberg,  who  was  one  of  its  most  formidable 
opponents,  relates  that  when  he  visited  Rome  under  Honorius 
II  (1124-1130),  he  met  there  a  certain  Luitolf  who  openly 
taught  that  Christ  as  man  was  the  adopted  son  of  the  Father; 

5  Epitome,  c.  27;  ML,  178,  1737;  6  Cfr.  John  of  Cornwall,  Eulo- 

Cfr.  Bach,  op.  cit.  II,  391-395-  gium;  ML,  199,  1047. 

7  Cfr.  Sum,  Sent.;  ML,  176,  76, 


174 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


and  also  a  canon  of  the  Lateran  by  the  name  of  Adam,  who 
held  that  Christ  was  partly  God  and  partly  man.8  In  Ger¬ 
many  similar  views  were  defended  by  Folmar,  Abbot  of 
Triefenstein  near  Wuerzburg,  who  went  even  so  far  as  to 
assert  that  Jesus  Christ  was  neither  the  Son  of  God  nor  equal 
to  God,  and  that  it  would  be  unlawful  to  accord  Him  divine 
honors.  It  was  against  Folmar  that  Gerhoh  wrote  his  treatise 
De  Gloria  et  Honore  Filn  Hominis,  in  which  he  goes  to  the 
other  extreme  of  teaching  that  the  divine  attributes  had  been 
communicated  to  the  humanity  of  Christ,  not  only  by  way  of 
predication,  but  in  reality  and  in  being,  that  is,  in  a  Eutychian 
sense.9 

These  Adoptionist  errors,  propagated  by  the  disciples  of 
Abelard,  were  discussed  at  the  Council  of  Tours  in  1163,  and 
again  at  the  Council  of  Sens  in  1164;  but  without  definite 
results.  A  few  years  later,  however,  Pope  Alexander  III, 
condemned  them  in  three  successive  letters,  in  the  last  of  which, 
addressed  to  William  of  Champeaux,  then  archbishop  of 
Rheims,  he  says :  “  Since  Christ  is  perfect  God  and  perfect 

man,  it  is  strange  that  some  should  go  so  far  in  their  temerity 
as  to  assert  that  Christ  as  man  is  not  anything  ( non  sit 
aliqnid ).  In  order  that  such  an  abuse  may  not  creep  into  the 
Church  of  God,  we,  by  these  Apostolic  Letters,  command  Your 
Fraternity  to  interdict  under  anathema,  by  Our  Authority,  the 
presumptuous  assertion  that  Christ  is  not  anything;  because 
as  He  is  true  God,  so  is  He  also  true  man,  subsisting  in  a 
rational  soul  and  human  flesh.”  10 

This  condemnation  put  an  end  to  all  theological  discussion 
on  the  controverted  point,  and  the  last  traces  of  Adoptionism 
gradually  disappeared.  Later  Scholastics  qualified  the  state¬ 
ment,  Christus  in  quantum  homo  non  est  aliquid,  simply  as 
heretical; 11  and  a  fortiori  that  as  man  He  is  not  the  natural 
Son  of  God.  However  in  the  fourteenth  century  another 
form  of  Adoptionism  made  its  appearance,  which  seems  to 

8  Ep.  ad  Coll.  Card.;  ML,  193,  10  Mansi,  21,  1081C ;  DB,  393. 

576.  11  Cfr*  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill, 

9  ML,  184,  1174;  cfr.  Pez,  The-  q.  2,  a.  6. 
saur.  Anecdot.  ML,  193,  47S. 


SCHOLASTIC  CHRISTOLOGY 


175 


have  been  originated  by  Durandus.  He  admitted  that,  in 
virtue  of  the  eternal  generation  of  the  Word,  Christ  as  man 
was  the  natural  Son  of  the  Father;  but  he  thought  that  over 
and  above  this,  in  view  of  the  rights  conferred  on  the  humanity 
of  Christ  by  the  hypostatic  union,  He  might  also  be  called  the 
adopted  son  of  God.12  Similar  views  were  held  by  Gabriel 
Biel  and  other  Nominalists.  Although  never  condemned  by 
the  Church,  these  peculiar  opinions  are  generally  regarded  as 
untenable. 

B  —  Christology  of  the  Great  Scholastics 

Nearly  all  the  most  eminent  writers  of  the  golden  age  of 
Scholasticism  built  their  systems  of  theological  thought  upon 
the  foundation  laid  by  Peter  Lombard,  in  his  famous  Sen - 
tentiarum  Libri  Quatuor.  In  regard  to  Christology,  however, 
this  foundation  was  in  many  respects  unsatisfactory.  It  was 
wanting  both  in  depth  of  thought  and  in  systematic  arrange¬ 
ment  of  the  subject-matter.  In  fact,  what  he  has  on  the 
subject  is  little  more  than  a  faint  echo  of  Patristic  teaching, 
supplemented  by  not  a  few  rather  doubtful  opinions  that  were 
current  in  his  day.  Still,  on  account  of  the  great  authority 
which  he  enjoyed  in  the  schools,  it  will  be  helpful  to  give  in 
this  connection  a  brief  summary  of  his  Christological  teach¬ 
ing,  as  contained  in  the  third  book  of  his  Sentences. 

Although  any  one  of  the  three  divine  persons  might  have 
become  incarnate,  nevertheless  it  was  more  befitting  to  the 
Son  than  to  the  Father  or  the  Holy  Spirit;  because  as  in  the 
Godhead  He  is  the  Son  of  God,  so  was  it  becoming  that  in  the 
humanity  to  be  assumed  He  should  become  son  of  man.13 
The  Incarnation  is  the  work  of  the  whole  Trinity,  but  it  is 
rightly  attributed  to  the  Holy  Spirit ;  because  He  is  the  charity 
and  the  gift  of  the  Father  and  the  Son,  and  it  was  through 
the  ineffable  charity  of  God  that  the  Word  became  man.14 
The  Son  assumed  the  entire  human  nature,  body  and  soul,  for 
the  reason  that  the  entire  nature  had  been  corrupted  by  sin. 

12  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  4,  q.  1.  14  Ibid.  d.  4. 

13  Op.  cit.  d.  1. 


176 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


However  He  assumed  an  individual  nature,  not  human  na¬ 
ture  in  general.15  Both  soul  and  body  were  united  to  the  God¬ 
head,  but  the  body  mediant e  anima.16 

He  took  real  flesh  of  the  Virgin,  who  had  been  purified 
from  all  stain  before  His  conception.  He  was  conceived  and 
born  without  sin,  and  although  a  descendant  of  Adam,  he  was 
free  from  all  concupiscence.17  He  took  upon  Himself  not 
sin,  but  the  punishment  of  sin.18 

In  Peter’s  time  it  was  a  much  mooted  question,  whether  the 
nature  of  the  Word  or  the  person  had  become  incarnate.  His 
answer  is:  “  The  person  of  the  Son  assumed  human  nature, 
and  the  divine  nature  was  united  to  the  human  nature  in  the 
Son.  .  .  .  For  although  it  is  said  that  the  Son  alone  took  the 
form  of  a  servant,  nevertheless  by  this  the  divine  nature  is  not 
excluded,  but  only  the  persons  of  the  Father  and  the  Holy 
Spirit.”  19  However  it  is  not  proper  to  say  that  the  divine 
nature  became  flesh,  because  this  would  seem  to  do  away  with 
the  distinction  of  the  two  natures.20  Nor  can  it  be  said  that 
the  Word  assumed  a  human  person;  because,  although  soul 
and  body  were  united  so  as  to  form  a  human  nature,  that  na¬ 
ture  had  no  personality  of  its  own :  they  were  united  in  their 
assumption  by  the  Word.21  As  the  human  soul,  which  is  in¬ 
deed  an  individual  substance  of  rational  nature,  is  not  a  per¬ 
son  when  united  to  the  body,  though  it  is  a  person  when  sepa¬ 
rated  from  it  by  death;  so  is  the  human  nature  of  Christ  not  a 
human  person  in  its  union  with  the  Word.22 

In  connection  with  the  foregoing  question,  he  considers  the 
meaning  of  the  expressions,  God  became  man,  God  is  man. 
He  first  states  the  three  different  views  then  current.  He 
words  them  as  follows :  “  There  are  some  who  say  that  in  the 

very  incarnation  of  the  Word  an  individual  man  was  formed, 
consisting  of  a  rational  soul  and  human  flesh,  as  every  other 
true  man,  and  that  this  man  began  to  be  God  —  not  indeed  the 
divine  nature,  but  the  person  of  the  Word ;  and  that  God  began 

15  Ibid.  d.  2.  is  Ibid.  d.  5. 

16  Ibid.  n.  2.  20  Ibid.  n.  3. 


17  Ibid.  d.  3. 

18  Ibid. 


21  Ibid.  n.  4,  5. 

22  Ibid.  n.  5. 


SCHOLASTIC  CHRISTOLOGY 


1 77 


to  be  that  man.  .  .  .  And  there  are  others  who  in  part  agree 
with  the  aforesaid,  but  who  besides  contend  that  the  man, 
who  is  thus  said  to  be  God,  consists  not  only  of  a  rational  soul 
and  a  body,  but  of  the  human  and  the  divine  nature,  that  is,  of 
three  substances,  the  divinity,  the  body,  and  the  soul ;  and  this 
Jesus  Christ  they  hold  to  be  only  one  person,  but  so  that  be¬ 
fore  the  Incarnation  the  person  was  simple,  while  in  the  In¬ 
carnation  the  same  person  became  composite,  being  made  up 
of  the  divinity  and  the  humanity.  .  .  .  And  others  there  are 
who  not  only  deny  that  in  the  incarnation  of  the  Word  there 
took  place  a  composition  of  the  natures  in  respect  of  the  person, 
but  also  that  there  was  formed  an  individual  man  or  any 
other  substance,  composed  of  soul  and  body.  These  two, 
soul  and  body,  were  united  to  the  person  or  nature  of  the  Word 
in  such  a  way  that  from  the  two  or  the  three  no  nature  or  per¬ 
son  resulted;  but  rather  in  such  wise  that  the  Word  of  God 
was  clothed  with  the  soul  and  the  body  as  with  a  garment, 
so  that  He  might  in  a  becoming  manner  appear  to  mortal 
eyes.”  23 

In  his  critical  review  of  these  three  opinions,  he  brings  for¬ 
ward  objections  against  the  first  and  the  second  without  giving 
a  definite  and  final  answer.  If  the  first  be  admitted,  he  says, 
then  God  is  now  a  substance  which  was  not  always  God,  and 
a  substance  is  God  without  being  divine.  If  the  second  be  ac¬ 
cepted,  then  God  and  man  are  each  a  part  of  the  person  of 
the  Son,  and  before  the  Incarnation  that  person  was  not  com¬ 
plete,  but  was  completed  and  perfected  in  the  union.  Against 
the  third  opinion  he  urges  no  objections,  and  in  so  far  he 
seems  to  make  it  his  own.24  However,  he  concludes  by  asking 
the  reader  to  give  the  matter  still  further  study,  and  mean¬ 
while  to  hold  firmly  that  God  assumed  human  nature  in  such  a 
way  that  man  was  not  changed  into  God,  nor  God  into  man.25 

Next  he  examines  the  question,  whether  it  can  be  said  that 
the  divine  nature,  which  became  incarnate,  was  born  of  the 
Virgin.  He  answers  in  the  negative,  and  assigns  as  a  reason 
for  his  answer  that  the  divine  nature  was  not  bom  of  the 


23  Ibid.  d.  6. 

24  Ibid.  d.  7. 


25  Ibid.  n.  14. 


i;8 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Father.  It  was  only  the  person  of  the  Word  that  was  gen¬ 
erated  by  the  Father,  and  this  alone  can  properly  be  said 
to  have  been  born  of  Mary.26  However  Christ  has  two  nativi¬ 
ties,  the  one  eternal  according  to  His  Godhead  and  the  other 
temporal  according  to  His  manhood ;  and  in  this  sense  He  was 
twice  born.27 

In  regard  to  the  worship  that  is  due  to  the  humanity  of 
Christ,  he  simply  states  the  two  opposite  views  that  were  held 
at  the  time.  Some  thought  that  Christ  as  man  should  only  be 
venerated  as  are  the  saints  of  God,  but  in  a  higher  degree; 
while  others  maintained  that  even  as  man  He  must  be  wor¬ 
shiped  with  divine  honors.  The  author  does  not  decide  the 
question,  but  he  seems  to  be  in  favor  of  the  latter  view  28 

Although  Christ  as  man  is  not  a  human  person,  He  is  never¬ 
theless  a  rational  substance  composed  of  body  and  soul ;  and 
therefore  the  statement,  Christus  in  quantum  homo  non  est 
aliquid,  is  false.29  According  to  His  human  nature  He  was 
predestined  to  be  the  Son  of  God,  not  by  nature  but  by  grace.30 
Yet,  although  the  Son  of  God  only  by  grace,  He  is  not  an 
adopted  son ;  because  He  never  was  a  person  extraneous  to  the 
Godhead.  His  divine  sonship,  in  so  far  as  He  is  man,  is 
based  upon  the  grace  of  union.31  Nor  can  He  be  called  a 
creature,  except  in  a  figurative  way.  His  human  nature  is 
indeed  a  created  substance,  but  He  to  whom  that  nature  is 
united  is  the  Creator  Himself.32  Neither  is  it  proper  to  say 
that  He  had  a  beginning,  for  it  was  only  His  humanity  that  be¬ 
gan  to  exist  in  time.33  That  humanity  could  have  been  pro¬ 
duced  by  a  creative  act,  but  it  was  more  becoming  that  it  should 
have  its  origin  by  generation  from  the  race  of  Adam,  of  which 
Christ  was  to  be  the  Redeemer.34 

In  consequence  of  the  hypostatic  union,  the  soul  of  Christ 
received  from  the  first  moment  of  its  existence  grace  and 
knowledge  without  measure.35  Although  it  is  said  in  Holy 


26  Ibid.  d.  8. 

27  Ibid.  n.  2. 

28  Ibid.  d.  9. 

29  Ibid.  d.  io. 

30  Ibid.  n.  3. 


31  Ibid.  n.  4. 

32  Ibid.  d.  11. 

33  Ibid.  d.  12. 

34  Ibid.  n.  2. 

35  Ibid.  d.  13. 


SCHOLASTIC  CHRISTOLOGY 


179 


Scripture  that  the  child  Jesus  increased  in  wisdom  and  grace, 
yet  this  cannot  be  understood  in  the  sense  that  He  did  not  al¬ 
ready  possess  the  plenitude  of  both,  it  only  means  that  He 
manifested  His  wisdom  and  grace  more  fully  as  He  advanced 
in  years.36  His  human  will  was  free,  but  because  of  its  union 
with  the  Word  it  was  confirmed  in  grace  and  made  impec¬ 
cable.37  His  human  intellect  was  endowed  with  infused 
knowledge,  so  that  Christ  as  man  knew  all  that  He  knew  as 
God,  but  not  in  the  same  excellent  and  perfect  way.38  How¬ 
ever  as  man  He  could  not  do  all  that  He  could  do  as  God,  be¬ 
cause  human  nature  is  incapable  of  receiving  unlimited 
power.39  Moreover  His  human  nature  was  passible  both  in 
soul  and  body,  and  therefore  as  man  He  was  subject  to  all  the 
infirmities  of  a  passible  nature,  in  so  far  as  these  infirmities 
did  not  involve  sin  and  were  not  unbecoming  to  the  dignity  of 
the  God-Man.40 

Upon  this  foundation,  laid  by  the  Magister  Sententiarum , 
most  of  the  Scholastics  based  their  system  of  Christological 
thought  However,  they  added  much  of  their  own,  and  at  the 
same  time  sought  to  develop  what  the  Sentences  contained  only 
in  germ.  In  the  following  survey  it  will  be  best  to  gather 
the  views  of  the  most  prominent  Schoolmen  under  certain 
headings,  so  that  one  may  see  at  a  glance  what  was  more  or 
less  common  to  all  and  what  was  peculiar  to  each. 

1.  Preliminary  Questions. —  Nearly  all  the  great  Scholastics 
consider  by  way  of  introduction  a  number  of  questions  whose 
solution  is  intended  to  prepare  the  way  for  a  thorough  study 
of  the  mystery  itself.  These  questions  deal  chiefly  with  the 
possibility,  the  fitness,  and  the  final  cause  of  the  Incarnation. 
A  few  remarks  in  reference  to  each  will  be  sufficient  to  indicate 
the  general  trend  of  thought  which  they  involve. 

The  possibility  of  the  Incarnation  is,  of  course,  implied  in 
the  accomplished  fact  as  set  forth  by  the  teaching  of  the 
Church;  and  in  so  far  it  was  presupposed  by  the  Scholastics. 
But  they  made  it  a  subject  of  special  inquiry  for  the  purpose 

36  Ibid.  n.  2-5.  39  Ibid.  n.  2,  3. 

37  Ibid.  d.  12,  n.  3,  4.  40  Ibid.  d.  15. 

38  Ibid.  d.  14. 


i8o 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


of  forestalling  objections  and  making  the  mystery  acceptable 
to  reason.  Hence  they  point  out  that  the  Incarnation  is  but 
one  of  the  many  ways  in  which  God  may  communicate  His 
goodness  to  His  creatures.41  As  it  is  not  a  change  of  God 
into  the  creature,  nor  of  the  creature  into  God,  but  only  an  ex¬ 
tension  of  the  divine  personality  to  human  nature,  it  lies  en¬ 
tirely  within  the  sphere  of  omnipotence.  For  since  one  divine 
nature  subsists  in  three  persons,  there  appears  no  reason  why 
it  should  be  impossible  for  two  natures  to  subsist  in  one  per¬ 
son.42  And  as  the  person  of  the  Son  was  from  all*eternity  an 
hypostasis  in  respect  of  the  divine  nature,  why  could  not  the 
same  in  time  become  also  the  hypostasis  of  a  human  nature?  43 
For  neither  is  its  terminating  power  in  itself  limited,  nor  is 
human  nature  incommunicable  to  a  higher  personality.44  All 
this  can  indeed  not  be  demonstrated  by  positive  arguments, 
because  there  is  question  of  a  mystery;  but  it  can  at  least  be 
shown  not  to  imply  an  evident  contradiction.45 

The  fitness  of  the  Incarnation  all  these  writers  prove  by 
pointing  to  the  striking  manifestation  of  God’s  various  attri¬ 
butes  in  this  mystery — of  His  power  which  brought  together 
the  highest  and  the  lowest  into  so  intimate  a  union;  of  His 
mercy  which  had  so  tender  a  compassion  on  man’s  weakness 
and  misery ;  of  His  wisdom  which  found  so  excellent  a  way  of 
repairing  the  ravages  of  sin;  of  His  justice  which  demanded 
from  human  nature  the  full  payment  of  the  debt  it  had  in¬ 
curred;  of  His  goodness  which  communicated  His  own  being 
in  the  highest  possible  measure  to  the  creature  He  had  made.40 
And  it  was  especially  befitting  that  the  person  of  the  Son 
should  become  incarnate,  although  the  Father  and  the  Holy 
Spirit  might  also  have  assumed  human  nature.47  The  reasons 


41  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  i, 
a.  i. 

42  Id.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  I,  q.  i,  a.  i. 

43  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  i,  a. 


h 


q.  i. 

44  Scotus,  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  I,  q. 


i, 


n.  i. 

45  Cfr.  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  2,  m. 
I,  2;  Albert.  Magn.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d. 
i,  a.  i;  Bonavent.  loc.  cit. ;  Thomas, 


loc.  cit.,  et  Cont.  Gent.  IV,  c.  39, 
40;  Scotus,  loc.  cit.,  et  Report.  Ill, 
d.  1,  q.  1. 

46  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  2;  Thom¬ 
as,  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  1,  q.  1,  a.  2; 
Bonavent.  Ibid.  a.  2,  q.  1 ;  Albert. 
Magn.  Ibid.  a.  1. 

47  Halens.  loc.  cit.  m.  5 ;  Thomas, 
Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  3,  a.  5;  Bona¬ 
vent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  1,  a.  1,  q.  4. 


SCHOLASTIC  CHRISTOLOGY 


181 


for  this  special  fitness  are  thus  given  by  St.  Thomas:  Man 
was  created  through  the  Word;  therefore  it  was  becoming  that 
after  the  fall  he  should  be  restored  by  the  Word.  Man  was 
predestined  to  become  the  son  of  God  by  adoption;  therefore  ' 
it  was  fitting  that  he  should  possess  this  dignity  through  Him 
who  is  Son  of  God  by  nature.  Man  strayed  from  God  by 
an  inordinate  thirst  for  knowledge;  therefore  it  was  proper 
that  he  should  be  led  back  to  God  by  the  eternal  Wisdom.48 

The  final  cause  of  the  Incarnation,  as  of  anything  else,  is 
the  end  to  be  attained.  This  is  ultimately  the  manifestation 
of  God’s  glory.  On  this  point  all  the  Scholastics  were  neces¬ 
sarily  agreed,  as  it  was  evidently  contained  in  the  teaching  of 
the  Church.  Their  discussions  turned  about  the  proximate 
final  cause,  or  the  chief  reason  why  God  decreed  to  manifest 
His  glory  through  the  Incarnation.  In  trying  to  solve  this 
question,  they  generally  spoke  with  great  reserve.  St.  Thomas 
says  that  it  is  a  matter  which  He  alone  knows  who  was  born 
and  offered  up  for  our  redemption  because  He  willed  it.49 
However  He  ventures  the  opinion  that  the  redemption  must 
be  regarded  as  the  chief  motive  of  the  Incarnation.  For 
“  since  everywhere  in  Holy  Scripture  the  sin  of  the  first  man  is 
assigned  as  the  reason  of  the  Incarnation,  it  is  more  in  accord- 
ance  with  this  to  say  that  the  work  of  the  Incarnation  was  or¬ 
dained  by  God  as  a  remedy  for  sin ;  so  that,  had  sin  not  existed, 
the  Incarnation  would  not  have  been.  However,  the  power  of 
God  is  not  limited  to  this;  hence  even  if  sin  had  not  existed, 
God  could  nevertheless  have  become  incarnate.”  50 

The  same  view  is  taken  by  St.  Bonaventure,  who  says  that 
“  the  principal  reason  of  the  Incarnation  seems  to  have  been 
the  redemption  of  mankind,  although  with  this  principal  mo¬ 
tive  there  were  connected  many  other  reasons  of  fitness.51 
Alexander  of  Hales  gives  no  definite  solution,  but  simply 
states:  “It  may  be  said  without  prejudice  to  truth,  that,  if 
human  nature  had  not  fallen  into  sin,  the  Incarnation  would 
still  have  been  befitting.52  Albertus  Magnus  solves  the  ques- 

48  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  3,  a.  8.  51  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  r,  a.  2,  q.  2. 

49  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  1,  q.  1,  a.  3.  62  Sum.  Ill,  q.  2,  m.  13. 

B0  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  1,  a.  3. 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


182 

tion  in  the  same  way  as  St.  Thomas,53  while  Richard  of  Mid¬ 
dleton  gives  arguments  for  both  sides,  without  coming  to  a  de¬ 
cision  on  the  point  at  issue.54  Scotus,  on  the  other  hand,  holds 
that  the  redemption  of  mankind  can  be  considered  only  as  a 
secondary  motive  of  the  Incarnation ;  while  the  primary  motive 
was  the  manifestation  of  God’s  glory  in  this  mystery  of  divine 
love.  Hence,  although  he  does  not  positively  assert  that  the 
Word  would  have  become  incarnate  even  if  human  nature  had 
not  fallen  into  sin,  nevertheless  the  general  import  of  his  teach¬ 
ing  points  to  that  conclusion.55  And  in  this  view  he  has  al¬ 
ways  had  many  followers,  even  outside  the  Franciscan  school 
of  theology. 

2.  The  Person  Assuming  Human  Nature. —  When  speaking 
of  the  assumption  of  human  nature  by  the  Word,  nearly 
all  Scholastics  consider  these  three  questions:  Whether  to 
assume  is  proper  to  a  divine  person  ?  Whether  the  divine  na¬ 
ture  can  assume?  Whether  one  person  can  assume  without 
the  others?  In  connection  with  these  questions  they  also 
speculate  about  other  points,  such  as  the  incarnation  of  the 
three  divine  persons  in  the  same  human  nature,  and  in  differ¬ 
ent  natures;  the  assumption  of  irrational  creatures,  and  other 
matters  of  a  similar  import :  but  all  this  may  here  be  passed  by, 
as  it  has  little  or  no  dogmatic  value.  It  will  be  sufficient  to 
make  a  few  observations  in  reference  to  the  first  three  ques¬ 
tions  mentioned  above. 

The  term,  “  to  assume,”  as  Richard  of  Middleton  explains, 
may  be  taken  in  three  different  meanings.  In  the  first  it  sig¬ 
nifies  simply  to  take  and  unite;  in  the  second,  to  take  and 
unite  to  oneself ;  in  the  third,  to  take  and  unite  to  one’s  per¬ 
son.56  In  accordance  with  this  threefold  meaning  of  the  term, 
the  Scholastics  teach  that  in  the  first  sense  the  assumption 
is  common  to  all  three  persons,  because  the  Trinity  united  hu¬ 
man  nature  with  the  person  of  the  Son;  in  the  second  sense 
the  assumption  belongs  to  the  divine  nature,  in  as  much  as  it 
caused  the  human  nature  to  be  together  with  itself  in  the  same 

53  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  20,  a.  4.  55  Ibid.  d.  7,  q.  3 ;  Report,  ibid.  q. 

54  Ibid.  a.  2,  q.  4.  4-6. 

56  In  Sent.  d.  5,  a.  1,  q.  1. 


SCHOLASTIC  CHRISTOLOGY 


183 


person ;  in  the  third  sense  the  assumption  is  proper  to  the  per¬ 
son  of  the  Son,  since  it  is  to  His  person  alone  that  the  human 
nature  is  united.67 

St.  Thomas  formulates  this  common  teaching  as  follows : 
“  The  act  of  assumption  proceeds  from  the  divine  power, 
which  is  common  to  the  three  persons,  but  the  term  of  the  as¬ 
sumption  is  a  person.  .  .  .  Hence,  what  has  to  do  with  action 
in  the  assumption  is  common  to  the  three  persons;  but  what 
pertains  to  the  nature  of  the  term  belongs  to  one  person  in  such 
a  manner  as  not  to  belong  to  another;  for  the  three  persons 
caused  the  human  nature  to  be  united  to  the  person  of  the 
Son.” 58  Again:  “To  be  the  principle  of  the  assumption 
belongs  to  the  divine  nature  itself,  because  the  assumption  took 
place  by  its  power;  however  to  be  the  term  of  the  assumption 
does  not  belong  to  the  divine  nature  in  itself,  but  by  reason 
of  the  person  in  whom  it  is  considered  to  be.  Hence  a  person 
is  primarily  and  more  properly  said  to  assume,  but  it  may  be 
said  secondarily  that  the  nature  assumed  a  nature  to  its  person. 
And  after  the  same  manner  the  nature  is  said  to  be  incarnate, 
not  that  it  changed  to  flesh,  but  that  it  assumed  the  nature  of 
flesh.”  59 

3.  The  Human  Nature  Assumed  by  the  Person  of  the  Word. 
—  It  is  a  matter  of  faith  that  Christ  has  a  true  and  complete 
human  nature,  composed  of  body  and  soul,  each  one  of  which 
has  its  own  proper  faculties  and  senses.  In  accordance  with 
this  teaching  of  faith,  the  Scholastics  point  out  that  the  Word 
assumed  human  nature  not  in  the  abstract,  but  in  the  con¬ 
crete  ; 60  not  as  multiplied  in  many,  but  as  individualized  in 
one.61  Abstract  human  nature,  representing  the  species, 
could  not  be  thus  assumed ;  for,  as  St.  Thomas  argues,  “  this 
assumption  is  terminated  in  a  person,  and  it  is  contrary  to  the 
nature  of  a  common  form  to  be  thus  individualized  in  a 

57  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  5,  m.  1,  2,  59  Ibid.  a.  2. 

3;  Thomas,  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  5,  q.  2,  60  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  4;  Bona- 

a.  1,  2;  Bonavent.  Ibid.  a.  1,  q.  1-3;  vent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  5,  a.  2,  q.  1; 
Albert.  Magn.  Ibid.  a.  1,  3,  4,  6;  Albert.  Magn.  Ibid.  a.  5. 

Scotus,  Ibid.  1,  1.  61  Bonavent.  Ibid.  d.  2,  a.  1,  q.  3; 

58  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  3,  a.  4.  Thomas,  Ibid.  q.  1,  a.  2. 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


person.”  62  Nor  would  it  have  been  befitting  “  for  human 
nature  to  be  assumed  by  the  Word  in  all  its  supposita.  First, 
because  the  multitude  of  supposita  of  human  nature,  which  are 
natural  to  it,  would  have  been  taken  away.  .  .  .  Secondly,  be¬ 
cause  this  would  have  been  derogatory  to  the  dignity  of  the 
incarnate  Son  of  God,  as  He  is  the  First-born  of  many  breth¬ 
ren.  Thirdly,  because  it  is  fitting  that  as  one  divine  supposi- 
tum  is  incarnate,  so  He  should  assume  one  human  nature,  so 
that  on  both  sides  unity  might  be  found.”  63 

Thus  the  Word  assumed  all  the  essential  parts  of  human 
nature.  He  assumed  a  real  body,  made  up  of  flesh  and  blood; 
for  that  belongs  to  the  essence  of  man,  and  it  would  not  have 
been  becoming  Him  to  have  anything  fictitious  in  His  work; 
besides  this  is  the  teaching  of  Holy  Scripture.04  And  He 
assumed  a  rational  soul,  through  which  the  body  received  its 
specific  being.  This  appears  both  from  the  Sacred  Writings 
and  from  the  purpose  and  truth  of  the  Incarnation.65  More¬ 
over  soul  and  body  were  substantially  united,  so  as  to  form 
a  complete  and  individual  human  nature.66  However  the  body 
was  assumed  mediant e  anima,  in  the  sense  that  it  was  made 
assumable  by  its  relation  to  the  rational  soul,  and  that  the 
soul,  on  account  of  its  higher  dignity,  occupies  a  middle  place 
between  it  and  God ;  but  not  in  the  sense  that  the  soul  is  the 
formal  bond  of  union.67 

However,  although  the  Word  thus  assumed  a  complete  and 
individual  human  nature,  He  did  not  assume  a  human  person. 
This  is  evident  for  three  reasons:  First,  if  the  human  per¬ 
son  existed  before  its  assumption,  the  Word  would  not  have 
been  conceived  by  Mary;  secondly,  if  only  in  its  assumption, 
it  would  have  been  consumed  rather  than  assumed;  thirdly,  if 
it  continued  to  exist  after  the  assumption,  there  would  be  two 


62  Sum.  q.  4,  a.  4. 

63  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  4,  a.  5. 
64Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  4,  m.  4; 

Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  2,  a.  2,  q. 
1 ;  Thomas,  Ibid.  q.  1,  a.  3 ;  Albert. 
Magn.  Ibid.  a.  1,  q.  1 ;  Scotus,  Ibid, 
q.  2,  3. 

65  Cfr.  Ibid.,  et  Rich.  Middleton, 


In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  2,  a.  1,  q.  1 ;  ./Egid. 
Rom.  Ibid.  q.  1,  a.  1. 

66  Cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill, 
q.  2,  a.  4,  6. 

67  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  4,  m.  5 ; 
Albert.  Magn.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  2,  a. 
9,  10;  Bonavent.  Ibid.  a.  3,  q.  1; 
Thomas,  III,  q.  6,  a.  1 ;  Scotus,  In 
Sent.  Ibid.  q.  2,  n.  5. 


SCHOLASTIC  CHRISTOLOGY 


185 


persons  in  Christ,  which  it  is  heretical  to  say.68  Hence,  while 
complete  in  every  other  respect,  the  human  nature  as  assumed 
by  the  Word  was  without  its  own  proper  personality. 

4.  Definition  of  Human  Personality. —  Nearly  all  Scholas¬ 
tics  accepted  the  Boethian  definition  of  person,  so  that  they 
regarded  a  human  person  as  an  individual  substance  of  a  ra¬ 
tional  nature.  It  is  true,  Richard  of  St.  Victor,  Alexander 
of  Hales,  and  Duns  Scotus,  as  was  pointed  out  in  the  chapter 
on  the  Blessed  Trinity,  modified  this  definition  somewhat;  but 
that  modification  did  not  introduce  any  substantial  change. 
They  all  insist  that  a  substance,  in  order  to  be  properly  denom¬ 
inated  as  a  person,  must  be  separated  from  others  of  its  kind 
by  a  threefold  distinction  —  of  singularity,  incommunicability, 
and  dignity.  A  substance  is  said  to  be  singular  when  it  is  un¬ 
divided  in  itself,  and  divided  from  every  other  substance.  It 
is  incommunicable,  when  it  has  no  natural  aptitude  to  become 
in  any  sense  a  part  of  another  being.  These  two  distinctions 
constitute  the  substance  in  question  a  suppositum.  When  to 
these  is  added  the  distinction  of  dignity,  which  consists  in 
rationality  or  intellectuality,  there  results  a  person.  Here  it 
must  be  noted,  however,  that  in  every  rational  subject  the  sup- 
positum  and  the  person  are  identical.  Hence  a  human  person 
is  a  rational  suppositum.69 

On  these  points  the  Scholastics  were  agreed,  except  that  a 
few  of  them  placed  a  distinction  between  the  suppositum  and 
the  person  in  the  same  subject.70  But  in  regard  to  the  further 
question,  what  is  it  precisely  that  distinguishes  the  person  from 
the  rational  nature,  or  what  does  personality  add  to  rational 
nature  so  as  to  make  it  a  person,  their  agreement  was  not  so 
perfect.  The  question  is  in  itself  purely  philosophical,  and 
as  such  they  did  not  give  to  it  any  special  consideration ;  but 
they  incidentally  indicate  their  views  regarding  it  when  speak¬ 
ing  of  the  hypostatic  union.  Although  even  in  that  connec¬ 
tion  hardly  any  of  them  state  explicitly  in  what  the  formal  rea¬ 
son  of  personality  consists. 

68  Cfr.  Bonavent.  loc.  cit.  d.  5,  a. 


69  Cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill, 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


1 86 

Thus  Alexander  of  Hales,  after  explaining  the  threefold  dis¬ 
tinction  noted  above,  goes  on  to  say  that  if  a  rational  nature 
is  created  so  as  to  exist  by  itself,  it  is  a  person;  but  if  at  the 
moment  of  creation  it  is  united  to  another  personality,  it  is 
not  a  person,  although  it  is  a  complete  rational  nature.71 
Hence  he  seems  to  imply  that  the  formal  reason  of  personality, 
presupposing  a  complete  rational  nature,  is  nothing  else  than 
the  fact  of  independent  existence.  The  same  view  is  taken 
by  St.  Bonaventure,  who  says  that  the  human  nature  of  Christ 
is  not  a  person,  simply  because  it  is  united  to  the  person  of  the 
Word.72  Scotus  is  somewhat  more  explicit.  He  holds  that 
personality  is  the  ultimate  complement  whereby  a  rational  na¬ 
ture,  complete  in  itself,  is  made  actually  incommunicable;  but 
this  complement  adds  nothing  to  the  complete  nature  except 
the  double  negation  of  actual  and  aptitudinal  communication. 
“  That  negation  of  dependence  .  .  .  actual  and  aptitudinal, 
constitutes  the  formal  reason  of  personality.”  73  Henry  of 
Ghent,  though  not  quite  so  explicit,  gives  a  similar  explana¬ 
tion.74  Hence  although  the  concept  of  personality  is  funda¬ 
mentally  positive,  in  as  much  as  person  is  the  same  as  a  sepa¬ 
rately  existing  complete  rational  nature;  still  formally  consid¬ 
ered  it  is  negative,  since  it  implies  no  physical  reality  distinct 
from  the  complete  nature  itself. 

St.  Thomas  looks  at  the  matter  in  a  somewhat  different 
light,  but  according  to  many  of  his  interpreters  comes  to  prac¬ 
tically  the  same  result.  “  Person,”  he  says,  “  has  a  different 
meaning  from  nature.  For  nature  .  .  .  designates  the  spe¬ 
cific  essence  which  is  signified  by  the  definition.  And  if  noth¬ 
ing  was  found  to  be  added  to  what  belongs  to  the  notion  of  the 
species,  there  would  be  no  need  to  distinguish  the  nature  from 
the  suppositum  of  the  nature,  which  is  the  individual  sub¬ 
sisting  in  this  nature.  .  .  .  Now  in  certain  subsisting  things 

we  happen  to  find  what  does  not  belong  to  the  notion  of  the 

species,  namely,  accidents  and  individuating  principles,  which 
appear  chiefly  in  such  as  are  composed  of  matter  and  form. 
Hence  in  such  as  these  the  nature  and  the  suppositum  really 

71  Sum.  ITT,  q.  4,  m.  6.  73  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  1,  q.  1,  n.  9. 

72  In  Sent.  d.  5,  a.  2,  q.  2.  74  Quodl.  5,  q.  8. 


SCHOLASTIC  CHRISTOLOGY 


187 


differ,  not  indeed  as  if  they  were  wholly  separate,  but  because 
in  the  suppositum  is  included  the  nature,  and  certain  other 
things  outside  the  species  are  added.  .  .  .  And  what  is  said 
of  a  suppositum  is  to  be  applied  to  a  person  in  rational  or  in¬ 
tellectual  creatures;  for  a  person  is  nothing  else  than  an  in¬ 
dividual  substance  of  rational  nature,  according  to  Boeth¬ 
ius.”  75 

From  this  exposition  many  have  inferred  that  St.  Thomas 
regarded  personality  as  something  positive,  really  distinct 
from  the  complete  nature  —  either  a  modus  realis  or  the  actus 
exist endi.  But  that  such  was  not  his  mind  appears  from  his 
solution  of  such  difficulties  as  were  drawn  from  the  ac¬ 
knowledged  fact  that  Christ’s  human  nature  is  a  complete  ra¬ 
tional  substance.  Thus  when  the  objectors  urged  that  Christ’s 
human  nature  answers  the  Boethian  definition  of  person,  he 
replied:  “  We  must  bear  in  mind  that  not  every  individual  in 
the  genus  of  substance,  even  in  rational  nature,  is  a  person,  but 
that  alone  which  exists  by  itself,  and  not  that  which  exists  in 
some  more  perfect  thing.  .  .  .  Therefore,  although  this  hu¬ 
man  nature  is  a  kind  of  individual  in  the  genus  substance,  it 
has  not  its  own  personality,  because  it  does  not  exist  separately, 
but  in  something  more  perfect,  namely,  in  the  person  of  the 
Word.”  76  And  to  the  statement,  that  the  Word  assumed 
whatever  perfection  He  had  sown  in  our  nature,  and  therefore 
human  personality,  he  replied :  “  Its  proper  personality  is  not 

wanting  to  the  nature  assumed  through  the  loss  of  anything 
pertaining  to  the  perfection  of  human  nature,  but  through  the 
addition  of  something  which  is  above  human  nature,  namely, 
the  union  with  a  divine  person.”  77  Hence  whatever  physical 
perfection  is  found  in  human  nature  existing  by  itself  apart, 
is  also  found  in  the  human  nature  assumed  by  the  Word;  and 
the  only  reason  why  it  is  not  a  human  person  is  the  fact  that  it 
does  not  exist  apart.  And  this  the  author  expressly  states  in 
answer  to  another  difficulty,  when  he  says:  “  If  the  two  na¬ 
tures  together  with  their  properties  were  separated,  there 

75  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  2,  a.  2.  77  Ibid.  q.  4,  a.  2  ad  2m. 

76  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  2,  a.  2  ad 
3m- 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


1 88 

would  be  on  both  sides  that  totality  which  is  required  by  the 
notion  of  person;  but  while  they  are  united  there  is  only  one 
totality,  and  therefore  only  one  person.”  78 

In  the  light  of  these  and  similar  texts,  the  other  statements 
of  St.  Thomas-,  that  person  and  nature  are  really  distinct, 
that  person  adds  something  to  nature,  evidently  bear  reference 
only  to  specific  nature,  or  to  nature  in  the  abstract ;  not  to  na¬ 
ture  in  the  concrete.  Hence,  if  according  to  his  teaching,  as 
some  of  his  followers  contend,  the  formal  notion  of  personality 
is  something  positive  in  itself,  it  is  at  most  a  modus ,  not  posi¬ 
tively,  but  only  negatively  distinct  from  the  complete  nature. 
And  this  was  also  the  teaching  of  Albertus  Magnus.  “  Were 
Christ,”  he  says,  “  to  lay  aside  His  humanity,  that  which  was  so 
laid  aside  would  be  an  individual  substance  of  rational  nature, 
and  therefore  a  person.  And  if  some  one  were  to  ask,  what 
conferred  upon  it  the  personality  which  it  did  not  have  before, 
the  answer  would  be  that  it  was  the  singularity  which  it  did 
not  have  before,  or  the  incommunicability,  as  others  say ;  for 
properly  speaking  it  is  singularity  that  causes  rational  nature 
to  be  a  person.  And  if  it  were  asked  still  further,  what  gave 
it  singularity,  one  would  have  to  answer  that  it  was  division 
which  gave  it  per  accidens.  For  although  per  se  division  re¬ 
moves  something,  still  per  accidens  it  causes  that  which  is 
divided  to  be  one  and  separate  from  the  other,  and  that  is  sin¬ 
gularity.”  79 

On  the  other  hand,  Durandus  and  the  Nominalists  went  still 
farther  than  Scotus  in  their  identification  of  nature  and  person. 
According  to  them  the  distinction  between  the  two  is  merely  a 
matter  of  concept;  it  is  in  no  sense  real.80  This,  however,  ill 
accords  with  the  oneness  of  person  in  Christ,  and  hence  their 
view  is  commonly  rejected  as  untenable. 

5.  The  Hypostatic  Union. —  When  the  Scholastics  began 
their  speculations  regarding  the  mystery  of  the  Incarnation, 
two  fundamental  points  in  reference  to  the  union  itself  had 
been  clearly  defined:  First,  that  the  union  resulted  in  oneness 

78  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  5,  q.  1,  a.  3  ad  80  Durand.  Ibid.  q.  2;  Biel,  Ibid. 

3ra.  d.  5.  q-  unica, 

79  Ibid.  d.  5,  a.  12. 


SCHOLASTIC  CHRISTOLOGY 


189 


of  person;  secondly,  that  in  spite  of  this  oneness  of  person, 
the  two  natures  with  all  their  properties  remained  really  dis¬ 
tinct  in  the  union.81  Hence  it  is  the  common  teaching  of  the 
Scholastics  that  the  union  between  the  divinity  and  the  hu¬ 
manity  of  Christ  is  hypostatic  or  personal.  The  human  nature 
is  united  to  the  divine  nature,  but  in  the  person  of  the  Son.82 

This  hypostatic  union  they,  first  of  all,  try  to  illustrate  by 
various  examples  found  in  nature;  but  they  are  careful  to 
point  out  that  all  these  examples  fall  short  of  a  real  explana¬ 
tion.  The  one  most  commonly  used  is  that  of  grafting.  The 
inserted  shoot  becomes  in  a  manner  one  suppositum  with  the 
tree  upon  which  it  is  engrafted,  yet  the  natures  of  the  two  re¬ 
main  really  distinct ;  they  do  not  form  a  new  or  third  nature.83 
A  similar  example  is  found  in  the  union  of  soul  and  body, 
which  had  already  been  employed  in  the  Athanasian  Symbol. 
It  is  true,  soul  and  body  form  not  only  one  person,  but  also  one 
nature;  still  in  that  nature  the  one  constituent  element  is  not 
changed  into  the  other,  and  in  so  far  the  example  illustrates  the 
hypostatic  union.  St.  Thomas  thought  it  was  the  best  example 
that  could  be  found  in  created  things.84 

In  the  next  place  they  inquire  whether  anything  intervenes 
between  the  two  extremes  of  the  union,  or  between  the  person 
of  the  Word  and  the  human  nature.  On  this  point  they  re¬ 
strict  their  inquiries  to  the  question  of  grace;  that  is,  whether 
habitual  grace  can  in  any  sense  be  considered  as  a  medium  in 
which  the  union  took  place.  With  the  exception  of  Alexander 
of  Hales,  they  all  answer  the  question  in  the  negative.85 
Alexander  taught  that  grace  must  be  considered  as  a  necessary 
disposition  of  the  human  nature,  in  order  that  it  might  fittingly 
be  assumed  by  the  Word.  Hence  he  called  it  the  grace  of 
union.86  The  others  also  admitted  that  the  human  nature  of 


81  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  396  sqq. ;  404  sqq. 

82  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  4;  Bona- 
vent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  5,  a.  1 ;  Thom¬ 
as,  ibid.  q.  2;  Scotus,  ibid.  q.  I. 

83  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  7,  m.  I, 
a.  1 ;  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  6, 
a.  2,  q.  1 ;  Thomas,  ibid.  d.  1,  q.  1, 
a.  1. 


84  QQ-  DD.  de  Unione  Verbi, 
a.  1. 

85  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  2,  a. 
3,  q.  2;  Middleton,  ibid.  a.  2,  q.  3; 
Dionys.  Carth.,  ibid.  q.  5 ;  Scotus, 
ibid.  q.  2,  3 ;  ^Egid.  Rom.,  ibid.  q.  2, 
a.  3. 

86  Sum.  Ill,  q.  7,  m.  2,  a.  1. 


190 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Christ  was  adorned  with  sanctifying  grace,  but  held  that  it  was 
consequent  upon  the  union  in  ordine  naturae ,  if  not  in  point 
of  time. 

The  common  teaching  on  the  point  in  question  was  thus 
formulated  by  St.  Thomas :  “  In  Christ  there  was  the  grace 

of  union  and  habitual  grace.  Therefore  grace  cannot  be  taken 
to  be  the  means  of  the  assumption  of  the  human  nature, 
whether  we  speak  of  the  grace  of  union  or  of  habitual  grace. 
For  the  grace  of  union  is  the  personal  being  that  is  given  gratis 
to  the  human  nature  in  the  person  of  the  Word,  and  it  is  the 
term  of  the  assumption.  While  the  habitual  grace  pertaining 
to  the  spiritual  holiness  of  the  man  is  an  effect  following  the 
union.  .  .  .  But  if  by  grace  we  understand  the  will  of  God 
doing  or  bestowing  something  gratis,  the  union  was  effected 
by  grace,  not  as  a  means,  but  as  the  efficient  cause/’  87 

Considered  in  itself,  the  hypostatic  union  consists  in  the 
relation  which  resulted  from  the  act  of  assumption,  and  in  so 
far  it  is  something  created.  “  The  union  of  which  we  are 
speaking,”  says  St.  Thomas,  “  is  a  relation  which  we  consider 
between  the  divine  and  the  human  nature,  in  as  much  as  they 
came  together  in  one  person  of  the  Son  of  God.  Now  .  .  . 
every  relation  which  we  consider  between  God  and  the  crea¬ 
ture  is  really  in  the  creature,  by  whose  change  the  relation  is 
brought  into  being;  whereas  it  is  not  really  in  God,  but  only  in 
our  way  of  thinking,  since  it  does  not  arise  from  any  change 
in  God.  And  hence  we  must  say  that  the  union  of  which  we 
are  speaking  is  not  really  in  God,  except  only  in  our  way  of 
thinking ;  but  in  human  nature,  which  is  a  creature,  it  is  really. 
Therefore  we  must  say  it  is  something  created.”  88 

Although  the  hypostatic  union  thus  formally  consists  in  a 
created  relation,  it  is  nevertheless  the  most  intimate  of  all  un¬ 
ions.  except  that  of  the  nature  and  persons  in  the  Blessed  Trin¬ 
ity.  In  respect  of  the  distance  of  the  terms  brought  together, 
of  the  power  that  united  them,  of  the  term  in  which  the  union 
resulted,  of  the  indissoluble  perpetuity  of  its  duration  — “  in 
respect  of  all  these  conditions,”  says  St.  Bonaventure,  “  there 

87  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  6,  a.  6.  88  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  2,  a.  7. 


SCHOLASTIC  CHRISTOLOGY 


191 


is  no  other  union  that  is  at  all  similar  to  it ;  because  it  exceeds 
all  nature  and  all  ordinary  graces;  for  it  is  the  indissoluble 
union  of  the  divine  and  human  nature  in  one  person  brought 
about  by  the  power  of  God.”  89  St.  Thomas  derives  the  inti¬ 
mate  nature  of  the  union  chiefly  from  its  term;  “  for  the  unity 
of  the  divine  person,  in  which  the  two  natures  are  united,  is 
the  greatest.”  90  And  as  this  unity  “  is  greater  than  the  unity 
of  person  and  nature  in  us,  hence  also  the  union  of  the  Incar¬ 
nation  is  greater  than  the  union  of  soul  and  body  in  our  na¬ 
ture.”  91 

It  is  because  of  this  intimate  union  that  Christ  is  strictly 
one  —  one  person,  one  suppositum,  one  being,  although  the  na¬ 
tures  remain  distinct  and  retain  their  own  properties.92  In 
itself  the  person  or  hypostasis  of  Christ  is  altogether  simple; 
yet  as  one  subsisting  being  in  two  natures,  He  is  in  so  far  said 
to  be  a  composite  person.93  Hence  one  nature  may  in  the 
concrete  be  predicated  of  the  other,  so  that  in  view  of  the  un¬ 
ion  it  is  perfectly  correct  to  say,  God  is  man,  man  is  God.94 
One  may  also  say,  God  became  man;  but  its  converse,  man 
became  God,  would  be  an  error  in  predication.95  And  as  the 
two  natures  may  thus  be  predicated  of  one  another,  so  also 
may  the  attributes  of  the  natures  when  taken  in  the  concrete. 
Hence  it  is  perfectly  orthodox  to  state  that  the  immortal  is 
mortal,  the  passible  is  impassible.  The  justifying  reason  of 
these  and  similar  predications  is  the  oneness  of  person;  because 
it  is  always  the  person  that  forms  the  proper  subject  of  predi¬ 
cation  in  the  concrete.96 

6.  Conscctaria  of  the  Union. —  As  the  human  nature  is 
united  to  the  Godhead  in  a  personal  union,  it  necessarily  shares 
in  such  properties  of  God  the  Son  as  are  communicable  to  a 
creature.  The  first  of  these  is  divine  sonship.  Not  only 
Christ  as  God,  but  also  Christ  as  man  is  the  natural  Son  of  God. 
Nor  can  He  in  any  sense  be  called  God’s  adopted  son.  Some 


89  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  6,  a.  2,  q.  2. 

90  Ibid.  a.  9. 

91  Ibid.  a.  9  ad  3m. 

92Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  6,  m.  2; 
Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  6,  a.  1 ; 
Thomas,  ibid.  a.  2 ;  Scotus,  ibid.  q.  2. 


93  Loc.  cit. 

94Cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill, 
q.  16,  a.  1,  2. 

95  Ibid.  a.  4,  5. 

96  Ibid. 


192 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


of  the  earlier  Scholastics  fell  into  error  on  this  point,  as  was 
indicated  in  the  first  section  of  this  chapter;  but  their  success¬ 
ors  were  at  one  in  defending  Christ’s  natural  sonship.  Filia¬ 
tion,  they  insisted,  is  a  personal  property ;  and  as  there  is  only 
one  person  in  Christ,  so  can  there  be  only  one  filiation.97 
Scotus,  indeed,  called  in  question  the  principle  that  filiation  is 
exclusively  a  personal  property ;  but  he  accepted  the  doctrine  of 
one  sonship  in  Christ  from  the  teaching  of  the  Church.98 

Since  Christ  as  man  is  thus  the  natural  Son  of  God,  it  neces¬ 
sarily  follows  that  He  must  be  adored  with  the  adoration  of 
latria,  which  has  for  its  formal  object  God’s  uncreated  ex¬ 
cellence.  On  this  point  there  was  no  dissension  after  the  time 
of  the  Lombard.  But  it  was  a  moot-question  whether  the 
humanity  might  at  the  same  time  be  venerated  with  the  cult 
of  dulia,  which  is  due  to  created  beings  on  account  of  their  su¬ 
pernatural  excellence.  St.  Bonaventure  and  others  regard  the 
question  as  purely  theoretical  and  then  solve  it  in  the  affirm¬ 
ative  ; 99  while  St.  Thomas  considers  it  as  practical,  and  also 
gives  an  affirmative  answer.  Thus  he  writes :  “  Adoration 

is  due  to  the  subsisting  hypostasis :  yet  the  reason  for  honoring 
may  be  something  non-subsistent  on  account  of  which  the 
person,  in  whom  it  is,  is  honored.  And  so  the  adoration  of 
Christ’s  humanity  may  be  understood  in  two  ways.  First,  so 
that  the  humanity  is  the  thing  adored:  and  thus  to  adore  the 
flesh  of  Christ  is  nothing  else  than  to  adore  the  incarnate 
Word  of  God,  just  as  to  revere  a  king's  robe  is  nothing  else 
than  to  revere  a  robed  king.  And  in  this  sense  the  adoration 
of  Christ’s  humanity  is  the  adoration  of  latria.  Secondly,  the 
adoration  of  Christ’s  humanity  may  be  taken  as  given  by  reason 
of  its  being  perfected  with  every  gift  of  grace.  And  in  this 
sense  the  adoration  of  Christ’s  humanity  is  the  adoration  not 
of  latria  but  of  dulia.  So  that  one  and  the  same  person  of 
Christ  is  adored  with  latria  on  account  of  His  divinity,  and 
with  didia  on  account  of  His  perfect  humanity.”  100 

97  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  10;  Bona-  98  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  10,  q.  unica. 

vent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  8,  a.  2;  Albert.  99  Ibid.  d.  9,  a.  1,  q.  1. 

Magn.  ibid.  a.  2;  Thomas,  Sum.  100  Sum.  Theol.  q.  25,  a.  1,  2. 

Theol.  Ill,  q.  35,  a.  5. 


SCHOLASTIC  CHRISTOLOGY 


193 


Strictly  consequent  upon  the  hypostatic  union  are  certain 
created  perfections,  which  are  found  in  the  faculties  of  Christ’s 
human  soul  —  in  his  will  and  intellect.  These  were  treated  by 
the  Scholastics  under  the  headings  of  grace  and  knowledge. 
Only  a  few  of  the  more  important  points  can  here  be  indicated. 

In  the  matter  of  grace,  aside  from  the  grace  of  union  and 
substantial  sanctity,  they  held  that  Christ  as  man  was  endowed 
with  habitual  grace,  and  also  with  gratuitous  graces,  or  gratia 
gratis  data.  The  former  was  in  Him  the  same  as  in  other 
just  men,  only  He  possessed  it  in  an  incomparably  higher  de¬ 
gree.  Though  finite  in  itself,  it  did  not  admit  of  an  increase 
as  possessed  by  Him.101  With  it  were  connected  all  the  virtues 
and  gifts,  excepting  such  as  in  their  formal  concept  conflicted 
with  the  perfection  of  the  state  of  personal  union.  To  this 
latter  class  belong  faith  and  hope,  when  taken  in  their  full 
significance;  because  Christ’s  human  soul  enjoyed  from  the 
first  moment  of  its  existence  the  beatific  vision.102  He  also 
possessed  all  the  gratuitous  graces  that  may  be  communicated 
to  human  nature,  and  that  in  the  highest  possible  degree.103 
And  all  these  graces  and  gifts  were  proper  to  Him  both  as  an 
individual  man  and  as  the  head  of  the  Church.104  Under  the 
latter  aspect  they  are  called  the  gratia  capitis. 

Although  in  Christ  as  man  there  was  thus  the  fullness  of  all 
graces,  nevertheless  His  human  will  remained  free;  not  in  re¬ 
gard  to  final  beatitude  of  which  His  soul  was  already  in  pos¬ 
session,  but  in  reference  to  the  choice  of  good  actions  which 
He  performed  during  His  life  on  earth.105  At  the  same  time, 
however,  it  was  so  determined  to  good  that  the  very  pos¬ 
sibility  of  sinning  was  excluded.  For  this  impeccability  three 
reasons  are  assigned  —  the  fullness  of  grace,  the  beatific  vi¬ 
sion,  and  the  hypostatic  union.106  Scotus,  however,  did  not 


101  Halens.  Sum.  TTI,  q.  8,  m.  3; 
Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  13*  a.  1 ; 
Albert.  Magn.  ibid.  a.  1 ;  Scotus, 
ibid.  d.  18,  q.  3. 

102  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  7- 

103  Ibid.  a.  7,  8;  Bonavent.  In 
Sent.  Ill,  d.  13,  a.  2. 

104  Ibid. 


105  Cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol. 
Ill,  q.  18,  a.  4. 

106  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  5’,  m.  2, 
a.  2;  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  12, 
a.  2;  Albert.  Magn.  ibid.  a.  4-6; 
Thomas,  ibid.  q.  2,  a.  1 ;  Scotus, 
ibid.  q.  unica. 


194 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


admit  that  the  hypostatic  union  necessarily  excluded  the  pos¬ 
sibility  of  sin.107  In  this  he  was  followed  by  Durandus,  who 
held  that  if  the  humanity  had  been  assumed  without  being  per¬ 
fected  by  grace,  Christ  could  have  sinned  and  even  lost  his 
soul.108 

In  the  human  intellect  of  Christ  the  Scholastics  recognized  a 
threefold  knowledge  —  scientia  bcata,  infusa,  acquisita.  The 
first  is  the  intuitive  vision  of  God,  which  Christ’s  human  soul 
enjoyed  from  the  first  moment  of  its  existence;  the  second  was 
produced  in  the  intellect  by  a  special  divine  operation,  also  at 
the  first  moment  of  His  earthly  life;  the  third  was  acquired  by 
a  natural  use  of  His  faculties  during  His  sojourn  on  earth.  By 
the  knowledge  of  beatific  vision  “  the  soul  of  Christ  knows  in 
the  Word  all  things  existing  in  whatever  time,  and  the  thoughts 
of  men,”  but  not  all  those  possibles  that  “  are  in  the  divine 
power  alone.”  109  By  the  infused  knowledge  “  the  soul  of 
Christ  knew :  First,  whatever  can  be  known  by  the  force  of 
man’s  active  intellect,  as,  for  example,  whatever  pertains  to 
human  sciences  ;  secondly,  all  things  made  known  to  man  by 
divine  revelation,  whether  they  belong  to  the  gift  of  wisdom  or 
the  gift  of  prophecy,  or  any  other  gift  of  the  Holy  Ghost; 
.  .  .  Yet  He  did  not  know  the  essence  of  God  by  this  knowl¬ 
edge,  but  by  that  of  vision  alone.”  110 

Coexisting  with  these  perfections  of  intellect  and  will,  there 
were  in  the  soul  and  body  of  Christ  “  those  defects  which  flow 
from  the  common  sin  of  the  whole  nature,  yet  are  not  repug¬ 
nant  to  the  perfection  of  knowledge  and  grace.”  111  Hence 
He  experienced  hunger,  thirst,  pain,  and  the  agony  of  death. 
All  these  defects  or  infirmities  were  proper  to  the  nature  as¬ 
sumed  by  the  Word;  for  that  nature  was  passible  and  did  not 
as  yet  enjoy  all  the  effects  of  the  beatific  vision.112 

In  this  brief  outline  are  contained  the  chief  points  discussed 
by  the  Scholastics  in  their  Christological  teaching.  Compre¬ 
hensive  and  thorough  as  that  teaching  was,  it  did  nevertheless 

107  Loc.  cit.  110  Ibid.  q.  n,  a.  I. 

106  Ibid.  q.  2.  111  Ibid.  q.  14. 

109  Cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  112  Ibid, 
q.  10,  a.  2. 


SCHOLASTIC  CHRISTOLOGY 


195 


not  add  very  much  to  the  development  of  dogmas  connected 
with  the  mystery  of  the  Incarnation.  And  the  reason  is  that 
nearly  all  of  them  had  received  their  full  development  during 
Patristic  times.113  When  the  Scholastics  began  their  specula¬ 
tions,  the  oneness  of  person  in  Christ,  the  duality  of  natures, 
faculties,  and  operations,  His  natural  sonship  as  God  and  as 
man,  and  His  title  to  divine  worship,  had  all  been  defined  as  so 
many  dogmas  of  the  faith;  and  to  these  nothing  really  new 
was  added  by  later  definitions.  But  the  studies  of  the  School¬ 
men  did  excellent  service  in  making  these  various  dogmas,  and 
many  important  points  of  doctrine  connected  with  them,  more 
accessible  to  reason. 

113  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  308  sqq. ;  p.  387  sqq. ;  p.  498  sqq. 


CHAPTER  XI 


SOTERIOLOGY 

SOME  SOTERIOLOGICAL  ERRORS:  SOTERIOLOGY  OF  TIIE 

SCHOLASTICS 

The  teaching  of  the  Fathers  on  the  redemption  of  the  world 
not  only  emphasized  the  fact  that  Christ  was  sent  by  God  as 
the  Savior  of  our  fallen  race,  but  also  set  forth  with  con¬ 
siderable  attention  to  details  the  nature  of  the  redemptive  work. 
They  regarded  the  incarnation  of  God’s  own  Son  as  a  deifica¬ 
tion  of  our  vitiated  nature,  and  in  His  sufferings  and  death 
they  recognized  a  superabundant  satisfaction  for  all  the  sins 
of  the  world.  He  was  to  them  the  second  Adam,  who  by  His 
perfect  obedience  undid  the  harm  that  had  been  wrought  by  the 
disobedience  of  the  first  Adam.  He  overcame  Satan,  con¬ 
quered  death,  opened  up  the  sources  of  divine  grace,  and  in  all 
things  acted  as  mediator  between  sinful  men  and  their  offended 
God.1  This  teaching  was  taken  over  in  its  entirety  by  the 
Scholastics;  and,  excepting  a  few  minor  points,  was  without 
further  development  incorporated  in  their  theological  system. 

A  —  Some  Soteriological  Errors 

In  a  previous  chapter  it  was  pointed  out  that  Abelard  and 
his  school  fell  into  a  very  serious  error  regarding  original  sin. 
They  looked  upon  it  not  as  a  moral  stain  implying  guilt,  but 
as  a  mere  liability  to  punishment.  Human  nature,  according 
to  them,  was  not  intrinsically  vitiated,  and  therefore  stood  in 
no  need  of  restoration.  Nothing  was  required  but  a  remission 
of  the  punishment  which  rested  heavily  upon  the  race  on  ac¬ 
count  of  the  sin  committed  by  the  common  ancestor.  And 
for  this  the  Son  of  God  need  not  have  become  man.2 

Such  a  view  of  original  sin  necessarily  led  to  a  misappre- 

1  Cir.  vol.  I,  p.  316  sqq.  2  In  Epist.  ad.  Rom.  c.  5. 

196 


SOTERIOLOGICAL  ERRORS 


197 


hension  of  the  redemptive  work  of  the  Savior.  It  was  the 
example  of  right  living  that  mankind  needed,  not  the  healing 
touch  of  a  divine  physician.  And  this  formed  the  burden  of 
Abelard’s  soteriological  teaching,  as  appears  from  many  parts 
of  his  works.  Thus  he  writes :  “  It  seems  to  us  that  in  this 

we  are  justified  and  reconciled  to  God,  in  the  blood  of  Christ, 
that,  through  a  singular  grace  conferred  on  us,  the  Son  took 
our  nature,  and  persevered  in  instructing  us  by  word  and  ex¬ 
ample  even  till  death,  drawing  us  so  closely  to  Him  by  the 
bonds  of  love,  that,  inflamed  by  the  thought  of  so  great  a 
benefit  of  divine  grace,  we  might  in  our  charity  not  be  afraid 
to  bear  all  for  His  sake.  .  .  .  Hence  our  redemption  is  that 
exceeding  great  love  of  Christ  which  He  showed  forth  in  His 
sufferings ;  for  thereby  we  were  not  only  set  free  from  the 
servitude  of  sin,  but  also  acquired  the  true  liberty  of  the  chil¬ 
dren  of  God ;  so  that  now  we  do  all  things,  not  through  fear 
but  through  love.”  3 

The  enlightenment  that  comes  to  us  from  Christ’s  instruc¬ 
tions,  the  encouragement  afforded  by  His  heroic  example,  the 
graces  obtained  for  us  by  His  prayer  —  these,  according  to 
Abelard,  constitute  the  work  of  redemption.  “  When  God 
caused  His  Son  to  become  man,  He  made  Him  subject  to  the 
law  which  was  common  to  all  men.  Hence  it  was  necessary 
that  He  should  love  His  neighbor  as  Himself,  and  infuse  into 
us  the  grace  of  His  charity,  both  by  instructing  us  and  by 
praying  for  us.”  4 

These  vagaries  of  Abelard  were  at  once  strongly  attacked 
by  William  of  Saint  Thierry  and  by  St.  Bernard.  William 
went  to  the  root  of  the  error  by  pointing  out  that  original  sin 
is  in  the  true  sense  of  the  term  a  vitiation  of  human  nature, 
and  that  the  nature  so  vitiated  needed  more  than  example  and 
instruction  to  raise  it  from  its  moral  degradation.  It  was  the 
death  of  the  God-Man  that  wrought  the  redemption.5  Christ’s 
death  was  a  vicarious  satisfaction  for  sin.  He  was  in  truth 
the  second  Adam,  by  whom  spiritual  life  was  restored  to  the 
fallen  race.6 

3  Loc.  cit. ;  cfr.  Theol.  Christ.  I,  4.  5y£nigma  Fidei,  p.  hi. 

4Loc.  cit.  6  Ibid.  p.  123. 


198 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


St.  Bernard’s  refutation  follows  the  same  line  of  thought. 
“  The  original  fault,”  he  says,  “  was  in  truth  a  grievous  sin, 
which  infected  not  only  the  person  of  Adam  but  the  entire 
race.”  7  God  thought  it  proper  that  the  redemption  should 
be  wrought  by  the  outpouring  of  blood.  “  Why,  you  ask, 
should  He  effect  by  the  outpouring  of  blood  what  He  could 
have  effected  by  instruction?  Ask  Him.  For  me  it  is  enough 
that  so  it  was  decreed.”  8  Yet  it  was  not  death  as  such,  but 
rather  the  obedient  will  that  was  efficacious :  “Not  death,  but 
the  ready  will  of  Him  who  died  was  acceptable;  and  so  by 
that  death  He  overcame  death,  effected  our  salvation,  and 
restored  us  to  innocence.”  9  Christ  accepted  His  sufferings 
and  death  freely;  but  we  had  urgent  need  of  them  for  our 
redemption.  “  For  human  perversity  can  indeed  kill,  but  it 
has  no  power  to  restore  life.  .  .  .  He  alone  could  in  such  wise 
lay  down  His  life,  who  by  His  own  power  rose  from  the 
dead.”  10 

Another  erroneous  conception  of  the  redemption  is  usually 
ascribed  to  St.  Anselm;  not  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  the 
redemptive  work  in  itself,  but  in  reference  to  its  necessity.  He 
develops  his  theory  of  the  redemption  in  the  treatise  which  he 
entitled,  Cur  Deus  Homo t  The  following  outline  will  suffice 
to  make  clear  his  views  on  the  subj  ect. 

His  fundamental  thought  on  the  point  in  question  is  this : 
Every  reasonable  creature  is  bound  to  obey  God ;  “  this  is  the 
sole  and  entire  honor  which  we  owe  our  Maker.11  Whoso¬ 
ever  does  not  give  to  God  this  honor  which  is  His  due,  takes 
away  from  Him  what  is  His  own,  and  thereby  dishonors 
Him.”  12  Now  the  human  race  by  committing  sin  disobeyed 
God,  and  therefore  deprived  Him  of  the  honor  to  which  He 
had  a  right ;  it  took  away  from  God  what  was  His  own.  Con¬ 
sequently,  “  so  long  as  man  does  not  restore  what  he  snatched 
away,  he  remains  guilty.  Nor  is  it  sufficient  to  restore  that 
only  which  was  thus  unjustly  taken  from  God;  but,  on  account 
of  the  affront  implied  in  that  unjust  action,  even  more  than 

7  In  IV  Hebd.  Sanct.  n.  7.  10  In  IV  Hebd.  Sanct.  n.  3. 

8  De  Error.  Abelard,  c.  5.  11  Op.  cit.  I,  11. 

9  Ibid.  12  Ibid. 


SOTERIOLOGICAL  ERRORS 


199 


was  taken  away  must  be  given  by  way  of  restoration.”  13 

This,  then,  was  the  position  of  the  fallen  race.  Might  its 
disobedience  have  been  forgiven,  without  demanding  satisfac¬ 
tion?  No:  “because  all  God’s  ways  are  well  ordered;  and 
right  order  demands  that  sin  not  satisfied  for  be  punished. 
For  it  is  by  punishment  that  God  subjects  the  recalcitrant 
sinner  to  Himself.”  14  Hence  “  it  is  necessary  that  every  sin 
be  followed  either  by  satisfaction  or  by  punishment.”  15  But 
the  punishment  and  consequent  loss  of  all  mankind  would 
interfere  with  the  purpose  which  God  had  in  view  when  He 
created  man ;  “  for  He  intended  that  human  nature,  which  He 
created  free  from  sin,  should  fill  up  the  number  of  the  angels 
who  had  fallen  away.”  16  Besides  “  it  was  not  becoming  that 
what  God  had  proposed  concerning  man  should  be  entirely 
frustrated.”  17 

Hence  satisfaction  was  necessary.  But  man  could  not  make 
due  satisfaction :  First,  because  he  already  owed  God  every¬ 
thing;  secondly,  even  if  he  did  not,  he  could  never  make  satis¬ 
faction  in  proportion  to  the  gravity  of  the  sin  Committed.18 
If  you  doubt  this,  “  you  have  not  considered  what  the  weight 
of  sin  is.”  19  Due  satisfaction  for  sin  is  “  something  far 
greater  than  every  conceivable  thing  besides  God.”  20  Hence 
God’s  goodness  must  complete  the  work  which  it  began  in 
the  act  of  creation.21  And  because  no  one  can  give  due  satis¬ 
faction  except  God,  and  no  one  must  give  it  except  man,  hence 
it  was  necessary  that  it  should  be  given  by  a  God-Man22 
This  is  the  answer  to  the  question,  Cur  Deus  homo  f  God  be¬ 
came  man  that  He  might  in  His  human  nature  render  satisfac¬ 
tion  for  the  sins  of  men. 

Through  Christ  a  way  was  opened  for  the  sinful  race  to 
effect,  its  reconciliation  with  God.  He  was  in  a  position  to 
make  atonement  for  all  the  sins  of  the  world,  and  to  do  so 
through  His  human  nature.  For  although  as  man  He  owed 


ibid. 

14  Ibid.  I,  12;  I,  15. 

is  Ibid.  I,  15. 

16  Ibid.  I,  16. 

17  Ibid.  I,  4. 


ig  Ibid.  I,  20. 

19  Ibid.  I,  21. 

20  Ibid.  II,  6. 

21  Ibid.  II,  5. 

22  Ibid.  II,  6. 


200 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


God  obedience,  yet  He  was  under  no  obligation  to  suffer  and 
to  die  as  He  did.  He  accepted  death  freely,  and  by  His 
ready  obedience  fulfilled  all  justice.23  Hence  one  can  truly 
say :  “  Ilium  tale  quid  sponte  dedisse  Deo  ad  honorem  illius, 

cui  quid  quid ,  quod  Deus  non  est,  comparari  non  potest,  et 
quod  pro  omnibus  omnium  hominum  debitis  recompensare 
potest .”  24  God  alone  can  be  compared  to  what  He  gave,  and 
therefore  it  was  an  adequate  compensation  for  the  sins  of 
men. 

Such  a  gift,  coming  from  Christ,  necessarily  called  for  a 
reward;  “  but  as  Christ  did  not  stand  in  need  of  anything.  He 
graciously  allowed  His  followers,  to  whom  by  dying  He  gave 
an  example  of  dying  for  justice’s  sake,  to  become  sharers  in 
His  merit;  so  that  what  they  owed  for  their  sins  might  be 
canceled,  and  what  was  wanting  to  them  on  account  of  their 
sins  might  be  given  to  them,”  namely,  the  grace  of  God. 
“  Nothing  more  reasonable,  nothing  sweeter,  nothing  more 
desirable,  could  the  world  ever  conceive.”  25  In  this  the  mercy 
of  God;  so  to  speak,  exhausted  itself.  “  So  great  do  we  find 
this  mercy,  so  perfectly  in  accord  with  the  demands  of  justice, 
that  neither  a  greater  nor  one  more  just  can  be  conceived.”  2(i 

This,  then,  is  Anselm’s  theory:  Redemption  through  the 
incarnate  Son  of  God  was  necessary  ;  because  it  was  unbecom¬ 
ing  that  God  should  either  forgive  man’s  sins  without  re¬ 
quiring  satisfaction,  or  that  He  should  allow  all  mankind  to 
perish  forever;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  man  was  altogether 
incapable  of  rendering  due  satisfaction :  therefore  the  redemp¬ 
tion  must  be  brought  about  by  the  expiatory  death  of  the  God- 
Man.  It  must,  however,  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  author 
bases  his  reasoning  exclusively  on  natural  principles,  without 
reference  to  revelation.  Hence  Boso,  his  interlocutor,  says 
very  much  to  the  point :  “  Sic  probas  Deum  fieri  hominem  ex 

necessitate,  ut  etiam,  si  removeantur  pauca,  quae  de  nostris 
libris  posuisti  (ut  quod  de  tribus  personis  Dei  et  de  Adam 
tetigisti),  non  solum  Judaeis,  sed  etiam  paganis  sola  ratione 
satisf arias.”  27 

23  Ibid.  I,  9;  II,  19.  25  Ibid.  II,  20.  27  Ibid.  II,  23. 

24  Ibid.  II,  19.  26  Ibid.  II,  21. 


SCHOLASTIC  SOTERIOLOGY 


201 


B - SOTERIOLOGY  OF  THE  SCHOLASTICS 

In  their  soteriological  discussions  the  Scholastics  enter  into 
so  many  details  and  side  issues  that  it  is  impossible  even  to 
mention  them  in  a  compendious  work  like  the  present.  Nor 
is  such  an  enumeration  at  all  necessary;  for  many  of  the  points 
discussed  are  mere  speculations,  and  are  not  likely  to  develop 
at  any  future  time  into  dogmas  of  the  faith.  In  the  following 
outline,  therefore,  only  such  questions  will  be  briefly  touched 
upon  as  are  more  or  less  essential  to  a  full  understanding  of 
the  redemptive  work  of  Christ  as  set  forth  by  the  Schoolmen. 

i.  Necessity  of  the  Redemption. —  It  is  sometimes  said  that 
St.  Anselm  had  no  followers  among  the  Scholastics  in  his 
theory  on  the  necessity  of  the  redemption.  This  statement  is 
true  in  so  far  as  his  theory  is  interpreted  as  implying  necessity 
in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  and  on  the  part  of  God.  But 
not  a  few  of  the  Scholastics  gave  a  different  interpretation  of 
it.  Thus  St.  Bonaventure  says  that  it  must  be  understood  in 
quantum  est  ex  parte  nostra,  praesupposita  dispositione  divina, 
qua  nos  sic ,  et  non  alio  modo ,  liberare  decrevit28  And  the 
same  interpretation  is  given  by  St.  Thomas :  Anselmus  loqui¬ 
tur  quantum  est  ex  parte  nostra,  supposita  Dei  ordinatione .29 
If  this  interpretation  be  correct,  which  does  however  not  ap¬ 
pear  very  probable,  it  must  be  said  that  St.  Anselm  had  nearly 
all  the  most  representative  Scholastics  on  his  side.  For,  with 
the  exception  of  Scotus  and  a  few  others,  they  are  all  agreed 
that  man  was  entirely  unable  to  make  due  reparation  for  his 
sins,  and  that  therefore  in  the  present  order  of  Providence 
redemption  by  the  God-Man  was  necessary.  They  usually 
bring  out  the  following  points. 

Due  satisfaction  for  sin  must  imply  a  twofold  reparation : 
First,  of  God’s  personal  honor  which  was  outraged  by  sin; 
secondly,  of  the  loss  sustained  by  God  in  the  corruption  of  the 
human  race.  Now  whatever  may  be  said  about  the  possibility 
of  a  creature,  assisted  by  grace,  repairing  the  loss  caused  by 
sin;  no  creature  whatever,  even  the  holiest,  could  possibly 

28  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  20,  a.  unic.,  q.  6  ad  2m. 

29  Ibid.  a.  4  ad  2m. 


202 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


repair  the  injury  done  to  God’s  honor.  That  injury  is  meas¬ 
ured  by  God’s  infinite  dignity,  and  in  this  sense  the  evil  of 
sin  is  infinite ;  whereas  the  moral  value  of  any  satisfaction  that 
might  be  rendered  by  a  creature  is  necessarily  finite.  Hence 
in  the  supposition  that  God  demanded  adequate  satisfaction 
from  human  nature,  there  was  no  other  means  of  redemption 
besides  the  incarnation  of  God’s  own  Son.30 

However  with  this  more  common  teaching  of  the  most  rep¬ 
resentative  Scholastics,  Scotus,  Durandus,  and  the  Nominalists 
generally,  do  not  agree.  They  deny  the  very  foundation  upon 
which  it  is  made  to  rest,  namely,  that  sin  is  in  any  real  sense 
an  infinite  moral  evil.  It  is  true,  God’s  offended  majesty  is 
infinite,  but  that  infinity,  they  say,  has  only  an  extrinsic  rela¬ 
tion  to  sin.  Hence  they  hold  that  human  nature  endowed  with 
the  fullness  of  grace,  but  without  being  hypostatically  united  to 
the  Godhead,  might  have  made  adequate  reparation  for  all 
sins  and  thus  have  redeemed  mankind.  It  is  true,  God  would 
have  been  under  no  obligation  to  accept  this  satisfaction,  but 
neither  was  He  under  obligation  to  accept  the  satisfaction 
rendered  by  Christ.31 

On  the  other  hand,  all  are  at  one  in  holding  that  God  might 
have  been  satisfied  with  an  inadequate  reparation,  such  as  it 
was  in  the  power  of  man  to  make.  The  common  teaching  on 
the  point  is  thus  set  forth  by  St.  Thomas.  “  Satisfaction  may 
be  said  to  be  sufficient  in  two  ways :  First,  perfectly,  in  as 
much  as  it  is  condign,  being  adequate  to  make  good  the  fault 
committed,  and  in  this  way  the  satisfaction  of  a  mere  man  can¬ 
not  be  sufficient  for  sin,  both  because  the  whole  of  human  na¬ 
ture  has  been  corrupted  by  sin,  whereas  the  goodness  of  any 
person  or  persons  could  not  make  up  adequately  for  the  harm 
done  to  the  whole  of  the  nature;  and  also  because  sin  com¬ 
mitted  against  God  has  a  kind  of  infinity  from  the  infinity  of 
the  divine  majesty;  for  the  greater  the  person  we  offend,  the 
more  grievous  the  offence.  Hence  for  condign  satisfaction  it 

30  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  i,  m.  6;  7;  Thomas,  ibid.  a.  2;  Sum.  Theol. 

Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  20,  a.  Ill,  q.  1,  a.  2. 

unic.,  q.  3 ;  Albert.  Magn.  ibid.  a.  6,  31  In  Sent.  d.  20,  q.  unic.  n.  3 

sqq. ;  Durandus,  ibid.  q.  2. 


SCHOLASTIC  SOTERIOLOGY 


203 


was  necessary  that  the  act  of  the  one  satisfying  should  have  an 
infinite  efficiency,  as  being  of  God  and  man.  Secondly,  man’s 
satisfaction  may  be  termed  sufficient  imperfectly,  that  is,  in  the 
acceptation  of  him  who  is  content  with  it,  even  though  it  is 
not  condign,  and  in  this  way  the  satisfaction  of  a  mere  man  is 
sufficient.”32  Scotus,  however,  as  was  pointed  out  in  the 
preceding  paragraph,  held  that  this  “  imperfectly  sufficient 
satisfaction  ”  might  have  been  accepted  by  God  as  condign. 

Furthermore,  all  are  agreed  that  God  might  have  freed 
-  mankind  from  sin  without  requiring  any  satisfaction  what¬ 
ever;  for  the  manner  of  forgiveness  rests  with  the  person  who 
is  offended  by  sin.  “  If  He  had  willed  to  free  man  from  sin 
without  any  satisfaction,”  argues  St.  Thomas,  “  He  would  not 
have  acted  against  justice.  For  a  judge,  while  preserving 
justice,  cannot  pardon  faults  without  penalty,  if  the  faults 
have  been  committed  against  another.  .  .  .  But  God  has  no  one 
higher  than  Himself,  for  He  is  the  sovereign  and  common 
good  of  the  whole  universe.  Consequently,  if  He  forgive  sin, 
which  has  the  formality  of  fault  in  that  it  is  committed  against 
Flimself,  He  wrongs  no  one:  just  as  any  one  else,  overlooking 
a  personal  trespass,  without  satisfaction,  acts  mercifully  and 
not  unjustly.”  33  However  such  forgiveness,  they  all  hold, 
would  have  been  less  in  accord  both  with  God’s  perfections 
and  the  needs  of  man.33 

2.  The  Atonement. —  It  is  the  common  teaching  of  the 
Scholastics  that  Christ  merited  during  the  whole  time  of  His 
earthly  existence,  from  His  conception  till  His  death;  and  in 
that  sense  every  action  of  His  life  contributed  to  the  atonement 
for  man’s  sins  34  However,  they  ascribe  the  atonement  in  a 
special  sense  to  His  passion  and  death,  as  it  was  through  them 
that  God  wished  to  effect  the  full  redemption  of  the  world. 
In  themselves  neither  sufferings  nor  death  would  have  been 
necessary  to  render  God  condign  satisfaction ;  but  there  were 
special  reasons  of  congruity  why  He  wished  the  redemption 

32  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  1,  a.  2  ad  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  18,  a.  1 ; 

2m.  Albert.  Magn.  ibid.  a.  6;  Thomas, 

33  Ibid.  q.  46,  a.  2  ad  3™.  ibid.  a.  3 ;  Scotus,  ibid.  q.  unica. 

34  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  16,  m.  2 ; 


204 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


to  be  accomplished  in  this  way.  “  That  man  should  be  de¬ 
livered  by  Christ’s  passion,”  writes  St.  Thomas,  “  was  in  keep¬ 
ing  with  both  His  mercy  and  His  justice.  With  His  justice, 
because  by  His  passion  Christ  made  satisfaction  for  the  sin 
of  the  human  race ;  and  so  man  was  set  free  by  Christ’s  justice : 
and  with  His  mercy,  because  since  man  of  himself  could  not 
satisfy  for  the  sin  of  all  human  nature.  .  .  .  God  gave  him 
His  Son  to  satisfy  for  him.”  35 

Then  there  were  special  reasons  on  the  part  of  man,  besides 
deliverance  from  sin.  Those  commonly  given  by  the  various 
writers  are  thus  summarized  by  St.  Thomas :  “  In  the  first 

place,  man  knows  thereby  how  much  God  loves  him,  and  so 
is  stirred  up  to  love  Him  in  return,  and  herein  lies  the  perfec¬ 
tion  of  human  salvation.  .  .  .  Secondly,  because  thereby  He 
set  us  an  example  of  obedience,  humility,  constancy,  justice, 
and  the  other  virtues  displayed  in  the  passion,  which  are 
requisite  for  man’s  salvation.  .  .  .  Thirdly,  because  Christ  by 
His  passion  not  only  delivered  man  from  sin,  but  also  merited 
justifying  grace  for  him  and  the  glory  of  bliss.  .  .  .  Fourthly, 
because  man  is  all  the  more  bound  to  refrain  from  sin,  when 
he  bears  in  mind  that  he  has  been  redeemed  by  Christ’s  blood. 
.  .  .  Fifthly,  because  it  redounded  to  man’s  greater  dignity, 
that  as  man  was  overcome  and  deceived  by  the  devil,  so  also 
it  should  be  a  man  that  should  overthrow  the  devil :  and  as  man 
deserved  death,  so  a  man  by  dying  should  vanquish  death.”  36 
The  moral  value  of  Christ’s  sufferings  and  death  are  thus 
indicated  by  St.  Bonaventure,  in  answer  to  an  objection  that 
the  Savior’s  passion  was  not  sufficient  to  blot  out  all  sins : 
“  This  one  passion  of  Christ  was  not  only  sufficient  to  satisfy 
for  the  sin  of  Adam,  but  also  for  the  vast  number  of  all 
other  sins.  Hence  the  death  of  Christ  was  of  avail  also  for 
His  slayers,  if  they  were  willing  to  be  converted  ;  for  the  merit 
of  the  suffering  Christ  was  infinitely  greater  than  the  sin  of 
Judas  who  betrayed  Him,  than  the  sin  of  the  Jews  who  in¬ 
stigated  the  Gentiles  to  crucify  Him;  because  the  goodness  of 
Christ  far  exceeded  their  malice.”  37 

37  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  20,  a.  unic.,  q. 
5  ad  6m. 


35  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  46,  a.  1. 

36  Ibid.  a.  3. 


SCHOLASTIC  SOTERIOLOGY 


205 


In  another  place  the  same  author  states  that  the  merit  of 
Christ  is  of  infinite  moral  value,  and  this  arises  from  the  fact 
that  “  His  soul  is  united  to  a  divine  person,  on  account  of 
which  union  not  only  man  but  God  Himself  is  said  to  die; 
whence  it  follows  that  His  merit  is  infinite,  not  by  reason  of 
created  grace,  but  because  of  the  infinite  dignity  of  His  per¬ 
son.”  38  St.  Thomas  expresses  this  view  in  almost  identical 
terms,  when  he  says:  “  The  dignity  of  Christ’s  flesh  is  not 
to  be  estimated  solely  from  the  nature  of  flesh,  but  also  from 
the  person  assuming  it  —  in  as  much  as  it  was  God’s  flesh,  the 
result  of  which  was  that  it  was  of  infinite  worth.”  39 

It  was,  however,  not  exclusively  from  the  dignity  of  Christ’s 
person  that  the  satisfactory  worth  of  His  sufferings  and  death 
was  derived.  Other  elements  also  contributed  thereto,  as  is 
thus  stated  by  St.  Thomas :  “  He  properly  atones  for  an  of¬ 

fence  who  offers  something  which  the  offended  one  loves 
equally,  or  even  more  than  he  detested  the  offence.  But  by 
suffering  out  of  love  and  obedience,  Christ  gave  more  than  was 
required  to  compensate  for  the  offence  of  the  whole  human 
race.  First  of  all,  because  of  the  exceeding  charity  with  which 
He  suffered;  secondly,  on  account  of  the  dignity  of  His  life 
which  He  laid  down  in  atonement,  for  it  was  the  life  of  one 
who  was  God  and  man ;  thirdly,  on  account  of  the  extent  of 
the  passion  and  the  greatness  of  the  grief  endured.  .  .  .  And 
therefore  Christ’s  passion  was  not  only  a  sufficient  but  a  super¬ 
abundant  atonement  for  the  sins  of  the  human  race.”  40 

Hence  in  estimating  the  moral  value  of  the  satisfaction 
rendered  by  Christ,  two  distinct  sources  must  be  considered. 
The  first  is  the  physical  goodness  of  the  action,  as  derived  from 
its  productive  principle,  its  circumstances,  and  its  object.  The 
second  is  the  same  goodness  as  elevated  in  the  moral  order  by 
the  dignity  of  the  person  of  whom  the  action  is  predicated. 
Under  the  first  aspect,  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  has  a  finite 
moral  value ;  because  its  productive  principle  —  Christ’s  human 
natUre  —  its  circumstances,  and  its  object  are  all  finite.  Un- 

38  Ibid.  d.  13,  a.  1,  q.  3-  40  Ibid*  a-  2- 

39  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  48,  a.  2  ad 

3m. 


206 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


der  the  second  aspect  its  moral  value  is  infinite;  because  the 
person  of  the  Word,  as  its  elevating  principle,  is  of  infinite 
dignity.  Nor  is  this  infinite  moral  value,  as  derived  from  the 
person  of  the  Word,  something  merely  extrinsic  to  Christ’s 
human  actions;  because  in  virtue  of  the  hypostatic  union,  the 
dignity  of  the  person  is  communicated  to  the  human  nature 
in  such  wise  that  its  actions  are  in  a  true  sense  the  actions  of 
God.  Hence  it  is  perfectly  correct  to  say  that  the  satisfaction 
of  Christ  is  intrinsically  of  infinite  moral  value.41 

On  this  last  point,  however,  different  views  were  entertained 
by  some  of  the  Scholastics.  Thus  Scotus  maintained  that  the 
satisfaction  of  Christ,  and  His  merit  in  general,  must  be  con¬ 
sidered  simply  as  finite.  He  states  his  view  in  these  precise 
terms:  “I  say  that  the  merit  of  Christ  was  finite:  because 
it  essentially  depended  on  a  finite  principle,  and  therefore, 
even  considering  all  its  circumstances,  its  relation  to  the  person 
of  the  Word,  its  connection  with  the  end  to  be  obtained,  it  was 
simply  finite;  for  all  these  relations  were  finite.”  42  Still  he 
admits  that  in  its  relation  to  the  person  of  the  Word  it  may 
be  termed  extrinsically  infinite;  because  on  account  of  this 
relation  it  was  of  such  a  nature  that  it  might  be  accepted  by 
God  as  of  infinite  value.  This  was  also  the  view  taken  by  the 
Nominalists,  who  laid  down  the  general  principle :  “  Meritum 

quodcumque  tantum  et  pro  tantis  potest  acceptari  passive, 
quantum  et  pro  quantis  milt  tot  a  Trinit  as  active.”  43 

3.  Effects  of  the  Atonement.—  From  what  has  been  said  in 
the  preceding  paragraphs,  it  is  clear  that  the  Scholastics  looked 
upon  the  satisfaction  rendered  by  Christ  as  a  compensation 
offered  to  God’s  offended  majesty  for  the  dishonor  and  loss 
caused  by  man’s  sins.  This  concept,  though  occurring  quite 
often  in  the  writings  of  the  Fathers,  was  first  fully  developed 
by  St.  Anselm,  as  was  pointed  out  at  the  beginning  of  this 
chapter.  The  later  Scholastics  adopted  it  as  developed  by  him, 
and  made  it  the  central  idea  of  their  soteriological  system. 
Hence,  according  to  them,  the  first  effect  of  Christ’s  redemp¬ 
tive  work  is  the  reconciliation  of  the  sinful  world  with  God. 

41  Cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  42  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  19,  n.  7. 
q.  46,  a.  4,  12.  43  Cfr.  Biel,  ibid,  note  3. 


SCHOLASTIC  SOTERIOLOGY 


207 


Christ  placated  God  by  restoring  that  which  sin  had  unjustly 
taken  away.  This  is  the  proper  effect  of  the  redemption  taken 
in  the  sense  of  atonement  or  satisfaction.  It  directly  termi¬ 
nates  in  God,  and  has  only  an  indirect  bearing  upon  the  re¬ 
deemed  world. 

However  this  placation  of  God  must  not  be  understood  in 
the  sense  that  God  was  at  enmity  with  the  world,  but  rather 
that  the  world  was  at  enmity  with  God.  God  loved  the  world 
even  when  buried  in  sin,  and  hence  He  sent  His  own  Son  to 
pay  the  price  of  redemption  demanded  by  His  justice;  but 
without  the  payment  of  that  price  He  would  not  grant  the 
graces  that  were  necessary  for  the  world’s  salvation.  Hence 
whilst  the  redemption  is  in  one  sense  a  compensation  made  to 
God.  it  is  in  another  sense  a  source  of  merit  both  for  the  Re¬ 
deemer  Himself  and  for  all  those  who  were  redeemed  by  Him. 
It  is  more  particularly  under  this  second  aspect  that  the  Scho¬ 
lastics  consider  the  effects  of  the  redemption  in  detail.  In 
this  connection  they  inquire  what  the  Savior  merited  for  Him¬ 
self,  and  what  for  those  whom  He  had  come  to  save. 

That  all  the  requisite  conditions  for  merit  were  found  in 
Christ’s  actions,  is  thus  briefly  pointed  out  by  St.  Thomas: 
“  For  merit  three  things  are  required:  A  person  who  can 
merit,  a  meritorious  action,  and  a  reward.  .  .  .  Now  all  three 
of  these  are  found  in  the  case  of  Christ.  For  although  in  one 
sense  He  was  in  termino ,  namely,  in  regard  to  those  operations 
of  His  soul  by  reason  of  which  He  enjoyed  the  beatific  vision; 
nevertheless  there  was  still  something  wanting  to  Him  in  re¬ 
spect  of  glory,  namely,  in  so  far  as  He  was  passible  both  in 
soul  and  body  and  was  subject  to  bodily  death:  and  therefore 
in  this  respect  He  was  a  viator,  in  the  state  of  acquiring  some¬ 
thing  further.  In  like  manner  all  His  actions  were  meritori¬ 
ous  by  reason  of  charity;  and  again,  He  had  dominion  over 
His  actions  on  account  of  the  liberty  of  His  will;  and  there¬ 
fore  He  merited  by  every  one  of  His  actions.”  44  Lastly,  the 
third  condition,  that  there  was  a  reward  in  store  for  Him,  is 
necessarily  implied  in  the  preceding  two;  since  the  merit  of 

44  In  Sent.  Ill,  q.  18,  a.  2. 


208 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


His  actions  was  in  proportion  to  any  reward  that  God  could 
bestow.45 

The  common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics  regarding  the  ob¬ 
ject  of  Christ’s  merit  for  Himself  is  thus  formulated  by  the 
same  author :  “  Since  all  perfection  and  greatness  must  be 

attributed  to  Christ,  consequently  He  must  have  by  merit  what 
others  have  by  merit;  unless  it  be  of  such  a  nature  that  its 
want  would  detract  from  His  dignity  and  perfection  more  than 
would  accrue  to  Him  by  merit.  Hence  He  merited  neither 
grace  nor  knowledge  nor  the  beatitude  of  His  soul,  nor  the 
Godhead,  because,  since  merit  regards  what  is  not  yet  pos¬ 
sessed,  it  would  be  necessary  that  Christ  should  have  been 
without  these  at  some  time;  and  to  be  without  them  would 
have  diminished  Christ’s  dignity  more  than  His  merit  would 
have  increased  it.  But  the  glory  of  the  body,  and  the  like, 
are  less  than  the  dignity  of  meriting,  which  pertains  to  the 
virtue  of  charity.  Hence  we  must  say  that  Christ  had  by 
merit  the  glory  of  His  body  and  whatever  pertained  to  His 
outward  excellence,  as  His  ascension,  veneration,  and  the 
rest.”  46 

In  regard  to  the  first  point,  however,  William  of  Auxerre 
and  a  few  others  maintained  that  Christ  also  merited  for  Him¬ 
self  life  eternal,  although  His  soul  was  in  possession  of  the 
beatific  vision  from  the  moment  of  His  conception.47  This 
view  was  regarded  by  Albertus  Magnus  as  probable.48  The 
second  point  was  admitted  by  all,  except  that  Scotus  held  that 
Christ  merited  the  glory  of  His  body  only  indirectly.  Accord¬ 
ing  to  him  the  direct  object  of  Christ’s  merit  in  this  respect  was 
the  cessation  of  the  miracle  by  which  the  glorification  of  the 
body  was  withheld  during  the  Savior’s  earthly  life.49  St. 
Thomas  and  others  look  upon  this  withholding  of  glory  from 
Christ’s  body  as  a  special  dispensation,  “  in  order  that  He 
might  procure  His  bodily  glory  with  greater  honor,  when  He 
had  merited  it  by  His  passion.”  50 

45  Ibid. ;  cfr.  a.  3,  4.  48  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  18,  a.  4. 

46  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  19,  a.  3.  49  Ibid.  q.  1,  n.  15. 

47  Sum.  Aurea,  III,  tr.  1,  c.  7.  50  Sum.  Theol.  q.  19,  a.  3  ad  3m. 


SCHOLASTIC  SOTERIOLOGY 


209 


The  object  of  Christ’s  merit  in  our  regard  includes  all  the 
graces  and  favors  that  come  to  us  in  the  supernatural  order  of 
our  existence.  The  Scholastics  usually  gather  them  under 
these  heads :  Deliverance  from  sin,  from  the  power  of  the 
devil,  from  the  debt  of  punishment;  reconciliation  with  God; 
opening  of  the  gates  of  heaven.51  However  the  various  bene¬ 
fits  here  enumerated  are  not  the  immediate  results  of  Christ’s 
redemptive  work ;  they  can  be  realized  in  individual  souls  only 
by  a  faithful  use  of  the  spiritual  graces  merited  by  Christ. 
Hence  the  first  effect  of  the  redemption  in  our  regard  consists 
in  the  grace  of  God,  freely  offered  to  us  as  a  means  of  work¬ 
ing  out  our  eternal  salvation. 

By  deliverance  from  sin  the  Scholastics  understand  forgive¬ 
ness  of  all  sins,  original  and  personal,  obtained  by  an  applica¬ 
tion  of  the  merits  of  Christ  through  the  ordinary  channels  of 
grace.  “  The  passion  of  Christ,”  writes  St.  Thomas,  “  is  the 
proper  cause  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins  in  three  ways.  First 
of  all,  by  way  of  exciting  our  charity,  because  ...  it  is  by 
charity  that  we  procure  the  pardon  of  our  sins.  .  .  .  Secondly, 
Christ’s  passion  causes  forgiveness  of  sins  by  way  of  redemp¬ 
tion.  For  since  He  is  our  head,  .  .  .  He  delivered  us  as  His 
members  from  our  sins,  as  by  the  price  of  His  passion.  .  .  . 
Thirdly,  by  way  of  efficiency,  in  as  much  as  Christ’s  flesh, 
wherein  He  endured  the  passion,  is  the  instrument  of  the  God¬ 
head,  so  that  His  sufferings  and  actions  operate  with  divine 
power  for  expelling  sin.”  52  Or  as  St.  Bonaventure  puts  it : 
“  Justificatio  nostra  attribuitur  passioni  Chrisii  per  modum 
meriti  intervenientis,  exempli  provocantis  et  exemplaris  diri- 
,  gentis!>  53 

Deliverance  from  the  power  of  the  devil  is  effected  in  three 
ways:  First,  “  in  as  much  as  the  passion  is  the  cause  of  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  ” ;  secondly,  “  in  as  much  as  it  reconciled 
us  with  God  ” ;  thirdly,  “  in  as  much  as  in  Christ’s  passion  he 
exceeded  the  limit  of  power  assigned  him  by  God,  by  conspir- 

51  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  17,  18;  52  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  49,  a.  1. 

Bonavent.  In  Sent.  d.  19,  a.  1;  Sco-  53  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  19,  a.  1,  q.  1. 

tus,  ibid.  q.  unic. ;  Albert.  Magn. 
ibid.  a.  1. 


210 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


ing  to  bring  about  Christ's  death,  who,  being  sinless,  did  not 
deserve  to  die.”  54 

We  were  delivered  from  the  debt  of  punishment  both  di¬ 
rectly  and  indirectly.  Directly,  “  in  as  much  as  Christ’s  pas¬ 
sion  was  sufficient  and  superabundant  satisfaction  for  the  sins 
of  the  whole  human  race;  but  when  sufficient  satisfaction  has 
been  paid,  then  the  debt  of  penalty  is  abolished.  Indirectly, 
in  so  far  as  Christ’s  passion  is  the  cause  of  the  forgiveness  of 
sin,  upon  which  the  debt  of  punishment  rests.”  55 

There  are  also  two  ways  in  which  we  may  be  said  to  have 
been  reconciled  to  God.  First,  because  Christ’s  passion  “  takes 
away  sin  by  which  men  became  God’s  enemies.”  Secondly, 
because  “  it  is  a  most  acceptable  sacrifice  to  God.  Now  it  is 
the  proper  effect  of  sacrifice  to  appease  God  ;  just  as  man  like¬ 
wise  overlooks  an  offence  committed  against  him  on  account 
of  some  pleasing  act  of  homage  shown  him.”  56 

Lastly,  by  Christ’s  passion  the  gates  of  heaven  were  opened, 
in  the  sense  that  by  the  forgiveness  of  sin,  obtained  through 
the  merits  of  the  Savior,  the  obstacle  to  the  intuitive  vision 
of  God  was  removed.  For  this  obstacle  was  the  twofold  sin 
which  prevented  men  from  entering  into  the  kingdom  of 
heaven  —  original  sin  and  personal  sin.  “Now  by  Christ’s 
passion  we  have  been  delivered  not  only  from  the  common 
sin  of  the  whole  human  race,  both  as  to  its  guilt  and  as  to  its 
debt  of  penalty,  for  which  he  paid  the  penalty  on  our  behalf ; 
but,  furthermore,  from  the  personal  sins  of  individuals,  who 
share  in  His  passion  by  faith  and  charity  and  the  sacraments 
of  faith.  Consequently,  the  gates  of  heaven’s  kingdom  are 
thrown  open  to  us  through  Christ’s  passion.”  57 

From  the  foregoing  exposition  of  the  redemptive  work  of 
the  Savior,  which  was  accomplished  by  His  human  nature  as 
united  to  the  person  of  the  Word,  it  necessarily  follows  that 
Christ  is  mediator  between  God  and  men.  For,  as  St.  Bona- 

54  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  49,  56  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q. 

a.  2.  49-  a-  4- 

55  Ibid.  a.  2;  cfr.  Halens.  Sum.  57  Ibid.  a.  4;  cfr.  Bonavent.  In 
III,  q.  17,  m.  4;  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Sent.  Ill,  d.  18,  a.  2,  q.  3. 

Ill,  d.  19,  a.  1,  q.  4;  Scotus,  ibid.  d. 

l4,  q*  I* 


SCHOLASTIC  SOTERIOLOGY 


21 1 


venture  says,  a  mediator  is  a  link  that  unites  two  extremes  and 
exercises  the  function  of  reconciliation.58  Christ  is  both  God 
and  man,  and  thus  unites  in  Himself  the  offended  Godhead 
and  human  nature  gone  astray  from  its  Maker.  As  man  He 
physically  performs  the  actions  which  are  required  to  pay  the 
debt;  as  God  He  communicates  to  these  actions  an  infinite 
moral  value,  so  that  the  payment  may  be  adequate.  Thus  as 
God-Man  He  brings  about  the  reconciliation  of  man  with  God. 
Hence  the  mediatorship  of  Christ  is  not  based  upon  His  hu¬ 
man  nature  alone,  nor  upon  His  Godhead  alone ;  but  upon  the 
two  united  in  the  one  person  of  the  Word.59  However,  to  be 
mediator  properly  belongs  to  Him  as  man,  and  not  as  God; 
for  as  God  He  does  not  differ  from  the  Father  and  the  Holy 
Ghost  either  in  nature  or  in  power  of  dominion,  while  as  man 
He  differs  from  God  in  nature  and  from  men  in  dignity  of 
both  grace  and  glory.60 

Furthermore,  to  be  a  mediator  between  God  and  men  is 
proper  to  the  office  of  priesthood;  therefore  Christ  is  not  only 
our  mediator  but  also  our  eternal  high  priest.61  And  as  He 
offered  Himself  as  a  sacrifice  for  our  salvation,  He  is  at  the 
same  time  a  victim  immolated  in  our  behalf  —  a  victim  for 
sin,  a  peace-offering,  a  perfect  holocaust.62  His  priesthood, 
moreover,  He  communicates  to  others  in  such  wise  that  He 
“  is  the  fountain-head  of  the  entire  priesthood :  for  the  priest 
of  the  Old  Law  was  a  figure  of  Him;  while  the  priest  of  the 
New  Law  works  in  His  person.”  63 

4.  The  Death  of  Christ. —  For  the  fitness  of  the  death  of 
Christ  St.  Thomas  gives  these  five  reasons:  “First  of  all 
that  He  might  satisfy  for  the  whole  human  race,  which  was 
sentenced  to  die  on  account  of  sin.  .  .  .  Secondly,  that  He 
might  show  the  reality  of  the  flesh  assumed.  .  .  .  Thirdly, 
that  by  dying  He  might  deliver  us  from  the  fear  of  death.  .  .  . 
Fourthly,  that  by  dying  in  the  body  to  the  likeness  of  sin  — 
that  is,  to  its  penalty  —  He  might  set  us  the  example  of  dy- 

58  Ibid.  d.  19,  a.  2,  q.  2.  61  Ibid.  q.  22,  a.  1. 

59  62  Ibid.  a.  2. 

60  Ibid.  cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  63  Ibid.  q.  22,  a.  1. 

Ill,  q.  26,  a.  2. 


212 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


in g  to  sin  spiritually.  .  .  .  Fifthly,  that  by  rising  from  the 
dead,  and  manifesting  His  power  whereby  He  overthrew  death, 
He  might  instil  into  us  the  hope  of  also  rising  again. ”  64 
In  His  death,  Christ’s  soul  and  body  were  separated  from 
one  another,  but  both  remained  united  to  the  divinity.65 
Hence,  on  the  one  hand,  Christ  truly  died,  and  in  consequence 
He  was  no  longer  man  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term ;  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  hypostatic  union  continued  uninter¬ 
rupted.  With  regard  to  the  first  point,  however,  Peter  Lom¬ 
bard  and  a  few  others  held  that  Christ’s  soul,  whilst  separated 
from  the  body,  was  truly  a  person.66  The  second  point,  which 
was  admitted  by  all,  is  thus  explained  by  St.  Bonaventure: 
“  Speaking  of  the  union  in  its  active  and  passive  sense,  it  is 
to  be  held  that  the  body  and  soul  were  united  to  the  Word  by 
one  union;  but  speaking  of  the  same  union  as  a  relation,  it 
must  be  said  that  before  death  there  was  one  union  actually 
and  several  potentially,  while  after  death  there  were  actually 
several  unions.”  67 

After  death  Christ’s  soul,  united  to  His  divinity,  descended 
into  hell,  by  which  place  the  Scholastics  understand  the  Limbus 
Pcitrum,  where  the  souls  of  the  just  were  detained  till  the 
opening  of  heaven’s  gates.68  This  descent  was  real,  and  nearly 
all  are  agreed  that  Christ  admitted  the  holy  souls  immediately 
to  the  beatific  vision.  Durandus,  however,  maintained  that 
Christ’s  descent  into  hell  was  only  virtual,  it  being  nothing 
more  than  an  exercise  of  His  power  in  that  place  of  waiting.69 
The  same  view  had  been  held  by  Abelard,  whose  teaching  on 
that  point  was  condemned  by  the  Council  of  Sens.  The  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  real  descent  was  confirmed  by  the  Fourth  Lateran, 
when  it  declared  against  the  Albigenses :  Descendit  in  anima 
et  resurrexit  in  came™  Some  held,  furthermore,  that  Christ 
also  appeared  to  the  poor  souls  in  purgatory,  and  freed  them 

64  Ibid.  q.  50,  a.  I.  68  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  22, 

65  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  19;  Thom-  a.  unic.  q.  4;  Thomas,  ibid.  q.  2; 
as,  In  Sent.  d.  21,  q.  1 ;  Bonavent.  Albert.  Magn.  ibid.  a.  4. 

ibid.  a.  1,  2;  Scotus,  ibid.  q.  unica.  69  Ibid.  q.  4. 

66  Sent.  Ill,  c.  2.  70  Mansi,  22,  982;  DB.  429. 

67  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  21,  a.  1,  q.  3. 


SCHOLASTIC  SOTERIOLOGY 


213 


from  their  sufferings;  but  this  view  was  commonly  regarded 
as  improbable.71 

These  are  the  chief  points  in  the  soteriological  teaching  of 
the  Scholastics.  Most  of  them  are  directly  or  indirectly  a 
matter  of  faith,  and  taught  as  such  by  the  Church.  Thus  the 
Fourth  Lateran  restated  the  article  of  the  Creed,  that  Christ 
“  suffered  and  died  on  the  wood  of  the  cross  for  the  salvation 
of  the  human  race,  and  descended  into  hell.,,  72  Pope  Clement 
VI,  in  1343,  declared  that,  because  of  the  hypostatic  union,  the 
merits  of  Christ  are  an  “  infinite  treasure.”  73  The  Council 
of  Trent  defined  that  Christ  is  the  meritorious  cause  of  our 
justification;  and  declared  that  He  merited  justification  for 
us  by  His  most  holy  passion  on  the  wood  of  the  cross^,  that  we 
are  justified  by  the  merits  of  the  one  Mediator,  and  that  all 
those  are  anathema  who  say  that  men  are  justified  without  the 
justice  of  Christ,  by  which  He  merited  our  justification.74 
Moreover  all  these  points,  as  was  indicated  at  the  beginning  of 
the  present  chapter,  were  already  clearly  contained  in  the 
teaching  of  the  Fathers ;  and  in  so  far  there  was  little  or  no 
development  in  the  doctrine  of  the  redemption  as  presented 
by  the  Scholastics. 

71  Cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  73  DB.  550. 

q.  52,  a.  8.  74  Decretum  de  Justificatione,  DB. 

72  Loc.  cit.  799  sqq. 


CHAPTER  XII 


THE  CHURCH  OF  CHRIST:  THE  PAPACY 

St.  Augustine,  in  his  contentions  with  the  Donatists,  had 
frequent  occasion  to  set  forth  and  also  to  develop  the  tradi¬ 
tional  teaching  on  the  Church  —  on  her  constitution,  her 
powers,  and  distinguishing  marks.  Hence,  at  the  time  of  his 
death,  Latin  ecclesiology  presented  a  fairly  complete  system 
of  theological  thought,  which  needed  only  a  few  finishing 
touches  to  bring  it  to  its  final  stage  of  development.1  This 
system  was  taken  over  by  the  Scholastics  of  the  Middle 
Ages,  and  then  was  handed  down  by  them,  practically  in 
the  same  condition  in  which  they  had  received  it,  to  their  suc¬ 
cessors  who  came  after  the  Council  of  Trent.  A  few  points, 
indeed,  were  somewhat  further  developed,  but  that  was  owing 
to  incidental  causes  rather  than  to  the  systematic  labor  of 
theologians.  Most  of  the  Scholastics  touched  the  subject  only 
in  connection  with  other  matters,  and  even  then  merely  in  a 
passing  way.  However,  the  following  summary  of  what  may 
be  gathered  from  their  writings  will  be  of  some  help  to  the 
student  in  determining  the  general  trend  of  dogmatic  develop¬ 
ment  along  these  lines. 

A  —  The  Church  of  Christ 

Some  interesting  remarks  on  the  Church  and  her  relation 
to  the  State  are  made  by  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,  who  touches  the 
subject  in  his  treatise  De  Sacramentis.  According  to  him,  the 
Church  is  the  assemblage  of  all  the  faithful,  forming  together 
one  body,  of  which  Christ  is  the  head  and  the  Holy  Spirit  the 

1  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  323  sqq. 

214 


THE  CHURCH  OF  CHRIST 


215 


vivifying  principle.2  The  unity  of  this  body  is  conserved  by 
faith  under  the  guidance  of  the  Holy  Spirit.3 

The  Church  and  the  State  are  the  two  powers  instituted 
by  God  for  the  right  government  of  the  people.  Each  of  them 
is  entitled  to  make  its  own  laws,  and  to  enforce  their  observ¬ 
ance  by  means  proportionate  to  the  end  to  be  attained.  Both 
are  monarchical  in  constitution,  and  therefore  the  supreme 
power  resides  in  one  individual,  who  communicates  it  in  vary¬ 
ing  degrees  to  many  others  for  the  good  of  all.  Compared 
to  the  State,  the  Church  is  the  higher  power ;  because  she  must 
lead  men  to  their  eternal  salvation,  while  the  State  provides 
for  their  temporal  welfare.  The  State  has  the  king  as  its 
head ;  but  the  head  of  the  Church  is  the  Pope.4 

As  both  powers  are  immediately  from  God,  and  as  the 
spiritual  power  is  the  higher  of  the  two,  the  Pope  can  be  judged 
only  by  God  Himself.  On  the  other  hand,  the  temporal  power, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  vested  in  a  particular  person,  may  be  con¬ 
stituted  and  judged  by  the  spiritual.  However,  the  spiritual 
power  cannot  proceed  arbitrarily  in  this  matter,  but  must  be 
guided  by  the  true  interest  of  the  people.5 

As  there  are  thus  two  powers  constituted  by  God,  so  are 
there  also  two  classes  of  people,  each  with  its  own  well  defined 
rights  and  duties.  The  first  of  these  two  classes  comprises 
all  the  clerics,  who  are  consecrated  or  deputed  to  the  service 
of  God;  the  second  is  made  up  of  laics,  to  whatever  state  in 
life  they  may  belong.  The  two  together  form  the  walls  of 
the  Church;  both  were  prefigured  in  the  Old  Testament,  the 
clerics  by  the  tribe  of  Levi,  and  the  laics  by  the  other  eleven 
tribes.6 

Peter  Lombard  has  a  few  scattered  remarks  on  the  Church 
in  his  commentaries  on  the* Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  but  practically 

2  He  says :  “  Caput  enim  est  itu  vivificata,  et  unita  fide  una  et 
Christus ;  membrum  Christianus.  sanctificata.  .  .  .  Quid  est  ergo  Ec- 
Caput  unum,  membra  multa:  et  clesia  nisi  multitudo  fidelium,  uni¬ 
constat  unum  corpus  ex  capite  et  versitas  Christianorum  ?  ”  (Ibid.  c. 
membris,  et  in  uno  corpore  Spiritus  2). 

unus  ”  (Op.  cit.  c.  1).  .  4  Ibid.  c.  4. 

3  His  words  are:  “  Ecclesia  5  Ibid.  c.  4. 

sancta  corpus  est  Christi  uno  spir-  6  Ibid.  c.  3. 


21 6 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


omits  the  subject  in  his  four  books  of  the  Sentences.  As  this 
work  later  on  became  the  textbook  of  the  schools,  it  was  most 
likely  owing  to  his  example  that  subsequent  theologians  barely 
touched  the  various  doctrines  concerning  the  Church. 

Alexander  of  Hales  devotes  a  few  articles  of  his  Summa 
to  a  consideration  of  the  Church,  but  has  nothing  of  value. 
According  to  him,  the  Church  of  Christ  began  with  Abel, 
whose  faith  in  the  future  Redeemer  was  manifested  through 
his  sacrifice.  He  also  prefigured  the  sanctity  of  the  Church  in 
his  exemplary  life,  and  was  the  first  to  suffer  martyrdom  for 
the  sake  and  the  name  of  Christ.  Of  this  Church,  which 
formed  then  as  now  Christ’s  mystical  body,  Christ  was  even 
then  the  chief  and  the  head.  The  fact  that  the  Church  is  the 
mystical  body  of  Christ,  and  also  His  spouse,  necessarily  im¬ 
plies  that  she  is  indefectible.  Her  power  may  wax  or  wane 
according  to  the  varying  conditions  and  circumstances  of  time 
and  place,  but  she  shall  never  be  vanquished  by  evil  or  cease  to 
exist  till  the  end  of  time.  Furthermore,  this  indefectibility  is 
assured  to  her  by  Christ’s  own  promise,  as  recorded  in  the 
Gospel:  “  Lo,  I  am  with  you  all  days,  even  to  the  consumma¬ 
tion  of  the  world.”  7 

A  somewhat  lengthier  exposition  is  found  in  the  Summa 
written  by  Moneta  of  Cremona  (  +  1250),  against  theCathari 
and  the  Waldensian  heretics.  He  proves  the  Apostolic  origin 
of  the  Church  of  Rome,  her  freedom  from  error,  the  unin¬ 
terrupted  succession  of  her  bishops,  her  legislative  power,  her 
right  to  own  temporal  possessions  for  the  attainment  of  her 
God-appointed  end,  and  other  points  of  a  kindred  nature.8 
However,  he  does  not  contribute  anything  of  special  value  to 
the  further  development  of  ecclesiological  teaching. 

St.  Thomas  has  some  very  valuable  points  on  the  Church, 
but  he  too  treats  the  matter  only  in  passing.  He  specially 
emphasizes  the  importance  of  unity,  both  among  the  members 
themselves  and  between  the  members  and  the  head.  That 
unity  is  essential  in  as  much  as  the  Church  is  an  individual 
organism,  an  organized  community,  the  kingdom  of  God, 

8  Op.  cit.  L.  V. 


1  Sum.  IV,  q.  2,  m.  4. 


THE  CHURCH  OF  CHRIST 


217 


whose  members  must  hold  fast  to  the  truth  as  an  object  of 
faith,  and  must  ever  live  together  in  the  spirit  of  love  and 
peace.9  The  visible  Church  on  earth  is  a  copy  of  the  invisible 
Church  in  heaven,  and  has  for  its  chief  and  head  the  visible 
representative  of  the  invisible  Christ,  even  as  the  blessed  have 
for  their  head  the  glorified  God-Man  Himself.10 

Protestants  not  rarely  blame  the  Scholastics  for  having  un¬ 
duly  emphasized  the  external  and  visible  element  of  the  Church, 
almost  to  the  entire  neglect  of  the  interior  spirit  which  escapes 
the  eyes  of  man.  But  this  accusation  is  based  upon  an  entire 
misunderstanding  of  their  viewpoint.  The  very  fact  that  they 
regarded  the  Church  as  a  living  organism,  vivified  by  the  Holy 
Spirit,  sufficiently  shows  that  they  looked  upon  the  interior 
and  spiritual  element  as  the  fountainhead  of  all  true  ecclesiasti¬ 
cal  life.  Nor  did  they  fail  to  point  this  out  when  occasion 
offered.  Thus,  for  instance,  St.  Thomas  states  quite  defi¬ 
nitely:  “  The  beauty  and  perfection  of  the  Church  consists 
chiefly  in  what  is  interior,  and  to  the  same  also  belong  all  her 
outward  actions,  in  as  much  as  they  proceed  from  the  interior 
spirit,  and  are  directed  towards  the  preservation  of  the  beauty 
that  is  from  within.”  10a  What  the  soul  is  to  the  body,  that 
the  spiritual  gifts  and  endowments,  together  with  the  Holy 
Spirit  Himself,  are  to  the  Church. 

The  truth  is  that  the  Scholastics,  in  this  matter  as  in  all 
others,  followed  the  golden  mean  in  the  expression  of  their 
views.  They  maintained,  indeed,  that  the  Church  was  intended 
by  her  divine  Founder  to  be  a  visible  institution  —  visible  in 
her  regimen,  in  her  sacraments,  in  her  cult ;  but  they  also  taught 
that  to  this  visible  institution  must  ever  correspond  a  spiritual 
reality  perfectly  known  to  God  alone.  In  this  sense  they  ad¬ 
mitted  even  an  invisible  Church,  made  up  of  all  those  who  are 
actually  united  to  God  in  faith  and  love  and  in  the  fervent 
practice  of  perfect  virtue.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  in  main¬ 
taining  this,  they  were  far  removed  from  the  later  Protestant 
idea  of  the  invisibility  of  the  Church  of  Christ;  and  also  from 
the  unreasonable  contention  of  Wiclif  and  Hus  that  the  Church 

9  Cont.  Gent.  IV,  76.  10a  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  15,  q.  3,  a.  1. 

Ibid. 


2 18 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


of  Christ  consists  only  of  the  predestined.  For,  as  St.  Thomas 
points  out,  the  invisible  Church  is  nothing  else  than  a  perfect 
realization  of  the  visible  Church  in  its  individual  members,  and 
is  essentially  dependent  on  it  for  all  its  perfection.11 

In  their  relation  to  the  faithful,  the  Apostles  and  their  suc¬ 
cessors  must  be  regarded  as  the  vicars  of  Christ.  They  must 
foster  the  life  of  the  Church  in  her  members  by  preaching  the 
faith  and  by  administering  the  sacraments.  St.  Thomas 
speaks  of  them  as  follows :  “  It  is  to  be  held  that  the  Apostles 

and  their  successors  are  the  vicars  of  God,  in  so  far  as  the 
government  of  the  Church,  the  preaching  of  the  faith,  and 
the  administration  of  the  sacraments  come  in  question.  Hence, 
as  it  is  not  lawful  for  them  to  found  another  church,  neither  is 
it  lawful  for  them  to  preach  another  faith,  or  to  institute  other 
sacraments;  but  through  the  sacraments  that  flowed  from  the 
side  of  Christ,  as  He  was  hanging  on  the  cross,  is  the  Church 
said  to  have  been  established  and  built  up.”  12 

la  virtue  of  her  divine  institution,  the  Church  has  full  ad¬ 
ministrative  powers  over  all  the  treasures  of  grace  which 
Christ  intended  to  communicate  through  external  rites.  She 
has  not,  it  is  true,  the  power  of  absolute  authority  in  this 
matter  —  potestas  auctoritatis,  for  that  belongs  to  God  alone ; 
nor  does  she  have  the  power  of  excellence  — potestas  excel - 
lentiae,  since  that  is  proper  to  Christ  the  author  of  our  redemp¬ 
tion;  but  she  has  a  ministerial  power  —  potestas  ministerii , 
communicated  by  the  Founder  of  the  Church  to  the  Apostles 
and  their  successors,  and  exercised  under  the  direction  of  the 
Pope  as  the  supreme  pastor  of  all  the  faithful.  This  com¬ 
prises  the  power  of  orders  and  the  power  of  jurisdiction.  The 
former  has  for  its  chief  object  the  true  or  Eucharistic  body  of 
Christ,  and  as  such  is  shared  in  equal  degree  by  priests,  bishops, 
and  the  Pope.  The  latter  is  exercised  over  the  mystical  body 
of  Christ,  or  the  faithful  as  constituting  the  Church,  and  is 
possessed,  in  all  its  fullness  only  by  the  Pope,  in  a  limited  de¬ 
gree  by  bishops,  and  with  still  greater  limitations  by  priests. 
It  finds  application  both  in  the  internal  and  external  forum, 

12  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  64,  a.  2. 


11  Ibid.  d.  19,  q.  I. 


THE  PAPACY 


219 


according  as  it  is  used  in  the  administration  of  the  sacraments 
or  in  the  enactment  of  laws  and  whatever  is  connected  there¬ 
with  by  way  of  enforcement  or  dispensation.13 

The  power  of  jurisdiction,  as  already  stated,  resides  primar¬ 
ily  in  the  Sovereign  Pontiff,  and  it  is  conferred  on  him  not  by 
sacramental  consecration,  but  in  virtue  of  his  election  to  the 
primatial  dignity.  Upon  other  prelates  it  is  conferred  by  way 
of  declaration  on  the  part  of  their  superiors.14  Jurisdiction 
in  foro  intcrno ,  for  the  absolution  of  penitents,  can  be  given 
to  all  priests;  but  jurisdiction  in  foro  externo,  that  is,  for  the 
purpose  of  governing,  making  laws,  judging,  and  punishing, 
belongs  to  the  bishops  under  the  authority  of  the  Pope,  and 
to  such  as  have  been  legitimately  delegated  by  him.15 

This  brief  outline  contains  the  gist  of  the  ecclesiological 
teaching  of  St.  Thomas,  and  comprises  practically  all  that  is 
found  in  the  writings  of  his  predecessors  and  contemporaries. 
The  matter  was  somewhat  further  developed  in  the  Summa  de 
Ecclesia  of  Torquemada,  who,  as  cardinal  of  the  Roman 
Church,  took  part  in  the  Council  of  Constance,  and  also  in  that 
of  Basle  and  Florence.  But  the  work  was  not  published  until 
the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century. 

B  —  The  Papacy 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Middle  Ages,  that  is,  from  the 
ninth  century  forward,  the  Papacy  was  for  some  time  in  a 
deplorable  condition.  Unworthy  Popes,  like  Benedict  IX, 
brought  disgrace  upon  the  See  of  Peter  and  were  a  cause  of 
scandal  to  the  Christian  world.  However,  towards  the  middle 
of  the  eleventh  century  a  reform  movement  began,  which  re¬ 
sulted  in  the  election  of  a  succession  of  Sovereign  Pontiffs 
who  proved  themselves  in  every  way  worthy  of  their  high  sta¬ 
tion.  The  first  of  these  was  the  saintly  Leo  IX,  who  defended 
the  prerogatives  of  the  Roman  See  against  Michael  Cerularius, 
the  chief  author  of  the  Greek  schism.  He  displayed  great 
zeal  in  laboring  for  the  reformation  of  morals  and  the  cor- 

13  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  7,  q.  3,  a.  1 ;  d.  14  Ibid.  d.  24,  q.  3,  a.  2. 

13,  q.  1,  a.  1.  15  Ibid.  d.  19,  q.  1,  a.  3. 


220 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


rection  of  abuses  both  among  the  clergy  and  laity.  His  im¬ 
mediate  successors,  Victor  II  and  Nicholas  II,  continued  the 
work  which  he  had  so  well  begun.  But  it  was  especially 
Gregory  VII  (1073-1085)  who  restored  to  the  Papacy  all  its 
ancient  splendor,  although  he  died  in  exile  for  justice’  sake. 
The  full  result  of  his  labors  became  apparent  only  under  In¬ 
nocent  III  (1198-1216),  who  was  “the  living  embodiment 
of  Papal  power  at  its  apogee.”  With  occasional  slight  yield- 
ings,  this  position  was  maintained  till  the  death  of  Boniface 
VIII  (1303),  when  a  new  decline  set  in  that  was  consider¬ 
ably  accelerated  by  the  secularizing  influence  of  the  Renais¬ 
sance. 

From  this  brief  sketch  it  will  be  seen  that  the  golden  age 
of  Scholasticism  coincided  with  the  period  when  Papal  power 
was  at  its  highest.  And  to  this  coincidence  the  theological 
writings  of  the  time  bear  no  uncertain  testimony.  The  su¬ 
preme  power  of  the  Pope,  not  only  in  matters  ecclesiastical, 
but  to  a  considerable  extent  also  in  secular  affairs  of  world¬ 
wide  interest,  stands  out  most  prominently.  It  is  not  referred 
to  as  something  that  needs  to  be  proved,  but  as  a  universally 
acknowledged  fact,  which  may  be  used  as  a  source  of  argu¬ 
ments  for  the  confirmation  of  other  doctrines.  Or  if  oc¬ 
casionally  a  proof  is  introduced,  it  is  only  by  way  of  assigning 
the  reason  for  a  fact  that  is  accepted  by  all.  In  the  following 
summary  we  shall  first  present  an  outline  of  what  was  held 
by  the  Scholastics  in  regard  to  the  spiritual  supremacy  of  the 
Pope,  and  then  add  a  few  remarks  in  reference  to  the  relation 
of  Church  and  State  as  commonly  understood  and  accepted 
in  those  times. 

1.  Spiritual  Supremacy  of  the  Pope. —  The  position  of  the 
Church  during  Patristic  times,  in  regard  to  the  supremacy  of 
the  Pope,  appears  most  clearly  from  the  formula  subscribed  to 
by  the  Eighth  General  Council,  held  in  869.  It  reads  as  fol¬ 
lows  :  “  It  is  impossible  to  set  aside  the  ordination  of  our 

Lord  Jesus  Christ,  who  said :  ‘  Thou  art  Peter,  and  upon  this 

rock  I  will  build  my  Church/  The  truth  of  these  words  has 
been  abundantly  proved  by  subsequent  events,  because  by  the 
Apostolic  See  the  Catholic  religion  has  always  been  preserved 


THE  PAPACY 


22 1 


immaculate,  and  sound  doctrine  has  ever  been  taught.  There¬ 
fore,  not  wishing  in  any  way  to  be  separated  from  its  faith 
and  teaching,  and  following  in  all  things  the  example  of  the 
Fathers,  and  particularly  the  ordinations  of  the  Pontiffs  of 
the  Apostolic  See,  we  anathematize  all  heresies.”  16 

This  testimony  of  the  Eastern  Church,  all  the  more  valuable 
because  it  was  given  at  a  time  when  the  schism  was  already 
in  preparation,  also  voiced  the  firm  belief  of  the  West.  Only 
a  few  years  before  the  Eighth  General  Council  was  held, 
Rabanus  Maurus  bore  witness  to  that  belief  in  these  terms : 
“  We  see  that  the  authority  of  the  Roman  Pontiff  extends 
itself  to  all  the  churches  of  Christ,  so  that  all  bishops  acknowl¬ 
edge  him  as  their  head,  and  that  all  ecclesiastical  transactions 
are  subject  to  his  judgment;  hence  according  to  his  decision, 
what  has  been  established  remains  in  force,  what  has  been 
done  amiss  is  corrected,  what  needs  to  be  enacted  is  approved. 
.  .  .  The  decrees  of  the  Roman  Pontiffs  are  sent  to  all  the 
churches,  both  in  the  East  and  the  West,  and  they  are  received 
and  observed  by  the  faithful  as  having  the  force  of  ecclesias¬ 
tical  laws.”  17 

The  P'opes  themselves  also  took  the  same  view  of  their  posi¬ 
tion  in  the  Church  of  Christ.  Thus  Leo  IX  stated  the  su¬ 
premacy  of  the  Roman  See  in  no  uncertain  terms,  when,  on 
the  occasion  of  the  Greek  schism,  he  wrote  to  Michael  Cer- 
ularius :  “  Is  it  not  true  that  by  the  See  of  the  Prince  of  the 

Apostles,  namely  by  the  Roman  Church,  both  through  the  same 
Peter  and  through  his  successors,  the  lying  inventions  of  all 
heretics  have  been  laid  bare  and  condemned?”  And  farther 
on :  “  Just  as  a  hinge,  remaining  itself  immovable,  opens  and 

shuts  the  door,  so  Peter  and  his  successors  exercise  judiciary 
authority  over  the  whole  Church,  and  their  firm  position  no 
one  must  attempt  to  shake;  because  the  Supreme  See  is  judged 
by  no  one  —  quia  Summa  Sedes  a  nemine  judicature  18 

This  is  the  teaching  faithfully  echoed  by  the  Scholastics  in 
their  more  or  less  casual  remarks  on  the  subject,  as  suggested 

16  Mansi,  8,  351.  18  Ep.  55,  ad  Michaelem  Cerula- 

17  Cont.  Graec.  1 1,  4;  cfr.  ML.  rium  et  Leonem  Acridanum,  c.  7  et 

121,  343.  32;  cfr.  Mansi,  19,  638  B  sqq. 


222 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


by  other  matters  that  claimed  their  attention  at  the  moment. 
Thus  Alexander,  while  speaking  of  the  priest’s  power  to  ab¬ 
solve  from  sin,  points  out  how  the  use  of  this  and  other  powers 
is  subject  to  the  authority  of  the  Pope.  “  It  is  to  be  held,” 
he  says,  “  that  this  subordination  was  intended  for  the  good  of 
the  Church.  For  God  willed  that  certain  persons  in  authority 
should  have  power  over  many  others;  and  over  these,  others 
in  smaller  number  should  have  authority;  and  so  on  until  we 
arrive  at  one,  namely  the  Pope,  who  is  subject  immediately 
to  the  Lord,  according  to  the  saying  of  Ecclesiastes:  ‘  He 
that  is  high  hath  another  higher.’  .  .  .  And  besides,  there  is 
a  king  who  commandeth  the  whole  earth,  namely  the  Pope, 
who  calls  himself  the  servant  of  the  servants  of  God;  so  that, 
just  as  the  Church  triumphant  is  one,  so  also  the  Church  mil¬ 
itant,  and  the  body  of  the  Church  triumphant  together  with 
that  of  the  Church  militant  is  united  in  one  under  the  Supreme 
Head.”  19 

Albertus  Magnus  regards  the  supremacy  of  the  Pope  in  all 
things  ecclesiastical  as  the  very  foundation  of  that  unity  which 
is  an  essential  mark  of  the  Church.  It  was  for  the  preserva¬ 
tion  of  this  unity  that  Christ  committed  the  keys  to  one  in¬ 
dividual,  “  so  that  in  him  might  be  found  the  plenitude  of 
power,  and  that  from  him  all  others  should  derive  their  au¬ 
thority  in  keeping  with  the  charge  committed  to  their  care.”  20 

Hence  the  Pope  is  bishop  of  bishops  as  well  as  of  the  faith¬ 
ful  in  general,  and  he  exercises  immediate  jurisdiction  over  all 
without  exception.  Albertus  expresses  his  views  in  these 
terms :  “  A  superior  has  either  limited  powers  or  he  has  the 

plenitude  of  power;  this  latter  is  the  prerogative  of  the  Pope, 
who  is  the  ordinary  of  every  one  of  the  faithful.  .  .  .  Hence 
as  the  ordinary  of  all,  he  has  power  over  his  subjects  inde¬ 
pendently  of  their  consent;  because  he  holds  the  place  of  God 
on  earth.”  21 

Furthermore,  as  head  of  the  Church,  the  Pope  is  infallible 
in  deciding  questions  of  faith.  For  speaking  of  the  common 

19  Sum.  IV,  q.  79,  m.  6,  a.  3.  21  Sum.  Theol.  II,  tr.  24,  q.  141, 

20  De  Sacrific.  Missae,  tr.  8,  c.  6,  m.  3. 

n.  9. 


THE  PAPACY 


223 


usage  of  reserving  to  the  Pope  the  granting  of  plenary  indul¬ 
gences,  the  author  says :  “  It  is  in  no  way  to  be  admitted  that 

the  head  of  the  Church  could  lead  anyone  into  error,  when 
there  is  question  of  matters  that  the  whole  Church  receives 
and  approves.  Yet  it  is  known  to  all  that  he  preaches,  and 
causes  to  be  preached  by  others,  that  indulgences  are  valid  be¬ 
fore  God.”  22  Here  it  must  be  noted  that  the  phrase,  “  what 
the  whole  Church  receives  and  approves  —  quae  tota  Ecclesia 
recipit  et  approbate  is  not  intended  to  make  the  Pope’s  infal¬ 
libility  dependent  on  the  approbation  of  his  teaching  by  the 
universal  Church;  but,  as  is  clear  from  the  author’s  own  ex¬ 
planation,  it  is  meant  simply  to  indicate  a  prerequisite  condi¬ 
tion  of  infallibility,  namely,  that  the  Pope  must  speak  as  the 
supreme  teacher  of  the  whole  Church.  The  same  condition 
was  also  put  down  by  the  Vatican  Council.23 

St.  Thomas  reasons  about  the  supreme  power  of  the  Pope 
in  this  way :  “  As  the  Church  is  a  living  organism,  essentially 

one  and  visible,  she  must  have  one  head  living  visibly  among 
men;  her  oneness,  moreover,  demands  that  this  head  have  su¬ 
preme  authority  in  matters  of  faith,  so  that  he  may  decide 
questions  and  solve  difficulties  connected  therewith.  Then,  as 
the  Church  is  expected  to  be  governed  in  a  perfect  manner,  hers 
must  be  a  monarchical  constitution ;  finally,  as  she  is  an  image 
of  the  Church  triumphant  in  heaven,  of  which  Christ  is  the 
head,  the  one  who  holds  the  supreme  power  must  be  the  repre¬ 
sentative  of  Christ  here  on  earth.”  24 

What  appears  thus  so  reasonable  from  the  very  nature  of 
the  Church,  is,  furthermore,  also  clearly  taught  in  Holy  Scrip¬ 
ture.  Christ,  argues  the  author,  is  indeed  the  invisible  head 
of  the  Church,  as  He  is  also  the  author  of  grace ;  yet,  as  in  the 
administration  of  the  sacraments  He  wished  to  be  represented 
by  a  visible  minister,  so  too  in  the  government  of  the  Church 
did  He  wish  to  be  represented  by  a  visible  head.  Hence  He 
appointed  Peter  to  the  office  of  chief  pastor,  and  in  Peter  all 
his  successors.  It  was  to  signify  the  prerogative  of  Peter  that 
He  gave  the  keys  to  him,  and  that  He  confirmed  him  in  the 

22  Tn  Sent.  IV,  d.  20,  a.  17.  24  Cont.  Gent.  IV,  76;  In  Sent.  IV, 

23  DB.  1839.  d.  24,  q.  3. 


224 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


faith.  Consequently,  as  the  Sovereign  Pontiff  is  the  successor 
of  Peter,  he  has  by  divine  right  full  jurisdiction  over  the  whole 
Church,  and  holds  the  place  of  Christ  in  regard  to  pastors  and 
flock  alike.25 

This  supreme  jurisdiction  of  the  Pope  extends  itself  to  ev¬ 
erything  that  concerns  the  welfare  of  the  Church  —  the  admin¬ 
istration  of  the  sacraments,  legislative  enactments,  matters  of 
discipline  and  dispensations.  In  consequence,  he  has  power 
over  all  that  is  merely  accidental  in  the  administration  of  the 
sacraments ;  he  can  depute  simple  priests  to  give  confirmation 
and  confer  minor  orders;  he  can  restrict  their  power  of  ab¬ 
solving  from  sin,  reserve  certain  cases  to  himself,  and  grant 
indulgences.26  He  can  also  for  a  reasonable  cause  abrogate 
Apostolic  enactments  —  agere  contra  Apostolum ,27  and  has 
power  to  dispense  from  vows  and  oaths.28 

In  regard  to  the  faithful,  this  supreme  jurisdiction  is  imme¬ 
diate,  so  that  he  can  act  as  their  bishop  and  their  parish  priest 
by  a  direct  exercise  of  his  power.  That  this  is  really  the  case 
is  quite  obvious ;  for  bishops  and  priests  derive  their  jurisdic¬ 
tion  from  him ;  hence  if  in  particular  cases  he  wishes  to  exercise 
that  jurisdiction  personally,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  him 
from  so  doing.29 

As  sovereign  lawgiver,  the  Pope  does  not  fall  under  the 
penal  laws  which  he  enacts;  consequently  these  laws  are  for 
him  merely  directive  norms.30  Nevertheless,  like  any  one  else, 
he  is  subject  to  fraternal  correction;  and  when  he  publicly 
endangers  the  faith,  this  correction  too  may  be  administered 
in  public.31 

Speaking  of  the  value  of  indulgences  before  God,  St. 
Thomas  touches  incidentally  the  question  of  the  Church’s  infal¬ 
libility  in  matters  of  faith,  and  points  out  that  it  is  ultimately  a 
prerogative  of  the  Sovereign  Pontiff  as  supreme  teacher  of 
the  whole  Church.  He  says :  “  The  universal  Church  cannot 


25  Ibid.  q.  3,  a.  2  ad  lm. 

26  Ibid.  d.  7,  q.  3,  a.  3 ;  d.  20,  q.  I, 
a.  4;  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  72,  a.  12. 

27  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  20,  q.  1,  a.  4. 

28  Sum.  Theol.  II.  II,  q.  88,  a.  12; 
q.  89,  a.  9. 


29  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  24,  q.  3,  a.  2; 
d.  17,  a.  3  ad  3m  quint,  quaest. 

30  Ibid.  d.  19,  q.  2,  a.  2. 

31  Sum.  Theol.  II.  II,  q.  33,  a.  4 
ad  2m. 


THE  PAPACY 


225 


fall  into  error:  because  He  who  in  all  things  was  heard  for 
His  reverence  said  to  Peter,  upon  whose  confession  the  Church 
was  founded :  ‘  I  have  asked  for  thee,  that  thy  faith  may  not 
fail/  But  the  universal  Church  approves  indulgences:  there¬ 
fore  indulgences  are  of  value  before  God.”  32 

It  is  because  of  this  infallibility  that  opposition  to  the  teach¬ 
ing  of  the  Church  causes  a  person  to  be  regarded  as  a  heretic. 
And  this  is  also  borne  witness  to  by  the  practice  of  all  past  ages. 
For  we  find  that  “  after  anything  pertaining  to  the  faith  had 
been  decided  by  the  authority  of  the  universal  Church,  and 
some  one  opposed  that  decision,  he  incurred  forthwith  the 
stigma  of  heresy.  Now  this  authority  resides  chiefly  in  the 
Sovereign  Pontiff.”  33  Again :  “  It  belongs  to  the  Sovereign 

Pontiff  to  determine  those  things  that  are  of  faith,  so  that 
they  may  be  firmly  believed  by  all.”  34 

St.  Thomas  also  considers  the  Pope’s  relation  to  general 
councils.  He  sets  forth  his  view  in  the  following  terms : 
“Just  as  a  subsequent  council  has  the  power  of  interpreting 
a  symbol  drawn  up  by  a  preceding  council,  and  of  adding 
thereto  by  way  of  explanation,  as  appears  from  what  has  been 
said ;  so  in  like  manner  can  the  Roman  Pontiff  do  the  same  by 
his  own  authority.  Furthermore,  it  is  only  by  his  authority 
that  a  council  can  be  convened,  and  it  belongs  to  him  to  con¬ 
firm  the  decisions  of  the  council.  Finally,  it  is  lawful  to 
appeal  from  the  council  to  him.  All  this  is  evident  from 
what  was  done  at  the  Council  of  Chalcedon.  Nor  is  it  even 
necessary  to  convene  a  general  council  for  matters  of  this  kind, 
as  in  times  of  war  it  would  be  impossible  to  do  so.”  35  Hence, 
according  to  the  teaching  of  St.  Thomas,  not  only  is  the  Pope’s 
authority  above  that  of  a  general  council,  but  it  is  also  from 
him  as  head  of  the  universal  Church  that  general  councils 
derive  their  infallibility  in  deciding  questions  of  faith. 

The  infallible  teaching  authority  of  the  universal  Church, 
and  consequently  of  the  Pope,  has  for  its  proper  object  all 
revealed  truths  that  must  be  believed  by  the  followers  of  Christ. 

32  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  20,  q.  1,  a.  3.  34  Ibid.  q.  1,  a.  10. 

33  Sum.  Theol.  II.  II,  q.  n,  a.  2  35  QQ.  DD.  De  Potentia  Dei,  q. 

ad  3“  10,  a.  4. 


226 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


“  This,”  St.  Thomas  argues,  “  follows  from  the  ways  of  Divine 
Providence,  which  directs  the  Church  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  so 
that  she  may  not  fall  into  error;  and  the  same  was  also  prom¬ 
ised  by  Christ,  when  he  said  that  the  Holy  Spirit  would  come 
and  teach  all  truth  in  matters  necessary  for  salvation.  Hence 
it  is  plainly  impossible  that  the  judgment  of  the  universal 
Church  should  err  in  those  things  that  pertain  to  the  faith ;  and 
as  it  belongs  to  the  Pope  to  decide  questions  of  faith,  his  de¬ 
cisions  have  greater  weight  than  the  views  of  all  men  what¬ 
ever,  no  matter  how  well  versed  in  Holy  Scripture  they  may 
be.”  36 

That  the  Pope  enjoys  the  same  infallibility  in  regard  to  ques¬ 
tions  and  facts  connected  with  faith,  is,  according  to  St. 
Thomas,  a  matter  of  pious  belief.  To  this  category  belongs 
the  canonization  of  saints.  Having  pointed  out  that  the  Pope 
may  err  in  other  cases  where  his  decision  depends  on  the  truth 
of  human  testimony,  he  proceeds :  “  The  canonization  of 

saints  holds  a  middle  place  in  regard  to  inerrancy.  However, 
as  the  honor  which  we  pay  the  saints  is  in  a  way  a  profession 
of  faith,  in  as  much  as  we  believe  that  they  have  attained  to 
glory,  it  is  to  be  piously  believed  that  in  this  matter  also  the 
judgment  of  the  Church  is  not  subject  to  error.”  37 

Hence,  as  appears  from  the  foregoing  citations,  the  teach¬ 
ing  of  St.  Thomas  on  the  supremacy  of  the  Pope  may  be 
summed  up  in  these  points:  i.  The  Pope  is  the  primate  of 
all  bishops.  2.  He  has  preeminence  over  the  whole  Church. 
3.  In  the  Church  he  has  plenitude  of  power.  4.  He  has  the 
same  power  that  Christ  gave  to  Peter.  5.  The  final  decision 
in  matters  of  faith  rests  with  him.  6.  Submission  to  the  Pope 
in  things  spiritual  is  required  of  all. —  As  a  mere  glance  suf¬ 
fices  to  show,  this  teaching  is  in  all  essentials  identical  with  the 
doctrine  defined  by  the  Vatican  Council  just  six  hundred  years 
later. 

St.  Bonaventure  advances  substantially  the  same  views. 
Like  St.  Thomas,  he  points  out  that  the  supremacy  of  the  Pope 
is  necessary  for  the  well-being  of  the  Church,  and  especially  for 


36  Quodl.  9,  c.  16. 


37  Ibid. 


THE  PAPACY 


227 


the  maintaining  of  unity.38  Hence  it  was  that  Christ  ap¬ 
pointed  Peter  as  the  prince  of  the  Apostles  and  chief  of  the 
whole  world,  and  provided  also  that  this  plenitude  of  power 
should  be  possessed  by  Peter’s  successors,  the  canonically 
elected  bishops  of  Rome.39 

The  power  thus  conferred  on  the  head  of  the  Church  is 
threefold :  “  First,  the  Sovereign  Pontiff  alone  has  the  whole 

plenitude  of  authority  which  Christ  gave  to  His  Church;  sec¬ 
ondly,  he  can  exercise  this  authority  in  any  and  all  particular 
churches  in  the  same  way  as  he  does  at  Rome;  thirdly,  from 
him  all  authority  and  jurisdiction  possessed  by  other  digni¬ 
taries  throughout  the  whole  Church  are  derived,  just  as  in 
heaven  all  glory  of  the  saints  flows  from  the  one  fountain  of 
infinite  goodness,  which  is  Christ  Jesus.”  40  It  is  true,  bishops 
have  by  divine  right  full  power  in  their  own  dioceses,  in  as 
much  as  Christ  instituted  the  episcopal  office  and  dignity;  but 
this  power  they  enjoy  only  so  long  as  they  are  in  communion 
with  the  Pope,  and  at  the  same  time  the  Pope  has  immediate 
jurisdiction  over  the  faithful  in  every  diocese.41 

St.  Bonaventure  explains  the  infallible  teaching  authority  of 
the  Church  in  the  same  way  as  does  St.  Thomas,  as  will  appear 
with  sufficient  clearness  from  one  or  two  citations.  Thus, 
speaking  of  religious  poverty,  he  says :  “  If  at  the  time  of  the 

legal  priesthood  it  was  morally  wrong  to  contravene  the  judg¬ 
ment  of  the  high  priest,  and  was  punished  with  death;  how 
much  more  is  not  this  the  case  under  the  dispensation  of  re¬ 
vealed  truth  and  grace,  when  it  is  known  that  the  plenitude  of 
power  has  been  entrusted  to  the  vicar  of  Christ.  Hence  this 
evil  is  in  no  way  to  be  tolerated,  that  in  matters  of  faith  and 
morals  any  one  should  teach  what  is  contrary  to  his  decisions ; 
approving  what  he  has  reprobated,  building  up  again  what  he 
has  torn  down,  defending  what  he  has  condemned.”  42 

He  also  points  out  that  the  infallibility  of  the  Pope  extends 
to  the  approbation  of  religious  orders  and  their  rules.  “  It  is 

38  In  Expos.  Regul.  c.  9.  41  Ibid. 

39  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  25,  a.  1,  q.  1.  _  42  Apol.  Paupert.  c.  1. 

40  Opusc. :  Quare  Fratres  Mi- 
nores  praedicent. 


228 


MEDI/EVAL  THEOLOGY 


manifest,”  he  argues,  “  that  the  sixth  rule  of  St.  Francis  was 
approved  and  confirmed  by  Pope  Honorius.  But  if  he  fell 
into  error  in  giving  this  approbation,  he  has  led  the  whole 
Church  into  error;  for  it  is  well  known  that  the  universal 
Church,  throughout  the  world,  receives  such  religious  orders 
as  are  approved  by  the  Pope ;  and  therefore  the  whole  Church 
was  deceived  and  led  into  error  by  her  divinely  constituted 
head.” 43  Of  course,  the  conclusion  is  inadmissible;  there¬ 
fore  also  the  premise  from  which  it  follows,  namely,  that  the 
Pope  fell  into  error  when  he  approved  the  aforesaid  rule. 

Duns  Scotus  is  equally  emphatic  in  his  statements  regarding 
the  universal  jurisdiction  and  infallible  teaching  authority  of 
the  Pope.  To  the  Sovereign  Pontiff  alone,  he  says,  does  it 
belong  to  fulminate  a  sentence  of  major  excommunication, 
which  entirely  cuts  off  the  delinquent  from  the  Church.44 
The  infallible  teaching  authority  of  the  Pope  is  identified  with 
that  of  the  universal  Church,  and  dogmatic  decrees  of  the 
Sovereign  Pontiffs  have  the  same  force  as  those  of  general 
councils.  All  decisions  regarding  doubtful  points  in  Holy 
Scripture  and  tradition  are  reserved  to  the  Pope,  in  the  sense 
that  his  decision  alone  is  binding. —  These  various  points  Sco¬ 
tus  brings  out  repeatedly  in  his  teaching  on  the  sacraments. 

What  has  been  said  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs  represents 
in  substance  the  common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics  on  the 
rights  and  prerogatives  of  the  Holy  See  in  the  sphere  of  re¬ 
ligion.  On  only  one  point  was  there  some  difference  of  opin¬ 
ion,  namely,  whether  the  jurisdiction  of  bishops  is  derived  im¬ 
mediately  from  Christ  or  mediately,  that  is,  through  the  Pope. 
This  latter  view  was  defended  by  Alexander  of  Hales,  St. 
Bonaventure,  St.  Thomas,  and  nearly  all  representative  Schol¬ 
astics;  while  the  former  was  held  by  Henry  of  Ghent  and  a 
few  others.45  But  even  with  regard  to  this  point,  all  admit 
that  no  bishop  can  exercise  his  jurisdiction  without 'the  consent 
of  the  Pope.  Hence  the  view  of  some  later  Nominalists, 
which  prevailed  at  the  Council  of  Constance  ( 1431-1434) ,  that 
the  jurisdiction  of  a  general  council  is  above  that  of  the  Pope, 

43  De  Paupert.  Christi,  a.  2.  45  Quodl.  9,  q.  22. 

44  Report.  IV,  d.  19,  q.  1. 


THE  PAPACY 


229 


was  directly  opposed  to  the  teaching  of  mediaeval  theologians. 

The  chief  points  set  forth  in  this  section,  namely,  the 
primacy  of  the  Roman  See,  the  universal  jurisdiction  of  the 
Pope,  his  right  to  decide  questions  of  faith  and  morals,  and  his 
position  of  supreme  judge  to  whom  appeal  may  be  made  by 
any  one  of  the  faithful  throughout  the  world,  were  all  em¬ 
bodied  in  the  profession  of  faith  exacted  from  Michael  Pal- 
aeologus  by  the  Second  Council  of  Lyons,  held  in  1274.46  It 
is  true,  the  Council  did  not  directly  define  the  Pope’s  infallibil¬ 
ity  in  matters  of  faith  and  morals ;  but  it  indicated  its  mind 
quite  clearly  on  the  subject,  when  it  stated:  “  As  he,  before 
all  others,  is  bound  to  defend  the  faith,  so  in  like  manner  does 
it  belong  to  him,  when  questions  of  faith  arise,  to  decide  them 
according  to  his  own  judgment.”  47 

2.  Relation  of  Church  and  State. —  That  during  the  Middle 
Ages  the  State  was  regarded  as  subject  to  the  Church  in  all 
spiritual  matters  need  not  be  pointed  out ;  for  that  follows  nec¬ 
essarily  from  the  universally  accepted  idea  of  the  supremacy 
of  the  Pope,  as  set  forth  in  the  preceding  section.  As  head 
of  the  Church,  the  Pope  was  believed  to  have  full  jurisdiction 
in  all  things  spiritual,  not  only  over  individuals,  but  also  over 
every  form  and  kind  of  society  made  up  of  Christians,  and 
therefore  over  the  Christian  commonwealth.  Hence  the  point 
now  at  issue  regards  solely  the  relation  of  Church  and  State  in 
temporal  matters. 

Protestants  quite  commonly  accuse  the  Popes  of  the  Middle 
Ages  of  having  dominated,  or  tried  to  dominate,  over  tem¬ 
poral  sovereigns  to  such  an  extent  that  no  king  or  emperor 
enjoyed  untrammeled  freedom  in  carrying  on  the  government 
committed  to  his  charge.  To  all  intents  and  purposes,  as  they 
see  it,  the  Popes  aimed  at  nothing  less  than  to  establish  them¬ 
selves  as  feudal  overlords  of  the  whole  Christian  world.  They 
not  only  exacted  the  payment  of  tribute  from  many  countries 
which  they  regarded  as  papal  fiefs,  but  without  their  good  will 
no  king  or  emperor  ever  felt  quite  safe  on  his  throne.  By  the 
terrible  weapon  of  excommunication  any  sovereign  could  be 

47  Ibid. ;  cfr.  DB.  466. 


46  Mansi,  24,  70  A  sqq. 


230 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


brought  to  his  knees,  as  was  Henry  IV  of  Germany  when 
forced  to  implore  the  mercy  of  Gregory  VII  at  Canossa.48 
In  confirmation  of  these  and  similar  statements,  Protestant 
writers  not  only  adduce  certain  facts  of  history,  such  as  the 
case  of  Henry  IV  just  referred  to,  but  also  cite  the  teaching 
of  Popes  and  theologians  to  the  same  effect.  As  regards  the 
teaching  of  the  Popes,  it  is  especially  the  Dictatus  Papae, 
sometimes  ascribed  to  Gregory  VII,  and  the  Bull,  Unam  sanc- 
tam,  of  Boniface  VIII,  that  are  made  to  do  service. 

That  these  charges  are  grossly  exaggerated  need  hardly  be 
pointed  out;  still  there  is  sufficient  truth  in  them  to  make 
them  plausible.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is  this :  The  Chris¬ 
tians  of  the  Middle  Ages  knew  from  bitter  experience  that  in 
certain  contingencies  they  had  no  protection  against  the  tyr¬ 
anny  and  arbitrary  violence  of  wicked  rulers,  except  such  as 
might  be  afforded  them  by  the  Sovereign  Pontiff.  Hence  in 
most  cases  they  were  more  than  willing  to  acknowledge  him  as 
their  overlord,  in  so  far  as  he  used  his  spiritual  power  to  check 
the  excesses  of  their  kings  or  emperors.  Again,  rulers  of 
smaller  countries,  who  had  always  more  or  less  reason  to  dread 
attacks  from  their  more  powerful  neighbors,  not  rarely  con¬ 
sidered  it  a  privilege  to  enfeoff  their  domains  to  the  Holy  See, 
so  that  for  the  payment  of  the  nominal  tribute  they  might  en¬ 
joy  its  powerful  protection.  Consequently,  if  in  this  sense  the 
Popes  were  to  some  extent  feudal  lords,  the  position  was  not  of 
their  own  seeking;  it  was  thrust- upon  them  by  the  condition  of 
the  times  or  the  devotion  of  the  people. 

Nor  did  they  claim  the  power  and  privilege  of  appointing 
or  dethroning  temporal  rulers ;  but  they  did  claim  the  right  to 
cut  them  off  from  ecclesiastical  communion,  if  against  the 
laws  of  the  land  they  misused  their  authority  to  the  destruc¬ 
tion  of  the  Christian  commonwealth  and  obstinately  refused 
to  be  corrected  by  gentler  means.  But  this  only  shows  that 
they  considered  the  high  and  the  low  to  be  on  an  equal  footing 
in  the  Church  of  God.  If  either  of  them  chose  to  lead  a  life 
unworthy  of  the  Christian  name,  he  must  be  satisfied  to  be  ex- 

48  Cfr.  Hinschius-Sehling,  Real-encyklpaedie  fuer  Protestantische  Theo- 
logie  und  Kirche,  14,  663. 


THE  PAPACY 


231 


eluded  from  the  benefits  of  the  Christian  Church.  It  is  true, 
such  an  excommunication,  if  persistently  disregarded,  might 
in  the  case  of  princes  lead  to  the  loss  of  their  throne,  because 
it  was  usually  understood  to  release  subjects  from  their  oath 
of  allegiance;  but  on  the  part  of  the  Popes  this  was  no  more 
than  an  acknowledgment  of  the  people’s  natural  right  to  de¬ 
fend  themselves  against  an  unjust  aggressor.  No  doubt,  this 
power  of  excommunication  might  be  abused,  and  perhaps 
sometimes  was  abused ;  but  so  is  every  other  power  under  the 
sun. 

Beyond  what  is  conceded  in  the  two  preceding  paragraphs, 
neither  Popes  nor  theologians  made  any  claims  in  regard  to 
the  subjection  of  the  temporal  power  to  the  spiritual.  Even 
if  the  Dictatus  Papae  were  certainly  the  “  sayings  ”  of  Greg¬ 
ory  VII,  which  they  most  probably  are  not ;  or  if  they  faithfully 
reflected  the  attitude  of  the  mediaeval  mind  on  this  matter, 
which  in  regard  to  most  of  the  “  sayings  ”  may  be  conceded ; 
even  then,  nothing  could  be  proved  from  them  beyond  what 
has  been  admitted.  In  fact,  only  two  of  them  have  any  bear¬ 
ing  on  this  matter  at  all.  They  read  as  follows :  1.  Quod  illi 

liceat  imperatores  deponere  —  That  it  is  lawful  for  him  (the 
Pope)  to  depose  emperors.  2.  Quod  a  ddelitate  iniquorum 
subjectos  potest  absolvere —  That  he  (the  Pope)  can  absolve 
the  subjects  of  wicked  (princes)  from  their  oath  of  alle¬ 
giance.49  If  these  “  sayings  ”  be  taken  in  the  sense  explained 
above,  both  may  be  admitted  to  be  genuine  expressions  of  the 
mediaeval  mind  on  the  matter  in  question;  on  the  other  hand, 
if  they  be  interpreted  to  imply  the  claim  of  arbitrary  power  by 
the  Pope,  there  is  not  a  shred  of  evidence  to  support  the  inter¬ 
pretation. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  Bull,  Unam  sanctam ,  of  Boniface 
VIII.  In  it  occurs  the  sentence:  Porro  subesse  Romano 
Pontifci  omni  humanae  creaturae  declarant  us,  dicimus,  defini- 
mns  et  pronuntiamus  omnino  esse  de  necessitate  salutis  — 
Furthermore,  We  declare,  say,  define  and  pronounce  that  it 
is  necessary,  by  way  of  salvation,  for  every  human  being  to  be 

49  Ep.  55 ;  Mansi,  20,  168. 


232 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


under  (the  power  of)  the  Roman  Pontiff. —  As  it  stands,  this 
looks  rather  sweeping,  but  it  need  not  mean  that  the  Pope 
claimed  direct  power  over  the  temporal  affairs  of  princes.  In 
fact,  when  Louis  the  Fair  of  France  interpreted  it  in  this  sense, 
Boniface  declared  without  hesitation:  “  It  is  now  forty  years 
since  We  began  to  be  versed  in  the  law,  and  We  know  that 
there  are  two  powers  established  by  God :  who,  then,  ought  or 
can  believe  that  such  fatuity,  such  foolishness,  ever  entered 
Our  head  ?  ”  50 

The  teaching  of  theologians  on  this  subject  is  neatly  sum¬ 
marized  by  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,  who  was  practically  a  con¬ 
temporary  of  Gregory  VII.  He  says:  “  The  Church  and 
the  State  are  the  two  powers  instituted  by  God  for  the  right 
government  of  the  people.  Each  of  them  is  entitled  to  make 
its  own  laws,  and  to  enforce  their  observance  by  means  in 
keeping  with  the  end  to  be  attained.  .  .  .  Compared  to  the 
State,  the  Church  is  the  higher  power;  because  she  must  lead 
men  to  their  eternal  salvation,  while  the  State  provides  for 
their  temporal  welfare.  ...  As  both  powers  are  immediately 
from  God,  and  as  the  spiritual  power  is  the  higher  of  the  two, 
the  Pope  can  be  judged  only  by  God  Himself.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  temporal  power,  in  so  far  as  it  is  vested  in  a  particular 
person,  may  be  constituted  and  judged  by  the  spiritual.  How¬ 
ever,  the  spiritual  power  cannot  proceed  arbitrarily  in  this  mat¬ 
ter,  but  must  be  guided  by  the  true  interest  of  the  people.”  51 

In  regard  to  the  deposition  of  princes  by  the  Pope,  St. 
Thomas  reasons  as  follows:  “  When  a  Christian  prince  falls 
away  from  the  faith,  he  may  be  punished  by  a  judicial  sen¬ 
tence;  and  the  proper  punishment  in  such  a  case  would  be  to 
deprive  him  of  the  power  to  rule  over  Christian  subjects;  for 
if  he  continues  to  rule  over  them,  there  is  imminent  danger  of 
his  turning  them  also  away  from  the  faith.  Hence,  as  soon  as 
the  sentence  of  excommunication  has  been  pronounced  against 
an  apostate  prince,  his  subjects  are  by  that  very  fact  freed 
from  his  dominion  and  released  from  their  oath  of  alle- 
giance.  7,2 

50  Cfr.  DB.  468,  note. 

61  De  Sacr.  c.  4. 


52  Sum.  Theol.  II.  II,  q.  12,  a.  2. 


THE  PAPACY 


233 


As  is  obvious,  this  power  of  excommunication  can  not  be 
used  against  sovereigns  who  have  never  been  baptized.  And 
hence  St.  Thomas  remarks:  “  Infidelity  in  itself  is  not  in¬ 
compatible  with  the  right  to  rule ;  because  that  right  was  intro¬ 
duced  by  the  law  of  nations,  which  is  a  human  law  —  jus  hu- 
manum.”  53  No,  it  is  not  infidelity  as  such  that  justifies  the 
Pope  to  proceed  against  any  sovereign;  but  the  infidelity  of 
one  who  had  a  right  to  the  crown  only  because  he  was  sup¬ 
posed  to  be  a  Christian. 


63  Ibid.  q.  12,  a.  2. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


ACTUAL  AND  SANCTIFYING  GRACE:  JUSTIFICATION  AND 

MERIT 

Patristic  teaching  on  the  subject  of  divine  grace  was  mostly 
concerned  with  its  supernatural  character  and  its  absolute 
necessity  for  the  attainment  of  eternal  life.  What  was  its 
precise  nature,  what  its  various  divisions,  what  its  mode  of  op¬ 
eration,  were  questions  that  received  only  a  passing  attention 
as  occasion  demanded.1  It  is  chiefly  on  these  points  that 
Scholastic  speculation  supplements  the  teaching  of  the  Fathers 
as  regards  the  question  of  grace.  The  following  is  a  brief 
summary  of  what  was  thus  accomplished  by  the  most  repre¬ 
sentative  of  the  Schoolmen. 

A  —  Actual  and  Sanctifying  Grace 

A  fair  outline  of  Scholastic  teaching  on  the  subject  of  grace 
is  presented  by  Peter  Lombard,  whose  brief  statements  were 
afterwards  developed  by  his  commentators.  On  some  points, 
however,  as  will  be  noted  in  the  proper  place,  his  views  were  set 
aside  as  untenable. 

Referring  to  the  teaching  of  St.  Augustine,  whom  he  fol¬ 
lows  rather  closely,  he  first  points  out  the  need  we  all  have  of 
a  special  divine  help  in  order  to  work  out  our  salvation.  “  The 
will  of  man,”  he  says,  “  when  left  to  its  natural  resources,  has 
not  the  power  either  to  will  efficaciously  what  is  supernaturally 
good,  or  to  accomplish  it.  For  this  it  needs  the  grace  of  God, 
by  which  it  is  liberated  and  assisted.  It  is  liberated  in  this 
sense,  that  stirred  up  by  grace  it  really  wills ;  and  it  is  assisted 
in  the  sense  that  it  successfully  accomplishes  the  work  to  be 
done.”  2 

2  Sent.  II,  d.  25,  n.  16. 


1  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  369  sqq. 


234 


ACTUAL  AND  SANCTIFYING  GRACE 


235 


This  grace  of  God,  which  is  given  for  the  performance  of 
supernaturally  good  works,  may  be  considered  in  itself  or  in 
its  relation  to  the  action  of  the  will.  In  the  first  case  it  is 
called  operating  grace  —  gratia  operans ;  for  the  reason  that 
it  exerts  an  influence  on  our  intellect  and  will,  and  disposes 
these  faculties  for  the  eliciting  of  salutary  acts.  In  the  second 
it  is  termed  cooperating  grace  —  gratia  cooperans;  because  it 
concurs  with  the  actions  of  our  faculties  as  prepared  by  its 
supernatural  influence.3  Hence  the  operating  grace  of  God  is 
in  us  without  our  own  doing ;  it  anticipates  the  salutary  action 
of  our  will  and  makes  it  possible,  and  hence  it  is  also  called 
preventing  or  prevenient  grace.  It  is  purely  a  gift  of  God’s 
gratuitous  mercy.4  However,  strictly  speaking,  this  is  true 
only  of  the  first  grace  that  is  given  us,  which  is  the  gift  of 
faith ;  for  if  we  cooperate  with  that,  we  can  merit  the  bestowal 
of  other  graces  and  thus  with  God’s  help  work  out  our  salva¬ 
tion.5  Hence  we  are  bidden  to  pray  for  the  further  help  of 
God;  so  that  what  He  has  begun  in  us,  He  may  also  accom¬ 
plish.6 

Entitatively  considered,  preventing  and  helping  grace  — 
gratia  operans  et  cooperans  —  are  the  same.  They  are  one 
and  the  same  gratuitous  gift  of  God,  but  bear  a- different  rela¬ 
tion  to  the  activity  of  the  will  in  respect  of  supernatural  ac¬ 
tions.  Preventing  grace  calls  forth  that  activity  by  soliciting 
the  will  to  act  and  making  it  capable  of  so  doing;  while  co¬ 
operating  grace  acts  together  with  the  will  in  exerting  its  ac¬ 
tivity  for  the  attainment  of  a  supernatural  end.  Consequently, 
grace  and  free  will  constitute  one  principle  of  action,  which  is 
at  the  same  time  supernatural  and  free  —  supernatural,  because 
of  grace;  free,  because  of  the  free  cooperation  of  the  will.7 

When  it  comes  to  the  heart  of  the  question,  namely,  what 
actual  grace  really  is  in  itself,  the  author  is  not  very  definite. 
In  the  first  place,  he  points  out  that  it  cannot  be  a  movement  of 


3  The  author’s  own  words  are : 
“  Haec  est  gratia  operans  et  coop¬ 
erans.  Operans  enim  gratia  praep- 
arat  hominis  voluntatem  ut  velit 
bonum;  gratia  cooperans  adjuvat 


ne  frustra  velit”  (Ibid.  d.  26,  n.  1). 

4  Ibid.  n.  1,  2. 

5  Ibid.  n.  3,  4,  5. 

6  Ibid.  n.  5. 

7  Ibid.  d.  26,  n.  9 ;  ibid.  n.  3. 


236 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


the  faculties  —  motus  vel  affectus  mentis  —  in  so  far  as  that 
might  be  said  to  have  its  origin  from  the  faculties  themselves; 
for  if  it  were,  grace  would  not  be  the  gift  of  God.  Next  he 
considers  the  opinion  of  some  who  hold  that  grace  is  a  super¬ 
natural  quality  or  form  of  the  soul  —  bonam  mentis  qualitatem 
sive  formant ,  quae  animam  informat.  And  this,  he  thinks, 
is  about  all  that  can  be  said  concerning  so  abstruse  a  matter. 
Hence  he  concludes  by  stating:  Et  ilia  gratia  virtus  non  in- 
congrue  nominatur,  quia  voluntatem  hominis  infirmam  sanat  et 
adjuvat.8 

Finally,  although  grace  is  necessary  for  salutary  actions, 
nevertheless,  even  after  the  fall,  man’s  free  will  retains  the 
power  of  performing  naturally  good  works.  Thus,  if  a  Jew 
or  a  bad  Christian  were  to  give  an  alms  to  a  poor  man,  with 
the  intention  of  relieving  the  sufferings  of  a  fellow  human  be¬ 
ing,  his  action  would  be  praiseworthy;  but,  unless  moved 
thereto  by  the  grace  of  God,  it  would  have  no  bearing  upon 
eternal  life.9 

The  question  of  sanctifying  grace  is  touched  only  inciden¬ 
tally  by  the  Lombard,  and  what  he  does  say  about  it  is  very 
unsatisfactory.  As  will  be  pointed  out  in  the  following  chap¬ 
ter,  he  identified  the  virtue  of  charity  with  sanctifying  grace, 
and  then  both  with  the  Holy  Spirit.  Not  indeed  in  the  sense 
that  the  Holy  Spirit  might  be  said  to  inhere  in  the  soul  as  an 
intrinsic  form,  but  rather  that  He  must  be  conceived  to  dwell 
therein  as  the  efficient  and  exemplary  cause  of  the  soul’s  super¬ 
natural  life.”  10  The  special  indwelling  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in 
the  souls  of  the  just  is,  of  course,  admitted  by  all  theologians; 
but  the  Lombard’s  inference  that  this  same  indwelling  is  iden¬ 
tical  with  sanctifying  grace  finds  no  defenders,  and  was  unani¬ 
mously  rejected  by  his  own  commentators. 

Alexander  of  Hales  begins  his  treatise  on  grace  with  a  very 
complete  division  of  the  various  supernatural  gifts  in  one  way 
or  another  designated  by  that  term.  He  proceeds  as  follows : 
“  Grace  therefore,  according  to  the  common  acceptation  of  the 
term,  is  either  an  uncreated  gift,  or  a  concreated  gift,  or  a 

8  Ibid.  d.  27,  n.  1-3.  10  Cfr.  Sent.  I,  d.  17,  n.  1-6. 

9  Ibid.  d.  41,  3. 


ACTUAL  AND  SANCTIFYING  GRACE 


237 


superadded  gift.  Again,  there  is  a  grace  that  makes  us  pleas¬ 
ing  to  God,  and  a  grace  that  is  the  first  supernatural  power  in 
the  soul,  and  a  grace  that  is  the  first  effect  of  grace  after  the 
fall,  and  a  grace  that  signifies  certain  spiritual  prerogatives, 
and  a  grace  that  is  a  sign  of  grace,  and  a  grace  that  is  the 
reward  that  follows  upon  grace.11 

These  various  graces  he  divides  into  two  distinct  classes : 
the  first  contains  the  gratia  gratum  faciens  or  sanctifying  grace ; 
and  the  other,  the  gratia  gratis  data .  By  this  latter  term  he 
designates,  not  only  the  charismata ,  as  we  do  to-day,  but  also 
all  actual  graces  and  infused  virtues.  This  use  of  the  term 
was  quite  common  in  the  schools  up  to  the  time  of  St.  Thomas. 

In  his  division  of  actual  graces  he  follows  the  Lombard,  who, 
it  may  be  noted  in  passing,  had  taken  his  terminology  and 
principle  of  division  from  St.  Augustine.  “  The  free  will  of 
man,”  he  says,  “  may  be  considered  in  reference  to  grace  in 
two  different  ways:  as  the  subject  that  receives  grace  and  as 
the  faculty  that  is  moved  to  act.”  As  received  into  the  will, 
grace  is  called  operating  or  preventing  grace ;  as  acting  with  the 
will,  it  is  termed  cooperating  grace.  Then  he  continues :  “  In 

the  reception  of  grace,  that  is,  when  grace  prepares  the  will,  the 
action  of  grace  is  first;  thereupon  follows  the  consent  of  the 
free  will,  or  its  cooperation  in  yielding  its  consent  to  the  move¬ 
ment  of  grace;  and  for  this  reason  grace  is  called  operating  or 
prevenient.  But  the  free  will  is  said  to  cooperate  with  grace 
when  it  performs  the  good  action  through  grace;  because  the 
action  proceeds  from  the  power  of  the  free  will  as  assisted  by 
grace:  and  therefore  the  free  will  itself  is  said  to  act,  while 
grace  contributes  its  help  to  it  as  the  cooperating  principle.”  12 
The  two  act  together,  yet  the  entire  effect  is  attributable  to 
each.13 


11  Sum.  Ill,  q.  61,  m.  1. 

12  Sum.  Ill,  q.  61,  m.  3,  a.  2  ad  2m. 

13  In  this  exposition  he  closely 

follows  St.  Bernard,  who,  in  his 
treatise  De  Gratia  et  Libero  Ar- 
bitrio,  puts  the  matter  very  clearly 
in  these  terms :  “  Sic  autem  ista 

cum  libero  arbitrio  operatur,  ut 
tantum  ilium  in  primo  praeveniat, 


in  ceteris  comitetur ;  ad  hoc  utique 
praeveniens,  ut  sibi  deinceps  co- 
operetur.  Ita  tamen,  quod  a  sola 
gratia  coeptum  est,  pariter  ab 
utroque  perficiatur;  ut  mixtim,  non 
singillatim ;  simul,  non  vicissim,  per 
singulos  profectus  operentur.  Non 
partim  gratia,  partim  liberum  ar- 
bitrium,  sed  totum  singula  opera 


238 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Like  the  Lombard,  Alexander  holds  that  preventing  and  co¬ 
operating  grace  are  entitatively  the  same,  and  he  gives  this 
reason :  “  Because  both  are  related  to  the  will  as  its  moving 

cause.”  14  Preventing  grace  is  in  the  will  both  as  a  super¬ 
natural  disposition  and  as  an  impulse  to  action,  and  when  the 
will  yields  to  this  impulse,  the  same  grace  acts  together  with 
the  will  and  is  then  properly  termed  cooperating  grace.15  It 
may  be  noted  here,  that  the  author  does  not  restrict  the  term, 
preventing  grace,  to  the  first  indeliberate  acts  of  the  faculties 
that  result,'  so  to  speak,  from  the  divine  touch ;  but  extends  it 
to  the  whole  process  by  which  the  faculties  are  elevated  and 
prepared  for  salutary  action.  Hence,  in  this  connection,  he 
does  not  use  the  two  terms,  praeveniens  and  operans,  as 
synonymous.16 

The  gratia  gratum  faciens ,  or  sanctifying  grace,  is  some¬ 
thing  objective  and  permanent  in  the  soul.  He  speaks  of  it 
as  follows.  “  It  must  be  held  that  the  grace  by  which  one  be¬ 
comes  pleasing  to  God,  necessarily  places  something  super¬ 
natural  in  the  person,  which  is  the  reason  of  his  being  thus 
pleasing  to  God.  And  this  particular  something  is  the  same 
as  that  by  which  a  person  becomes  deiform  or  is  made  like  unto 
God;  and  hence  a  person  is  said  to  be  pleasing  to  God  when 
he  is  like  unto  Him.”  17 

Furthermore,  this  grace  is  both  increate  and  created.  For 
he  continues  :  “  It  must  be  maintained  that  in  the  just  there  is 

a  created  grace  and  an  increate  grace.  The  increate  grace  is 
the  Holy  Spirit :  and  the  Holy  Spirit  is  called  grace  in  as  much 
as  He  is  a  gift;  and  He  is  termed  a  gift  in  as  much  as  He  is 
love:  for  by  way  of  appropriation  the  Holy  Spirit  is  said  to 


individuo  peragunt.  Totum  quidem 
hoc,  et  totum  ilia;  sed  ut  totum  in 
illo,  sic  totum  ex  illo  (Op.  cit.  c. 
14). 

14  Loc.  cit.  a.  1. 

15  Ibid. 

16  He  explains  the  terms  as  fol¬ 
lows  :  “  Eadem  est  gratia  operans 

et  praeveniens,  sed  differenter ; 
quia  utraque  comparator  respectu 
liberi  arbitrii  ut  causa  movens  ip- 


sum  ;  sed  praeveniens  dicitur  in 
quantum  semper  praesto  est  ut 
causa  bonae  voluntatis,  etsi  in  ef- 
fectu  non  causet ;  operans  vero 
efficit  bonam  voluntatem.  Unde 
gratia  praeveniens  et  operans  di- 
cuntur  causa  bonae  voluntatis,  sed 
praeveniens  dicit  causam  secundum 
habitum,  operans  vero  dicit  causam 
secundum  actum”  (Ibid.  m.  3,  a.  2). 

17  Ibid.  m.  2,  a.  1. 


ACTUAL  AND  SANCTIFYING  GRACE 


239 


be  love.  .  .  .  Since  therefore  the  Holy  Spirit  is  love,  .  .  . 
hence  it  is  that  when  He  is  given  to  us,  He  transforms  us  into 
a  special  divine  likeness,  so  that  our  soul  itself  is  made  like 
unto  God.  But  besides  this  increate  grace,  we  must  also  hold 
that  there  is  a  created  grace,  which  is  a  certain  divine  likeness 
and  supernatural  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  rational  soul, 
and  by  reason  of  this  the  soul  is  pleasing  to  God  and  is  made 
like  unto  Him.  Hence  there  is  in  the  soul  a  transforming 
form,  and  this  is  increate  grace;  and  there  is  in  like  manner 
also  a  transformed  form,  which  remains  permanently  in  the 
soul  as  the  effect  of  the  aforesaid  transformation,  and  this  is 
created  grace.”  18 

The  question  whether  sanctifying  grace,  as  distinct  from  the 
Holy  Spirit,  is  an  accident  or  a  substance,  he  answers  with  a 
distinction :  “  It  is  to  be  held  that  created  grace  has  a  twofold 

relation  to  the  soul :  First  as  regards  the  essence  of  the  soul, 
or  its  nature;  secondly,  as  regards  the  perfection  of  the  soul  in 
the  supernatural  order.  In  its  first  relation,  I  say  that  grace 
is  an  accident ;  because  it  is  superadded  to  the  soul  when  already 
complete  in  its  essential  perfection.  In  its  second  relation, 
grace  is  a  substantial  disposition;  nevertheless  it  is  not  a  sub¬ 
stance.”  19  Hence  sanctifying  grace  is  a  supernatural  quality, 
which  permanently  inheres  in  the  soul  and  is  the  foundation 
of  all  other  divine  gifts.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  author 
favors  the  opinion  of  those  who  hold  that  the  relation  of 
sanctifying  grace  to  the  infused  virtues  is  the  same  as  that  of 
the  soul  to  its  faculties.20 

St.  Bonaventure  does  little  more  than  reproduce  the  teaching 
of  Alexander,  and  hence  there  is  no  need  of  examining  his 


18  Ibid.  m.  2,  a.  2. 

19  Ibid.  m.  2,  a.  3. 

20  Ibid.  m.  2,  a.  4.  Besides  the 

citations  in  the  text,  the  following 
may  also  be  noted :  “  Gratia  du¬ 

plex  est,  scil.  gratum  faciens  et 
gratis  data,  et  haec  non  est  gratum 
faciens,  sed  tamen  disponens.  .  .  . 
Gratia  gratis  data  proprie  dicitur 
donum  infusum  rationali  naturae 
sine  meritis,  .  .  .  disponens  ad  sa- 


lutem  propriam,  vel  aedificationem 
alterius.  .  .  .  Ad  differentiam  gra- 
tiae  gratum  facientis,  quae  non  est 
sicut  dispositio  ad  salutem,  quasi 
distans,  sed  est  dispositio  salutis, 
quia  habens  illam  dignus  est  salute 
aeterna ;  immo  gratia  gratum  fa¬ 
ciens  est  ipsa  salus,  ad  quam  dis- 
ponit  gratia  gratis  data”  (Loc.  cit. 
m.  6,  a.  3  ad  im;  ibid.  q.  63,  m.  2,  3). 


240 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


views  in  detail.  He  gives  the  same  division  of  grace  into 
gratia  gratum  faciens  et  gratis  data ,  and  uses  the  latter  term 
to  designate  all  divine  gifts  distinct  from  sanctifying  grace. 
He  refutes  Peter  Lombard  who  denied  that  sanctifying  grace 
must  be  considered  as  a  permanent  created  gift,  really  distinct 
from  the  indwelling  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  opinion  of  those, 
he  says,  who  maintain  that  sanctifying  grace  is  a  created  gift, 
a  permanent  supernatural  accident  of  the  soul,  is  safer  and 
more  reasonable.  It  is  safer,  because  it  is  commonly  held  in 
the  schools  —  Doctores  enim  Parisienses  communiter  hoc  sen- 
tiunt  et  senserunt  ah  antiquis  diebus.  It  is  more  reasonable, 
because  it  is  unintelligible  how  supernatural  effects,  such  as  we 
observe  in  the  just,  should  be  produced  by  the  soul  without  an 
inherent  supernatural  form.21 

Sanctifying  grace  purifies  the  soul,  elevates  it  to  the  super¬ 
natural  state,  makes  it  like  unto  God,  and  is  the  principle  of  all 
supernatural  merit.22  It  is  not  merely  a  superficial  ornament 
of  the  soul,  but  penetrates  its  very  being  and  faculties,  vivify¬ 
ing  all  the  infused  virtues,  and  making  their  actions  meritorious 
for  heaven.  In  regard  to  this  last  effect  he  compares  sancti- 
fying  grace  to  material  light,  which  brings  out  all  the  beautiful 
colors  inherent  in  the  objects  of  sense.23 

Unlike  Alexander,  who  considered  the  increase  of  sanctify¬ 
ing  grace  to  consist  in  an  intensification  of  its  power  and  in  the 
conferring  of  a  more  perfect  likeness  to  God,24  St.  Bonaventure 
explains  it  by  an  addition  of  new  degrees,  which  result  in  a 
quantitative  augmentation  of  sanctifying  grace.  Moreover 
the  increase  of  grace  is  not  merited  de  condigno,  nor  de  con- 
gruo ,  but  by  a  sort  of  intermediate  merit.25  This  last  kind 
of  merit  was  not  generally  admitted  in  the  schools. 

Albertus  Magnus  gives  substantially  the  same  exposition  as 


21  In  Sent.  II,  d.  26,  a.  unic.  q.  2. 

22  Breviloq.  V,  3,  4. 

23  His  own  words  are:  “  Quem- 
admodum  enim  color  qualitas  est 
corporis  terminati,  quae  a  praesen- 
tia  luminis  influxi  venustatur  et 
completur,  ut  possit  movere  visum, 
sic  virtus,  quae  est  habilitatio  po- 
tentiae,  absque  gratia  gratum  fa- 


ciente  informis  est  sicut  color  sine 
lumine ;  sed  ea  adveniente,  ex  qua 
tota  anima  in  se  et  in  suis  potentiis 
decoratur,  formari  et  vivificari  di- 
cuntur  virtutum  actus  et  effici  Deo 
accepti  ”  (In  Sent.  II,  d.  27,  a.  1,  q. 
2;  cfr.  ibid.  d.  26,  q.  2). 

24  Sum.  q.  69,  m.  2. 

25  In  Sent.  II,  d.  27,  a.  2,  q.  2. 


ACTUAL  AND  SANCTIFYING  GRACE 


241 


Alexander  and  St.  Bonaventure.  In  regard  to  sanctifying 
grace  he  points  out  that  its  relation  to  the  infused  virtues  re¬ 
sembles  that  which  exists  between  the  soul  and  its  faculties, 
and  that  therefore  it  has  only  a  mediate  influence  upon  salu¬ 
tary  acts.  “  It  is  evident,”  he  says,  “  that  sanctifying  grace  is 
primarily  not  a  perfection  of  the  potencies,  but  of  the  essence 
of  the  soul,  and  through  this  only  does  it  exercise  its  influence 
upon  these  same  potencies.”  26 

St.  Thomas,  in  keeping  with  his  customary  mode  of  pro¬ 
cedure,  draws  largely  on  the  known  facts  of  nature,  when  he 
comes  to  consider  the  various  questions  connected  with  the  sub¬ 
ject  of  grace.  In  the  order  of  nature  God  is  the  first  cause :  as 
creator,  He  produces  all  secondary  causes;  as  preserver,  He 
sustains  them  in  being;  as  ruler,  He  directs  them  to  their  proper 
end.  He  concurs  with  all  their  activities  in  such  a  way,  that 
the  effects  depend  on  Him  as  well  as  on  these  secondary  causes 
themselves.  And  the  same  is  also  true  in  the  supernatural 
order.  Grace  is  the  result  of  His  goodness  and  mercy  ;  He 
infuses  it  into  the  soul  or  its  faculties,  and  through  it  He 
moves  man  to  the  practice  of  virtue  and  the  final  attainment  of 
Life  eternal. 

The  activity  of  grace  is  exercised  in  a  two-fold  manner. 
First,  it  serves  as  a  remedy  against  the  moral  weakness  caused 
by  sin,  and  in  so  far  it  is  of  a  medicinal  nature.  Secondly,  it 
confers  a  mode  of  action  that  lies  beyond  the  reach  of  man’s 
natural  powers  in  any  state,  and  as  such  it  is  a  principle  of 
supernatural  merit.  Taken  in  the  first  sense,  grace  belongs 
properly  to  the  state  of  fallen  nature;  in  the  second,  it  is  a 
necessary  complement  of  the  powers  of  every  rational  creature 
destined  for  a  supernatural  end.27 

In  his  classification  of  grace,  St.  Thomas  uses  the  same 
terms  as  Alexander  of  Hales,  St.  Bonaventure,  and  Albertus 
Magnus;  but  he  attaches  to  them  a  different  sense.  Thus  by 
the  term  gratia  gratum  faciens  he  designates  all  supernatural 
helps  and  gifts  conferred  for  the  recipient’s  own  sanctification, 
comprising  both  habitual  and  actual  graces.  On  the  other 

26  In  Sent.  II,  d.  27,  a.  1,  q.  1 ;  Sum.  II,  tr.  16,  q.  101. 

27  Sum.  Theol.  I.  II,  q.  109,  a.  2.' 


242 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


hand,  the  term  gratia  gratis  data  he  restricts  to  such  gratuitous 
gifts  or  charismata  as  are  intended  for  the  good  of  others 
rather  than  for  that  of  the  recipient.  He  puts  his  division  in 
these  terms :  “  According  to  this,  there  are  two  kinds  of 

grace:  one,  namely,  through  which  the  recipient  himself  is 
united  to  God,  and  this  is  called  a  grace  that  makes  one  pleasing 
to  the  Giver  —  gratia  gratum  faciens ;  another,  again,  through 
which  one  person  assists  others,  for  the  purpose  of  leading 
them  back  to  God;  and  a  gift  of  this  kind  is  termed  a  grace 
gratuitously  bestowed  —  gratia  gratis  data.”  28  In  another 
sense,  however,  both  kinds  of  grace  are  gratuitous  gifts,  ex¬ 
cluding  not  only  all  natural  merit,  but  also  rising  above  the 
exigencies  of  human  nature.29 

Again,  the  gratia  gratum  faciens  is  also  of  two  kinds:  habit¬ 
ual  and  actual.  “  For  the  right  ordering  of  his  life,”  he  says, 
“  man  needs  a  two-fold  help  of  God :  one  by  way  of  a  perma¬ 
nent  gift,  through  which  corrupted  human  nature  is  healed,  and 
when  healed  is  elevated,  for  the  purpose  of  performing  ac¬ 
tions  that  are  meritorious  of  life  eternal,  and -that  exceed  the 
powers  of  unaided  nature.  In  another  way  man  needs  the 
help  of  grace  in  order  that  he  may  be  moved  by  God  to  per¬ 
form  actions  that  are  necessary  for  the  attainment  of  salva¬ 
tion.”  30  This  latter  help  is  called  actual  grace. 

Actual  grace  is  a  movement  of  the  faculties  produced  by 
God;  habitual  grace  is  a  supernatural  quality  infused  into  the 
soul.  He  describes  both  in  these  terms :  “  It  was  said  above 

that  man  is  gratuitously  assisted  by  God  in  two  ways:  one 
way,  in  as  much  as  man’s  soul  is  moved  by  God  to  know  some¬ 
thing,  or  to  will,  or  to  act;  and  when  assisted  in  this  way,  the 
gratuitous  effect  produced  in  man  is  not  a  quality,  but  a  cer¬ 
tain  movement  of  the  soul;  for  the  act  of  him  that  moves  is 
movement  in  him  who  is  moved.  In  another  way,  man  is  as¬ 
sisted  by  the  gratuitous  will  of  God  in  the  sense  that  a  perma¬ 
nent  gift  is  infused  by  God  into  his  soul.  And  this  gift  is  in¬ 
fused  into  the  soul  because  it  would  be  unbecoming  that  God 
should  be  less  generous  to  creatures  destined  for  a  supernatural 

28  Ibid.  q.  hi,  a.  i.  30  Ibid.  a.  9. 

29  Ibid.  a.  1  ad  2m. 


ACTUAL  AND  SANCTIFYING  GRACE 


243 


end  than  to  those  destined  merely  for  a  natural  end.  For  to 
these  latter  He  not  only  imparts  the  requisite  movements  in 
respect  of  their  natural  actions,  but  He  also  endows  them  with 
permanent  forms,  and  certain  powers,  which  are  so  many  prin¬ 
ciples  of  action  in  accordance  with  the  movements  which  He 
imparts.  In  this  way  the  movements  produced  in  them  by  God 
are  connatural  to  these  creatures,  and  render  easy  the  exer¬ 
cise  of  their  powers,  according  to  the  saying  of  Wisdom :  *  He 

disposed  all  things  sweetly/  With  far  greater  reason,  there¬ 
fore,  does  He  infuse  certain  forms,  or  supernatural  qualities, 
into  those  creatures  that  He  directs  towards  the  attainment  of 
a  supernatural  and  eternal  good,  so  that  in  accordance  with 
them  they  may  be  moved  by  Him  to  the  acquisition  of  the 
aforesaid  eternal  good  both  sweetly  and  promptly.  And  in 
this  sense,  grace  is  a  certain  quality.”  31 

This  quality,  in  which  habitual  grace  consists,  is  distinct 
from  the  infused  virtues.  And  the  reason  is  that  the  infused 
virtues  presuppose  a  permanent  elevation  of  the  soul  to  the 
supernatural  order,  just  as  the  acquired  virtues  presuppose  the 
soul’s  essence.  Hence  sanctifying  grace  is  related  to  the  in¬ 
fused  virtues  very  much  the  same  way  as  nature  is  related  to 
its  potencies.32 

As  a  logical  consequence,  sanctifying  grace  has  for  its  im¬ 
mediate  subject  of  inhesion,  not  the  faculties,  as  is  the  case 
with  infused  virtues,  but  the  substance  of  the  soul  itself.  “  It 
follows  therefore,”  he  argues,  “  that  as  habitual  grace  is  prior 
to  the  virtues,  it  has  for  its  subject  something  that  is  prior  to 
the  potencies  of  the  soul ;  and  this  is  the  soul’s  substance.  For 
just  as  man  by  reason  of  his  intellectual  faculty  participates  in 
divine  cognition  through  the  virtue  of  faith,  and  by  reason 
of  his  volitional  faculty  participates  in  divine  love  through 
the  virtue  of  charity;  so  does  he  by  reason  of  the  substance 
of  his  soul  participate  according  to  a  certain  similitude  in  the 


31  Ibid.  q.  110,  a.  2. 

32  He  sums  up  his  argument  in 

these  terms :  “  Sicut  igitur  lumen 

naturale  rationis  est  aliquid  praeter 
virtutes  acquisitas,  quae  dicuntur  in 
ordine  ad  ipsum  lumen  naturale ; 


ita  etiam  ipsum  lumen  gratiae,  quod 
est  participatio  divinae  naturae,  est 
aliquid  praeter  virtutes  infusas, 
quae  a  lumine  illo  derivantur,  et  ad 
illud  lumen  ordinantur  ”  (Ibid.  a. 

3). 


244 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


divine  nature  through  a  spiritual  regeneration  and  supernatural 
elevation.  ”  33 

Both  actual  and  habitual  grace  are  divided  into  operating 
and  cooperating  grace.  He  explains  the  division  in  this  way 
“  Considered  in  either  sense,  grace  is  properly  divided  into 
operating  and  cooperating  grace.  For  the  operating  or  pro¬ 
ducing  of  an  effect  is  not  attributed  to  the  thing  moved  but  to 
the  mover  thereof ;  hence  in  the  production  of  that  effect  in 
respect  of  which  our  mind  is  moved  and  not  moving,  but  God 
alone  is  moving,  the  operation  is  attributed  to  God ;  and  in  this 
sense  the  movement  is  termed  operating  grace :  but  in  the  pro¬ 
duction  of  that  effect  in  regard  to  which  our  mind  is  both  mov¬ 
ing  and  moved,  the  operation  is  attributed  not  only  to  God,  but 
also  to  the  soul;  and  in  this  sense  the  movement  is  called  co¬ 
operating  grace.”  34  However,  habitual  grace  does  not  act 
effectively,  but  formally:  “  just  as  whiteness  is  said  to  make 
the  surface  of  a  body  white.”  35  Operating  and  cooperating 
graces  are  entitatively  the  same,  but  they  are  distinguished  in 
their  relation  to  the  effect  produced.36 

As  operating  or  preventing  grace  stands  exclusively  for  the 
operation  of  God  in  the  soul,  it  is  obvious  that  in  relation  to 
this  grace  there  can  be  no  question  of  freely  accepting  or  re¬ 
jecting  it.  Precisely  because  it  is  preventing  or  prevenient 
grace,  hence  it  comes  to  us  without  our  own  deliberate  concur¬ 
rence  —  est  in  nobis  sine  nobis.  But  the  question  is,  how  does 
it  affect  the  will?  Does  it  leave  the  will  free  to  make  it  co¬ 
operative,  so  that  the  efficacy  of  connection,  as  it  is  called, 
comes  from  the  free  will  prepared  by  grace?  Or  does  it  con¬ 
tain  that  same  efficacy  in  itself,  so  that  in  its  presence  the  will  is 
not  free  to  withhold  its  cooperation?  How  does  St.  Thomas 
answer  this  very  fundamental  question  ? 

In  one  sense  it  may  be  said  that  he  did  not  answer  it  at  all, 
in  as  much  as  he  never  proposed  the  question  in  that  particular 
form.  But  in  another  sense  he  answered  it  very  fully,  in  so 
far,  namely,  as  he  laid  down  principles  from  which  it  neces¬ 
sarily  follows  that  in  his  view  the  efficacy  of  connection  comes 

33  Ibid.  a.  4.  35  Ibid.  a.  2  ad  im. 

34  Ibid.  q.  hi,  a.  2.  36  Ibid.  a.  2  ad  4™. 


ACTUAL  AND  SANCTIFYING  GRACE 


245 


from  man’s  free  will.  Thus,  for  instance,  he  says  that  God 
“  acts  upon  man’s  free  will  in  such  a  way  as  to  impart  to  it 
the  power  of  acting,  and  to  bring  it  about  that  the  will  acts  to¬ 
gether  with  Him ;  without,  however,  interfering  with  the  free 
determination  of  the  will  in  respect  of  the  action  to  be  per¬ 
formed  and  the  end  to  be  attained.  Hence  the  will  retains  the 
dominion  over  its  own  action.”  37  And  again:  “  Man’s  will 
would  not  be  free  unless  it  belonged  to  him  to  determine  the 
course  of  his  own  actions,  and  to  choose  by  his  own  proper 
judgment  either  the  one  or  the  other.”  38  Statements  of  this 
kind  are  met  with  over  and  over  again  in  the  writings  of  St. 
Thomas,  and  therefore  the  only  possible  inference  is  that  he 
held  the  efficacy  of  connection  to  come  from  man’s  free  will 
and  not  from  grace.  Nor  is  this  inference  at  all  weakened  by 
the  fact  that  in  many  other  texts  he  ascribes  the  consent  of  the 
will  to  the  action  of  grace ;  for  they  need  mean  no  more  than 
that  grace  prepares  the  will  to  give  its  free  consent  when  it 
still  may  withhold  the  same.  Hence  the  contention  of  later 
Thomists,  that  the  Angelic  Doctor  taught  anything  like  their 
praemotio  physica,  is  absolutely  without  foundation  in  fact. 

Duns  Scotus  proposes  practically  the  same  doctrine  as  re¬ 
gards  actual  grace,  and  is  quite  definite  in  asserting  the  freedom 
of  the  human  will  as  moved  by  God.  That  freedom  is  not 
merely  a  matter  of  terms,  but  it  implies  the  power  of  freely 
choosing  either  the  one  or  the  other  of  two  opposite  actions  at 
the  very  instant  when  the  choice  is  made.39  Grace  and  free 
will  act  together  in  producing  the  same  effect,  and  that  effect 
may  be  impeded  by  the  withdrawal  of  either  of  the  two 
causes.40  Hence  the  efficacy  of  connection  is  derived  imme¬ 
diately  from  the  free  will,  and  mediately  from  grace;  in  as 
much,  that  is,  as  grace  prepares  the  will  to  give  its  free  con¬ 
sent.41 

On  the  other  hand,  the  teaching  of  Scotus  on  sanctifying 
grace  is,  to  say  the  least,  peculiar.  In  the  first  place,  he  identi¬ 
fies  sanctifying  grace  with  the  theological  virtue  of  charity. 

37  In  Sent.  II,  d.  25,  q.  1,  a.  1  ad  39  ibid.  I,  d.  39,  n.  16. 

3m  40  ibid.  II,  d.  37,  n.  14. 

38  Ibid.  d.  28,  q.  1,  a.  1.  41  Ibid. 


246 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


“  The  Holy  Ghost,”  he  says,  “  does  not  move  the  will  to  the 
meritorious  love  of  God  by  a  habit  distinct  from  charity,  nor 
does  He  by  a  habit  distinct  from  charity  dwell  in  the  soul;  and 
this  habit  is  grace,  and  grace  itself  is  charity.”  42  Thus  sanc¬ 
tifying  grace  and  charity  are  essentially  the  same;  nevertheless 
as  referred  to  God  they  are  distinct,  but  only  distinctione 
formalid 3 

Next  he  holds  that  sanctifying  grace  has  for  its  immediate 
subject  of  inhesion,  not  the  substance  of  the  soul,  but  the  will ; 
for  the  will  is  the  immediate  subject  of  charity,  and  charity  is 
the  same  as  grace.  Furthermore,  although  the  will  through 
charity  participates  in  divine  love,  and  the  intellect  through 
faith  participates  in  divine  knowledge;  yet  the  soul  through 
sanctifying  grace  is  not  made  a  partaker  of  the  divine  nature. 
The  reason  he  assigns  for  this  is  twofold:  First,  because  the 
divine  nature  so  far  transcends  all  created  beings  that  it  can¬ 
not  be  represented  in  them  by  a  proper  image  of  itself,  such  as 
participation  implies ;  secondly,  this  participation  would  neces¬ 
sitate  the  inhesion  of  sanctifying  grace  in  the  substance  of 
the  soul;  and  this  is  against  the  well  known  fact  that  the  loss 
of  grace  manifests  itself  first  in  the  loss  of  love,  which  is  in 
the  will.44 

In  this  reasoning  the  author  obviously  loses  sight  of  two 
facts  pointed  out  by  St.  Thomas:  First,  that  the  participa¬ 
tion  of  the  divine  nature  through  sanctifying  grace  is  only 
analogous,  consisting  as  it  does  in  a  certain  accidental  likeness 
to  God;  secondly,  that  the  infused  virtues  do  not  flow  physi¬ 
cally  from  sanctifying  grace,  and  consequently  there  is  no 
necessary  connection  between  the  loss  of  grace  and  of  the 
virtues.  Charity  is  indeed  lost  together  with  grace,  but  that 
is  because  of  its  essential  opposition  to  every  mortal  sin. 

B  —  Justification  and  Merit 

According  to  the  common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics,  jus¬ 
tification  is  effected  through  the  infusion  of  sanctifying  grace 

42  In  Sent.  II,  d.  27,  n.  35.  44  Ibid.  d.  26,  n.  1. 

43  Ibid. 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  MERIT 


247 


into  the  soul  by  God.  In  its  final  term  it  is  an  instantaneous 
change,  which  offers  four  distinct  points  for  consideration. 
Alexander  of  Hales  describes  it  in  the  following  manner : 
“  In  justification  there  are  two  terms:  the  term  whence  and 
the  term  whither  —  a  malo  ad  bonum.  Hence  on  the  part  of 
God  there  is  something  required  in  regard  to  the  term  whence, 
and  also  in  regard  to  the  term  whither :  in  like  manner  there  is 
something  required  on  our  part  in  regard  to  each.  .  .  .  Now 
on  the  part  of  God  there  is  required,  in  respect  of  the  term 
whither,  the  infusion  of  sanctifying  grace ;  and  in  respect  of  the 
term  whence,  the  forgiveness  of  sin.  On  our  part,  in  refer¬ 
ence  to  the  term  whither,  is  required  the  turning  of  our  free 
will  to  God  through  faith ;  and  in  reference  to  the  term  whence, 
contrition  or  the  detestation  of  sin.”  45 

This  exposition,  as  is  obvious,  presupposes  that  the  person 
to  be  justified  has  attained  to  the  use  of  reason;  for  in  infants 
justification  is  entirely  the  work  of  God,  and  as  such  comprises 
only  the  infusion  of  grace  and  the  remission  of  original  sin. 
The  matter  is  treated  in  the  same  way  by  St.  Bonaventure,46 
and  also  by  St.  Thomas.47  In  fact,  as  regards  the  four  points 
themselves,  enumerated  by  Alexander,  there  is  no  difference 
of  opinion  among  the  Scholastics.  All  admit  that  without  true 
conversion  of  heart  on  the  part  of  man,  and  the  infusion  of 
grace  together  with  forgiveness  of  sin  on  the  part  of  God,  there 
can  be  no  justification  of  the  adult  sinner.  A  mere  imputa¬ 
tion  of  the  justice  of  Christ,  such  as  was  excogitated  by  the  six¬ 
teenth-century  Reformers,  is  never  referred  to  by  them  as 
even  thinkable.  But  there  is  not  the  same  agreement  among 
them  when  the  above-mentioned  four  points  are  considered  in 
their  relation  to  one  another.  In  the  order  of  time  they  are 
simultaneous,  but  in  the  order  of  nature  priority  of  one  to 
the  others  must  be  admitted.  Which  of  them  has  the  prece¬ 
dence?  It  is  on  this  that  opinions  differ.  A  few  words  must 
suffice  to  indicate  the  nature  of  the  contention. 

St.  Thomas  answers  the  question  of  priority  in  this  way: 
“  It  is  to  be  held  that  the  aforesaid  four  points,  which  are  re- 

45  Sum.  IV,  q.  1 7,  m.  4,  a.  6  ad  4m.  47  Sum.  Theol.  I.  II,  q.  113,  a.  6. 

46  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  17,  p.  1,  a.  2,  q.  1. 


248 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


quirea  for  the  justification  of  the  sinner,  are  indeed  simultan¬ 
eous  in  time  —  because  justification  is  not  successive ;  but  in  the 
order  of  nature  one  comes  before  the  other.  And  in  this 
order,  first  of  all  occurs  the  infusion  of  grace;  next  comes  the 
turning  of  the  free  will  to  God;  then  the  free  will  turns  against 
sin ;  and  in  the  fourth  place  is  granted  the  remission  of  guilt.”  48 
This  order,  he  argues,  must  be  observed  because  in  the  matter 
of  justification  God  takes  the  initiative,  and  He  acts  through 
the  infusion  of  grace.  It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  in  this 
explanation  he  considers  justification  under  its  formal  aspect. 
Hence  in  another  place  he  says  that  the  ultimate  disposition  re¬ 
quired  for  justification,  or  the  act  of  contrition,  proceeds  from 
sanctifying  grace  then  and  there  infused  into  the  soul;  quia 
secundum  ordinem  causae  formalis,  efdcientis  et  finalis  infusio 
gratiac  natura  prior  est.  On  the  other  hand,  if  justification  be 
considered  with  reference  to  the  material  cause  —  secundum 
ordinem  causae  materialis  —  the  forgiveness  of  sin  precedes 
the  infusion  of  grace,  and  is  in  its  turn  preceded  by  the  turning 
of  the  will  to  God  and  away  from  sin ;  because  this  is  required 
by  way  of  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  soul,  which  is  related 
to  grace  as  matter  to  its  form.49  Hence,  in  the  view  of  St. 
Thomas,  sanctifying  grace  is  the  formal  reason  of  the  expul¬ 
sion  of  sin  from  the  soul. 

Alexander  of  Hales  and  St.  Bonaventure  conceive  the  mat¬ 
ter  somewhat  differently.  According  to  them,  the  production 
of  grace  in  the  soul  is  indeed  prior  to  the  expulsion  of  sin;  but 
the  expulsion  of  sin,  in  its  turn,  is  prior  to  the  information  and 
sanctification  of  the  soul  by  grace.  In  a  similar  manner,  the 
act  of  contrition  on  the  part  of  the  subject  precedes  the  infusion 
of  grace  and  the  expulsion  of  sin,  but  only  as  attrition ;  the  mo¬ 
ment  that  grace  is  infused,  it  becomes  contrition  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  term,  and  then  sin  is  expelled  by  grace.50  Hence 
in  their  view  also,  sanctifying  grace  expels  sin  formally  from 
the  soul.  The  whole  process  of  justification  is  beautifully  de¬ 
scribed  by  St.  Bonaventure  in  his  Breviloquium.51 

48  Ibid.  q.  1 13,  a.  8.  50  Loc.  cit. 

49  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  17,  q.  1,  a.  4;  51  Op.  cit.  V,  3. 

De  Verit.  q.  28,  a.  8. 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  MERIT 


249 


Duns  Scotus  regards  justification  in  an  altogether  different 
light.  He  conceives  it  to  consist  in  two  divine  operations : 
the  forgiveness  of  sin  and  the  interior  renovation  of  the  soul 
through  sanctifying  grace.  The  two  are  simultaneous  in  time, 
but  in  the  order  of  nature  the  forgiveness  of  sin  precedes  the 
infusion  of  grace.52  Hence  grace  does  not  expel  sin  formally 
from  the  soul,  but  only  by  way  of  moral  exigency,  in  as  much 
as  its  presence  in  the  will  is  a  cogent  reason  why  God  should 
forgive  sin.  It  is,  therefore,  absolutely  possible  that  mortal  sin 
and  sanctifying  grace  should  be  in  the  soul  at  one  and  the  same 
time.53  Conversely,  of  course,  mortal  sin  does  not  formally 
expel  sanctifying  grace,  but  only  by  way  of  demerit.54  This 
peculiar  view  of  Scotus  on  justification  is  based  upon  an  equally 
peculiar  view  on  the  nature  of  habitual  sin,  that  is,  of  sin  as  it 
exists  in  the  soul  after  the  sinful  act  has  ceased.  Such  a  sin, 
according  to  him,  does  not  consist  in  the  privation  of  sanctify¬ 
ing  grace,  nor  in  anything  positive  in  the  soul ;  but  simply  in  a 
liability  to  punishment  —  nihil  aliud  nisi  ista  relatio  rationis, 
scilicet  ordinatio  ad  poenam ,55 

Closely  connected  with  the  question  of  justification  is  that 
of  merit.  For,  in  the  first  place,  although  justification  in  its 
ultimate  term  is  an  instantaneous  operation,  nevertheless  the 
whole  process  consists  of  many  acts  of  the  will  elicited  under 
the  influence  of  actual  grace;  and  in  regard  to  these  acts  the 
question  immediately  arises  whether  they  have  any  meritorious 
value.  In  the  next  place,  justification  is  not  intended  for  its 
own  sake,  but  is  meant  as  a  preparation  for  the  attainment 
of  eternal  life;  hence  the  same  question  of  merit  recurs  in  re¬ 
gard  to  actions  performed  after  justification.  Hence  the  fol¬ 
lowing  few  points  in  the  teaching  of  the  Scholastics  on  the 
subject  of  merit  may  be  added  to  what  has  been  said  on  the 
question  of  justification  and  grace. 

The  first  point  that  deserves  consideration  in  this  connec¬ 
tion  is  the  possibility  of  merit.  For  merit,  as  St.  Thomas 

52  In  Sent.  I,  d.  17,  q.  2;  Report.  Mastrius,  Scotus  Academicus,  IX, 

IV,  d.  16,  q.  2,  n.  23.  tr.  3,  d.  3,  q.  2.  3. 

53  Report.  IV,  d.  16,  q.  2;  cfr.  54  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  1,  q.  6. 

55  Ibid.  d.  16,  q.  2. 


250 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


observes,  is  in  the  order  of  justice;  and  as  God  cannot  be  under 
obligation  of  justice  in  regard  to  His  own  creatures,  it  would 
seem  that  merit  on  the  part  of  man  is  impossible.  He  solves 
the  difficulty  by  distinguishing  between  justice  according  to 
absolute  equality  and  justice  according  to  a  certain  proportion. 
The  former  can  indeed  have  no  place  between  man  and  God, 
but  the  latter  may;  in  so  far,  namely,  as  man  does  what  in 
him  lies  to  comply  with  the  demands  of  God  in  using  the 
powers  given  him  for  the  attainment  of  a  certain  end.  Hence, 
in  this  connection,  merit  presupposes  a  divine  ordination  in 
virtue  of  which  certain  actions  are  entitled  by  way  of  reward 
to  an  equivalent  of  their  moral  value  in  the  eyes  of  God.56 

In  regard  to  the  conditions  put  down  for  merit,  presupposing 
the  divine  ordination  just  mentioned,  there  is  no  disagreement. 
All  postulate  the  status  viae,  freedom  of  choice,  and  the  as¬ 
sistance  of  divine  grace.  Thus  St.  Thomas,  after  pointing 
out  the  necessity  of  grace,  says  very  briefly:  Quia  creatura 
rationalis  seipsam  movet  ad  agendum  per  liberum  arbitrium; 
unde  sua  actio  habet  rationem  meriti ,57  And  Scotus  defines 
meritorious  actions  in  these  terms:  Actus  potentiae  liberae  et 
secundum  inclinationem  gratiae  elicitus,  acceptus  a  Deo  ut 
praemiabilis  beatitudineP 8  Furthermore,  when  there  is  an 
equality  of  proportion  between  the  meritorious  action  and  the 
reward,  merit  is  said  to  be  condign  —  de  condigno ;  when  that 
equality  is  wanting,  but  still  there  is  a  certain  fitness  that  the 
action  should  receive  some  remuneration,  merit  is  termed  con¬ 
gruous  —  de  congruo.  Both  kinds  of  merit  are  admitted  by 
the  Scholastics. 

The  object  of  merit  varies  with  the  conditions  of  the  person 
who  performs  the  meritorious  action.  In  the  first  place,  if 
he  is  in  the  state  of  mortal  sin,  he  is  incapable  of  meriting  de 
condigno;  because  no  one  is  entitled  to  a  reward  who  is  not 
united  to  God  through  sanctifying  grace.59  Secondly,  if  he 
is  in  the  state  of  grace,  he  can  merit  de  condigno  both  an  in¬ 
crease  of  sanctifying  grace  and  life  eternal.  In  regard  to  the 

56  Sum.  Theol.  I.  II,  q.  114,  a.  1.  59  Cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  I. 

57  Ibid.  II,  q.  1 14,  a.  5. 

58  In  Sent.  I,  d.  17,  q.  3,  n.  25. 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  MERIT 


251 


second  point,  namely,  that  life  eternal  can  be  merited  de  con- 
digno,  there  never  was  any  difference  of  opinion  among  the 
Scholastics;  they  all  admitted  that  heaven  was  promised  not 
only  as  an  inheritance  but  also  as  a  reward.  On  the  other 
hand,  with  regard  to  the  increase  of  sanctifying  grace  opinions 
were  divided.  Thus,  for  instance,  St.  Bonaventure  contends 
that  although  such  an  increase  may  be  merited,  still  the  merit 
in  question  can  only  be  de  congruo.  And  the  reason  is  that 
there  is  a  want  of  proportion  between  the  lower  degree  of 
grace,  which  is  the  foundation  of  merit,  and  the  higher  degree 
which  is  conferred  as  a  reward.  But  at  the  same  time  it  is 
fitting  that  the  good  works  of  the  just  should  be  rewarded  by 
an  increase  of  grace,  and  hence  there  is  room  for  merit  de 
congruo .60 

St.  Thomas  solves  this  difficulty  by  distinguishing  between 
the  quantity  of  grace  and  its  power  of  meriting.  “  The  in¬ 
crease  of  grace,”  he  argues,  “  is  not  above  the  meriting  power 
of  the  grace  already  existing  in  the  soul,  although  it  exceeds 
that  same  grace  in  quantity.  And  this  may  be  illustrated  by 
an  example  taken  from  the  growth  of  a  tree ;  for  although  the 
tree  exceeds  the  seed  in  quantity,  nevertheless  it  was  evidently 
not  beyond  the  power  of  the  seed  to  produce  it.”  61  And  in 
keeping  with  this  solution  he  makes  the  general  statement, 
that  the  object  of  merit  comprises  everything  for  which  grace 
is  given ;  and  grace  is  given  not  only  for  the  actual  attainment 
of  eternal  life,  but  also  for  the  growth  in  sanctity  as  implied 
in  a  proper  preparation  for  that  life.  And  in  this  sense  the 
increase  of  sanctifying  grace  falls  under  merit  de  condigno.G 2 

The  object  of  merit  in  a  wider  sense  of  the  term,  or  of  merit 
de  congruo ,  may  comprise  even  the  spiritual  good  of  others. 
Thus  a  just  man  by  his  prayers  and  good  works  may  merit  the 
conversion  of  sinners,  or  an  increase  of  perfection  for  those 
who  are  already  in  the  state  of  grace.  Of  course,  what  is 
merited  in  this  case  is  not  sanctifying  grace  itself,  but  the 
bestowal  of  actual  graces  that  lead  to  the  end  intended. 

60  In  Sent.  II,  d.  2 7,  a.  2,  q.  2.  62  Ibid.  a.  8. 

61  Sum.  Theol.  I.  II,  q.  H4»  a.  8 
ad  2m. 


252 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Hence,  although  no  one  can  merit  the  first  grace  for  himself, 
he  may  merit  it  for  others.  St.  Thomas  argues  the  point  in 
this  way:  “  Because  a  just  man  fulfills  the  will  of  God,  hence 
it  is  fitting  that  God  also,  in  consideration  of  their  mutual 
friendship,  should  have  regard  to  his  will  in  reference  to  the 
conversion  of  others.”  63 

The  chief  points  contained  in  the  present  chapter,  especially 
those  referring  to  actual  grace  and  justification,  were  incorpo¬ 
rated  by  the  Council  of  Trent  in  its  dogmatic  decree  on  the 
justification  of  sinners.64  Further  particulars  regarding  the 
definition  of  the  points  in  question  will  be  given  in  another 
chapter. 

63  Ibid.  a.  6. 


64  Cfr.  DB.  793  sqq. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


INFUSED  VIRTUES  :  THEOLOGICAL  AND  CARDINAL 

Most  of  the  Scholastics  treat  the  subject  of  infused  virtues 
in  connection  with  Christology.  Peter  Lombard  introduces 
it  in  these  terms :  “  As  we  have  shown  above  that  Christ  was 

full  of  grace,  it  will  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  inquire  whether, 
besides  charity,  He  had  also  faith  and  hope.  For  if  He  was 
without  these,  it  seems  that  He  did  not  have  the  plenitude  of 
grace.  Now,  in  order  to  make  this  matter  clear,  we  must  con¬ 
sider  each  of  these  two  virtues  by  itself/’  1  Then  he  gives 
a  brief  dissertation  on  faith  and  hope,  and  points  out  in  what 
sense  they  were  found  in  Christ.  After  this  he  presents  an 
outline  of  his  views  on  the  four  cardinal  virtues,  justice,  forti¬ 
tude,  prudence,  and  temperance,2  to  which  he  adds  a  some¬ 
what  fuller  exposition  of  the  seven  gifts  of  the  Holy 
Ghost.3 

This  arrangement  and  disposition  of  the  subject-matter  was 
retained  by  his  commentators,  but  they  expanded  his  brief 
statements  into  numerous  and  lengthy  articles.  However,  in 
so  doing  they  did  not  indulge  in  profitless  speculations ;  on  the 
contrary,  they  contributed  very  much  to  the  development  of  a 
doctrine  which  had  only  been  touched  upon  in  a  general  way 
by  Patristic  writers.  The  following  points  may  be  put  down 
as  constituting  the  more  important  results  of  their  laborious 
investigations. 

i.  Nature  of  Infused  Virtues. —  Alexander  of  Hales  terms 
the  infused  virtues  gratiae  gratis  datae,  to  distinguish  them 
from  the  gratia  gratum  faciens  or  sanctifying  grace;4 
while  Peter  Lombard  and  most  of  his  commentators  speak  of 
them  as  gratuitous  habits  —  habitus  gratuiti.  They  agree 

1  Sent.  Ill,  d.  23,  n.  I.  3  Ibid.  d.  34. 

2  Ibid.  d.  33.  4  Sum,  III,  q.  63. 


253 


254 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


with  acquired  habits  in  this,  that  they  are  permanent  disposi¬ 
tions  of  their  proper  subject  in  the  order  of  operation.  But 
they  are  distinguished  from  them  in  their  origin,  in  their 
sphere  of  activity,  and  in  their  relation  to  the  end  for  the 
attainment  of  which  they  are  intended.  Acquired  habits  are 
the  result  of  a  repeated  and  systematic  exercise  of  man’s 
natural  faculties;  of  themselves  they  operate  exclusively  in 
the  natural  order,  and  tend  towards  the  more  ready  attain¬ 
ment  of  a  natural  end.  As  a  consequence,  they  may  be  either 
good  or  bad,  according  as  they  incline  the  will  to  what  is 
morally  good  or  morally  evil.  Infused  habits,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  a  free  gift  of  God,  and  as  such  they  are  produced 
in  their  subject  without  any  operation  on  its  part;  their  pur¬ 
pose  is  not  to  facilitate  but  to  make  possible  the  connatural 
production  of  supernatural  acts,  and  their  tendency  is  always 
towards  a  supernatural  end.  Hence  they  are  necessarily  good, 
and  have  no  part  in  the  doing  of  evil.5  It  is  because  of 
this  that  they  are  called  virtues ;  because  a  virtue  is  defined  as 
“  a  habit  that  perfects  a  human  potency  in  respect  of  good 
acts/’ 6 

As  these  gratuitous  habits  have  thus  an  essential  relation  to 
activity,  their  proper  subject  is  not  the  substance  of  the  soul, 
but  the  faculties  through  which  the  soul  exerts  its  own  activity 
as  a  rational  being.7  Hence  they  reside  in  the  intellect  and 
will,  and  are  ad  modum  potentiae.  St.  Thomas,  however, 
holds  that  they  may  also  reside  in  the  sensitive  potencies 
“  sed  secundum  quod  sunt  rationales  per  participatio nem,  ut 
obedientcs  rationi .8  Scotus  says  that  they  immediately  per¬ 
fect  the  soul.9 

Although  the  infused  habits,  or  virtues,  are  really  distinct 
from  one  another,  yet  they  are  all  connected  among  them¬ 
selves,  and  with  sanctifying  grace.  On  this  general  statement 
all  Scholastics  are  agreed,  but  they  are  at  variance  in  regard 

5  Cfr.  Thomas,  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  Thomas,  loc.  cit.  q.  2,  a.  3;  Albert. 
23,  q.  1,  a.  1-5;  Bonavent.  ibid.  a.  Magn.  In  Sent.  Ill,  q.  23,  a.  6; 
1 ;  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  q.  68,  m.  3.  Bonavent.  Ibid.  a.  1,  q.  2. 

6  Thomas,  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  23,  q.  1,  8  Sum.  Theol.  I.  II,  q.  50,  a.  3. 

a.  4.  9  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  34,  n.  6. 

7  Halens.  loc.  cit.  m.  3,  8; 


THE  INFUSED  VIRTUES 


255 


to  some  particular  aspects  of  the  point  in  question.  The 
Lombard  and  a  few  others  seem  to  hold  that  grace  and  the  in¬ 
fused  virtues  are  essentially  the  same,  but  their  position  in 
reference  to  this  matter  is  not  very  clear.10  St.  Bonaventure 
expresses  his  view  in  these  terms  :  “  Because  of  its  perfec¬ 

tion,  by  reason  of  its  dignity  and  eminence,  grace  confers  on 
man  all  the  habits  that  constitute  the  integrity  of  justice  in 
relation  to  the  various  acts  and  objects,  conditions  and  oppor¬ 
tunities,  which  are  found  in  statu  viae.”  11  However  this 
“  conferring  ”  does  not  imply  efficient  causality  on  the  part 
of  grace;  it  denotes  only  a  certain  concomitant  exigency,  in 
view  of  which  God  produces  the  virtues  in  the  soul.12  In 
this  sense  they  have  their  origin  in  grace,  and  in  so  far  grace 
may  be  regarded  as  their  source.13  They  have  each  their  own 
proper  form  which  bears  a  relation  to  specifically  different  acts, 
and  hence  they  are  essentially  and  formally  distinct.14 

St.  Thomas  teaches  practically  the  same.  “Just  as  the  po¬ 
tencies,”  he  says,  “  which  are  certain  principles  of  action,  flow 
from  the  essence  of  the  soul;  so  also  do  the  virtues  flow  from 
grace  into  the  potencies  of  the  soul,  which  are  thereby  moved 
to  their  own  proper  acts.”  15  And  again  :  “  Grace  is  reduced 

to  the  first  species  of  qualities;  however  it  is  not  the  same  as 
virtue,  but  is  by  way  of  habitude,  which  is  presupposed  to 
the  infused  virtues  as  their  principle  and  root.”  16 

Alexander  of  Hales  develops  these  points  at  considerable 
length,  while  the  others  touch  upon  them  more  or  less  inci¬ 
dentally.  He  points  out  the  distinction  between  sanctifying 
grace  and  the  infused  virtues;  their  relation  to  one  another 
and  to  salutary  acts;  their  connection  with  the  gifts  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  and  their  distinction  from  the  same.  On  all 
these  questions  his  teaching  is  essentially  the  same  as  that  set 
forth  in  the  preceding  paragraphs.17 

2.  Division  of  Infused  Virtues. —  Infused  virtues,  writes 

10  Sent.  d.  26,  n.  4.  15  Sum.  Theol.  I.  II,  q.  no,  a.  4 

11  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  34,  p.  1,  a.  2,  ad  im. 


q.  3- 

12  Ibid.  II,  d.  27,  a.  1,  q.  2  ad  im. 

13  Ibid.  Ill,  d.  34,  p.  1,  a.  1,  q.  2. 

14  Ibid.  d.  33,  a.  unic.  q.  2. 


16  Ibid.  a.  3  ad  3m. 

17  Sum.  Ill,  q.  62-64. 


256 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Alexander  of  Hales,  are  classed  according  as  they  are  in  finem 
or  ad  finem.  To  the  former  class  belong  the  three  theological 
virtues  of  faith,  hope,  and  charity;  to  the  latter,  the  four 
cardinal  virtues  of  prudence,  justice,  fortitude,  and  temper¬ 
ance.18  This  is  the  same  division  as  that  given  by  the  Lom¬ 
bard,  and  was  adopted  by  most  of  the  Schoolmen.  By  some, 
however,  it  was  rejected  as  unduly  multiplying  the  number  of 
infused  virtues.  Thus  Scotus  denies  that  any  solid  reason 
can  be  assigned  for  holding  that  moral  virtues  are  infused  by 
God;  because  the  acquired  virtues  under  the  influence  of 
faith  and  charity  are  quite  sufficient  to  regulate  man’s  moral 
conduct.19  The  same  position  was  taken  by  Henry  of  Ghent,20 
Durandus,21  and  most  of  the  Nominalists. 

The  necessity  and  nature  of  the  theological  virtues  is  thus 
indicated  by  St.  Thomas :  “  Man  is  perfected  by  virtue  in 

respect  of  the  acts  that  place  him  in  due  relation  to  beatitude. 
.  .  .  Now  man’s  beatitude  or  happiness  is  twofold:  One 
that  is  in  proportion  to  human  nature,  and  to  which  man  can 
attain  by  the  proper  use  of  his  natural  principles  of  action; 
another  that  exceeds  man’s  nature,  and  which  he  can  reach 
only  through  divine  power  by  way  of  a  certain  participation 
of  the  divinity.  .  .  .  And  because  this  beatitude  exceeds  the 
capacity  of  human  nature,  hence  man’s  natural  principles  of 
action  .  .  .  are  not  sufficient  to  place  him  in  due  relation  to 
it;  and  therefore  it  is  necessary  that  other  principles  be  di¬ 
vinely  bestowed  on  him,  by  which  he  is  so  disposed  in  respect 
of  supernatural  beatitude,  as  he  is  disposed  by  natural  prin¬ 
ciples  of  action  in  regard  to  his  connatural  end,  though  not 
without  the  assistance  of  divine  grace.  Now  these  principles 
are  called  theological  virtues;  both  because  they  have  God  for 
their  object,  in  as  much  as  by  them  we  are  placed  in  the  proper 
relation  to  God;  and  because  they  are  infused  into  us  by  God 
alone;  and  also  because  their  existence  is  known  to  us  only 
by  divine  revelation  as  contained  in  Holy  Scripture.”  22 

These  theological  virtues  are  really  distinct  from  intellec- 

18  Ibid.  q.  68.  21  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  33,  q.  6. 

19  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  36,  n.  28.  22  Sum.  Theol.  I.  II,  62,  a.  1. 

20  Quodl.  6,  q.  1 2. 


THE  INFUSED  VIRTUES 


257 


tual  and  moral  virtues.  Because  “  habits  are  distinguished 
according  to  the  formal  difference  of  their  objects;  but  the 
object  of  the  theological  virtues  is  God  Himself,  the  ultimate 
end  of  things,  in  so  far  as  He  exceeds  the  cognition  of  our 
reason;  while  the  object  of  intellectual  and  moral  virtues  is 
something  that  can  be  comprehended  by  human  reason :  there¬ 
fore  the  theological  virtues  are  specifically  distinct  from  in¬ 
tellectual  and  moral  virtues.”  23 

There  are  only  three  theological  virtues  —  faith,  hope,  and 
charity.  This  follows  from  their  very  nature,  since  they  are 
in  us  as  so  many  permanent  dispositions  towards  God  as  our 
last  end.  For  in  every  one  who'  strives  to  attain  an  end,  two 
prerequisites  must  be  found  before  he  can  act  —  knowledge 
of  the  end  and  an  intention  of  attaining  the  end.  But  in  order 
to  have  such  an  intention,  two  further  prerequisites  are  neces¬ 
sary  :  First,  the  possibility  of  attaining  the  end,  for  no  one 
is  moved  to  strive  for  what  is  impossible;  secondly,  the  good¬ 
ness  of  the  end,  because  no  one  intends  except  what  is  good. 
Therefore  faith  is  required  in  order  to  make  the  end  known; 
hope  is  necessary  to  give  confidence  of  attaining  the  end; 
charity  is  needed  to  incline  the  agent  to  the  end  as  his  own 
good.  And  besides  these  nothing  else  is  requisite  by  way  of 
placing  man  in  a  proper  relation  to  the  attainment  of  his  last 
end,  which  is  God.24 

However,  as  these  theological  virtues  have  God  for  their 
object,  there  must  be  other  infused  virtues  whose  object  con¬ 
sists  in  the  things  that  lead  us  to  God;  and  these  are  the  in¬ 
fused  moral  virtues.  They  bear  the  same  relation  to  the  theo¬ 
logical  virtues  as  the  acquired  intellectual  and  moral  virtues 
bear  to  our  natural  principles  of  action.25  They  are  in  the 
same  general  order  of  operation  as  the  acquired  moral  virtues, 
but  they  are  specifically  distinct  from  them ;  because  their  for¬ 
mal  object  is  different,  in  as  much  as  they  regulate  man’s 
activity  according  to  the  supernatural  norm  of  rectitude.26 

3.  The  Virtue  of  Faith. —  Faith,  says  St.  Bonaventure,  is 
not  only  a  virtue,  but  it  is  the  pilot  or  helmsman  of  all  virtues; 

23  Ibid.  a.  2.  25  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  63,  a.  3. 

24  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  33,  q.  1,  a.  5.  26  Ibid.  a.  4. 


258 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


because  without  faith  there  is  no  knowledge  of  God  as  our 
supernatural  end,  and  without  such  knowledge  no  infused  vir¬ 
tue  could  exert  its  activity  along  its  own  proper  line  of  opera¬ 
tion.27  It  is  a  virtue  that  captivates  the  intellect  in  the  obedi¬ 
ence  of  Christ  and  clings  to  the  First  Truth  on  account  of 
Itself  and  above  all  things.28  In  regard  to  it,  authority  takes 
the  place  of  reason ;  not  any  authority  whatever,  but  the  Su¬ 
preme  Authority,  God  Himself,  who  is  infallible  in  His  testi¬ 
mony  to  the  truth.29 

Most  of  the  Scholastics  evolve  the  definition  of  faith  given 
by  St.  Paul  ■ —  Now  faith  is  the  substance  of  things  to  be  hoped 
for ,  the  evidence  of  things  that  appear  not.30  “  This  designa¬ 
tion  of  faith,”  writes  St.  Thomas,  “  is  a  most  complete  defini¬ 
tion  ;  not  that  it  is  put  in  the  accustomed  form  of  a  definition, 
but  in  it  all  those  things  are  touched  upon  which  are  required 
for  a  definition  of  faith.”  31  Here  we  have  the  material  ob¬ 
ject  of  faith  in  the  things  that  appear  not ;  the  act  of  faith  in 
the  evidence  of  the  same  things;  and  the  end  of  faith  in  the 
substance  of  things  to  be  hoped  for  32  Or  as  St.  Bonaventure 
puts  it:  “  The  habit  of  a  virtue  must  be  designated  with  re¬ 
spect  to  two  things  —  its  end  and  its  object.  The  end  of  faith 
consists  in  eternal  beatitude,  which  we  hope  to  attain,  and 
therefore  in  the  things  to  be  hoped  for;  the  object  of  faith  con¬ 
sists  in  the  truth  that  is  not  seen,  and  therefore  in  the  things 
that  appear  not.”  33 

In  connection  with  this  definition  of  faith  given  by  the 
Apostle,  St.  Thomas  defines  the  virtue  of  faith  as  a  “  habit 
of  the  mind,  by  reason  of  which  eternal  life  has  its  inception 
in  us,  in  as  much  as  it  causes  the  intellect  to  give  its  assent  to 
things  that  are  not  seen.”  34  In  substance  this  definition  is 
admitted  by  the  other  representative  Scholastics,  although  they 
use  somewhat  different  terms.  In  the  first  place,  they  are  all 
agreed  that  faith,  whether  it  is  considered  in  one  and  the  same 
individual  or  in  several,  is  specifically  one  virtue;  because  a 


27  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  23,  a.  1,  q.  1. 

28  Ibid. 

29  Ibid,  ad  3m. 

30Hebr.  11,  1. 


31  De  Verit.  q.  14,  a.  2. 

32  Ibid. 

83  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  23,  a.  1,  q.  5. 
34  Loc.  cit. 


THE  INFUSED  VIRTUES 


259 


virtue  is  specified  by  its  principal  act,  and  the  principal  act  in 
its  turn  is  specified  by  its  proper  object,  and  the  proper  object 
of  faith  is  one  —  the  First  Truth.35  Furthermore,  all  are  at 
one  in  assigning  the  intellect  as  the  subject  of  the  virtue  of 
faith  ;  but  there  is  some  difference  of  opinion  among  them  as 
to  whether  faith  is  properly  in  the  speculative  or  practical  in¬ 
tellect.  The  latter  view  is  taken  by  Albertus  Magnus,36 
Richard  of  Middleton,37  and  a  few  others.  St.  Thomas  holds 
that  the  virtue  of  faith  “  is  in  the  speculative  intellect,  although 
it  is  there  as  the  remote  occasion  of  operation;  hence  opera¬ 
tion  is  not  attributed  to  it  except  as  under  the  influence  of 
charity.  However  it  must  be  noted  that  it  is  not  in  the  specu¬ 
lative  intellect  absolutely,  but  in  so  far  as  the  latter  is  subject 
to  the  dictate  of  the  will.”  38  The  matter  is  viewed  in  prac¬ 
tically  the  same  light  by  St.  Bonaventure  ;39  while  Alexander 
of  Hales  holds  that  if  faith  be  considered  materially  it  must 
be  said  to  be  in  the  speculative  intellect,  but  if  taken  formally 
it  is  in  the  practical  intellect.40 

The  object  of  faith  is  twofold  —  material  and  formal. 
The  former  consists  in  the  truths  that  must  be  believed;  the 
latter,  in  the  reason  upon  which  this  belief  is  made  to  rest. 
The  Scholastic  teaching  on  both  points  may  be  given  in  a  few 
words. 

In  the  first  place,  all  admit  that  the  material  object  of  faith 
comprises  in  a  general  way  all  the  truths  revealed  by  God,  in 
the  sense  that  belief  in  them  can  be  made  to  rest  upon  the 
infallible  authority  of  God’s  word.41  In  so  far  there  is  full 
agreement  of  views;  but  this  agreement  ceases  when  the  ques¬ 
tion  is  asked,  whether  truths  that  are  clearly  apprehended  by 
man’s  natural  reason  may  at  the  same  time  be  an  object  of 
faith.  On  this  there  are  the  following  two  sets  of  opinions. 


35  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  23, 
a.  1,  q.  3;  Albert.  Magn.  ibid.  a.  12; 
Middleton,  ibid.  a.  4,  q.  3 ;  Halens. 
Sum.  Ill,  q.  68,  m.  4. 

36  Loc.  cit.  a.  6. 

37  Loc.  cit.  a.  6,  q.  2. 

38  De  Verit.  q.  14,  a.  4;  In  Sent. 
Ill,  d.  23,  q.  2,  a.  3. 


39  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  23,  a.  1,  q.  1. 

40  Sum.  Ill,  q.  68,  m.  3. 

41  Halens.  loc.  cit.  m.  7,  a.  6; 
Bonavent.  loc.  cit.  q.  2 ;  Thomas, 
Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  1,  a.  1 ;  Scotus, 
In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  23,  n.  6. 


260 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


The  question  is  answered  negatively  by  St.  Thomas,  who 
expresses  his  view  in  these  terms :  “  A  thing  may  be  credible 

in  two  ways :  First,  simply,  in  the  sense  that  it  exceeds  the 
capacity  of  all  men  whilst  they  are  in  statu  viae  —  such  as  the 
truth  of  the  Trinity,  and  others  of  the  same  kind.  Concern¬ 
ing  these  it  is  impossible  that  any  man  should  have  natural 
knowledge;  hence,  everyone  of  the  faithful  gives  his  assent 
to  them  because  of  the  testimony  of  God,  to  whom  they  are 
ever  present  and  known.  Secondly,  a  thing  may  be  credible 
not  simply,  but  only  in  respect  of  some  particular  person; 
for  the' reason  that  it  does  not  exceed  the  capacity  of  all  men, 
but  of  some  only ;  such  as  the  truths  that  can  be  known  by 
demonstration.  Of  this  kind  are  the  truths  that  God  is  one 
and  incorporeal,  and  others  of  the  same  nature.  In  regard 
to  them  there  is  no  reason  why  they  should  not  be  known  to 
some  by  way  of  demonstration,  and  believed  by  others  who 
for  one  reason  or  another  do  not  perceive  the  force  of  the 
demonstration :  but  it  is  impossible  that  they  should  be  both 
known  and  believed  by  the  same  person.”  42  The  position 
thus  taken  by  St.  Thomas  was  endorsed  by  Scotus,43  and  is 
defended  by  many  modern  theologians,  although  the  ma¬ 
jority  reject  it  as  untenable.  On  the  other  hand,  St.  Bona- 
venture,44  Alexander  of  Hales,45  Albertus  Magnus,46  Richard 
of  Middleton,47  and  Durandus,48  took  the  opposite  view.  St. 
Bonaventure  argues  the*  point  in  this  way :  “  The  reason 

why  such  knowledge  is  compatible  with  faith  in  regard  to 
the  same  object,  so  that  the  one  cognition  does  not  expel  the 
other,  is  this,  because  knowledge  which  results  from  the  light 
of  reason,  although  it  affords  some  certainty  and  evidence  in 
reference  to  divine  things,  does  nevertheless  not  make  that 
certainty  and  evidence  quite  clear  so  long  as  we  are  on  the  way 
to  God.  For  although  we  may  be  able  to  show  by  conclusive 
reasons  that  God  exists  and  that  God  is  one,  still  we  are  not 
able  to  see  the  divine  essence  itself,  nor  the  unity  of  God,  nor 

42  De  Verit.  q.  14,  a.  9.  46  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  15,  a.  9. 

43  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  23,  n.  17.  47  Ibid.  d.  24,  q.  5. 

44  Ibid.  a.  2,  q.  3.  48  Ibid.  q.  1. 

45  Loc.  cit.  m.  7,  a.  3. 


THE  INFUSED  VIRTUES 


261 

how  that  unity  does  not  exclude  the  plurality  of  persons,  un¬ 
less  we  are  purified  by  the  justice  of  faith.  .  .  .  Hence,  as  was 
pointed  out  above,  just  as  faith  is  compatible  with  external 
vision,  because  something  remains  hidden  about  the  person  of 
Christ  ;  so  must  it  also  be  understood  in  regard  to  the  habit 
of  faith  and  this  manner  of  knowing,  namely,  that  they  are 
compatible  with  each  other  in  the  same  person  and  in  respect 
of  the  same  material  object.”  49 

The  truths  to  be  believed  are  in  the  present  order  of  Provi¬ 
dence  unchangeable,  so  that  the  material  object  of  faith  admits 
neither  of  increase  nor  diminution.  However  men's  knowl¬ 
edge  of  what  is  contained  in  the  material  object  of  faith  grows 
with  the  lapse  of  time;  “because  what  at  one  time  was  be¬ 
lieved  only  implicitly,  as  involved  in  some  article  of  the  faith, 
was  later  on  explained  and  thereupon  became  an  object  of  ex¬ 
plicit  belief.”  50  In  this  sense,  therefore,  faith  may  also  be 
said  to  grow  objectively;  not  by  addition  to  the  truths  revealed, 
but  by  a  clearer  exposition  of  them  as  occasioned  by  the  cir¬ 
cumstances  of  time.51 

The  formal  object  of  faith,  as  was  stated  above,  is  the 
reason  upon  which  supernatural  faith  is  based.  This  reason, 
according  to  the  common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics,  is  the 
Supreme  Truth  bearing  witness  to  Its  truthfulness  and  au¬ 
thority  in  the  revelation  made  to  men.  Thus  St.  Bonaventure, 
answering  the  objection  that  to  believe  without  reason  is 
worthy  of  blame,  says:  “This  is  very  true  in  cases  where 
authority  does  not  supply  the  place  of  reason.  But  where 
authority  does  supply  the  place  of  reason  it  is  not  blameworthy 
but  commendable.  Thus  it  is  in  faith ;  for  although  no  reason 
presents  itself  to  the  intellect  on  account  of  which  it  ought  to 
give  its  assent  to  the  truth,  nevertheless  there  is  present  to  it 
the  authority  of  the  Supreme  Truth  which  exerts  its  suasion 
on  the  heart;  and  we  know  that  the  Supreme  Truth  cannot  lie, 
and  therefore  it  is  impious  not  to  believe  Its  testimony.”  52 

49  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  24,  a.  2,  q.  3.  ibid.  a.  5,  q.  1 ;  Scotus,  Report.  Ill, 

50  Ibid.  d.  25,  a.  2,  q.  1.  d.  25,  q.  1 ;  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  11,  q.  3, 

51  Albert.  Magn.  ibid.  q.  1 ;  n.  5. 

Thomas,  ibid.  q.  2,  a.  2;  Middleton,  52  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  23,  a.  1,  q.  I. 


262 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Or  as  Scotus  puts  it  very  briefly:  “  Fides  infusa  assentit 
alicui  revelato,  quia  credit  Deo ,  vel  veracitati  Dei  asserentis 
illudF  53  And  St.  Thomas :  “  Ratio  assentit  alicni  ex  hoc 

quod  est  a  Deo  dictum ”  54 

However  the  intellect  does  not  give  its  assent  precisely  as 
compelled  by  the  evidence  of  the  revealed  truth;  faith  is  a  free 
act  and  depends  partly  on  the  bidding  of  the  will  as  moved  by 
divine  grace.  “  Faith/’  says  St.  Thomas,  “  is  not  in  the  in¬ 
tellect  except  in  so  far  as  commanded  by  the  will,  .  .  .  Hence 
although  the  act  of  the  will  can  be  said  to  be  accidental  to  the 
intellect,  yet  it  is  essential  to  faith.”  55  On  the  other  hand, 
the  act  of  the  mind  is  not  a  blind  assent;  the  light  of  faith 
itself  makes  it  reasonable.50  The  intellect  is  elevated  and  en¬ 
lightened  by  the  First  Truth,  and  so  disposed,  it  is  inclined  by 
the  will,  also  elevated  by  divine  grace,  to  yield  its  assent  to  the 
truth  proposed.57 

The  certainty  of  faith,  therefore,  is  not  in  proportion  to  the 
light  of  evidence,  but  to  the  weight  of  God’s  authority.  St. 
Thomas  presents  this  aspect  of  faith  as  follows :  “  Certainty 

imports  two  things:  First,  firmness  of  the  assent  given,  and 
in  this  respect  faith  is  more  certain  than  all  cognition  and 
knowledge;  because  the  First  Truth,  which  causes  the  assent 
of  faith,  is  a  more  powerful  cause  than  the  light  of  reason 
which  causes  the  assent  in  natural  cognition.  Secondly,  cer¬ 
tainty  imports  also  the  evidence  of  that  to  which  assent  is 
given,  and  in  this  respect  there  is  no  certainty  in  faith.”  58 

St.  Bonaventure  puts  the  same  teaching  in  a  somewhat  dif¬ 
ferent  form.  Speaking  about  the  action  of  grace  in  the  mat¬ 
ter  of  faith,  he  says :  “  Since  man  must  give  credence  to  the 

truth,  and  greater  credence  to  the  greater  truth,  and  the  great¬ 
est  credence  to  the  greatest  truth;  and  since  the  truth  of  the 
First  Principle  is  infinitely  greater  than  all  created  truth,  and 
infinitely  more  luminous  than  all  the  light  of  his  intellect,  it 
necessarily  follows  that  his  intellect,  in  order  to  show  itself 

53  Ibid.  d.  23.  57  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  23, 

64  De  Verit.  q.  14,  a.  2.  a.  1,  q.  1  ad  3m. 

55  Ibid.  a.  3  ad  iom.  58  De  Verit.  q.  14,  a.  1  ad  7m. 

56  Ibid.  corp. 


THE  INFUSED  VIRTUES 


263 


properly  disposed  in  the  matter  of  belief,  must  give  greater 
faith  to  the  first  Truth  than  to  itself,  and  thus  yield  itself  to 
the  obedience  of  Christ,  so  that  he  not  only  believes  those 
things  that  appear  to  be  in  conformity  with  reason,  but  also 
those  that  are  above  reason  and  in  opposition  to  the  experi¬ 
ence  of  the  senses.  If  he  refuses  to  do  this,  he  fails  to  show 
the  proper  reverence  that  is  due  to  the  Supreme  Truth,  pre¬ 
ferring  as  he  does  the  judgment  of  his  natural  reason  to  the 
dictate  of  the  Eternal  Light.”  59 

Hence  the  certainty  of  faith  consists  in  only  one  thing  —  in 
the  firmness  with  which  the  mind  clings  to  the  First  Truth.60 
From  this  it  naturally  follows  that  faith  does  not  necessarily 
exclude  from  the  mind  involuntary  doubts  in  regard  to  the 
truths  that  are  believed,  although  its  certainty  is  of  a  higher 
order  than  that  which  can  be  found  in  any  natural  knowledge ; 
because  in  faith  “  the  intellect  is  not  in  the  quiescent  state  that 
results  from  the  evidence  of  vision.”  61 

4.  The  Virtue  of  Hope. —  Hope  is  defined  by  the  Lombard 
as  “  a  virtue  by  which  spiritual  and  eternal  things  are  hoped 
for,  that  is,  are  looked  forward  to  with  confidence.”  62  “  This 

expectation/’  comments  St.  Bonaventure,  “  consists  in  a  cer¬ 
tain  reaching  out  to  the*  good  things  of  eternity,  which  arises 
from  the  confidence  with  which  the  soul,  in  all  the  abandon  of 
its  strength,  leans  upon  God  Himself.”  63  Almost  the  same 
terms  are  used  by  St.  Thomas,  when  he  says  that  “  hope  im¬ 
plies  a  certain  reaching  out  of  the  appetite  to  what  is  good.”  64 
All  are  agreed  that  hope  is  a  theological  virtue,  and  nearly 
all  that  it  is  really  distinct  from  faith  and  charity.65  Its  real 
distinction  from  the  other  two  theological  virtues  was  called 
in  question  by  a  few  obscure  writers,  whose  view,  Scotus  says, 
“  is  opposed  to  the  authority  of  the  saints  as  based  upon  the 


69  Breviloq.  V,  7. 

60  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  23, 
a.  1,  q.  3. 

61  Thomas,  ibid.  q.  2,  a.  2,  sol.  3 
ad  2m. 

62  Sent.  Ill,  d.  26,  c.  1. 

63  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  26,  a.  1,  q.  3 
ad  4m. 


64  Sum.  Theol.  I.  II,  q.  40,  a.  2. 

65  Albert  Magn.  In  Sent  III,  d. 
26,  a.  2;  Bonavent.  ibid.  a.  1,  q.  2, 
3;  Thomas,  ibid.  q.  2,  a.  3 ;  Middle- 
ton,  ibid.  a.  3,  q.  3;  Durandus,  ibid, 
q.  2. 


264 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


teaching  of  St.  Paul.”  60  The  reason  why  hope  is  to  be  con¬ 
sidered  as  a  theological  virtue  is  thus  given  by  St.  Bonaven- 
ture :  “  Hope  must  undoubtedly  be  classed  as  a  theological 

virtue;  and  the  reason  for  this  assertion  is  taken  both  from 
the  object  and  the  subject  of  hope.  From  the  object,  because, 
just  as  faith  in  the  act  of  believing  gives  its  assent  to  God  as 
dictating  what  is  true,  so  does  hope  rely  upon  Him  as  promis¬ 
ing  what  is  great.  Hence  just  as  the  object  of  faith,  which 
acts  by  way  of  motive,  is  something  uncreated,  which  is  God, 
and  for  that  reason  faith  is  counted  among  the  theological  vir¬ 
tues;  so  the  same  must  be  said  and  understood  in  regard  to 
hope.  From  the  subject  also  a  similar  reason  may  be  taken; 
because  as  the  superior  part  of  the  soul  must  be  perfected  by 
the  theological  virtues,  and  as  hope  is  one  of  the  virtues  that 
perfects  this  part  of  the  soul,  it  follows  necessarily  that  hope 
is  a  theological  virtue.”  67  St.  Thomas  puts  this  very  briefly, 
when  he  says  :  “  Hope  has  God  for  its  object,  and  therefore 

it  is  a  theological  virtue.”  68  And  it  is  distinct  from  faith 
and  charity,  because  while  faith  simply  gives  knowledge  of 
man’s  last  end,  and  charity  embraces  it  as  the  highest  good, 
hope  tends  to  it  as  attainable.69 

The  material  object  of  hope,  according  to  the  Scholastics, 
is  God  Himself  to  be  possessed  in  eternal  beatitude.  “  The 
good  we  must  properly  and  chiefly  hope  for  from  God,”  says 
St.  Thomas,  “  is  infinite  and  in  proportion  to  God’s  assistance ; 
and  this  is  life  eternal,  consisting  in  the  fruition  of  God  Him¬ 
self.”  70  And  St.  Bonaventure:  “Whatever  hope  expects, 
it  expects  not  only  from  God  but  also  in  God,  so  that  possess¬ 
ing  God  it  may  possess  all  that  is  good.”  71  Hence  the  ma¬ 
terial  object  of  hope  does  not  consist  in  formal  beatitude, 
which  is  something  created,  and  finite,  but  in  beatitude  taken 
objectively,  which  is  God  Himself  as  the  object  of  blessed  frui¬ 
tion.  The  only  one  of  the  Scholastics  who  held  a  different 
view  on  this  point  was  Durandus,  in  as  much  as  he  made  for¬ 
mal  beatitude,  or  the  fruition  of  God  apart  from  God  Him- 

66  Ibid.  q.  unic.  n.  2;  cfr.  n.  10.  69  Ibid.  q.  2,  a.  3. 

67  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  26,  a.  1,  q.  3.  70  Sum.  Theol.  II.  II,  q.  17,  a.  2. 

68  Ibid.  q.  2,  a.  2.  71  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  26,  a.  1,  q.  2. 


THE  INFUSED  VIRTUES 


265 


self,  the  immediate  object  of  the  virtue  of  hope.72  Scotus  is 
sometimes  cited  as  holding  that  objective  and  formal  beati¬ 
tude  together  constitute  the  material  object  of  hope,  but  he 
states  quite  distinctly  and  definitely  that  hope  tends  to  a  good 
which  is  infinite  and  eternal,  and  this  is  God  Himself.73 

However,  as  is  quite  obvious,  since  no  one  can  hope  to  pos¬ 
sess  God  except  by  the  help  of  divine  grace,  the  material  ob¬ 
ject  of  hope  must  also  include  the  means  that  are  necessary  for 
salvation.  Hence  these  means  constitute  the  secondary  object 
of  hope.  In  this  sense  Scotus  writes:  “We  expect  an  in¬ 
finite  good  from  God,  who  liberally  communicates  Himself  to 
us  in  view  of  the  graces  previously  conferred. ”  74  In  the 
same  sense  also  St.  Thomas  writes :  “  Hope  looks  chiefly 

to  eternal  beatitude,  and  in  reference  to  it  all  other  things  are 
asked  of  God  ”  75  And  this  is  the  common  teaching  of  the 
Schoolmen. 

The  formal  object  of  hope,  if  taken  in  a  general  sense,  is 
the  possession  of  God  regarded  under  the  aspect  of  possibility. 
However,  as  the  possession  of  God  is  difficult  of  attainment, 
the  formal  object  of  hope  is  commonly  designated  as  summum 
bonum  in  quantum  summum  arduum  —  it  is  the  Supreme 
Good  as  possible  of  attainment  indeed,  but  not  without  great 
difficulty.  This  is  the  explanation  given  by  St.  Thomas,  who 
says:  “Hope  implies  a  motion  of  the  appetite  towards  a 
good  that  is  commensurate  with  the  strength  of  him  that 
hopes :  for  it  neither  regards  a  good  that  is  unattainable,  nor 
a  good  that  is  esteemed  as  nothing;  but  such  a  good  only  as 
can  be  attained,  yet  the  attainment  of  which  is  difficult.  For 
this  reason  it  is  termed  a  bonum  arduum.” 76  Others  use 
practically  the  same  terms,  though  some  of  them  attach  a 
slightly  different  meaning  to  the  term  arduum.77 

From  the  fact  that  hope  has  the  attainment  of  good  for 
its  object,  it  necessarily  follows  that  it  is  a  virtue  which  re¬ 
sides  in  the  will.  On  this  point  all  Scholastics  are  agreed. 

72  Ibid.  q.  2.  76  In  Sent.  Ill,  q.  26,  a.  2. 

73  Ibid.  d.  26,  n.  11.  77  Cfr.  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d. 

74  Loc.  cit.  26,  a.  2,  q.  4. 

75  Sum.  Theol.  II.  II,  q.  1 7>  a.  2 
ad  2m. 


266 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


But  there  is  no  strict  agreement  as  regards  the  number  of 
potencies  that  must  be  distinguished  in  the  will.  Some  few 
hold  that  the  irascible  part  of  the  will  constitutes  a  distinct 
potency,  and  is  therefore  really  distinct  from  the  concupiscible 
part.  Others  identify  the  irascible  and  concupiscible  parts 
so  completely  as  to  make  them  absolutely  one  potency  of  the 
rational  soul.78  Others,  again,  distinguish  the  two,  but  main¬ 
tain  that  the  irascible  part,  as  referred  to  the  rational  soul, 
must  be  taken  in  an  improper  sense.  The  concupiscible  and 
the  irascible  parts  constitute  really  one  potency,  which  is  the 
rational  will;  but  they  imply  different  tendencies  of  the  will 
towards  its  object.  This  is  the  more  common  view,  and  is 
defended  by  St.  Thomas,79  St  Bonaventure,80  Scotus,81  and 
many  others. 

However,  notwithstanding  this  diversity  of  views  in  regard 
to  the  potencies  of  the  will,  there  is  found  a  general  agree¬ 
ment  among  the  Scholastics  in  reference  to  the  proper  sub¬ 
ject  of  hope.  They  all  maintain  that  the  virtue  of  hope  re¬ 
sides  primarily  in  the  irascible  part  of  the  will.  The  summum 
arduum,  which  they  regard  as  the  formal  object  of  hope,  in 
one  way  or  another  implies  difficulties  that  must  be  overcome ; 
and  it  is  to  the  irascible  part  of  the  will  that  the  overcoming 
of  difficulties  properly  belongs.  However,  as  hope  also  looks 
forward  to  the  fruition  of  the  summum  bonum,  in  so  far  it 
may  be  said  to  reside  secondarily  in  the  concupiscible  part  of 
the  will.82 

Although  the  act  of  hope  is  essentially  an  act  of  the  will, 
since  the  virtue  resides  in  the  will  as  its  proper  subject,  never¬ 
theless  the  more  representative  Scholastics  hold  that  hope  has 
a  certainty  of  its  own,  distinct  from  that  of  faith.  “  It  is, 
however,  a  difficult  thing,”  says  St.  Bonaventure,  “  to  define 
in  what  this  certainty  consists.”  83  St  Thomas  puts  his  ex¬ 
planation  in  this  form :  “  The  certainty  of  faith  and  hope 

differ  in  four  respects :  First  in  this,  that  the  certainty  of 
faith  is  in  the  intellect,  whereas  the  certainty  of  hope  is  in 

78  Cfr.  Henry  of  Ghent,  Quodl.  I,  81  Ibid.  d.  34,  n.  13. 

q.  13.  82  Loc.  cit. 

79  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  26,  q.  2,  a.  3.  83  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  26,  a.  I,  q.  5. 

80  Ibid.  d.  26,  a.  2,  q.  5. 


THE  INFUSED  VIRTUES 


267 


the  affections;  secondly,  because  the  certainty  of  faith  can 
never  fail,  while  the  certainty  of  hope  may  fail  per  accidens ; 
thirdly,  because  the  certainty  of  faith  is  de  complexo,  whereas 
the  certainty  of  hope  is  de  incomplexo,  which  is  the  object  of 
the  appetite;  fourthly,  because  the  certainty  of  faith  is  opposed 
to  doubt,  while  the  certainty  of  hope  is  opposed  to  diffidence 
or  hesitation.”  84  This  certainty  of  hope  comes  ultimately 
from  God. 

5.  The  Virtue  of  Charity . — All  Scholastics  are  at  one  in 
holding  that  charity  is  a  theological  virtue,  but  there  is  no 
agreement  regarding  its  distinction  from  sanctifying  grace. 
Scotus,85  Durandus,86  Henry  of  Ghent,87  and  nearly  all 
the  Nominalists  follow  the  view  taken  by  the  Lom¬ 
bard,  that  charity  and  sanctifying  grace  are  essentially  the 
same,  although  there  is  between  them  a  distinctio  rationis. 
“  The  same  habitus says  Scotus,  “  which  is  grace  is  also 
charity.” 88  And  again :  “  By  the  same  habitus  by  rea¬ 

son  of  which  the  Holy  Spirit  dwells  in  our  soul,  the  will  is 
inclined  to  its  own  meritorious  acts.” 89  Henry  of  Ghent 
is  even  more  explicit,  when  he  says :  “  Grace  and  charity  do 

not  really  differ;  nay,  that  which  in  the  essence  itself  is  grace, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  absolutely  or  by  way  of  essence, 
the  very  same  is  there  also  charity,  in  so  far  as  it  is  considered 
under  the  aspect  of  potency.”  90 

On  the  other  hand,  St.  Thomas,91  Albertus  Magnus,92 
^Egidius  Romanus,93  and  some  others  maintain  that  charity 
and  sanctifying  grace  are  really  distinct.  Their  relation  to 
one  another  is  somewhat  like  that  of  potency  and  essence,  if 
the  terms  be  taken  in  a  wider  sense.  St.  Thomas  points  out 
that  in  the  natural  order  of  things  there  are  three  requisites 
for  the  attainment  of  any  given  end :  A  nature  that  is  in 
proportion  to  the  end  proposed;  an  appetitive  inclination  to¬ 
wards  its  attainment;  and  an  actual  tendency  in  its  direction. 


84  Ibid.  q.  2,  a.  4  ad  5m. 

85  In  Sent.  II,  d.  27,  q.  unic. 

86  Ibid.  d.  26,  q.  1. 

87  Quodl.  4,  q.  10. 

88  In  Sent.  II,  d.  27,  n.  35. 

89  Ibid.  I,  d.  17,  q.  3. 


90  Quodl.  4,  q.  10. 

91  In  Sent.  II,  d.  26,  a.  4;  Sum. 
Theol.  I.  II,  q.  no,  a.  3. 

92  In  Sent.  II,  d.  26,  a.  n. 

93  Ibid.  q.  2,  a.  1. 


268 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


By  analogy,  then,  it  follows  that  similar  requisites  must  be 
found  in  the  supernatural  order,  so  that  man  may  be  enabled 
to  attain  the  end  that  lies  beyond  the  reach  of  his  natural 
powers.  This  being  premised,  the  author  continues  :  “  Hence 

it  is  necessary  that  something  be  bestowed  upon  man  by  reason 
of  which  he  is  not  only  enabled  to  strive  for  the  end,  or  has 
an  inclination  thereto,  but  his  nature  itself  is  elevated  to  a 
certain  degree  of  dignity,  so  that  it  be  in  proportion  to  the 
supernatural  end ;  and  for  this  purpose  grace  is  bestowed ;  but 
for  the  purpose  of  inclining  the  will  to  the  same  end,  charity 
is  given;  while  for  the  performance  of  actions  by  which  the 
end  is  actually  attained,  other  virtues  are  infused.  And  there¬ 
fore  just  as  in  the  natural  order  of  things  nature  is  distinct 
from  its  inclination  to  the  end  and  from  its  operation,  so  like¬ 
wise  in  the  supernatural  order  is  grace  distinct  from  charity 
and  other  virtues.”  94 

Between  these  two  opposite  views  there  is  a  third,  advo¬ 
cated  among  others  by  St.  Bonaventure  95  and  Alexander  of 
Hales.96  According  to  this,  there  is  not  merely  a  distinctio 
rationis  between  charity  and  sanctifying  grace,  but  neither  is 
there  between  them  a  distinctio  realis.  They  are  distinguished 
not  per  essentiam,  but  only  comparatione  and  secundum  esse. 
St.  Bonaventure  illustrates  his  distinction  as  follows :  “  Just 

as  the  productive  principle  in  man,  because  of  its  great  perfec¬ 
tion  in  giving  natural  life,  not  only  causes  life  in  actu  primo 
but  also  in  actu  secundo ,  which  consists  in  operation;  so  like¬ 
wise  does  the  principle  of  reparation  give  life  to  the  spirit  in 
the  supernatural  order,  both  as  regards  the  life  itself  and  the 
operation  that  follows.”  97  Hence  in  the  supernatural  order, 
sanctifying  grace  is  the  remote  principle  of  action;  just  as 
nature  is  the  remote  principle  of  action  in  the  natural  order : 
hence  grace  compared  to  charity,  even  as  light  compared  to 
color,  “  is  not  different  in  essence,  but  only  by  way  of  com¬ 
parison  and  in  its  mode  of  existence.”  98 

The  proper  subject  of  the  virtue  of  charity  is  simply  the 

94  De  Verit.  q.  27,  a.  2.  97  Breviloq.  V,  c.  4. 

95  In  Sent.  II,  d.  27,  a.  1,  q.  2.  98  In  Sent.  II,  d.  27,  q.  2. 

96  Sum.  II,  q.  61,  m.  2,  a.  4. 


THE  INFUSED  VIRTUES 


269 


rational  will  itself,  though  a  few  of  the  Scholastics  assigned 
as  its  subject  the  concupiscible  part  of  the  will.  Concerning 
these  latter  St.  Thomas  says :  “  Some  say  that  charity  re¬ 
sides  in  the  concupiscible  part,  but  this  cannot  be;  because  the 
concupiscible  part  belongs  to  the  sensitive  appetite.  And  if  it 
be  said  that  the  concupiscible  part  is  human,  this  is  not  true 
except  because  of  its  being  under  the  direction  of  reason; 
unless  perhaps  they  intend  to  call,  by  way  of  equivocation,  the 
will  itself  an  irascible  and  concupiscible  potency.” 99  And 
this  some  of  them  did  intend,  as  for,  instance,  St.  Bonaven- 
ture,  who,  on  the  one  hand,  held  that  the  virtues  of  hope  and 
charity  reside  in  the  rational  will,  and  yet,  on  the  other  hand, 
assigned  as  their  respective  subjects  the  irascible  and  con¬ 
cupiscible  part  of  the  will.100 

The  material  object  of  charity  is  in  a  way  twofold:  primary 
and  secondary.  The  primary  object  is  God  Himself,  the 
Supreme  Good,  to  be  possessed  in  eternal  beatitude.  The  sec¬ 
ondary  object  comprises  all  rational  creatures  in  so  far  as  they 
are  capable  of  possessing  God.101  Hence  the  fallen  angels 
and  lost  souls  are  not  properly  included  in  the  secondary  ob¬ 
ject  of  the  virtue  of  charity.102 

The  formal  object  of  charity  is  God  as  the  absolute  and 
supreme  good,  to  be  loved  for  His  own  sake.  “  Faith  and 
hope,”  says  St.  Thomas,  “  do  indeed  reach  out  to  God,  but 
only  in  so  far  as  from  him  comes  the  knowledge  of  what  is 
true  and  the  possession  of  what  is  good;  whereas  charity  em¬ 
braces  God  Himself  for  the  purpose  of  resting  in  Him,  and 
not  that  thence  any  advantage  may  accrue  to  us.”103  Hence 
charity  is  first  and  foremost  a  love  of  benevolence,  because 
it  intends  the  good  of  the  beloved;  but  as  the  possession  of 
God  constitutes  our  eternal  beatitude,  it  in  so  far  also  includes 
the  love  of  concupiscence.104 

Although  the  virtrue  of  charity,  like  that  of  faith  and  of 

99  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  27,  q.  2,  a.  3.  102  Cfr.  Thomas,  In  Sent.  Ill,  d. 

100  Ibid.  a.  1,  q.  1 ;  d.  26,  a.  2,  q.  5.  28,  q.  2,  a.  5 ;  Bonavent.  ibid.  a.  unic. 

101  Cfr.  Bonavent.  ibid.  d.  27,  a.  2,  q.  2. 

q.  4;  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  II.  II,  q.  103  Sum.  Theol.  II.  II,  q.  23,  a.  6. 

23,  a.  5;  q.  25,  a.  1;  Albert.  Magn.  104  Id.  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  29,  q.  1,  a. 

In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  27,  a.  7.  4;  Bonavent.  ibid.  d.  27,  a.  2,  q.  2. 


270 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


hope,  is  really  distinct  from  sanctifying  grace  ;  yet  unlike  them, 
it  does  not  remain  when  grace  is  lost.  This  difference  is 
owing  to  the  different  opposition  of  the  three  theological  vir¬ 
tues  to  mortal  sin.  Thus  faith  is  opposed  only  to  the  sin  of 
infidelity,  either  partial  or  total;  hope,  to  the  sin  of  presump¬ 
tion  and  despair;  but  charity  is  opposed  to  all  mortal  sins. 
Hence,  while  faith  and  hope  may  exist  in  a  soul  that  is  de¬ 
prived  of  grace,  charity  cannot.105  Finally,  while  faith  and 
hope  cease  on  the  threshold  of  heaven,  in  the  sense  that  they 
issue  respectively  into  vision  and  possession ;  charity  remains 
formally  as  it  is,  only  it  blossoms  into  greater  perfection. 
This,  however,  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  whatever  per¬ 
fection  there  is  in  the  virtues  of  faith  and  hope  is  lost;  but 
only  that  all  imperfection  has  been  removed  from  their  corre¬ 
sponding  acts.106 

6.  The  Cardinal  Virtues. — “  The  general  purpose  of  vir¬ 
tue/’  says  St.  Bonaventure,  “is  twofold:  First,  that  they 
may  give  a  right  direction  to  the  powers  of  the  soul  by  coun¬ 
teracting  man’s  natural  obliquity  of  inclination;  secondly,  that 
they  may  strengthen  these  same  powers  against  the  difficulties 
that  must  be  overcome.’’  107  Now  man  has  a  threefold  rela¬ 
tion —  to  God,  to  himself,  and  to  the  neighbor.  The  right 
ordering  of  his  relation  to  God  is  affected  by  the  three  theo¬ 
logical  virtues;  but  as  they  do  not  touch  his  relation  to  him¬ 
self  and  the  neighbor,  other  supernatural  virtues  must  be  in¬ 
fused  for  this  purpose.  These  are  the  moral  virtues:  justice, 
fortitude,  prudence,  and  temperance.  The  last  three  regulate 
man's  conduct  in  respect  to  himself,  while  the  first  orders  his 
relations  with  his  neighbor.  Each  one  of  these  four  has 
other  moral  virtues  connected  with  it,  and  therefore  they  are 
called  principal  or  cardinal  virtues.  They  have  their  own 
proper  object,  and  are  distinct  from  corresponding  acquired 
habits.108  Scotus,  however,  as  was  pointed  out  above,  does 
not  admit  the  existence  of  infused  moral  virtues.109 

105  Ibid.  q.  4;  Albert.  Magn.  ibid.  108  Cfr.  Thomas,  QQ.  DD.,  De 

a.  3.  Virt.  Cardinal. ;  Bonavent.  In  Sent. 

106  Loc.  cit.  d.  31,  a.  3,  q.  I ;  III,  d.  33 ;  Dionys.  Carth.  ibid.  q. 

Thomas,  ibid.  q.  2,  a.  1.  unica. 

107  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  33,  q.  1.  109  The  relation  of  all  these  vir- 


THE  INFUSED  VIRTUES 


271 


The  principal  points  in  this  teaching  of  the  Scholastics  on 
the  infused  virtues  have  been  embodied  by  the  Council  of 
Trent  in  its  decree  on  justification,  and  by  the  Council  of  the 
Vatican  in  its  definitions  of  matters  pertaining  to  faith,  as 
will  be  pointed  out  in  a  later  chapter.  It  must  be  noted,  how¬ 
ever,  that  the  declarations  of  these  two  councils  bear  almost 
exclusively  on  the  existence  and  nature  of  the  theological  vir¬ 
tues;  the  moral  virtues  are  referred  to  only  in  passing,  with¬ 
out  even  any  direct  affirmation  of  their  existence.  Hence 
the  view  taken  by  Scotus  and  his  followers  is  free  from  all 
ecclesiastical  censure,  but  it  is  rejected  by  most  modern  theo¬ 
logians.  The  Council  of  Vienne,  held  in  1311-1312,  left  the 
question  still  open,  whether  sanctifying  grace  and  the  virtues 
are  infused  in  the  baptism  of  children; 110  but  the  Council  of 
Trent  decided  it  in  the  affirmative,  by  defining  in  a  general 
way  that  justification  is  obtained  in  baptism,  and  that  in  jus¬ 
tification  the  virtues  of  faith,  hope,  and  charity  are  infused 
together  with  sanctifying  grace.111 


tues  to  sanctifying  grace,  and  their 
connection  with  one  another,  is  thus 
beautifully  described  by  St.  Bona- 
venture  :  “  De  ramificatione  igitur 

gratiae  in  habitus  virtutum  haec 
tenenda  sunt,  quod  una  sit  gratia 
gratificans  animam,  septem  tamem 
sunt  virtutes  gratuitae,  quibus  regi- 
tur  vita  humana :  tres  quidem  the- 
ologicae,  scilicet  tides,  spes  et  cari- 
tas :  quatuor  cardinales,  scilicet  pru- 
dentia,  temperantia,  fortitudo  et 
justitia,  quae  uno  modo  est  virtus 
communis  et  generalis,  alio  modo 


specialis  et  propria.  Haec  autem 
septem  virtutes,  licet  sint  distinctae 
et  proprias  excellentias  habentes, 
sunt  tamen  connexae  et  aequales  ad 
invicem  in  eodem ;  et  licet  sint  gra¬ 
tuitae  per  gratiam  informatae,  pos- 
sunt  tamen  fieri  informes  per  cul- 
pam,  sola  caritate  excepta,  et  iterum 
reformari  per  poenitentiam  ad- 
veniente  gratia,  quae  est  habituum 
virtualium  origo,  finis  et  forma  ” 
(Breviloq.  V,  c.  4). 

110  Cfr.  BD.  583. 

111  Cfr.  Ibid.  800. 


CHAPTER  XV 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 
DEFINITION  AND  EFFICACY  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 

St.  Augustine,  when  speaking  of  baptism,  states  that  a  sac¬ 
rament  consists  of  two  things :  a  material  or  sensible  element 
and  the  word  —  accedit  verbnm  ad  elementum  et  fit  sacr amen¬ 
tum.1  By  the  word  he  most  likely  understood,  not  only  the 
prayer  used  in  the  consecration  of  the  material  element,  but 
also  the  sacramental  form.  The  combination  of  the  word  and 
the  element  he  designated  on  various  occasions  as  a  visible 
word,  a  sacred  sign ,  the  sign  of  a  sacred  thing,  a  sign  of  grace, 
or  simply  as  a  sacrament.  In  his  usage  of  them,  all  these 
terms  stand  for  the  outward  sacramental  rite.  Then,  with  this 
outward  rite  he  connected  an  inward  effect,  a  res  sacra  or 
gratia,  which  he  usually  called  the  power  of  the  sacrament  — 
znrtus  sacramenti.  The  production  of  this  inward  effect  he 
attributed  to  the  Holy  Spirit,  as  operating  in  and  through  the 
sacramental  rite.2 

These  fundamental  concepts,  considerably  clarified  though 
not  all  first  introduced  by  St.  Augustine,  were  looked  upon  as 
a  sacred  heirloom  by  most  subsequent  theologians.  Up  to  the 
twelfth  century,  and  even  till  somewhat  later,  sacramental 
theology  did  not  pass  beyond  that  stage  of  development  to 
which  it  had  been  advanced  by  the  labors  of  Augustine  in  his 
contention  with  the  Donatists.  Then  his  studies  of  the  sac¬ 
ramental  system  were  taken  up  again  with  renewed  ardor,  and 
for  nearly  three  hundred  years  continued  to  be  a  subject  of 
special  interest  to  the  greatest  of  the  Schoolmen.  What  he 
had  barely  touched  upon  they  subjected  to  a  searching  inquiry, 
with  the  result  that  they  rounded  out  and  completed  the  sys- 

1  Ad  Catech.  3.  2  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  347  sqq. 

272 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


273 


tem  in  all  its  parts.  The  contents  of  the  present  and  the  fol¬ 
lowing  chapter  will  give  us  some  idea  of  the  fruitfulness  of 
their  labors. 

1.  Definition  of  a  Sacrament.—  During  the  ninth  and  tenth 
centuries,  St.  Augustine’s  definition  of  a  sacrament  as  a  sacred 
sign  had  been,  to  a  great  extent,  replaced  by  that  of  St.  Isidore 
of  Seville,  according  to  which  a  sacrament  is  a  sacred  secret 
or  a  mystery.  But  with  the  advent  of  Scholasticism  the 
Augustinian  definition  came  again  into  favor.  Abelard  ex¬ 
panded  it  somewhat,  without,  however,  introducing  any  sub¬ 
stantial  modification.  “  A  sacrament,”  he  says,  “  is  a  visible 
sign  of  the  invisible  grace  of  God.”  3  This  definition,  as  is 
obvious,  may  be  applied  to  any  sacred  ceremony,  and  for 
that  reason  it  was  soon  found  to  be  of  little  practical  value  to 
the  scientific  study  of  the  sacraments. 

About  the  same  time,  Hugh  of  St.  Victor  defined  a  sacra¬ 
ment  as  “  a  corporeal  or  material  element,  which  in  its  out¬ 
ward  application  is  perceptible  by  the  senses,  by  its  similitude 
represents  some  invisible  spiritual  grace,  by  reason  of  its  insti¬ 
tution  signifies  that  grace,  and  because  of  its  sanctification  con¬ 
tains  the  same.”  4  This  is  a  rather  cumbersome  definition; 
and,  moreover,  it  is  applicable  only  to  those  sacraments  that 
are  partly  made  up  of  a  “corporeal  or  material  element,”  which 
is  not  the  case  with  penance,  orders,  and  matrimony.  Be¬ 
sides,  when  the  author  says  that  a  sacrament  “  contains  ”  grace, 
he  seems  to  hold  that  grace  is  stored  up  in  the  sanctified  ele¬ 
ment  as  in  a  vessel ;  and  this  he  actually  asserts  a  little  further 
on.5 

A  better  definition  is  found  in  the  Summa  Sententiarum , 
which  in  the  past  was  commonly  ascribed  to  Hugh  of  St.  Vic¬ 
tor  but  is  now  considered  by  many  to  be  the  work  of  some 
unknown  twelfth-century  writer.  Discussing  the  Augustinian 
definition,  he  savs :  “  A  sacrament  is  a  visible  form  of  the 

invisible  grace  conferred  in  it,  which  grace  the  sacrament  itself 
confers.  For  a  sacrament  is  not  merely  a  sign  of  a  sacred 
thing,  but  also  exerts  efficiency  in  its  respect.  And  this  is  the 

3  Introd.  ad  Theol.  I,  2.  5  Ibid.  c.  4. 

4  De  Sacram.  I,  p.  9,  c.  2. 


274 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


difference  between  a  sign  and  a  sacrament:  in  order  to  be  a 
sign  nothing  is  required  except  that  it  signifies  the  thing  of 
which  it  is  a  sign,  without  in  any  way  bestowing  the  same ; 
but  a  sacrament  furthermore  also  bestows  that  of  which  it  is  a 
sign  or  expression.”  6 

This  marks  an  immense  advance  over  the  definition  given  by 
Hugh.  It  places  an  essential  distinction  between  sacramental 
rites  and  all  other  sacred  ceremonies,  by  attributing  to  the 
former  an  efficacy  in  the  production  of  grace  which  is  denied 
to  the  latter.  Practically  the  same  definition  is  found  in  the 
Sentences  of  Magister  Bandini.  He  puts  it  in  this  form : 
“  That  is  properly  said  to  be  a  sacrament  which  signifies  grace 
in  such  a  way  as  also  to  confer  it.  And  by  this  the  difference 
between  the  old  and  the  new  sacraments  is  clearly  manifested: 
for  they  only  promised  and  signified,  whereas  these  signify 
and  give  grace.”  7 

Almost  the  same  terms  are  used  by  Peter  Lombard  in  the 
definition  which  in  one  form  or  another  recurs  in  the  works 
of  all  his  commentators.  After  briefly  explaining  the  various 
kinds  of  signs  and  their  purport,  he  states  that  a  sacrament  is 
not  a  natural  but  a  conventional  sign,  but  of  such  a  kind  that  it 
bears  the  likeness  of  the  thing  signified;  and  then  he  proceeds : 
“  For  that  is  properly  said  to  be  a  sacrament  which  is  in  such 
a  manner  a  sign  of  the  grace  of  Gpd  and  a  form  of  invisible 
grace,  that  it  bears  its  image  and  is  its  cause.  It  was  not 
therefore  merely  to  signify  grace  that  the  sacraments  were 
instituted,  but  also  to  confer  sanctification.”  8  It  is  this  that 
distinguishes  the  sacraments  of  the  Old  and  the  New  Law : 
the  former  “  only  promised  and  signified,  the  latter  give  sal¬ 
vation.”  9  Hence  every  sacrament  is  indeed  a  sign,  but  not 
every  sign  is  a  sacrament.10 

Later  Scholastics  frequently  shortened  the  definition  given 
by  the  Lombard,  but  they  all  kept  its  essential  elements.  Thus 
St.  Thomas  states  briefly :  “  A  sacrament  is  a  sign  of  a  sacred 

thing  in  so  far  as  it  sanctifies  men.”  11  It  is  its  objective  con- 

s  Ibid, 
ibid. 

11  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  6o,  a.  2. 


6  Op.  cit.  tr.  4,  c.  i. 

7  Op.  cit.  IV,  d.  i. 

8  Sent.  IV,  d.  i,  c.  4. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


275 


nection  with  grace  that  differentiates  a  sacrament  from  all 
other  sacred  rites  and  ceremonies.  This,  therefore,  is  the 
specific  difference  that  restricts  the  generic  term,  “  sacred 
sign  ”  or  “  sign  of  a  sacred  thing,”  in  its  signification,  and 
limits  it  to  a  particular  class  of  sacred  signs,  which  finally 
came  to  be  exclusively  designated  as  sacraments. 

While  the  Scholastics  thus  gradually  succeeded  in  working 
out  a  satisfactory  definition,  they  also  investigated  the  nature 
and  composition  of  the  external  rite  or  sign.  They  soon  recog¬ 
nized  that  the  “  element  ”  and  the  “  word,”  spoken  of  by  St. 
Augustine,  are  not  only  found  in  every  sacrament,  but  bear  a 
very  definite  relation  to  one  another  in  the  constitution  of  the 
“  sacred  sign.”  The  element  is  always  more  or  less  indefinite 
in  its  signification,  and  this  indefiniteness  is  taken  away  by  the 
words  used  in  its  application.  Thus  water,  which  is  the  “  ele¬ 
ment  ”  in  baptism,  may  be  employed  either  for  cooling  or 
cleansing  purposes;  but  when  the  “word,”  I  baptize  or  wash 
thee,  is  added,  the  purpose  of  the  ceremony  is  definitely  deter¬ 
mined.  And  so  proportionately  in  all  other  sacramental  rites, 
even  in  those  which  do  not  consist  of  a  corporeal  element  and 
formal  words.  The  analogy  between  this  observed  fact  and 
the  constitution  of  bodies,  as  explained  by  the*  Scholastics,  was 
too  striking  to  remain  long  unnoticed.  Hence  early  in  the 
thirteenth  century,  William  of  Auxerre  originated  the  theory 
of  matter  and  form  as  applied  to  the  sacramental  sign.12 
Alexander  of  Hales  adopted  the  terms  in  his  exposition  of 
the  sacramental  rite,13  and  after  him  St.  Thomas  permanently 
introduced  them  into  the  theological  language*  of  the  School¬ 
men.  What  formerly  went  by  the  general  name  of  thing,  was 
thenceforth  spoken  of  as  matter;  and  what  till  then  had  been 
designated  as  words,  was  thereafter  simply  called  form.14 

This  theory  was  still  further  developed  by  Duns  Scotus,  who 
distinguished  two  kinds  of  matter:  remote  and  proximate. 
The  remote  matter,  according  to  his  distinction,  is  the  indefi¬ 
nite  element  in  itself ;  as,  for  instance,  the  water  used  in  bap¬ 
tism  or  the  chrism  employed  in  confirmation.  While  the  prox- 

12  Cfr.  Schanz,  Die  Lehre  von  den  13  Sum.  IV,  q.  5,  m.  3,  a.  1. 
heiligen  Sacramenten,  p.  103.  14  Sum.  Theol.  IV,  q.  60,  a.  6,  7,  8. 


276 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


imate  matter  is  the  application  of  the  indefinite  element  or 
remote  matter  to  the  recipient  of  the  sacrament;  as  ablution 
and  chrismation  in  baptism  and  confirmation  respectively.15 
All  this,  as  is  obvious,  introduced  no  real  change  in  sacra¬ 
mental  theology,  but  it  was  helpful  towards  clarifying  ideas. 
Scotus,  it  may  here  be  noted,  made  some  reservation  in  apply¬ 
ing  the  theory  of  matter  and  form  to  the  sacrament  of  penance, 
in  so  far  as  he  did  not  consider  the  acts  of  the  penitent  con¬ 
stituent  parts  of  the  sacrament. 

2.  The  Efficacy  of  the  Sacraments. —  St.  Augustin,  in  his 
contention  with  the  Donatists,  had  already  clearly  pointed  out 
that  the  Christian  sacraments  produce  their  effects  indepen¬ 
dently  of  the  moral  disposition  of  the  minister;  and  had  also 
made  it  clear  that  the  sanctification  of  the  subject  is  objec¬ 
tively  connected  with  the  sacramental  rite.  It  was  this  teach¬ 
ing,  called  to  mind  at  a  time  when  violent  discussions  were  car¬ 
ried  on  regarding  the  validity  of  sacraments  conferred  by 
excommunicated  ministers,  that  introduced  the  phrase  opus 
opera-turn  into  sacramental  theology.  It  was  at  first  used  to 
distinguish  the  sacramental  rite,  as  objectively  posited,  from 
the  action  of  the  minister  considered  subjectively,  although 
later  on  it  became  customary  to  apply  the  same  distinction  also 
to  the  actions  of  the  recipient.  Its  earliest  use  is  thus  indi¬ 
cated  by  Peter  of  Poitiers,  who  died  in  1205  :  Baptizatio  dici- 
tur  actio  illius  qua  baptizat ,  quae  est  aliud  opus  quam  baptis- 
mus,  quia  est  opus  opcrans ,  sed  baptismus  est  opus  operatum, 
ut  ita  liceat  loqui.1Q  A  few  years  later  Pope  Innocent  III  used 
the  term  in  a  similar  connection.  Speaking  of  the  administra¬ 
tion  of  the  sacraments  by  an  unworthy  minister,  he  says : 
Quamvis  igitur  opus  operans  aliquando  sit  immundum,  semper 
tamen  opus  operatum  est  mundum.11 

After  the  •middle  of  the  thirteenth  century,  the  two  terms, 
ex  opere  operato  and  ex  opere  operantis,  were  also  quite  gen¬ 
erally  used  to  indicate  the  difference  between  the  Christian 
sacraments  and  the  Mosaic  rites.  As  already  pointed  out 

15  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  7,  q.  I ;  cfr.  ibid.  17  Cfr.  Pourrat,  Theology  of  the 

d.  3,  q.  3.  Sacraments,  p.  163. 

16  Sent.  V,  c.  6. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


277 


in  a  preceding  paragraph,  the  difference  between  the  two  was 
held  to  consist  chiefly  in  their  connection  with  grace.  It  is 
true,  some  of  the  Scholastics,  among  whom  was  Peter  Lom¬ 
bard,18  went  so  far  as  to  assert  that  the  sacraments  of  the 
Old  Law  were  of  no  spiritual  benefit  whatever,  even  to  those 
who  used  them  piously;  but  the  majority  of  mediaeval  theo¬ 
logians  regarded  them  in  some  way  as  means  of  grace,  al¬ 
though  not  in  the  same  sense  as  the  Christian  sacraments.  Ac¬ 
cording  to  Hugh  of  St.  Victor  and  a  few  others,  their  connec¬ 
tion  with  grace  was  objective  but  indirect,  in  the  sense  that 
they  foreshadowed  the  sacraments  of  the  New  Law,  and  by 
this  foreshadowing  caused  grace  in  the  recipient.19  St. 
Thomas,  on  the  other  hand,  and  indeed  the  greater  number 
of  the  Scholastics,  denied  them  all  objective  efficacy  and  held 
that  they  sanctified  the  recipient  because  of  the  faith  and 
charity  with  which  he  received  them.  Hence  their  efficacy 
was  entirely  ex  op  ere  operantis,  whereas  that  of  the  Christian 
sacraments  is  ex  opere  operato. 

From  this  use  of  the  term,  ex  opere  operato,  it  is  sufficiently 
clear  that  the  Scholastics  ascribed  some  kind  of  causality  to 
the  sacraments  of  the  New  Law.  And  this  appears  also  from 
the  definition  of  the  sacraments  as  signs  that  sanctify,  signs 
that  signify  and  cause  grace.  But  what  kind  of  causality  did 
they  have  in  mind?  In  precisely  what  sense  must  the  Chris¬ 
tian  sacraments  be  considered  as  causes  of  grace?  On  this 
point  there  was.no  agreement,  even  at  the  time  of  St.  Thomas; 
for  he  says:  “  All  are  forced  to  admit  that  the  sacraments  of 
the  New  Law  are  in  some  manner  causes  of  grace;  for  this  is 
the  express  teaching  of  authority.  But  different  men  regard 
that  causality  in  a  different  way.”20  These  different  views 
held  by  different  theologians  during  the  Middle  Ages,  are 
usually  reduced  to  three  distinct  systems  of  sacramental  caus¬ 
ality.  The  following  is  a  brief  outline  of  them,  as  gathered 
from  the  works  of  the  most  representative  Scholastics. 

The  first  is  the  system  of  occasional  causality,  which  was 
most  ably  defended  by  St.  Bonaventure  and  Duns  Scotus.  The 

18  Sent.  IV,  d.  1,  c.  4.  20  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  1,  a.  4. 

19  Sum.  Sent.  tr.  4,  c.  1,  2. 


278 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


former  speaks  of  it  in  these  terms  :  “  There  is  also  the  opinion 

of  other  great  men,  who  say  that,  in  the  sense  of  quality  or 
absolute  property,  there  is  no  causality  in  the  sacraments,  nor 
any  power  productive  of  grace,  either  by  way  of  efficiency  or 
disposition;  but  that  grace  is  produced  by  reason  of  a  certain 
divine  assistance.  For  they  say  that  the  divine  power,  which 
is  the  cause  of  grace,  is  present  in  the  sacrament,  and  that  the 
faith  and  devotion  of  the  recipient  act  by  way  of  disposition 
for  the  reception  of  grace.  And  this  they  explain  by  an  ex¬ 
ample:  At  the  word  of  Eliseus,  Naaman,  washing  himself, 
was  cleansed  of  his  leprosy;  in  this  case  the  divine  power  ef¬ 
fected  the  cure,  and  the  devotion  and  obedience  of  Naaman 
acted  by  way  of  disposition,  but  there  was  no  causality  either  in 
the  word  of  Eliseus  or  in  the  water  of  the  Jordan.  Now,  if  the 
Lord  had  so  decreed  that  at  the  word  of  Eliseus,  not  only 
Naaman  himself,  but  also  all  others  coming  for  this  purpose 
to  the  Jordan  should  be  cured,  and  then  by  a  kind  of  covenant 
had  promised  His  perpetual  assistance,  that  water  would  be 
said  to  cure  and  heal  leprosy,  and  also  to  be  the  cause  of  such 
cures  and  to  have  the  power  of  healing.  And  so,  they  say, 
it  is  in  the  case  of  the  sacraments ;  so  that,  at  the  uttering  of  the 
word,  the  divine  power  is  present  in  the  water  and  thus  in¬ 
fuses  grace  and  regenerates  the  recipient,  while  he  submits 
himself  by  a  profession  of  faith  and  by  obedience.  In  this 
sense,  they  hold,  the  sacraments  are  said  to  have  power,  to  be 
causes,  to  produce  effects,  on  account  of  the  divine  power 
which  is  present.”  21 

Then,  after  explaining  more  in  detail  how  all  these  terms, 
power,  efficiency,  causality,  are  taken  in  a  wider  sense  —  ex- 
tenso  nomine  —  when  applied  to  the  sacraments,  and  how 
grace  is  produced  entirely  in  virtue  of  a  divine  ordination  that 
became  effective  at  the  time  when  the  sacraments  were  insti¬ 
tuted,  he  concludes  by  saying:  “  To  this  position  the  piety  of 
faith  is  not  opposed,  and  reason  gives  its  approval.”  22  In 
another  place  he  assigns  as  his  reason  for  adopting  this  view 
the  fact  that  the  efficiency  of  the  sacraments,  taken  in  the 

21  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  1,  p.  1,  a.  unic.  22  Ibid, 
q.  4. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


279 


strict  sense  of  the  term,  in  regard  either  to  the  production  of 
grace  or  of  a  disposition  thereto,  is  unintelligible.23 

Scotus  explains  his  position  in  practically  the  same  terms. 
The  sacraments,  he  says,  are  not  the  cause  of  grace  by  reason 
of  any  intrinsic  form  or  property;  but  they  may  be  said  to 
produce  grace  by  a  kind  of  concomitance,  in  as  much  as,  in 
consequence  of  the  order  established  by  God,  they  induce  a 
natural  condition  in  the  subject  on  account  of  which  God 
causes  grace  in  the  soul.  Hence  their  efficacy  in  relation  to 
grace  is  not  raised  above  the  natural  order,  and  even  this  dis¬ 
positive  efficacy  is  the  result  of  a  divine  agreement,  or  com¬ 
pact,  as  the  author  calls  it,  by  which  God  bound  Himself  to 
impart  His  grace  to  all  those  who  receive  the  sacraments  with 
the  proper  disposition.  A  sacrament,  therefore,  is  merely  the 
occasion  on  which  God  recalls  His  promise,  and  then  on  ac¬ 
count  of  His  promise  produces  grace  in  the  soul.24  This  occa¬ 
sional  causality  of  the  sacraments,  as  it  is  usually  called,  was 
also  defended  by  Durandus,25  Ockam  26  and  the  Nominalists 
generally. 

Another  explanation  of  the  efficacy  of  the  sacraments  was 
outlined  by  Alexander  of  Hales,  and  afterwards  further  de¬ 
veloped  by  St.  Thomas.  Like  Peter  Lombard,  Alexander  dis¬ 
tinguished  two  effects  produced  in  the  reception  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments  —  the  sacramentum  et  res  and  the  res  tantam.  By  the 
former  he  understood  the  sacramental  character,  or,  when  there 
was  question  of  sacraments  that  do  not  imprint  a  character, 
a  spiritual  ornament  produced  in  the  soul ;  by  the  latter  he 
designated  the  grace  conferred  in  the  administration  of  the 
sacraments.  The  character  or  the  ornament  of  the  soul,  as 
the  case  might  be,  he  conceived  to  be  efficiently  produced  by 
the  sacraments,  with  a  view  to  dispose  the  soul  for  the  recep¬ 
tion  of  grace;  27  while  grace  itself,  thus  called  for  by  the  dis- 


23  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  40,  dub.  3. 

24  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  1,  q.  4,  5 ;  Re¬ 
port.  IV,  d.  1,  q.  4,  n.  8. 

25  In  Sent.  IV,  q.  4. 

26  Ibid.  IV,  q.  1,  6. 

27  His  own  words  are:  “Sine 
praejudicio  melioris  sententiae  opin- 


ando  dico,  nihil  asserendo,  quod 
sacramenta  sunt  causae  alicujus  ef- 
feetus  in  anima,  non  dico  solum  dis- 
ponendo,  sed  efficiendo :  efficiunt 
enim  simpliciter  characterizando  et 
ornando.  Unde  dico,  quod  singula 
sacramenta  aliquo  modo  ornant 


28o 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


position  effected  in  the  soul  through  the  sacramental  rite,  must 
be  caused  directly  and  exclusively  by  God.28  Hence  the  sac¬ 
raments  act  directly  only  as  dispositive  causes  of  grace.  Thus 
their  causality  is  indeed  saved,  but  it  has  only  an  indirect  bear¬ 
ing  on  the  production  of  the  grace  which  they  are  said  to 
confer. 

This  view  was  adopted  by  St.  Thomas,  at  least  in  his  earlier 
works;  for  in  his  Commentary  on  the  Sentences  he  says: 
“  Others  there  are  who  maintain  that  in  the  reception  of  the 
sacraments  two  things  are  effected  in  the  soul;  one  is  the 
sacr amentum  et  res,  as  the  character,  or  an  ornament  of  the 
soul  in  the  case  of  sacraments  that  do  not  imprint  a  character ; 
the  other  is  the  res  tantnm,  as  grace.  In  respect  of  the  first 
effect  the  sacraments  are  in  some  way  efficient  causes;  but 
in  respect  of  the  second  they  are  dispositive  causes,  inducing 
such  a  disposition  as  necessitates  the  infusion  of  grace,  unless 
there  be  an  impediment  on  the  part  of  the  recipient.  And  this 
view  seems  more  in  conformity  with  the  teachings  of  theolo¬ 
gians  and  the  sayings  of  the  saints.”  29 

However,  as  there  appears  to  be  an  insuperable  difficulty  in 
the  supposition  that  a  physical  and  material  rite  produces  a 
supernatural  and  spiritual  effect,  whether  that  effect  be 
sanctifying  grace  or  merely  a  disposition  thereto,  St.  Thomas 
found  himself  under  the  necessity  of  introducing  here  the 
distinction  between  principal  and  instrumental  causes.  The 
principal  cause  of  the  sacramental  character  or  ornament  of 
the  soul,  as  well  as  of  sanctifying  grace,  is  God,  whose  caus¬ 
ality  alone  bears  a  due  proportion  to  the  effect  produced;  but 
the  instrumental  causes  of  this  same  effect  are  the  sacraments, 
in  so  far  as  they  are  subservient  to  God’s  power  and  inten¬ 
tions.  Thus  he  says :  “  In  so  far  as  they  are  the  instruments 

of  the  divine  mercy  which  justifies  man,  they  produce  instru- 

animam,  vel  imprimendo  charac-  ceptibile,  efficiendo  aptiorem  ad 
terem,  vel  alio  modo  signando  ”  gratiae  snsceptionern  et  faciunt, 
(Sum.  IV,  q.  5,  m.  3,  a.  5  ad  im).  quod  gratia  efficax  sit”  (Ibid.  a.  5 
28  “  Solus  Deus  operatur  gratiam  ad  2m). 
et  animae  infundit ;  sed  sacramenta  29  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  1,  q.  1,  a.  4. 
Novae  Legis  disponunt  ipsum  sus- 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


281 


mentally  in  the  soul  some  effect  that  bears  a  direct  propor¬ 
tion  to  the  sacraments,  such  as  the  character  or  something  of 
that  kind.  But  to  the  ultimate  effect,  which  is  grace,  they  do 
not  attain  even  instrumentally,  except  by  way  of  disposition 
strictly  as  such.  Hence  what  the  sacraments  directly  produce 
is  a  disposition  that  necessitates,  so  far  as  it  comes  in  question, 
the  infusion  of  grace.”  30 

Then,  in  order  to  show  the  possibility  of  this  instrumental 
causality  as  predicated  of  the  sacraments,  he  enters  into  a 
rather  minute  discussion  on  the  difference  between  the  action 
of  principal  and  instrumental  causes.  “  The  power  of  acting,” 
he  says,  “  is  always  in  proportion  to  the  agent.  Therefore 
it  is  necessary  to  suppose  one  kind  of  power  in  the  principal 
agent,  and  another  in  the  instrumental  agent.  The  principal 
agent  acts  always  according  to  the  exigencies  of  his  own 
form,  and  therefore  his  active  power  is  some  form  or  quality 
that  is  complete  in  the  order  of  nature.  But  the  instrument 
acts  only  as  moved  by  another,  and  hence  it  must  have  power 
in  proportion  to  this  movement.  Now  movement  is  not  a 
complete  entity,  but  is  the  way  to  it,  holding  a  middle  place 
between  pure  potency  and  complete  actuality.  .  .  .  Hence,  as 
the  sacraments  are  instrumental  agents,  their  spiritual  power 
is  not  a  complete  entity,  but  is  incomplete.”  31  And  again : 
“  In  a  corporeal  thing  there  cannot  be  a  spiritual  power  that  is 
complete  in  itself ;  but  it  can  be  there  by  way  of  intention,  just 
as  art  is  said  to  exist  in  the  instruments  employed  by  the 
artist.”  32 

This  view  of  St.  Thomas  was  adopted  by  many  of  his  fol¬ 
lowers,  and  up  to  the  sixteenth  century  it  was  commonly  de¬ 
fended  as  his  genuine  and  exclusive  teaching.  Then,  how¬ 
ever,  owing  to  the  sharp  criticism  of  Cardinal  Cajetan,33  it 
was  by  many  set  aside  in  favor  of  another  view,  which  St. 
Thomas  apparently  defended  in  his  Siimma  Theologica. 
Whether  he  really  did  change  his  mind  is  even  now  a  matter 
of  dispute,  but  all  indications  are  that  he  did.  For  in  the 

32  Ibid.  a.  4  ad  4™. 

33  In  Sum.  Ill,  q.  62. 


30  Ibid. 

31  Ibid. 


282 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Sutnma,  which  is  the  last  work  he  wrote,  he  puts  aside  the 
distinction  between  the  sacramentum  et  res  and  the  res  tantum, 
and  states  without  any  modification  whatever  that  the  sacra¬ 
ments  are  the  instrumental  causes  of  grace.  Furthermore,  he 
answers  the  objection  that  grace,  being  a  participation  of  the 
divine  nature,  can  be  produced  only  by  God  without  the  con¬ 
currence  of  a  created  instrument,  by  explaining  how  the  effect 
is  assimilated  not  to  the  instrumental  but  to  the  principal  cause, 
and  that  consequently  the  nature  of  grace  does  not  make  im¬ 
possible  the  instrumental  causality  of  the  sacraments.34  Some 
writers,  like  Cardinal  Billot,  maintain  that  this  teaching  of 
the  Summa  should  be  interpreted  by  what  St.  Thomas  holds 
in  his  Commentaries  on  the  Sentences;  but  modern  Thomists 
generally  contend  that  the  Angelic  Doctor  changed  his  mind 
with  advancing  years. 

According  to  this  latter  interpretation,  then,  St.  Thomas 
finally  decided  in  favor  of  the  system  that  advocates  the 
physical  perfective  causality  of  the  sacraments,  in  the  sense 
that  the  sacraments  are  physical  instrumental  causes,  not 
merely  of  a  disposition  to  grace,  but  of  grace  itself.  By  vir¬ 
tue  of  a  divine  power,  in  some  way  transiently  communicated 
to  them,  they  exercise  an  immediate  physical  influence  on  the 
production  of  grace  in  the  soul.  However,  that  the  sacra¬ 
ments,  according  to  the  teaching  of  St.  Thomas,  are  physical 
instrumental  causes  is  not  conceded  by  all  those  of  his  gen¬ 
uine  followers  who  admit  that  he  finally  abandoned  the  idea 
of  dispositive  causality.  In  various  places,  they  point  out, 
there  occur  expressions  which  indicate  that  he  was  rather  in 
favor  of  causality  in  the  moral  or  intentional  order.  Thus 
he  says  that  the  sacraments  are  causes  by  way  of  significa¬ 
tion,35  that  their  causative  virtue  is  present  after  the  manner 
of  intention  —  per  modum  intentionispQ  and  that  in  baptism 
the  water  produces  its  spiritual  effect  in  the  soul  in  so  far  as 
it  is  recognized  by  the  intellect  as  a  sign  of  supernatural  cleans¬ 
ing.37  Expressions  of  this  kind  occur  quite  frequently  in 
his  writings,  and  their  import  seems  to  be  that  the  causality  of 

34  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  62,  a.  1,  4.  36  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  1,  a.  4  ad  4™. 

35  QQ.  DD.,  q.  27,  a.  4  ad  i8m.  37  QQ.  DD.,  q.  27,  a.  4  ad  2m. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


283 


the  sacraments  belongs  to  the  moral  or  intentional  rather  than 
to  the  physical  order.  At  all  events,  it  is  not  likely  that  a 
unanimous  verdict  on  the  teachings  of  St.  Thomas  in  regard 
to  sacramental  causality  will  ever  be  reached. 


CHAPTER  XVI 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 

SACRAMENTAL  GRACE:  THE  CHARACTER:  NEED  OF  IN¬ 
TENTION:  THE  NUMBER  SEVEN:  INSTITUTION  OF 

THE  SACRAMENTS 

Since  all  the  sacraments  have  the  same  essential  definition, 
it  necessarily  follows  that  they  have  certain  properties  in  com¬ 
mon.  The  more  important  of  them  will  be  briefly  outlined  in 
the  present  chapter. 

i.  Sacramental  Grace. —  St.  Bonaventure  cites  three  differ¬ 
ent  views  on  the  nature  of  the  grace  conferred  by  the  sacra¬ 
ments,  each  one  of  which  had  its  defenders  among  the  Scho¬ 
lastics.  Those  who  held  the  first  view  maintained  that  sac¬ 
ramental  grace  did  not  differ  intrinsically  from  ordinary 
sanctifying  grace,  the  term  sacramental  being  applied  to  it 
simply  for  the  purpose  of  indicating  its  origin.  Others,  who 
defended  the  second  view,  contended  for  an  essential  difference 
between  the  two  kinds  of  grace.  Ordinary  sanctifying  grace, 
according  to  them,  has  for  its  object  the  performance  of  good 
works,  whereas  sacramental  grace  is  primarily  intended  to  re¬ 
pair  the  ravages  of  sin.  Hence  there  may  be  two  different 
kinds  of  sanctifying  grace  in  the  soul.  St.  Bonaventure  him¬ 
self  took  a  middle  stand,  holding  on  the  one  hand  that  all 
sanctifying  grace  is  essentially  the  same,  and  on  the  other  that 
sacramental  grace  connotes  different  effects  because  of  the 
purpose  for  which  it  is  given.1 

The  position  of  St.  Thomas  in  this  matter  is  not  quite 
clear.  In  his  Commentary  on  the  Sentences  he  says  that 
the  grace  conferred  by  the  sacraments  is  distinct  from  the 
grace  of  virtues  and  gifts,  or  from  ordinary  sanctifying  grace; 

1  In  Sent.  IV,  p.  i,  a.  unic.,  q.  6. 

284 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


285 


and  also  that  sanctifying  grace  is  of  one  kind  in  so  far  as  it  is 
in  the  essence  of  the  soul,  and  of  another  kind  in  so  far  as  it 
perfects  the  potencies.2  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  Summa 
he  seems  to  hold  that  sanctifying  grace  is  essentially  the  same 
whatever  be  its  origin,  and  that  the  grace  derived  from  the 
sacraments  merely  connotes  different  helps  intended  for  the 
attainment  of  the  end  proper  to  each  sacrament.3  Prac¬ 
tically  the  same  indefinite  position  had  been  taken  by  Alexander 
of  Hales.4  However,  the  opinion  defended  by  St.  Bonaven- 
ture  finally  gained  the  day. 

According  to  the  common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics,  sac¬ 
ramental  grace  is  ordinarily  conferred  at  the  time  when  the 
sacraments  are  received ;  however,  if  there  be  an  obstacle  in  the 
recipient,  which  on  the  one  hand  does  not  invalidate  the  sac¬ 
rament  and  on  the  other  impedes  its  effect,  the  bestowal  of 
grace  is  deferred  until  the  obstacle  has  been  removed.  This 
deferred  bestowal  of  grace  is  now  known  as  the  reviviscence 
of  the  sacraments.  The  doctrine  of  reviviscence  is  clearly 
taught  by  St.  Thomas  in  respect  of  the  three  sacraments  that 
imprint  a  character.5  Scotus  refers  to  it  only  when  speaking 
of  baptism,  and  then  he  says  that  as  soon  as  the  obstacle  is 
removed  by  proper  penance,  baptismal  grace  is  conferred  in 
virtue  of  the  baptism  already  received.6 

2.  The  Sacramental  Character. —  The  doctrine  of  the  sac¬ 
ramental  character,  and  also  of  the  consequent  initerability  of 
the  sacraments  by  which  it  is  imprinted,  was  brought  to  prac¬ 
tically  its  full  development  by  St.  Augustine.  His  teaching 
on  this  point  was  accepted  by  the  whole  Western  Church, 
and  remained  a  directive  norm  till  about  the  end  of  the  seventh 
century.  But  from  that  time  on,  at  least  so  far  as  appearances 
go,  little  attention  seems  to  have  been  paid  to  the  doctrine 
of  the  sacramental  character.  Owing  to  the  disorder  caused 
by  schism,  moral  corruption,  and  the  encroachment  of  the 
civil  authority  upon  the  rights  of  the  Church,  theological 
learning  was  at  a  low  ebb,  and  in  places  practices  sprang  up 

2  Op.  cit.  IV,  d.  I,  q.  1,  a.  5.  5  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  4,  a.  2. 

3  Op.  cit.  Ill,  q.  62,  a.  2.  6  Ibid.  IV,  q.  5,  n.  2,  3. 

4  Sum.  IV,  q.  5,  m.  4,  a.  2. 


286 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


that  were  directly  opposed  to  the  teaching  of  Christian  an¬ 
tiquity.  Among  these  abuses  was  that  of  reordaining  persons 
upon  whom  orders  had  been  conferred  by  simoniac  or  deposed 
bishops,  or  of  declaring  their  orders  null  and  void.  In  the 
contentions  that  thereupon  ensued,  little  or  no  reference  was 
ever  made  to  the  fact  that  an  indelible  character  imprinted  by 
the  sacrament  of  orders  would  make  such  reordinations  sac¬ 
rilegious.  And  hence  the  logical  inference  seems  to  be  that 
the  doctrine  of  the  sacramental  character  had  more  or  less 
fallen  into  oblivion.7 

However,  the  correctness  of  this  inference  is  not  clearly  es¬ 
tablished.  Even  to  what  extent  the  practice  of  reordination 
was  carried  is  historically  uncertain.  Saltet  appears  to  take 
an  extreme  view  when  he  states :  “In  the  struggle  of  the 
Church  against  simoniacs  and  intruders,  until  the  twelfth  cen¬ 
tury,  the  chief  instrument  of  warfare,  sometimes  of  the  enemies 
of  the  Church,  sometimes  too,  nay  most  often,  of  the  best 
sons  of  the  Church  and  of  several  Popes,  was  simply  to  declare 
void  and  to  repeat  ordinations  that  were  certainly  valid.”  8 

At  all  events,  during  the  twelfth  century  the  doctrine  of  the 
character  was  thoroughly  familiar  to  theological  writers. 
This  appears  clearly  from  the  manner  in  which  Innocent  III 
answered  the  question,  whether  those  who  had  been  baptized 
whilst  asleep,  or  whilst  out  of  their  mind,  had  received  the 
sacramental  character.  Neither  the  question  nor  the  answer 
admits  of  any  doubt  regarding  the  doctrine  that  in  baptism  a 
character  is  impressed  on  the  soul.  The  only  point  on  which 
the  questioners  were  in  doubt  touched  the  validity  of  baptism 
under  the  given  conditions.  And  this  doubt  the  Pope  solved 
by  saying  that,  if  the  persons  in  question  had  previously  in¬ 
tended  to  be  baptized,  the  sacrament  so  administered  was 
valid.9  Hence  the  contention  of  some  Protestant  writers,  that 
Innocent  III  introduced  the  doctrine  of  the  sacramental  char¬ 
acter,  only  shows  that  either  they  have  not  read  or  else  must 
have  misinterpreted  his  answer  to  the  proposed  question.  And 

7  Cfr.  Morin,  De  sacris  Eccl.  8  Bulletin  de  litt.  eccl.  1901,  p.  229, 
ordinat.  Ill,  exerc.  5,  c.  5.  230. 

9  DB.  441. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


287 


the  same  must  be  said  with  regard  to  some  fourteenth-century 
theologians,  among  whom  were  Scotus  and  Durandus.  The 
former  admitted  the  existence  of  the  sacramental  character 
only  because  it  was  taught  by  the  Church  in  his  day,10  while 
the  latter  based  his  acceptance  of  the  doctrine  on  the  prevail¬ 
ing  opinion  of  the  schools.11 

In  the  early  part  of  the  thirteenth  century,  the  Scholastics 
began  to  inquire  into  the  nature  of  the  character,  as  imprinted 
on  the  soul  by  baptism,  confirmation,  and  orders.  On  this 
point  there  was  quite  a  diversity  of  opinion.  Thus  William 
of  Paris  thought  that  the  sacramental  character  must  be  re¬ 
garded  as  a  certain  kind  of  sanctity,  somewhat  like  that  which 
results  from  the  consecration  of  churches,  altars,  and  litur¬ 
gical  vessels.12  In  maintaining  this  view,  he  had  no  fol¬ 
lowers  except  Durandus,  who,  about  a  century  later,  described 
the  sacramental  character  in  these  terms :  Character  non  est 
aliqua  natura  ahsoluta,  sed  est  sola  relatio  rationis,  per  quam 
ex  institutione  vel  pactione  divina  deputatur  aliquis  ad  sacras 
actiones .13 

Peter  Lombard  barely  refers  to  the  sacramental  character, 
but  Alexander  of  Hales  gives  a  full  exposition  of  the  doctrine. 
According  to  him,  the  character  imprinted  by  the  sacraments 
is  an  objective  and  absolute  reality  that  adheres  to  the  soul. 
It  belongs  to  the  first  species  of  qualities,  which  is  termed 
habitus.  Its  primary  purpose  is  to  dispose  the  soul  for  the 
reception  of  grace,  and  to  mark  it  as  belonging  to  the  flock  of 
Christ.  Each  of  the  three  characters  is  the  foundation  of  a 
peculiar  relation  to  the  Savior.  That  of  baptism  makes  the 
recipient  like  unto  Him  as  Head  of  the  Church;  that  of  con¬ 
firmation  produces  a  somewhat  similar  likeness  to  Him  as 
King  of  the  sacred  hosts;  while  that  of  orders  assimilates  the 
newly  ordained  to  Him  as  Sovereign  Priest.  Its  proximate 
subject  is  not  the  substance  of  the  soul,  but  the  potencies,  and 
through  them  it  inheres  in  the  soul  itself.  It  is  especially  at¬ 
tributed  to  the  intellect,  as  that  faculty  is  more  expressive  of 
the  divine  image  in  man.  By  divine  ordination  it  is  indeli- 

10  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  6,  q.  9,  n.  14.  12  De  Sacrament,  c.  3. 

11  Ibid.  d.  4,  q.  1.  13  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  4,  q,  1. 


288 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


ble,  and  therefore  will  remain  in  the  soul  for  all  eternity.14 

St.  Bonaventure  gives  the  same  exposition,  both  as  regards 
the  nature  and  purpose  of  the  sacramental  character  and  its 
proximate  subject.  He  explicitly  refutes  five  different  views 
on  the  nature  of  the  sacramental  character,  which  were  held 
in  his  day.  The  first  regarded  the  character  as  a  mere  con¬ 
secration  of  the  soul;  the  second,  as  a  potency;  the  third,  as 
a  passible  quality;  the  fourth,  as  a  form  or  figure;  the  fifth, 
as  some  unclassified  infused  quality.  After  giving  the  reason 
for  rejecting  these  views,  he  establishes  his  own,  holding  with 
Alexander  that  the  sacramental  character  is  an  indelible 
habitus ,  which,  residing  proximately  in  the  faculties,  disposes 
the  soul  for  the  reception  of  sanctifying  grace.15 

Albertus  Magnus  takes  practically  the  same  position,  except 
that  he  favors  the  opinion  which  makes  the  intellect  the  prox¬ 
imate  subject  of  the  sacramental  character.16  St.  Thomas, 
on  the  other  hand,  looked  at  the  matter  in  quite  a  different 
light.  In  the  first  place,  he  set  aside  the  opinion,  rather  com¬ 
mon  in  his  day,  that  the  character  is  a  habitus ;  and  the  reason 
he  gives  for  this  is  that  no  virtuous  habit,  such  as  the  character 
would  have  to  be  if  it  were  a  habitus,  can  be  used  indifferently 
for  good  or  evil,  as  is  the  case  with  the  sacramental  character. 
Then,  as  the  character  is  permanent  and  indelible,  it  can  evi¬ 
dently  not  be  a  passio,  which  is  a  merely  transient  modifica¬ 
tion  ;  hence  he  concludes  that  it  is  a  potentia.11 

This  conclusion,  moreover,  he  reasons  out  by  a  consider¬ 
ation  of  the  end  for  which  the  sacraments  were  instituted. 
Their  purpose  is  not  only  to  serve  as  a  remedy  against  sin,  as 
was  commonly  held  at  the  time,  but  furthermore  to  perfect  the 
soul  in  those  things  which  pertain  to  the  service  of  God  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  Christian  manner  of  life.  Hence  some  sacra¬ 
ments  imprint  a  character,  in  order  to  fit  man  for  this  serv¬ 
ice.18  Now,  divine  service  consists  either  in  receiving  some¬ 
thing  sacred  for  oneself  or  in  giving  it  to  others;  and  for 
both  purposes  a  certain  power  is  required,  passive  in  one  case 

14  Sum.  IV,  q.  8,  m.  8,  a.  I.  16  Ibid.  d.  6,  a.  3,  4. 

15  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  6,  p.  1,  a.  unic.  17  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  63,  a.  2. 

q.  1,  2.  18  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  63,  a.  1. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


289 


and  active  in  the  other.  Consequently,  the  sacramental  char¬ 
acter  imparts  a  certain  spiritual  power,  whose  direct  object 
is  the  service  or  worship  of  God.  Still,  this  power,  and  there¬ 
fore  the  character  itself,  is,  properly  speaking,  not  in  any  genus 
or  species,  but  is  reducible  to  the  second  species  of  quality,  and 
in  this  sense  it  is  a  potentia .19 

Considered  in  relation  to  its  primary  purpose,  the  sacra¬ 
mental  character  is  a  participation  in  the  eternal  priesthood  of 
Christ,  whence  the  Christian  manner  of  worship  is  derived. 
Hence  every  one  of  the  faithful,  by  the  very  fact  of  his  bap¬ 
tism,  is  clothed  with  a  priesthood  like  that  of  the  eternal 
High  Priest.  This  likeness  is  perfected  in  confirmation,  and 
brought  to  its  highest  perfection  in  the  sacrament  of  orders.20 
On  the  other  hand,  the  sacramental  character  may  also  be  con¬ 
sidered  as  a  configuration  or  resemblance  of  the  soul  to  the 
Blessed  Trinity,  but  only  through  Christ,  who  is  the  bright¬ 
ness  of  God’s  glory  and  the  figure  of  His  substance. 21 

Finally,  as  the  sacramental  character  is  a  potentia,  and  is 
primarily  imprinted  for  the  purpose  of  fitting  the  recipient  for 
rendering  God  due  service,  either  by  receiving  the  sacraments 
himself  or  by  administering  them  to  others,  its  proximate  sub¬ 
ject  is  not  the  substance  of  the  soul  but  its  faculties.22  And 
as,  moreover,  the  reception  and  administration  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments  is  in  a  certain  manner  a  profession  of  faith,  the  charac¬ 
ter  is  properly  said  to  reside  in  the  intellect.23 

For  a  time  this  teaching  of  St.  Thomas  gained  many  fol¬ 
lowers,  but  later  theologians,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Thomists,  quite  generally  set  it  aside  as  being  more  or  less 
arbitrary.  For  whatever  be  said  about  the  baptismal  and 
sacerdotal  character  in  this  respect,  it  seems  quite  obvious  that 
the  character  bestowed  in  confirmation  does  not  confer  any 
power,  either  active  or  passive,  which  is  not  already  possessed 
in  virtue  of  baptism.  And  this  is  admitted  by  St.  Thomas 
himself.  Hence,  outside  the  Thomistic  school,  it  has  become 
the  common  teaching  of  theologians  that  the  character  is  simply 

22  Ibid.  a.  4. 

23  Ibid.  a.  4,  ad  3m. 


19  Ibid.  a.  2. 

20  Ibid.  a.  3. 

21  Ibid. 


290 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


a  supernatural  quality  which  places  the  soul  in  a  special  rela¬ 
tion  to  Christ,  and  in  view  of  its  sacramental  origin  entitles 
man  to  those  abundant  helps  to  salvation  which  the  sacraments 
were  intended  to  confer.24 

A  word  may  here  be  added  in  reference  to  the  rather 
peculiar  position  of  Duns  Scotus.  After  rejecting  the  argu¬ 
ments  of  St.  Bonaventure  and  St.  Thomas,  which  were  ad¬ 
vanced  by  these  authors  for  the  express  purpose  of  proving 
that  the  sacramental  character  must  be  regarded  as  an  abso¬ 
lute  quality,  he  states  his  own  view  in  the  following  terms : 
“  Notwithstanding  these  reasons,  which  do  not  conclude,  it 
may  be  said  that  the  character  is  only  some  kind  of  extrinsic 
relation  of  the  soul  itself,  caused  directly  by  God  in  the  recep¬ 
tion  of  the  sacraments  that  are  initerable ;  for  putting  the  mat¬ 
ter  in  this  way,  all  that  is  commonly  said  about  the  character 
is  perfectly  safe.”  25  This  extrinsic  relation  is  supposed  to  be 
real,  and  has  the  will  for  its  proximate  term.26  Hence  the 
view  of  Scotus  regarding  the  sacramental  character  is  different 
from  that  of  Durandus,  but  its  drawbacks  are  hardly  less  se¬ 
rious;  for  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  a  real  relation  of  this 
kind  without  some  absolute  quality  as  its  foundation  in  the 
soul.  For  this  reason  modern  followers  of  Scotus  usually  in¬ 
terpret  his  teaching  on  the  sacramental  character  as  postulat¬ 
ing  such  an  absolute  quality;  yet;  to  all  appearances,  he  him¬ 
self  did  not  consider  it  necessary. 

3.  Need  of  Intention. —  That  neither  sanctity  nor  faith  is 
required  for  the  valid  administration  of  the  sacraments  is  the 
common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics.27  But  not  the  same 
unanimity  is  found  in  their  statements  regarding  the  need  of 
intention.  Thus  Rolandus  held  that  baptism  would  be  valid 
even  if  the  minister  had  no  intention  whatever,  provided  he 
administered  the  sacramental  rite  according  to  the  prescription 
of  the  Church.28  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,  on  the  other  hand,  re¬ 
garded  this  view  as  absurd.29  So  did  the  author  of  the 

24  Cfr.  Pesch,  Praelect.  Dogm.  27  Cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill, 

VI,  n.  189  sq.  q.  64,  a.  5,  9. 

25  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  6,  q.  10,  n.  2,  13.  28  Sent.  Gietl,  p.  206. 

26  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  6,  q.  11.  29  De  Sacr.  II,  6,  13. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


291 


Summa  Sententiarum ,30  and  Peter  Lombard.31  But  Robert 
Pulleyn,  at  the  beginning  of  the  thirteenth  century,  tried  to 
refute  the  arguments  of  Hugh,  and  stated  in  very  explicit 
terms :  “  Baptism  is  valid  when  the  rite  is  outwardly  per¬ 

formed  in  its  entirety,  whatever  be  the  inward  intention  of  him 
who  baptizes  or  of  him  who  is  baptized.”  32 

A  little  later  Alexander  of  Hales  formulated  a  rule  in  regard 
to  baptism  which  was  generally  adopted  by  later  Scholastics, 
and  applied  to  other  sacraments  as  well.  He  expresses  it  in 
this  way.  “  Whenever  anyone  uses  the  proper  words  and 
has  the  intention  of  doing  what  the  Church  does,  although  he 
understands  not  what  that  may  be  —  that  is,  he  intends  to 
do  what  the  Church  has  been  accustomed  to  do  —  that  bap¬ 
tism  is  valid. ”  33  Yet,  even  he  admitted  that  the  want  of  in¬ 
tention  on  the  part  of  the  minister  might  be  supplied  by  Christ, 
at  least  in  the  case  of  those  sacraments  that  are  necessary  for 
salvation.34  Some  also  interpret  a  passage  in  the  works  of  St. 
Thomas  as  upholding  this  view,  but  others  understand  it  in  a 
different  sense.35  Innocent  IV  is  frequently  cited  in  favor  of 
the  opinion  that  there  is  no  need  of  an  interior  intention;  but 
without  just  reason.  He  treats  the  question  of  the  validity  of 
baptism  in  his  commentary  on  the  third  book  of  Decretals , 
which  he  wrote  before  his  elevation  to  the  pontifical  chair;  and 
although  he  maintains  that  the  minister  need  not  “  bear  in 
mind  to  do  what  the  Church  does/’  or  “  may  even  have  the 
contrary  in  mind,”  still  in  this  contention  he  refers  merely  to 
the  minister's  understanding  of  the  end  intended,  not  to  the 
fact  of  an  interior  intention  as  such.  Hence  his  further 
statement :  “  The  baptism  is  valid,  provided  he  intends  to 

baptize.”  36 

At  all  events,  the  general  teaching  of  the  thirteenth-century 
and  later  Scholastics  is  that  an  interior  or  mental  intention  is 
required  on  the  part  of  the  minister  for  the  valid  administra¬ 
tion  of  the  sacraments.  The  principle  underlying  this  teach- 

30  Sent.  IV,  d.  6,  5.  34  Loc.  cit. 

31  Op.  cit.  tr.  6,  9.  35  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  6,  q.  1,  a.  2. 

32  Sent.  V,  c.  16.  36  Tit.  42,  c.  2;  cfr.  Pesch,  Prae- 

33  Sum.  IV,  q.  8,  m.  3,  a.  1.  lect.  Dogm.  VI,  p.  120. 


292 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


ing  is  thus  stated  by  St.  Thomas :  “  When  a  rite  is  of  such 

a  nature  that  it  may  indifferently  signify  many  things,  it  must 
be  determined  in  its  signification  by  something  else.  Now, 
the  sacramental  rites  are  of  this  kind;  thus  ablution  in  bap¬ 
tism  may  have  for  its  end  either  bodily  cleanness,  or  bodily 
health,  or  mere  enjoyment,  or  many  other  things  of  a  similar 
kind;  and  therefore  it  is  necessary  that  it  be  determined 
by  the  intention  of  the  minister  to  signify  one  of  them,  that  is, 
to  signify  the  sacramental  effect.” 37  And  that  he  under¬ 
stands  this  intention  to  be  interior  or  mental,  the  author 
indicates  in  his  answer  to  an  objection  drawn  from  the  dis¬ 
tractions  that  may  occur  during  the  performance  of  the  sacra¬ 
mental  rite;  for  he  says:  “  If,  while  making  ready  to  baptize, 
the  priest  intends  to  do  in  baptism  what  the  Church  does, 
then,  even  if  during  the  rite  his  thoughts  wander  to  something 
else,  the  sacrament  is  valid  in  virtue  of  the  intention  which  he 
actually  had  before  he  began  to  baptize.”  38  This  teaching 
had  already  been  embodied  in  the  profession  of  faith  which 
Innocent  III  required  of  converts  from  the  Waldensian  error.39 

A  similar  intention  was  also  required  in  the  recipient  of  the 
sacraments.  Hence  the  same  Pope  decided  that  those  who 
approach  baptism  induced  by  fear  of  punishment,  and  those 
who  are  baptized  while  unconscious  or  asleep,  do  not  receive 
the  sacrament  unless  they  have  an  actual  or  habitual  intention 
to  that  effect.40 

4.  The  Number  Seven. — Before  the  number  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments  could  be  determined,  there  was  need  of  an  exact  defini¬ 
tion  which  marked  off  the  sacramental  rites  from  all  other 
sacred  ceremonies.  Such  a  definition  was  worked  out  in  the 
twelfth  century,  and  it  was  at  that  time  that  seven  religious 
rites  began  to  be  exclusively  designated  as  sacraments.  All  of 
them  had  been  known  to  Patristic  writers,  and  the  Church  had 
used  them  from  the  beginning  of  her  existence;  but  so  long  as 
there  was  no  strict  definition  of  a  sacrament,  the  term  was 
applied  indiscriminately  to  all  rites  and  ceremonies  that  had  a 
religious  character.  Hence,  what  the  Scholastics  achieved 

37  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  64,  a.  8.  39  DB.  424. 

38  Ibid.  a.  8  ad  3m.  40  Ibid.  411, 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


293 


was  not  the  invention  of  sacramental  rites,  but  their  proper 
classification  by  means  of  an  exact  definition.  It  was  this 
classification  that  the  unknown  author  of  the  Summa  Sen- 
tentiarum  had  in  mind  when  he  wrote :  “  A  sacrament  is  not 

merely  a  sign  of  a  sacred  thing,  but  it  also  exerts  efficacy  in 
its  respect.  And  this  is  the  difference  between  a  sign  and  a 
sacrament:  in  order  to  be  a  sign  nothing  is  required  except 
that  it  signifies  the  thing  of  which  it  is  a  sign,  without  in  any 
way  bestowing  the  same;  but  a  sacrament  furthermore  also 
bestows  that  of  which  it  is  a  sign  or  expression.”  41 

The  work  of  classification  itself  proceeded  slowly,  even  after 
the  principle  upon  which  it  was  to  rest  had  been  clearly  enun¬ 
ciated.  This  was  partly  owing  to  the  want  of  proper  terms 
for  sacred  rites  that  were  not  productive  of  grace.  It  was  not 
until  Alexander  of  Hales  coined  the  term  sacramental  that  the 
name  sacrament  could  be  used  in  an  exclusive  sense.  Hence 
the  earliest  attempts  at  classification  distinguished  between 
sacramenta  majora  and  minora ,  that  is,  between  sacred  rites 
that  were  held  to  be  of  great  importance  because  of  their  in¬ 
timate  connection  with  salvation,  and  others  that  were  con¬ 
sidered  of  less  importance.  That  distinction  is  already  found 
in  the  works  of  Abelard,42  of  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,43  and 
Alger  of  Liege,44  all  of  whom  wrote  in  the  first  half  of  the 
twelfth  century.  They,  however,  enumerate  only  five  sacra¬ 
ments  among  the  majora:  Eucharist,  baptism,  confirmation, 
matrimony,  and  extreme  unction ;  or  as  Alger  gives  them : 
Eucharist,  baptism,  chrisma  (confirmation),  confession,  and 
orders.45 

At  the  same  time,  or  perhaps  a  little  later,  the  author  of 
the  Summa  Sententiarum  speaks  about  “  all  the  sacraments,” 
and  then  treats  of  baptism,  confirmation,  the  Eucharist,  pen¬ 
ance,  anointing  of  the  sick,  and  matrimony;  thus  leaving  out 
the  sacrament  of  orders;  but  to  that  he  refers  in  connection 
with  the  keys  which  are  given  at  the  consecration  of  the 
priest.46  Meanwhile  in  Abelard’s  own  school  penance  and 

41  Op.  cit.  tr.  4,  c.  1.  44  De  Misericord,  et  Just.  I,  62-70. 

42  Epit.  Theol.  Christ.  28.  45  Loc.  cit.  ML,  180,  884. 

43  De  Sacr.  I,  9,  II,  9,  1.  46  Op.  cit.  tr.  5-7. 


294 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


orders,  which  he  himself  had  passed  by,  were  also  counted 
with  the  other  five.  Thus  Rolandus 47  and  Omnebene48 
speak  first  in  a  general  way  of  the  sacramentum  Incarnationis, 
and  then  of  baptism,  confirmation,  the  sacrament  of  the  body 
and  blood  of  Christ,  penance,  the  conferring  of  the  keys,  and 
matrimony.  At  the  same  time,  however,  all  these  authors 
still  apply  the  name  sacrament  also  to  other  religious  rites; 
and  so  too  did  the  Third  Lateran,  1179,  and  a  synod  of  Lon¬ 
don  held  in  1237. 49  It  was  Peter  Lombard  who  first  enu¬ 
merated  the  seven  sacraments  in  their  present  order,  and 
designated  them  exclusively  as  sacraments ; 50  but  it  took  some 
little  time  before  his  terminology  was  universally  accepted. 

From  the  foregoing  brief  statements  it  appears  sufficiently 
clear  that  the  classification  of  seven  religious  rites  as  sacra¬ 
ments  did  not  result  from  the  individual  speculation  of  the 
Lombard,  as  is  frequently  maintained  by  Protestant  writers. 
He  merely  gave  the  finishing  touch  to  a  development  that  had 
been  going  on  for  generations.  Nay,  it  seems  that  even  in¬ 
dependently  of  his  speculations  the  same  classification  re¬ 
sulted  spontaneously  from  the  traditional  teaching  of  the 
Church.  For  in  a  sermon  which  was  written  down  at  the  very 
latest  towards  the  middle  of  the  twelfth  century,  we  find  this 
striking  passage :  “  As  I  am  about  to  depart  from  you,  I  de¬ 

liver  to  you  what  was  delivered -unto  us  by  the  Lord,  a  pledge 
of  the  holy  faith  between  you  and  God,  namely,  the  seven 
sacraments  of  the  Church,  as  the  seven  sanctifying  gifts  of 
the  Holy  Spirit.  .  .  .  For  your  sake  I  deem  it  proper  to  enu¬ 
merate  them  once  more,  and  to  point  out  which  they  are  — 
baptism,  confirmation,  the  anointing  of  the  sick,  the  Eucharist, 
the  reconciliation  of  sinners,  matrimony,  and  orders.  .  .  . 
Wherefore  retain  them  with  all  honor  and  reverence,  love  and 
revere  them;  teach  them  to  your  children,  so  that  they  may 
know  them  by  heart  and  diligently  guard  them  for  all  future 
generations.”  51 

After  the  twelfth  century  theologians  no  longer  inquired 

47  Cfr.  Gietl,  157  sqq.  60  Sent.  IV,  d.  2,  1. 

48  Cfr.  Denifle,  ALKG,  I,  467.  61  Cfr.  Bolland.  I,  Jul.  396; 

49  Mansi,  22,  221 ;  23,  448.  Monum.  Germ.  Hist.  Script.  20,  732. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


295 


into  the  number  of  the  sacraments,  but  they  displayed  con¬ 
siderable  ingenuity  in  thinking  out  reasons  why  there  should 
be  seven.  They  were  convinced  that  Christ  had  given  seven 
sacraments  to  His  Church,  neither  more  nor  less;  but  why 
seven?  In  answer  to  this  question  they  advanced  a  great 
variety  of  divergent  views.  Thus  Albertus  Magnus  thought 
that  the  sacraments  were  instituted  as  so  many  remedies 
against  the  seven  capital  sins.52  St.  Bonaventure  coordinated 
them  with  the  three  theological  and  the  four  cardinal  virtues.53 
St.  Thomas  pointed  out  the  evident  correspondence  that  is 
found  between  man’s  natural  and  supernatural  life,  and  thence 
derived  reasons  of  congruity  as  to  why  there  should  be  five 
sacraments  to  provide  for  man’s  spiritual  needs  in  so  far  as 
he  is  an  individual  human  being,  and  two  others  to  be  of  help 
to  him  in  his  relation  to  society.54  It  must  be  noted,  however, 
that  as  all  these  authors  presuppose  the  existence  of  seven 
sacraments,  the  various  reasons  advanced  by  them  are  not  in¬ 
tended  to  prove  anything  else  than  the  fitness  of  the  divine 
institution. 

5.  Institution  of  the  Sacraments. —  The  traditional  teaching 
of  the  Church  in  regard  to  the  institution  of  the  sacraments 
was  thus  formulated  by  a  fourth-  or  fifth-century  writer,  to 
whom  the  treatise  De  Sacramentis  is  attributed :  “  The  au¬ 

thor  of  the  sacraments?  Who  is  he,  if  not  the  Lord  Jesus? 
The  sacraments  have  come  down  from  heaven.”  55  This  tra¬ 
ditional  view,  in  so  far  as  it  merely  asserts  that  the  sacra¬ 
ments  were  in  some  way  instituted  by  Christ,  was  universally 
adopted  by  the  Scholastics.  But  on  the  further  question, 
whether  Christ  instituted  the  sacraments  immediately,  in  per¬ 
son,  or  through  the  agency  of  others,  there  was  no  absolute 
agreement.  Thus  Hugh  of  St.  Victor  and  Peter  Lombard 
held  that  extreme  unction  was  instituted  by  the  Apostles ; 56 
and  the  same  was  taught  by  Alexander  of  Hales  57  and  St. 
Bonaventure.58  The  latter  expressed  a  similar  view  with  re- 

52  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  2,  a.  1.  56  Hugh,  De  Sacr.  II,  15,  11; 


53  Breviloq.  VI,  3. 

54  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  65,  a.  1. 
65  Op.  cit.  ML,  16,  439. 


Lomb.  Sent.  IV,  d.  23,  c.  3. 

57  Sum.  IV,  q.  9,  m.  i,  2. 

58  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  23,  a.  1,  q.  2. 


296 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


gard  to  confirmation,59  while  the  former  attributed  the  insti¬ 
tution  of  that  sacrament  to  the  Council  of  Meaux,  held  in 
845.  Before  that  time,  he  contended,  the  Holy  Ghost  had 
been  imparted  to  the  faithful  without  the  medium  of  any 
sacramental  rite.00 

St.  Bonaventure,  however,  seems  to  have  changed  his  mind 
towards  the  end  of  his  life.  For  in  his  Brcviloqiiimn  he  says : 
“  Christ  instituted  the  aforesaid  sacraments  in  different  ways. 
Some  of  them  he  instituted  by  confirming,  approving,  and  per¬ 
fecting  what  already  existed,  as  matrimony  and  penance ;  some 
others,  by  insinuating  and  initiating  them,  as  confirmation  and 
extreme  unction;  others  again,  by  initiating,  consummating, 
and  receiving  them  Himself,  as  the  sacrament  of  baptism,  the 
Eucharist,  and  orders.  These  three  He  instituted  fully,  and 
He  was  also  the  first  to  receive  them.”  61  Even  Alexander 
states  in  one  place  that  all  the  sacraments  were  instituted 
either  by  Christ  Himself  or  by  the  Apostles,  in  virtue  of  His 
authority.62 

Albertus  Magnus,63  St.  Thomas,64  and  Duns  Scotus 65 
attribute  the  institution  of  all  the  sacraments  immediately  to 
Christ,  so  that  the  Apostles  simply  used  and  promulgated  what 
Christ  had  established.  St.  Thomas,  while  speaking  of  ex¬ 
treme  unction,  expresses  his  view  in  these  terms :  “  In  re¬ 

gard  to  this  sacrament  there  are  two  opinions.  Some  there 
are  who  say  that  Christ  did  not  institute  extreme  unction  and 
confirmation  in  person,  but  commissioned  the  Apostles  to  in¬ 
stitute  them ;  because  these  two,  on  account  of  the  fullness  of 
grace  which  is  conferred  in  them,  could  not  be  instituted  be¬ 
fore  the  final  sending  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  .  .  .  Others  say 
that  Christ  instituted  all  the  sacraments  in  person;  but  that 
He  personally  promulgated  only  those  which  present  greater 
difficulty  in  the  way  of  belief,  while  He  left  it  to  the  Apostles 
to  promulgate  the  others,  such  as  extreme  unction  and  con¬ 
firmation.  And  this  opinion  appears  all  the  more  probable 

59  Ibid.  d.  7,  a.  1,  q.  I.  63  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  7,  a.  1-3  . 

60  Loc.  cit.  m.  1.  64  Ibid.  q.  1,  a.  1-3. 

61  Op.  cit.  VI,  c.  4.  65  Ibid.  d.  2,  q.  1. 

62  Op.  cit.  q.  5,  m.  2,  a.  1. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


297 


as  the  sacraments  belong  to  what  is  fundamental  in  the  New 
Law,  and  therefore  their  institution  pertains  to  the  Lawgiver 
Himself.”  66  And  where  he  speaks  of  the  sacraments  in  gen¬ 
eral,  he  simply  states  that  they  were  instituted  by  God  potestate 
auctoritatis ,  and  by  Christ  potestate  excellentiae ,67 

After  the  time  of  St.  Thomas  the  immediate  institution  of 
the  sacraments  by  Christ  was  universally  taught  in  the  schools, 
and  not  until  the  seventeenth  century  was  the  mediate  institu¬ 
tion  of  some  of  the  sacraments  again  defended  by  theologians. 
Then,  however,  the  question  was  proposed  in  a  different  form, 
namely,  whether  Christ  determined  the  sacramental  rite  in 
gencre  only  or  also  in  specie.  Thus  put,  the  question  is  still 
waiting  for  a  solution. 

The  principal  points  contained  in  the  foregoing  two  chap¬ 
ters,  which  set  forth  the  teaching  of  the  Scholastics  on  the 
sacraments  in  general,  were  embodied  by  the  Council  of  Trent 
in  its  various  definitions  of  doctrines  then  under  discussion. 
The  septenary  number  of  the  sacraments,  their  institution  by 
Christ,  their  efficacy  ex  opere  operato,  the  conferring  of  grace, 
the  impression  of  a  character  by  baptism,  confirmation,  and 
orders ;  the  difference  between  the  sacraments  of  the  Old  and 
New  Law,  the  need  of  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  minis¬ 
ter,  the  validity  of  the  sacraments  conferred  by  ministers  in 
the  state  of  mortal  sin  —  all  these  points  were  clearly  defined 
and  proposed  for  the  acceptance  of  the  faithful. 6S  It  is  true, 
not  all  of  the  doctrines  thus  defined  had  been  brought  to  their 
full  development  by  the  labor  of  the  Scholastics;  but  in  no 
other  field  of  theological  inquiry  did  the  Schoolmen  achieve 
more  satisfactory  results  than  in  sacramental  theology. 

66  Sum.  Theol.  Suppl.  29,  a.  3.  68  DB,  844-856. 

67  Ibid.  Ill,  q.  64,  a.  2,  3. 


CHAPTER  XVII 
BAPTISM:  CONFIRMATION 

After  considering  the  points  that  are  common  to  all  the 
sacraments,  or  at  least  to  several  of  them,  the  Scholastics 
proceed  to  investigate  each  sacrament  in  particular.  They 
inquire  into  the  time  and  circumstances  of  its  institution,  its 
nature,  effects,  and  the  manner  of  its  administration.  In  this 
study  they  are,  as  a  general  rule,  rather  diffuse,  considering 
not  only  dogmatic  questions,  but  also  such  as  have  an  ex¬ 
clusively  moral  bearing.  Hence  in  the  following  chapters  it 
will  be  impossible  to  do  more  than  give  the  barest  outline  of 
their  teaching,  setting  forth  only  such  points  as  are  of  more 
particular  interest  and  importance  in  the  history  of  dogmatic 
development. 


A  —  Baptism 

Peter  Lombard  describes  baptism  in  these  terms :  “  Bap¬ 

tism  is  called  a  dipping  in  —  vntinctio  — that  is,  an  external 
washing  of  the  body  done  while  pronouncing  a  prescribed 
formula.  For,  if  the  washing  be  not  accompanied  by  the 
pronouncing  of  the  words,  no  sacrament  is  had,  but  when  the 
washing  in  the  water  is  accompanied  by  the  pronouncing  of 
the  words,  it  becomes  a  sacrament;  the  water  itself  does  not, 
indeed,  become  a  sacrament,  but  the  washing  in  the  water.”  1 
Hence  the  sacrament  of  baptism  consists  of  two  parts:  a 
bodily  ablution  with  water  and  a  prescribed  form  of  words. 
The  bodily  ablution  was  considered  by  the  Scholastics  both 
under  an  active  and  a  passive  aspect.  Under  its  active  aspect 
they  understood  by  it  the  action  of  the  minister  in  so  far  as  he 
applies  the  baptismal  water  to  the  subject  and  pronounces  the 

1  Sent.  IV,  d.  3,  c.  1. 

298 


THE  SACRAMENT  OF  BAPTISM 


299 


prescribed  form.  Under  its  passive  aspect  they  considered  the 
ablution  precisely  as  received  by  the  subject.  From  this  dis¬ 
tinction  arose  the  question,  under  which  of  these  two  aspects 
does  the  ablution  properly  constitute  the  sacrament  of  bap¬ 
tism?  Some  answered  this  question  by  saying  that  the  sac¬ 
rament  is  properly  in  the  person  who  is  regenerated  by  it,  and 
therefore  it  is  the  ablution  in  its  passive  sense  that  constitutes 
the  sacrament.2  Others  made  a  distinction  between  the  sac¬ 
rament  as  a  sign  of  grace  and  a  cause  of  regeneration.  In 
the  former  sense  the  sacrament  was  said  to  consist  in  the 
ablution  as  applied  by  the  minister;  in  the  latter,  as  received 
by  the  subject.3  Others,  again,  argued  that  the  sacrament  is 
primarily  an  efficacious  sign  of  grace,  and  therefore  it  is  the 
ablution  taken  in  an  active  sense  that  properly  constitutes  its 
essence.4 

In  connection  with  this  discussion  a  distinction  was  made 
between  the  remote  and  proximate  matter  of  baptism,  and 
thereby  different  definitions  were  more  or  less  reconciled. 
The  remote  matter  is  the  water  itself  that  is  to  be  used  in  the 
sacramental  rite;  and  it  was  with  this  before  his  mind  that 
Hugh  of  St.  Victor  said :  “  Baptism  is  the  water  that  is  sanc¬ 

tified  for  the  blotting  out  of  sin.”  5  The  proximate  matter  is 
the  application  of  the  baptismal  water  to  the  subject,  or  the 
bodily  ablution  taken  in  an  active  sense;  and  referring  to  this 
the  Lombard  defined  baptism  as  a  bodily  ablution  under  a 
prescribed  form  of  words.6 

Again,  in  the  same  connection  a  distinction  was  made  be¬ 
tween  the  sacrament  only,  the  sacrament  and  the  thing,  and 
the  thing  only  —  sacramentum  tantum,  sacramentum  et  res , 
res  tantum.  The  first  is  the  sacramental  rite  in  itself,  the 
second  is  the  character,  the  third  is  sacramental  grace.  In 
reference  to  this  St.  Bonaventure  states :  “  Baptism  is  some¬ 

times  denominated  a  sacrament  from  the  sacramentum  et  res, 
which  is  the  character ;  hence  the  Damascene  writes :  ‘  Bap- 

2  Cfr.  William  of  Auxerre,  Sum.  4  Cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill, 

IV,  tr.  3,  c.  2.  q.  66,  a.  1. 

3  Cfr.  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  5  De  Sacr.  Ill,  p.  6,  c.  2. 

3,  p.  1,  a.  1,  q.  2.  6Loc.  cit. 


300 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


tism  is  the  principle  of  spiritual  life,  a  seal  and  safeguard 
and  an  illumination  of  the  mind/  ”  7  And  thus  the  various 
definitions  are  substantially  the  same,  only  they  refer  to  dif¬ 
ferent  aspects  of  baptism. 

Regarding  the  form  of  baptism,  all  the  Scholastics  were 
agreed  that  in  their  day  the  invocation  of  the  Blessed  Trinity 
was  of  obligation.  The  majority  also  held  that  the  Trini¬ 
tarian  form  was  necessary  for  the  validity  of  the  sacrament. 
However,  Hugh  of  St.  Victor 8  and  Peter  Lombard 9  were 
of  opinion  that  baptism  administered  in  the  name  of  Jesus 
might  still  be  considered  valid.  On  the  other  hand,  they  all 
held  that  baptism  in  the  name  of  Jesus,  without  an  explicit 
invocation  of  the  Blessed  Trinity,  had  been  both  valid  and 
licit  in  the  first  ages  of  the  Church.  To  this  conclusion  they 
argued  from  what  they  found  in  the  Acts  of  the  Apostles,10 
from  a  statement  of  St.  Ambrose,11  and  from  a  decision  given 
by  Pope  Nicholas  I.12  They  pointed  out,  however,  that  the 
primitive  usage  rested  upon  a  special  dispensation  from  the 
general  law  of  baptism  under  the  explicit  invocation  of  the 
Blessed  Trinity.  And  the  reason  for  this  dispensation  they 
found  in  the  fact  that  in  the  beginning  the  name  of  Jesus  was 
still  unknown,  or  where  known  it  was  generally  despised ;  and 
therefore,  in  order  to  cause  this  name  to  become  known  and 
honored,  it  was  ordained  that  for  some  time  it  alone  should 
be  used  in  the  administration  of  the  baptismal  rite.13 

That  according  to  the  ordinary  law  of  baptism  an  explicit 
invocation  of  the  Blessed  Trinity  is  essential,  is  thus  taught 
by  St.  Thomas,  with  whom  St.  Bonaventure  and  others  are 
in  full  agreement.  “  The  sacraments,”  he  says,  “  have  their 
efficacy  from  the  institution  of  Christ.  And  therefore  if  any 
of  those  things  be  omitted  which  Christ  instituted  in  regard 
to  any  one  of  the  sacraments,  it  is  without  efficacy;  except 
when  the  omission  occurs  in  virtue  of  a  dispensation  granted 

7  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  3,  p.  i,  a.  l  q.  I.  12  Ad  Bulgaros,  DB.  335. 

8  De  Sacr.  II,  p.  6,  c.  2.  13  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  66, 

9  Sent.  IV,  d.  3,  c.  4.  a.  6  ad  im;  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  loc. 

10  Op.  cit.  2,  38;  8,  16;  10, 48.  cit.  a.  2,  1,  2  ad  3m. 

11  De  Spirit.  Sanct.  c.  3. 


THE  SACRAMENT  OF  BAPTISM 


301 


by  Him  who  connected  His  own  power  with  the  sacramental 
rite.  Now  Christ  ordained  that  the  sacrament  of  baptism 
should  be  conferred  under  the  invocation  of  the  Trinity;  and 
therefore  if  anything  be  wanting  to  the  full  invocation  of  the 
Trinity,  the  integrity  of  baptism  is  thereby  destroyed.  Nor 
is  this  conclusion  invalidated  by  the  fact  that  in  the  name  of 
one  person  that  of  another  is  understood  (thus  in  the  name  of 
the  Father  the  Son  is  understood),  or  that  he  who  names  one 
person  only  can  have  the  right  faith  concerning  the  three : 
because  just  as  sensible  matter  is  required  for  the  sacrament, 
so  likewise  is  there  required  a  sensible  form.  Hence  a  mere 
understanding  of  the  doctrine  or  interior  faith  in  the  Trinity 
does  not  suffice  for  the  validity  of  the  sacrament,  unless  the 
Trinity  be  also  mentioned  in  words  that  can  be  perceived  by 
the  senses.”  14 

Besides  the  three  holy  names,  the  form  of  baptism  must  also 
express  the  act  of  baptizing.  The  reason  for  this  is  thus  given 
by  St.  Bonaventure :  “  As  stated  by  Alexander,  the  word  ex¬ 

pressing  the  act  of  baptizing  is  essential  to  the  form.  And  the 
reason  for  it  is  the  institution  of  the  sacrament  itself.  Fur¬ 
thermore,  the  reason  why  the  sacrament  was  thus  instituted 
is  this,  because  in  administering  the  sacrament  there  is  need 
of  an  intention;  then,  too,  this  sacrament  is  necessary  for  sal¬ 
vation  and  is  conferred  on  some  one  distinct  from  the  minister. 
Hence  to  avoid  the  danger  of  not  having  the  proper  inten¬ 
tion,  it  is  necessary  that  this  intention  be  expressed  by  a  proper 
word  in  the  form.”  10 

St.  Thomas  gives  a  different  reason.  “  Baptism,”  he  says, 
“  is  consecrated  by  its  form.  .  .  .  Therefore  it  is  necessary 
that  in  the  form  of  baptism  the  cause  of  baptism  be  expressed. 
Now  the  cause  is  twofold:  the  one  is  the  principal  cause,  from 
which  baptism  has  its  power,  and  this  is  the  Blessed  Trinity; 
the  other  is  the  instrumental  cause,  namely,  the  minister,  who 
confers  the  exterior  sacrament.  Hence  it  is  necessary  that  in 
the  form  of  baptism  mention  be  made  of  both.  Now  the 
ministerial  cause  is  mentioned  by  saying :  I  baptise  thee ;  and 

Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  66,  a.  6.  15  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  3,  p.  1,  a.  2,  q.  1. 


302 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


the  principal  cause,  by  saying :  In  the  name  of  the  Father,  and 
of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost.”  16 

The  manner  of  baptizing  was  still  in  a  state  of  transition, 
from  immersion  to  affusion.  Peter  Lombard  mentions  im¬ 
mersion  only,  but  later  writers  refer  to  both  as  being  in  use 
simultaneously  in  different  churches.  St.  Bonaventure  states 
that  although  baptism  by  affusion  is  customary  in  some  places, 
the  Roman  Church  still  baptizes  by  immersion.17  Albertus 
Magnus  considers  baptism  by  immersion  more  praiseworthy,18 
and  St.  Thomas  speaks  of  baptism  by  affusion  as  being  more 
or  less  exceptional.19  However  the  general  rule  laid  down 
was,  that  the  custom  of  the  place  where  baptism  was  admin¬ 
istered  should  be  observed. 

In  regard  to  the  effect  produced  by  baptism  it  was  cus¬ 
tomary  to  make  a  threefold  distinction.  In  the  first  place,  all 
hold  that  baptism  imprints  an  indelible  character  on  the  soul, 
and  this  effect  is  produced  by  every  valid  baptism.20  Secondly, 
all  are  agreed  that  in  a  properly  disposed  subject  sin  and  the 
punishment  due  to  sin  are  entirely  blotted  out.21  Thirdly, 
they  are  also  agreed  that  when  adults  are  baptized,  and  are 
properly  disposed,  they  receive  sanctifying  grace  together  with 
the  infused  virtues  and  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit.22  The 
amount  of  grace,  however,  in  the  case  of  adults,  varies  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  different  dispositions. with  which  the  sacrament  is 
received.  The  person  who  is  better  disposed  receives  more 
grace,  and  the  one  who  is  less  well  disposed  receives  less 
grace.23 

When  there  is  question  of  the  baptism  of  infants,  all  teach 
that  a  character  is  imprinted  on  the  soul  and  that  original  sin 
and  its  punishment  are  blotted  out;  but  there  is  some  differ¬ 
ence  of  opinion  in  regard  to  infusion  of  grace  and  the  accom¬ 
panying  virtues.  St.  Thomas  speaks  of  this  diversity  of 

16  Loc.  cit.  a.  5;  Sent.  d.  3,  c.  7.  21  Cfr.  Thomas,  In  Sent.  IV,  d. 

17  In  Sent.  d.  3,  p.  2,  a.  2,  q.  1.  4,  q.  2. 

18  Ibid.  a.  5.  22  Bonavent.  op.  cit.  d.  4,  p.  1,  a. 

19  (3p  cit  q  (56  J  i  q  3 

20  Cfr.  Bonavent.  Op.  cit.  d.  6,  p.  23  Ibid. ;  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol. 
I,  a.  unic.  q.  4;  Thomas,  op.  cit.  q.  Ill,  q.  69,  a.  8. 

69,  a.  8. 


THE  SACRAMENT  OF  BAPTISM 


303 


opinion  as  follows :  “  Some  of  the  older  teachers  held  that 

in  the  baptism  of  children  grace  and  the  virtues  were  not 
infused,  but  that  the  character  of  Christ  was  imprinted  on 
their  souls,  in  virtue  of  which,  when  arrived  at  the  age  of 
reason,  they  received  grace  and  the  virtues.  But  this  appears 
to  be  false  for  two  reasons:  First,  because  children,  the  same 
as  adults,  are  in  baptism  made  members  of  Christ;  and  hence 
it  is  necessary  that  they  receive  from  the  Head  an  influx  of 
grace  and  virtue.  Secondly,  because  according  to  this,  chil¬ 
dren  dying  after  baptism  would  not  attain  eternal  life,  as  it  is 
said  that  the  grace  of  God  is  life  everlasting ;  and  thus  it  would 
be  of  no  benefit  to  them  to  have  been  baptized.  The  cause 
of  the  error  lay  in  this,  that  they  did  not  know  how  to  dis¬ 
tinguish  between  the  virtues  and  their  acts ;  and  hence  seeing 
that  children  are  incapable  of  eliciting  acts  of  virtue,  they 
thought  that  after  baptism  they  in  no  way  had  the  virtues 
themselves. ”  24 

The  question  had  already  been  referred  to  by  Innocent  III 
in  1201,  but  was  left  undecided.25  Clement  V  took  the  matter 
up  again  at  the  Council  of  Vienne,  held  in  13 11,  and  gave  his 
decision  in  these  terms :  “  The  second  opinion,  which  holds 

that  in  baptism  sanctifying  grace  and  the  virtues  are  con¬ 
ferred  on  children  as  well  as  on  adults,  is  more  in  harmony 
and  concord  with  the  sayings  of  the  saints  and  the  teaching 
of  modern  theologians;  and  therefore,  with  the  approval  of 
this  holy  Council,  we  have  thought  proper  to  give  it  'the  prefer¬ 
ence.”  26  This  view  was  adopted  as  certain  by  the  Council  of 
'  Trent.27 

In  the  case  of  adults,  the  principal  effect  of  baptism,  that  is, 
the  infusion  of  grace  and  the  blotting  out  of  sin,  may  also  be 
obtained  by  the  baptism  of  desire,  which  consists  in  an  act  of 
perfect  contrition  and  the  intention  of  receiving  the  sacrament 
at  an  opportune  time.  “  God,”  says  St.  Bonaventure,  “  obliges 
no  one  to  do  the  impossible,  .  .  .  and  therefore  it  must  be 
admitted  that  the  baptism  of  desire  without  the  baptism  of 
water  is  sufficient,  provided  the  person  in  question  has  the 

24  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  69,  a.  7.  26  Mansi,  25,  410;  DB.  483. 

25  DB.  410.  27  DB.  800. 


304 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


will  to  receive  the  baptism  of  water,  but  is  prevented  from  do¬ 
ing  so  before  he  dies.”  28  Or  as  St.  Thomas  words  it : 
“  Although  the  effect  depends  on  the  First  Cause,  nevertheless 
the  Cause  exceeds  the  effect  and  is  not  dependent  thereon. 
And  for  that  reason  one  may  obtain  the  effect  of  the  sacrament 
aside  from  the  baptism  of  water,  namely  through  the  suffer¬ 
ings  of  Christ,  in  so  far  as  one  becomes  conformable  to  Him 
in  suffering  for  His  sake.  .  .  .  And  for  the  same  reason  one 
may  also  obtain  the  effect  of  baptism  through  the  power  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  not  only  without  the  baptism  of  water  but  also 
without  the  baptism  of  blood;  namely,  in  so  far  as  anyone’s 
heart  is  moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost  to  believe  and  to  love  God, 
and  to  do  penance  for  his  sins;  hence  it  is  also  called  the 
baptism  of  penance.”  29 

What  St.  Thomas  here  says  about  the  baptism  of  blood,  that 
it  justifies  before  God  without  the  baptism  of  water,  is  the 
common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics,  and  was  taught  by  the 
Church  from  the  beginning.  Still  they  generally  point  out 
that  per  se  it  frees  from  venial  sins  only;  because  mortal  sins, 
if  there  be  any,  must  be  blotted  out  by  charity,  without  which 
even  martyrdom  “  would  be  of  no  avail  unto  salvation.”  30 

There  is  no  complete  agreement  among  the  Scholastics  in 
regard  to  the  time  when  baptism  was  instituted.  “  Concern¬ 
ing  the  institution  of  baptism,  as  regards  the  time,”  says  the 
Lombard,  “  there  are  various  opinions.  Some  say  that  bap¬ 
tism  was  instituted  when  Christ  said  to  Nicodemus:  Unless 
a  man  be  born  again  of  ivater  and  the  Holy  Ghost,  he  cannot 
enter  into  the  kingdom  of  heaven.  Others  hold  that  the  in¬ 
stitution  of  baptism  took  place  when  He  said  to  the  Apostles : 
Go,  teach  all  nations,  baptising  them  in  the  name  of  the  Father 
and  of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost.31  Alexander  of 
Hales  32  and  Albertus  Magnus  33  make  a  distinction  between 
formal  and  material  institution.  Baptism,  they  say,  was 
formally  instituted  after  Christ’s  resurrection,  when  He  sent 

28  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  4,  p.  2,  a.  1,  q.  1.  31  Sent.  d.  3,  n.  5. 

29  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  66,  a.  11.  32  Sum.  IV,  q.  8,  m.  2,  a.  3. 

30  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  4,  p.  2,  a.  2,  q.  33  In  Sent.  d.  3,  a.  8. 

1 ;  Cfr.  Thomas,  II.  II,  q.  124,  a.  2 

ad  2m. 


THE  SACRAMENT  OF  CONFIRMATION 


305 


His  Apostles  to  baptize  all  nations ;  it  was  materially  instituted 
when  Christ  Himself  was  baptized  by  John.  However,  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  more  common  view,  held  by  St.  Bonaventure,34 
St.  Thomas,35  and  Duns  Scotus,36  the  sacrament  was  insti¬ 
tuted  before  Christ’s  sufferings  and  death,  and  probably  at 
the  time  of  His  own  baptism. 

The  obligation  of  receiving  baptism  did  not  come  into  force 
until  after  the  death  of  Christ,  as  is  admitted  even  by  those  who 
hold  that  the  sacrament  was  instituted  before  He  suffered; 
but  on  the  further  question,  how  soon  after  His  death  that 
obligation  arose,  there  is  no  agreement.  St.  Thomas  37  and 
Albertus  Magnus  38  consider  it  probable  that  it  began  immedi¬ 
ately,  so  that  after  Christ  had  died  for  the  sins  of  the  world, 
baptism  became  forthwith  the  ordinary  means  of  justification 
for  all  men.  On  the  other  hand,  Alexander  of  Hales,39  St. 
Bonaventure,40  Richard  of  Middleton,41  and  Scotus 42  hold 
that  the  obligation  to  receive  baptism  did  not  begin  until  the 
law  had  been  sufficiently  promulgated ;  which  promulgation 
took  place  gradually,  up  to  the  fall  of  Jerusalem. 


B  —  Confirmation 


In  regard  to  confirmation  comparatively  little  is  said  by  the 
Scholastics.  The  Lombard  puts  all  he  has  to  say  on  the  sub¬ 
ject  in  two  short  paragraphs.  The  form,  he  says,  is  known 
to  all ;  the  sacrament  can  be  administered  only  by  a  bishop ; 
it  must  be  received  by  all  Christians ;  it  confers  the  Holy  Spirit, 
and  for  that  reason  it  is  of  a  higher  dignity  than  baptism;  it 
cannot  be  repeated.43  These  few  points  were  taken  by  his 
commentators  and  made  the  headings  of  so  many  distinct  ques¬ 
tions  or  articles,  to  which  were  usually  added  a  few  subordi¬ 
nate  considerations  by  way  of  clearer  and  fuller  exposition. 

Although  in  olden  times  confirmation  was  intimately  con¬ 
nected  with  baptism,  yet  most  Scholastics  simply  assume  that 

34  Ibid.  p.  2,  a.  1,  q.  I.  39  Op.  cit.  q.  8,  m.  2,  a.  3. 


35  Ibid.  q.  1,  a.  3. 

36  Ibid.  q.  4,  n.  2. 

37  Ibid.  q.  1,  a.  5. 

38  Ibid.  a.  6. 


40  Loc.  cit.  a.  3,  q.  1. 

41  Ibid.  a.  5. 

42  Ibid.  q.  4. 

43  Sent.  d.  7,  n.  2. 


3°6 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


it  is  a  distinct  sacrament.  St.  Thomas,  however,  thinks  it 
proper  to  give  a  proof  to  that  effect.  He  proposes  it  in  these 
terms:  “  The  sacraments  of  the  New  Law  were  instituted 
for  the  production  of  special  effects  in  the  order  of  grace. 
Hence,  wherever  a  special  effect  of  grace  is  produced,  there 
we  must  admit  a  distinct  sacrament.  .  .  .  Now  it  is  manifest 
that  in  man’s  bodily  life  a  certain  perfection  is  acquired  when 
he  arrives  at  mature  age,  and  in  consequence  is  capable  of 
performing  perfect  actions;  .  .  .  and  hence  it  is  that  besides 
generation,  from  which  he  receives  bodily  life,  there  is  also 
the  movement  to  augmentation,  by  which  he  is  brought  to  a 
perfect  state.  And  so  man  receives  spiritual  life  through  bap¬ 
tism,  which  is  a  spiritual  regeneration;  but  in  confirmation  he 
attains  to  a  certain  maturity  in  the  spiritual  life.  .  .  .  And 
therefore  it  is  manifest  that  confirmation  is  a  special  sacra¬ 
ment.”  44 

The  external  rite  of  confirmation,  according  to  all  the 
Scholastics,  comprises  the  anointing  of  the  forehead  with  con¬ 
secrated  chrism  and  the  verbal  form :  Consigno  te  signo  cru- 
cis,  et  confirmo  te  chrismate  salutis,  in  nomine  Patris,  et  Filii, 
et  Spiritus  Sancti ,45  The  previous  consecration  or  blessing 
of  the  chrism  by  a  bishop  is  regarded  as  essential,  so  that 
without  it  the  sacrament  would  not  be  valid.  The  reason 
usually  assigned  for  the  necessity  of  this  consecration  is  that 
Christ  Himself  did  not  consecrate  the  matter  of  this  sacra¬ 
ment  by  His  own  use.  For  He  did  not  receive  confirmation, 
and  so  He  did  not  impart  a  blessing  to  its  material  element. 
Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  only  consecrated  material  elements 
can  be  used  in  the  administration  of  the  sacraments;  hence, 
as  the  bishop  cannot  consecrate  chrism  by  simply  using  it,  he 
must  do  so  by  a  previous  blessing.40 

Furthermore,  according  to  Alexander  of  Hales  and  St.  Bona- 
venture,  as  was  pointed  out  in  the  preceding  chapter,  Christ 
did  not  designate  the  matter  and  form  of  confirmation, 
although  the  efficacy  of  the  sacrament  must  in  the  last  in¬ 
stance  be  attributed  to  Him.  Hence  these  authors  regard 

44  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  72,  a.  1.  46  Cfr.  ibid.  a.  3 ;  Bonavent.  In 

45  Ibid.  a.  4.  Sent.  IV,  d.  7,  a.  1,  q.  2. 


THE  SACRAMENT  OF  CONFIRMATION 


307 


the  sacramental  rite  of  confirmation  as  having  a  purely  ecclesi¬ 
astical  origin,  and  consequently  as  needing  a  special  consecra¬ 
tion,  so  far  as  its  material  element  comes  in  question,  before 
it  may  be  used  to  confer  the  Holy  Spirit.  St.  Thomas  and 
others  set  aside  this  aspect  of  the  question.  They  hold  that 
Christ  not  only  instituted  the  sacrament  of  confirmation  in 
the  sense  that  He  is  the  author  of  the  grace  conferred  thereby, 
but  that  He  also  designated  the  very  matter  and  form  that 
were  used  in  after  ages.  Hence,  according  to  them,  the 
Apostles  usually  administered  confirmation  not  by  a  mere  im¬ 
position  of  hands  and  a  suitable  prayer,  but  by  the  use  of 
chrism  and  a  corresponding  form.47  Thus  the  historical 
difficulty  arising  from  an  apparent  change  of  matter  and  form, 
which  exercised  the  ingenuity  of  later  theologians,  had  prac¬ 
tically  no  existence  for  these  writers. 

The  ordinary  minister  of  confirmation  is  the  bishop,  and 
the  bishop  only,  although  the  Pope,  in  the  plenitude  of  his 
power,  may  at  times  depute  a  simple  priest  to  administer  the 
sacrament.48  St.  Bonaventure  assigns  two  reasons  why  it  is 
that  bishops  alone  can  confirm  in  virtue  of  their  ordinary 
power.  The  first  is  that  it  was  so  in  the  beginning;  for  then 
confirmation  was  reserved  to  the  Apostles,  and  it  is  only  the 
bishops  who  are  properly  speaking  their  successors.  The 
second  consists  in  the  fact  that  the  bishops  are  the  highest 
prelates  in  the  Church,  and  it  is  their  office  to  provide  such 
things  as  are  necessary  for  the  defense  of  their  flock.49  The 
same  reasons  are  also  given  by  St.  Thomas.50  But  as  St. 
Bonaventure  remarks,  many  others  might  be  assigned,  as  this 
is  a  matter  of  fitness  rather  than  of  necessity.51 

The  effect  of  confirmation  is  twofold:  it  confers  sanctify¬ 
ing  grace  and  imprints  a  sacramental  character.  Concerning 
the  former  St.  Bonaventure  remarks :  “  Theologians  agree  in 

this,  that  confirmation  confers  sanctifying  grace.  But  it  must 
be  noted  that  grace  is  termed  sanctifying  in  two  ways :  First, 
when  it  makes  one  pleasing  to  God  who  before  was  not  pleas- 

47  Loc.  cit.  a.  2.  49  Loc  cit. 

48  Ibid.  a.  11 ;  Bonavent.  op.  cit.  d.  50  Loc.  cit. 

7,  a.  1,  q.  3.  51  Loc.  cit. 


3°8 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


in g  to  Him;  and  such  is  the  grace  of  baptism  and  of  penance. 
Secondly,  when  it  makes  one  who  is  already  pleasing  to  God 
more  pleasing  to  Him;  and  such  is  the  grace  of  confirmation, 
which  augments  and  confirms  the  grace  already  present  in  the 
soul.”  52  St  Thomas  infers  the  bestowal  of  sanctifying  grace 
in  confirmation  from  the  fact  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is  given  — 
missio  sen  datio  Spiritus  Sancti  non  est  nisi  cum  gratia  gratum 
facienteP 3  And  this  grace  is  not  given  for  the  blotting  out  of 
sin,  as  is  that  of  baptism ;  but  for  the  increase  and  greater  sta¬ 
bility  of  justice.54  Hence  confirmation  is  a  sacrament  of  the 
living,  and  consequently  it  must  always  be  received  in  the  state 
of  grace.  However,  if  any  one  receives  confirmation  in  the 
state  of  mortal  sin,  of  which  he  is  not  conscious  and  for  which 
he  is  not  perfectly  contrite,  grace  is  nevertheless  given  him  by 
the  sacrament,  provided  he  is  sincere  in  receiving  it  under  these 
conditions.55 

Connected  with  sanctifying  grace,  as  bestowed  in  confirma¬ 
tion,  are  certain  special  helps  which  enable  the  recipient  to 
profess  his  faith  boldly  under  difficult  circumstances.  Hence 
the  phrase  commonly  used  by  the  Scholastics  in  this  connec¬ 
tion:  Spiritus  Sanctus  datur  ad  robur.  It  is  to  indicate  both 
the  strength  thus  imparted  and  the  obligation  assumed  that  the 
recipient  is  anointed  on  the  forehead.56 

Confirmation,  like  baptism,  imprints  an  indelible  character 
on  the  soul;  and  this  follows  from  the  very  end  and  purpose 
of  the  sacrament.  For  in  confirmation  the  Christian  becomes 
a  soldier  of  Christ,  and  as  such  he  must  have  his  badge  of  spe¬ 
cial  allegiance  and  service.  In  virtue  of  this  character,  says 
Scotus,  man  is  permanently  enrolled  in  the  spiritual  militia  of 
Christ,  for  the  purpose  of  defending  the  grace  merited  for  him 
by  the  Saviour  of  the  world.57  Or  as  St.  Thomas  puts  it: 
“  In  baptism  man  receives  the  power  of  working  out  his  salva¬ 
tion  in  so  far  as  he  lives  an  individual  life;  but  in  confirmation 
he  receives  power  to  carry  on  a  spiritual  warfare  against  the 

52  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  7,  a.  2,  q.  1.  55  Ibid,  ad  2m. 

53  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  72,  a.  7.  06  Ibid.  a.  9. 

54  Ibid,  ad  im.  57  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  7,  q.  1,  n.  4. 


THE  SACRAMENT  OF  CONFIRMATION 


309 


enemies  of  the  faith.  .  .  .  And  hence  it  is  manifest  that  the 
sacrament  of  confirmation  imprints  a  character.”  58 

Although  confirmation  is  not  strictly  necessary  for  salva¬ 
tion,  as  all  Scholastics  are  agreed,  nevertheless,  unless  they 
have  a  valid  excuse,  the  faithful  are  under  obligation  to  receive 
the  sacrament.  “  It  is  the  law  of  the  Church,”  argues  St. 
Bonaventure,  “  that  all  must  receive  this  sacrament,  so  that 
they  may  be  brave  in  the  battle  of  life:  and  therefore  if  any¬ 
one,  to  whom  place  and  time  and  opportunity  are  not  wanting, 
contemptuously  neglects  to  receive  confirmation,  he  exposes 
himself  to  danger.”  59  And  again:  “  The  grace  of  confirma¬ 
tion  is  not  such  that  one  absolutely  cannot  be  saved  without 
it;  but  it  is  such  that  without  it  one  is  not  prepared  to  battle 
for  salvation.”  60  St.  Thomas  derives  the  necessity  of  con¬ 
firmation  chiefly  from  the  fact  that  God  intends  all  men  to 
reach  spiritual  perfection,  for  which  it  is  necessary  that  they 
be  assisted  by  the  grace  of  confirmation,  as  thereby  they  grow 
in  holiness  and  are  firmly  established  in  justice.61 

Nearly  all  the  chief  points  contained  in  the  foregoing  sum¬ 
mary  of  Scholastic  teaching  on  baptism  and  confirmation  were 
later  on  embodied  in  the  Decretum  pro  Armenis,  which  Pope 
Eugenius  IV  issued  while  the  Council  of  Florence  was  in 
session,  1438-1445.  That  document  can  indeed  not  be  said 
to  contain  new  definitions  of  the  faith,  yet  it  offers  at  least  an 
authoritative  declaration  of  the  accepted  teaching  of  the 
Church.62  Furthermore,  what  touches  the  nature  of  the  two 
sacraments,  their  matter  and  form,  their  institution  by  Christ, 
and  their  principal  effects,  was  defined  by  the  Council  of 


Trent.63 


58  Loc.  cit.  a.  5'. 

59  Op.  cit.  d.  7,  a.  3,  q.  2. 

60  Ibid,  ad  3m. 


61  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  72,  a.  8. 

62  DB.  695  sqq. 

63  DB.  844  sqq. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 

THE  REAL  PRESENCE:  TRANSUBSTANTIATION :  THE 
MANNER  OF  CHRIST'S  PRESENCE:  THE  ACCI¬ 
DENTS  OF  BREAD  AND  WINE 

The  Eucharist  was  from  the  beginning  the  central  point  of 
Christian  faith  and  worship.  Christ  had  indeed  ascended  into 
heaven,  yet  He  had  not  thereby  deprived  the  earth  of  His  per¬ 
sonal  presence.  He  was  no  longer  visible  to  the  bodily  eyes 
of  His  followers,  but  He  continued  to  be  discernible  by  the 
eyes  of  faith  in  His  mysterious  presence  under  the  Eucharistic 
veil.  There  the  faithful  still  felt  the  enduring  love  of  His 
human  heart;  there  they  still  recognized  the  shrouded  majesty 
of  His  incarnate  Godhead.  Christ  risen  from  the  dead  dieth 
no  more :  true  indeed,  but  Christ  risen  from  the  dead  is  for¬ 
ever  an  immolated  victim  on  the  altar  of  sacrifice.  Around 
that  altar  gathered  the  martyrs  of  old;  around  the  same  altar 
gathered  the  believers  of  all  succeeding  ages.  Without  Christ 
there  is  no  Christianity;  without  the  Eucharist  there  is  no 
Christian  worship. 

All  this  was  from  the  very  first  so  clearly  and  thoroughly 
realized  that  during  the  seven  centuries  of  Patristic  theology, 
which  were  for  the  most  part  centuries  of  great  religious 
strife,  no  one  ever  thought  of  calling  in  question  the  Church’s 
teaching  on  the  sacrament  of  Christ’s  love.  The  Church  used 
the  Savior’s  own  words  in  the  celebration  of  the  Sacred 
Mysteries  —  this  is  my  body,  this  is  the  chalice  of  my  blood  — 
and  these  words  were  understood  by  all  His  followers  in  their 
literal  sense.  That  sums  up  the  faith  of  the  Patristic  age  in 
regard  to  the  Blessed  Eucharist.1 

1  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  352  sqq. ;  472  sq. 

310 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 


3ii 

And  this  simple  faith  was  taken  over  by  the  Scholastics  of 
the  Middle  Ages.  They  accepted  the  teaching  of  the  Fathers 
on  this  point  practically  without  comment,  and  incorporated  it 
in  their  general  system  of  theology.  Most  of  them  treat  the 
subject  with  considerable  attention  to  detail,  but  even  in  so 
doing  they  contribute  little  by  way  of  doctrinal  development. 

If  we  except  the  nature  of  the  Eucharistic  change,  which  they 
set  forth  with  remarkable  clearness,  there  is  hardly  any  aspect 
of  the  Blessed  Sacrament  that  received  a  more  definite  treat¬ 
ment  in  the  works  of  the  Scholastics  than  in  those  of  the 
Fathers.  And  the  reason  is  that  the  doctrine  was  almost  fully 
developed  before  the  Apostles  laid  down  their  lives  for  the 
faith  which  they  had  delivered  to  their  successors  in  the  teach¬ 
ing  office  of  the  Church. 

In  their  work  of  systematizing  the  teaching  of  the  Fathers 
on  this  matter,  the  Scholastics  say  very  little  about  the  sacri¬ 
ficial  aspect  of  the  Eucharist.  But  that  need  not  appear 
strange;  for  they  speak  of  this  mystery  of  our  holy  religion 
almost  exclusively  in  connection  with  the  other  sacraments, 
and  so  it  was  more  or  less  natural  that  its  sacramental  aspect 
should  chiefly  engross  their  attention.  It  is  for  the  same  rea¬ 
son  that  they  discuss  the  Eucharist  as  a  sacrament  before  they 
consider  the  doctrine  of  the  Real  Presence.  In  their  day  it 
was  perfectly  safe  to  assume  Christ’s  presence  on  the  altar  as 
something  that  was  admitted  by  all,  and  from  that  assumption  * 
to  proceed  without  delay  to  an  exposition  of  the  sacrament. 
At  the  present  time  his  could  hardly  be  done,  and  therefore  in 
the  following  resume  the  teaching  of  the  Scholastics  on  the 
Real  Presence  is  put  in  the  first  place.  It  must  be  noted,  how¬ 
ever,  that  this  inversion  of  their  order  of  treatment  introduces 
no  change  whatever  in  the  exposition  of  their  doctrine. 

1.  The  Real  Presence. —  It  is  quite  commonly  assumed  by 
Protestant  writers  that  the  ninth-century  Eucharistic  contro¬ 
versy,  carried  on  principally  by  Radbertus  and  Ratramnus, 
both  of  Corbie  in  Picardie,  was  concerned  with  the  real  pres¬ 
ence  of  Christ’s  body  and  blood  in  the  Holy  Eucharist.  But 
this  assumption  is  altogether  false.  The  one  point  at  issue 
was,  whether  Christ’s  Eucharistic  body  and  blood,  which  both 


312 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


contestants  held  to  be  real,  must  be  conceived  as  subject  to  the 
laws  of  space  in  the  same  way  as  was  His  historic  body  whilst 
tarrying  here  on  earth.  While  Radbertus  gave  an  affirmative 
answer,  and  in  this  sense  contended  that  Christ’s  Eucharistic 
body  is  the  same  as  that  which  was  born  of  the  Virgin  Mary, 
Ratramnus  answered  the  question  in  the  negative,  and  in  con¬ 
sequence  maintained  that  in  respect  of  its  relation  to  space  the 
historic  body  of  Christ  is  not  present  in  the  Eucharist.  The 
issue  appears  at  times  confused,  owing  to  the  inappropriate 
terms  that  were  employed  in  the  controversy;  but  at  no  time 
was  the  reality  and  truth  of  Christ’s  presence  called  in  ques¬ 
tion.2 

It  was  nearly  two  hundred  years  after  the  death  of  Rad¬ 
bertus  and  Ratramnus  that  the  real  presence  of  Christ’s  body 
and  blood  in  the  Holv  Eucharist  was  attacked,  and  then  the 
attack  was  made  in  the  interest  of  dialectics.  It  was  Beren- 
garius  of  Tours  (  +  1088)  who  first  tried  to  set  aside  the  tradi¬ 
tional  teaching  of  the  Church,  and  contended  for  a  merely 
virtual  presence.  In  discussing  the  mystery  of  the  Eucharist, 
he  put  forward  the  principle :  Maxim e  plane  cordis  est  ad 
diale  dicam  con  fug  ere,  quia  confugere  ad  earn  ad  rationem  est 
confitgere.3  He  belonged  to  the  school  of  Fulbert  of  Chartres 
(  +  1028),  and  through  him  was  connected  with  Gerbert,  after¬ 
wards  Pope  Sylvester  III.  Besides  a  few  letters  and  some 
fragments  from  an  early  controversial  work,  his  treatise  De 
Sacra  Coena  adversus  Lanfrancum  and  the  Ada  Concilii  Ro¬ 
mani  in  Causa  Berengarii  are  the  only  two  of  his  works  that 
have  come  down  to  us. 

His  error  in  regard  to  the  Eucharist  appeared  first  in  a  letter 
to  Lanfranc,  written  in  1050.  He  professed  to  follow  the 
teaching  of  Ratramnus,  but  wholly  misinterpreted  the  views  of 
that  author.  Ratramnus  had  designated  Christ’s  sacramental 
body  as  a  figure  of  His  historic  body,  intending  thereby  merely 
to  indicate  that  its  presence  in  space  was  not  the  same  as  that 
which  is  proper  to  His  body  in  heaven ;  whereas  Berengarius 

2Cfr.  Bach,  Dogmengeschichte  3  De  Sacra  Coena,  ed.  Vischer, 
des  Mittelalters,  I,  p.  166  sqq. ;  192  101. 

sqq. 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 


3i3 


took  the  term  “  figure  ”  in  its  literal  sense,  and  thence  argued 
to  a  purely  symbolic  or  virtual  presence  in  the  Eucharist.  At 
Easter  of  the  same  year  he  was  condemned  by  a  synod  then 
held  in  Rome,  and  a  few  months  later  by  another  synod  which 
convened  at  Vercelli.  However,  he  continued  to  defend  his 
view,  until  in  1059  Nicholas  II  forced  him  to  recant.  On  that 
occasion  he  accepted  the  following  formula,  presented  to  him 
by  Cardinal  Humbert :  Panem  et  vinum ,  quae  in  altari 
ponuntur ,  post  consecrationem  non  solum  sacramentnm ,  sed 
etiam  verum  corpus  et  sanguinem  Domini  nostri  Jesu  Christi 
esse  ( confiteor )  et  sensualiter ,  non  solum  sacramento,  sed  in 
veritate  manibus  sacerdotum  tractari,  frangi,  et  fidelium  denti- 
bus  atterid 

Although  Berengarius  attacked  the  formula  which  he  had 
been  induced  to  sign,  still  for  about  ten  years  after  the  Council 
he  abstained  from  open  controversy,  and  even  enjoyed  the 
protection  of  Hildebrand,  afterwards  Pope  Gregory  VII.  But 
in  1069  he  returned  to  his  former  position  and  published  a 
controversial  treatise  against  Nicholas  II  and  Cardinal  Hum¬ 
bert,  which  is  no  longer  extant.  He  was  answered  by  Hugh, 
bishop  of  Langres,5  Lanfranc,  archbishop  of  Canterbury,6 
Guitmund,  a  pupil  of  Lanfranc,7  and  others.  In  answer  to 
Lanfranc,  Berengarius  wrote  his  still  extant  work  De  Sacra 
Coena,  which  was  published  towards  the  end  of  the  year  1076. 
For  some  time  no  measures  were  taken  against  him,  but  at  a 
synod  held  in  Rome  during  the  Eastertide  of  1079,  Gregory 
VII  required  him  to  confess :  Panem  et  vinum ,  quae  ponuntur 
in  altari,  per  mysterium  sacrae  orationis  et  verba  nostri  Re- 
demptoris  substantialiter  converti  in  veram  et  pro priam  et  vivi- 
ficatricem  carnem  et  sanguinem  Jesu  Christi.8  On  his  return 
to  France,  he  repudiated  his  profession  of  belief  in  the  Real 
Presence  and  returned  to  his  old  error.  However,  a  year  later 
he  made  a  final  retractation,  and  eight  years  later  died  in  peace 
with  the  Church. 

4  Lanfranc.  De  Corpore  et  San-  6  Op.  cit. 
guine  Domini,  2.  \  Libri  Tres  de  Corporis  et  San- 

5Tractatus  de  Corpore  et  San-  quinis  Christi  Veritate. 
guine  Domini.  8  Mansi,  19,  762  E. 


3H 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


As  appears  from  the  formulas  which  were  presented  to  him 
for  subscription,  Berengarius  not  only  denied  the  conversion 
of  the  Eucharistic  elements  into  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ, 
but  also  defended  a  purely  intellectual  or  spiritual  presence. 
And  the  same  may  be  inferred  from  various  statements  found 
in  his  works.9  Protestant  writers  usually  contend  that  he 
simply  restated  the  teaching  of  St.  Augustine,  which  had  fallen 
into  oblivion;  but  that  contention  rests  entirely  upon  a  misin¬ 
terpretation  of  St.  Augustine’s  doctrine.10 

These  discussions  contributed  considerably  towards  the 
clearing  up  of  certain  hazy  concepts,  which  are  met  with  in 
not  a  few  writers  of  the  period.  Thus,  to  rectify  a  rather  com¬ 
mon  misconception  in  reference  to  persons  who  communicate 
in  the  state  of  mortal  sin,  Lanfranc  pointed  out  that  they  truly 
receive  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ,  but  only  to  their  spiritual 
detriment.11  Guitmund  showed  that  at  the  consecration  the 
bread  and  wine  are  converted  in  such  a  way  that  the  whole 
Christ  is  in  the  entire  species  and  also  in  each  single  part 
thereof.12  He  further  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
changes  to  which  the  accidents  of  bread  and  wine  are  subject 
do  not  affect  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ  present  under  the 
consecrated  species.13  St.  Anselm  explained  the  doctrine  of 
concomitance,  showing  that  the  whole  Christ  is  received  under 
each  separate  species,  whether  it*  be  that  of  bread  or  of  wine.14 
While  Gregory  VII,  in  the  formula  presented  for  subscription 
to  Berengarius,  indicated  that  the  Eucharistic  conversion  is  ef¬ 
fected  by  the  words  which  our  Savior  used  in  the  institution 
of  the  Holy  Eucharist.15 

The  thirteenth-century  Scholastics  touch  these  discussions 
only  incidentally,  while  affirming  the  Real  Presence  as  based 
upon  the  faith  of  the  Church  and  the  words  of  our  Savior. 
Thus  St.  Thomas,  after  citing  a  number  of  texts  from  the 
writings  of  the  Fathers  and  from  Holy  Scripture,  concludes 
his  article  on  the  Real  Presence  with  this  brief  statement : 

9  Ep.  ad  Adelman,  fragm.  3.  13  Op.  cit.  III. 

10  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  352.  14  Epp.  IV,  107;  ML.  159,  255. 

11  Op.  cit.  20.  15  Loc.  cit. 

12  Op.  cit.  I ;  ML.  149,  1434  B. 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 


3i5 


“  Some,  not  bearing  in  mind  what  is  here  said,  held  that  the 
body  and  blood  of  Christ  are  not  present  in  this  sacrament  ex¬ 
cept  figuratively  —  in  signo  — ,  which  opinion  must  be  re¬ 
jected  as  heretical,  because  it  is  opposed  to  the  words  of  Christ. 
Hence,  also  Berengarius,  who  was  the  first  author  of  this 
error,  was  compelled  to  retract  his  erroneous  teaching  and  to 
confess  the  truth.”  16  And  St.  Bonaventure  briefly  remarks: 
“  As  the  Master  says  in  passing,  it  was  the  opinion  of  some, 
and  a  most  wicked  error  it  was,  that  Christ  is  present  on  the 
altar  only  in  signo,  and  that  to  eat  His  body  means  simply  to 
eat  the  sign  of  His  body.  .  .  .  But  this  is  the  worst  of  errors 
and  opposed  to  the  piety  of  faith.”  17 

2.  Transubstantiation. —  From  their  brief  references  to  the 
Real  Presence  the  Scholastics  pass  on  to  the  question  of  Eu¬ 
charistic  conversion  or  transubstantiation.  This,  again,  they 
treat  not  as  something  new,  but  as  a  doctrine  that  was  clearly 
contained  in  the  teaching  of  the  Church.  Still  there  were  some 
different  views  on  the  matter,  four  of  which  are  thus  indi¬ 
cated  by  the  Lombard:  1.  Substantia  panis  fit  corpus  Christi 
.  .  .  sicnt  farina  fit  panis.  2.  Illud  quod  erat  panis  .  .  . 
post  consecrationem  est  corpus.  3.  Ubi  erat  panis ,  nunc  est 
corpus  Christi  .  .  .  substantia  panis  in  nihilum  redigitur. 
4.  Substantia  panis  remane t  et  ibidem  corpus  Christi  est.18 
The  first  and  the  fourth  of  these  views  he  rejects  as  absolutely 
inadmissible,  and  then  argues  from  the  promise  of  the  Savior, 
as  contained  in  the  sixth  chapter  of  St.  John,  that  in  the  con¬ 
secration  the  bread  is  changed  into  the  identical  body  which 
Christ  has  in  heaven.  However,  he  does  not  enter  into  any 
speculations  as  regards  the  intimate  nature  of  this  change, 
but  contents  himself  with  the  statement  that  after  the  conse¬ 
cration  nothing  remains  of  the  bread  and  wine  except  their 
accidents.19 

St.  Bonaventure  mentions  some  other  views,  which,  he  says, 
had  come  into  vogue  since  the  time  of  the  Lombard.  Some 
hold  that  as  the  accidents  of  bread  and  wine  remain,  the  matter 

16  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  75,  a.  I.  18  Sent.  IV,  d.  11,  c.  3,  4. 

17  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  10,  p.  1,  a.  unic.  19  Op.  cit.  d.  11,  c.  4. 

q.  1. 


316 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


of  their  substance  must  also  remain,  although  the  form  is 
changed.  Others,  on  the  contrary,  seeing  that  the  accidents 
have  an  operation  of  their  own,  contend  that  the  substantial 
forms  of  bread  and  wine  remain,  and  that  the  matter  alone  is 
changed.  He  rejects  both  of  these  views  as  utterly  untenable, 
and  then  continues:  “It  is  the  common  teaching  of  theologi¬ 
ans  that  the  whole  substance  is  converted  into  the  whole  body 
and  blood  of  Christ  —  totum  transit  in  totum — and  that  for 
a  necessary  and  useful  reason  the  accidents  alone  remain.  And 
therefore,  setting  aside  the  first  opinion  which  denies  the  con¬ 
version  of  the  matter,  and  also  the  second  which  denies  the 
conversion  of  the  form,  we  hold  as  more  Catholic  that  the 
whole  bread  is  converted  into  the  whole  body  of  Christ,  and 
this  conversion  is  most  aptly  called  transubstantiation.”  20 

The  discussion  of  St.  Thomas  proceeds  along  the  same  lines. 
He  first  rejects  the  opinion  of  those  who  hold  that  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  bread  and  wine  remain  on  the  altar  together  with  the 
body  of  Christ.  If  the  bread  and  wine  remain,  he  reasons, 
then  the  truth  of  the  sacrament  is  destroyed.  For  there  is  no 
sacrament  unless  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ  be  really  pres¬ 
ent,  and  yet  they  can  become  present  only  by  way  of  con¬ 
version.21  Then  he  refutes  the  view  of  those  who  assert  that 
the  substantial  form  of  the  elements  remains.  If  this  were 
true,  he  says,  the  bread  would  not  be  changed  into  the  whole 
body  of  Christ,  but  into  its  matter  only ;  and  then  the  form  of 
the  sacrament,  This  is  my  body ,  would  be  false.22  In  the  con¬ 
secration,  he  argues,  “  the  whole  substance  of  the  bread  is 
converted  into  the  whole  substance  of  the  body  of  Christ,  and 
the  whole  substance  of  the  wine  is  converted  into  the  whole 
substance  of  the  blood  of  Christ.  Hence  this  conversion  is 
not  formal  but  substantial ;  nor  is  it  contained  in  any  species 
of  natural  changes,  but  is  denominated  by  its  own  proper  term 
of  transubstantiation.”  23 

The  technical  term  “  transubstantiation,”  which  is  used  by 
all  the  later  Scholastics  to  designate  the  Eucharistic  conversion, 

20  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  n,  p.  I,  a.  unic.  22  Ibid.  a.  6. 

q.  3.  23  Ibid.  a.  4, 

21  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  75,  a.  2. 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 


317 


is  of  uncertain  origin.  As  far  as  can  now  be  determined,  it 
occurs  for  the  first  time  in  a  sermon  formerly  attributed  to 
Hildebert  of  Lavardin,  archbishop  of  Tours  (  +  1133),  but 
now  usually  ascribed  to  Peter  Comestor,  who  died  after 
1 1 70. 24  It  occurs  also  in  the  Tractatus  dc  Sacramento  Altar  is, 
which  was  written  either  by  Stephen  I  or  Stephen  II  of  Autun. 
The  former  died  in  1 139,  and  the  latter  in  1 189.  Shortly  after 
the  middle  of  the  twelfth  century  the  term  seems  to  have  been 
in  common  use  in  the  schools,  as  it  is  found  again  and  again 
in  theological  treatises  belonging  to  that  period.25  Likely 
enough  it  originated  in  the  discussions  with  Berengarius,  but 
there  is  no  documentary  evidence  to  prove  that  it  did. 

Most  of  the  Scholastics  proved  the  doctrine  of  transubstan- 
tiation  from  the  words  of  institution,  pointing  out  that  these 
words  would  not  be  true  except  on  the  supposition  that  the 
whole  substance  of  the  bread  and  wine  are  changed  into  the 
body  and  blood  of  Christ.  Duns  Scotus,  however,  did  not  con¬ 
sider  this  argument  conclusive,  if  used  independently  of  the 
traditional  teaching  of  the  Church.  His  final  conclusion  is: 
“  It  is  therefore  to  be  held  that  the  substance  of  the  bread 
ceases  to  be  there  in  virtue  of  a  conversion,  and  that  its  ceasing 
to  be  is  a  conversion  into  the  body  of  Christ.  And  this  I  hold 
principally  on  account  of  the  authority  of  the  Church,  which 
cannot  fall  into  error  regarding  those  truths  that  belong  to  the 
faith.”  26  This  was  also  the  position  taken  by  the  Nominal¬ 
ists.  Thus  Ockam,27  D’Ailly,28  Gabriel,29  and  others  of  the 
same  school,  personally  favored  the  impanation  theory,  namely, 
that  the  substance  of  the  bread  and  wine  remain  on  the  altar 
together  with  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ;  but  on  account 
of  the  clear  teaching  of  the  Church  they  professed  their  be¬ 
lief  in  transubstantiation. 


24  The  passage  in  which  it  is  used 
reads  as  follows :  “  Cum  profero 

verba  canonis  et  verbum  transsub- 
stantiationis,  et  os  meum  plenum 
est  contradictione  et  amaritudine  et 
dolo,  quamvis  eum  honorem  labiis, 
tamen  spuo  in  faciem  Salvatoris  ” 
(Serm.  93;  ML,  21,  776). 


25  Cfr.  Dictionnaire  de  Theologie 
Catholique,  t.  5,  col.  1290  sqq. 

26  Report.  IV,  d.  11,  q.  3,  n.  13. 

27  In  Sent.  IV,  q.  6  D. 

28  In  Sent.  IV,  q.  6  E. 

29  Exposit.  Can.  Missae,  lect.  41 
J;  cfr.  In  Sent.  IV,  11,  q.  1,  a.  1, 
note  1. 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


It  is,  then,  in  virtue  of  the  consecration  that  Christ  is  really 
and  personally  present  on  the  altar,  because  thereby  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  bread  and  wine  are  changed  into  His  body  and  blood ; 
but  in  what  precise  manner  does  the  conversion  thus  effected 
bring  about  Christ’s  personal  presence?  All  Scholastics  are 
agreed  that  the  Eucharistic  conversion  does  not  effect  a  local 
change  in  Christ.  And  this  is  quite  obvious :  for  although  He 
becomes  truly  present  on  the  altar,  yet  He  ever  remains  un¬ 
changed  in  heaven.  But  aside  from  this  one  point,  which  is 
a  matter  of  faith,  there  is  no  agreement  among  mediaeval  the¬ 
ologians  in  reference  to  the  proposed  question.  A  few  re¬ 
marks  about  the  two  principal  views  entertained  by  them  must 
here  suffice. 

In  the  first  place,  Alexander  of  Hales,30  St.  Bonaventure,31 
and  St.  Thomas  32  maintain  that  the  reason  of  Christ’s  pres¬ 
ence  on  the  altar  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  Eucharistic  conversion 
is  a  productive  action,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  equivalent  to  the 
production  of  an  already  existing  term  or  reality.  They  do 
not  actually  use  the  term  production  in  this  connection,  but 
that  is  obviously  what  they  have  in  mind.  Thus  St.  Bonaven¬ 
ture  compares  the  conversion  of  the  bread  and  wine  to  the 
act  of  creation  and  to  other  productive  changes,  although,  as 
he  remarks,  in  some  particulars  it  differs  from  each  and  all.33 
St.  Thomas  explains  that  the  body  of  Christ  becomes  present 
through  the  conversion  of  the  substance  of  the  bread  into 
itself;  34  and,  again,  that  the  entity  of  the  one  is  changed  into 


30  Sum.  IV,  q.  io,  m.  7,  a.  3  ad  6m. 

31  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  11,  p.  1,  a.  unic. 
q.  2. 

32  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  75,  a.  4. 

33  His  words  are  :  “  Dicendum, 

quod  haec  est  mutatio  singularis, 
quae  nullum  simile  plenum  habet; 
assimilatur  tamen  in  aliquo.  Quia 
enim  in  hac  mutatione  nihil  com¬ 
mune  manet ;  assimilatur  creationi. 
Quia  vero  principium  initiale  non 
est  nihil,  sed  aliquid ;  ideo  dissimi- 
lis  est  creationi  et  similis  genera- 
tioni.  Quia  vero  terminum  finalem 
non  habet  aliquid  de  novo  factum, 


sed  prius  existens ;  ideo  est  dissimi- 
lis  generationi  et  similis  augmento. 
Quia  vero  corpus  Christi  ex  hoc 
non  crescit,  sed  in  pluribus  locis 
existit;  ideo  dissimilis  augmento  et 
similis  loci  mutationi.  Quia  vero 
in  alio  loco  existit  et  a  proprio  non 
recedit,  sed  aliquid  in  ipsum  tran¬ 
sit;  ideo  omni  motui  et  mutationi 
dissimilis  est  et  est  prorsus  mutatio 
singularis”  (Loc.  cit.). 

34  Answering  the  question  wheth¬ 
er  the  bread  is  converted  into  the 
body  of  Christ,  the  author  says : 
“  Cum  in  hoc  sacramento  sit  verum 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 


3i9 


the  entity  of  the  other.35  True,  the  reproduction  of  an  al¬ 
ready  existing  reality  is  something  that  baffles  all  human  un¬ 
derstanding,  but  so  does  everything  else  that  is  attempted  by 
way  of  explanation  in  reference  to  the  question  under  discus¬ 
sion.  In  this  matter  one  feels  inclined  to  rest  satisfied  with 
the  saying  of  Pope  Innocent  III :  Ego  nescio  quomodo 
Christ  us  accedit;  sed  et  quomodo  recedit ,  ignoro.  Novit  ille 
qui  nihil  ignorat .36 

Duns  Scotus  brings  forward  many  arguments  against  the 
view  taken  by  St.  Thomas  and  St.  Bonaventure,  and  then  at¬ 
tempts  an  explanation  of  his  own.  Transubstantiation,  he 
holds,  is  not  the  formal  reason  of  Christ’s  sacramental  pres¬ 
ence;  that  presence  can  be  explained  only  by  postulating  such 
a  change  in  the  body  of  Christ  that  in  virtue  of  it  there  results 
a  new  relation  to  place,  yet  without  any  local  change  properly 
so  called.37  As  interpreted  by  his  commentators,  he  distin¬ 
guishes  between  passive  and  active  transubstantiation.  By  the 
former  he  understands  the  substance  which  ceases  to  be  and 
that  which  succeeds  it,  together  with  their  mutual  relations  of 
terminus  a  quo  and  terminus  ad  quern;  by  the  latter  he  desig¬ 
nates  the  conversive  action  of  the  agent,  which  is  in  itself 
neither  productive  nor  adductive,  but  simply  expresses  the 
order  and  relation  of  change.  But  concomitantly  this  action 
may  be  either  productive  or  adductive,  according  as  a  new  term 
is  produced  or  merely  a  new  presence  of  an  already  existing 
term.  Similarly  the  term  of  transubstantiation  is  twofold. 
The  one  formal,  namely,  the  substance  of  the  body  of  Christ 


corpus  Christi,  nec  incipit  ibi  esse 
de  novo  per  raotum  locale'"*!,  cum 
etiam  nec  corpus  Christi  sit  ibi 
sicut  in  loco,  ut  ex  dictis  patefi 
necesse  est  dicere  quod  incipiat  ibi 
esse  per  conversionem  substantiae 
panis  in  ipsum”  (Loc.  cit.). 

35  To  the  objection,  “non  potest 
esse  quod  haec  materia  panis  fiat 
haec  materia  qua  individuatur  cor¬ 
pus  Christi,”  he  replies  by  saying: 
“  Ad  tertium  dicendum,  quod  virtute 
agentis  finiti  non  potest  forma  in 
formam  mutari,  nec  materia  in  ma- 


teriam  sed  virtute  agentis  infiniti 
(quod  habet  actionem  in  totum  ens) 
potest  tabs  conversio  fieri,  quia  utri- 
que  formae  et  utrique  materiae  est 
communis  natura  entis ;  et  id  quod 
est  entitatis  in  una  potest  auctor  en¬ 
tis  convertere  in  id  quod  est  entitatis 
in  altera,  sublato  eo  per  quod  ab  ilia 
distinguebatur  ”  (Loc.  cit.  ad  3m). 

36  De  Sacro  Altaris  Mysterio,  4, 
16. 

37  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  10,  q.  1,  n.  5 
sqq.;  q.  3. 


320 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


already  existing;  the  other  concomitant,  namely,  the  new  re¬ 
lation  to  place  of  that  same  body.  In  the  former  there  is  no 
production,  as  the  same  body  of  Christ  which  is  in  heaven  is 
also  on  the  altar ;  in  the  latter  there  is  a  new  presence,  by  rea¬ 
son  of  which  Christ’s  body  is  really  and  truly  in  the  Holy 
Eucharist.  Hence,  Christ  is  present  on  the  altar  not  by  way 
of  reproduction,  but  by  way  of  simple  adduction.38 

Apparently  this  is  a  much  more  rational  explanation  than 
that  offered  by  St.  Thomas;  yet  the  difficulties  involved  in  it 
are  hardly  less  formidable.  For  if  this  new  presence  is  some¬ 
thing  real,  a  real  ubi  int  rinse  cum,  there  is  a  real  though  acci¬ 
dental  change  in  the  body  of  Christ,  which  theologians  are 
unwilling  to  admit;  if  it  is  not' something  real,  a  mere  ubi 
extrinsecum,  how  can  it  be  adductive  in  respect  of  the  body 
of  Christ?  And  so  in  either  case,  there  seems  to  be  no  way 
out  of  the  difficulty,  and  one  feels  again  inclined  to  say: 
Novit  ille  qui  nihil  ignorat. 

3.  The  Manner  of  Christ’s  Presence. —  In  regard  to  the 
manner  of  Christ’s  presence  on  the  altar,  the  Scholastics  first 
of  all  teach  that  He  is  whole  and  entire  under  the  species  of 
bread,  and  whole  and  entire  under  the  species  of  wine.  In 
virtue  of  the  consecrated  words,  they  point  out,  only  the  body 
of  Christ  is  under  the  species  of  bread,  and  only  the  blood 
under  the  species  of  wine  ;  but  by  reason  of  a  natural  and  real 
concomitance,  the  whole  Christ  is  under  each  separate  species. 
“  Because  the  bread  has  a  likeness  only  to  the  body,”  says  St. 
Bonaventure,  “  therefore  it  was  ordained  to  be  converted  only 
into  the  body;  and  the  sanctifying  word,  namely:  This  is  my 
body,  signifies  that  it  is  converted  into  the  body ;  neither  into 
the  divinity,  nor  into  the  soul,  nor  into  the  blood,  is  anything 
of  the  bread ‘Converted.  Neither,  however,  is  the  body  in  the 
sacrament  without  them;  for  although  they  are  not  there  on 
account  of  the  conversion,  still  they  are  there  because  of  their 
inseparable  connection  or  indivisible  conjunction.  For  the 
blood  is  there  by  reason  of  its  commingling,  the  soul  by  reason 
of  its  conjunction,  the  divinity  by  reason  of  its  union.”  39 

38  Cfr.  Rada,  Controvers.  p.  4,  39  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  11,  p.  1,  a.  unic. 

controv.  6.  q.  4. 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 


321 


St.  Thomas  gives  the  same  explanation,  and  then  adds : 
“  The  blood  of  Christ  is  now  no  longer  separated  from  the 
body,  as  it  was  at  the  time  of  His  suffering  and  death;  hence 
if  the  Eucharist  had  then  been  celebrated,  under  the  species 
of  bread  would  have  been  the  body  without  the  blood,  and 
under  the  species  of  wine  would  have  been  the  blood  without 
the  body,  just  as  body  and  blood  were  then  separated  in 
reality.”  40 

As  the  whole  Christ  is  present  in  the  Eucharist,  it  follows 
that  His  body  and  blood  are  there  with  their  own  proper 
quantity ;  and  this  is  the  common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics, 
against  Durandus 41  and  a  few  Nominalists.  However  the 
secondary  effects  of  quantity,  such  as  actual  extension  and 
impenetrability,  are  impeded;  and  hence  the  quantity  of  the 
body  and  blood  of  Christ  is  present  after  the  manner  of  sub¬ 
stance  —  ad  modum  substantiae.  Consequently  Christ  is  in  the 
Eucharist  totus  sub  toto  et  totus  sub  qualibet  parted 2  In  this 
sense,  therefore,  He  is  definitely  present;  yet,  on  the  other 
hand,  as  His  presence  is  not  limited  to  the  space  occupied  by  the 
consecrated  species,  it  is  not  properly  speaking  definitive  but 
sacramental. 

St.  Bonaventure,  citing  Pope  Innocent  III,  gives  this  ex¬ 
position  of  Christ’s  presence  in  the  Eucharist :  “  As  Inno¬ 

cent  words  it,  4  just  as  the  Son  of  God  has  a  threefold  pres¬ 
ence  according  to  His  divinity,  in  as  much  as  He  is  in  all  things 
by  His  essence,  in  the  just  by  His  grace,  in  Christ  through 
the  hypostatic  union;  so  the  body  of  Christ  is  locally  in 
heaven,  personally  in  the  Word,  sacramentally  on  the  altar.’ 
According  to  this  third  manner  of  presence,  he  says,  Christ 
is  in  many  places ;  because  there  are  many  consecrated  species 
under  which  He  is  contained.  Hence  properly  speaking,  as 
an  individual  He  is  in  only  one  place,  in  which  He  is  con¬ 
tained;  but  because  many  (substances  of  bread  and  wine)  are 
converted  into  Him,  and  they  are  in  different  places,  conse¬ 
quently  He  Himself  is  in  different  places  after  that  manner 

40  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  76,  a.  2.  42  Thomas,  loc.  cit.  a.  4. 

41  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  10,  q.  2. 


322 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


of  presence  according  to  which  they  are  converted  into  Him, 
and  thus  He  is  in  the  sacrament.”  43 

The  objection  that  Christ  must  be  in  the  Eucharist  either 
definitively  or  circumscriptively,  is  thus  answered  by  St. 
Thomas :  “  I  reply  that  the  body  of  Christ  is  not  present 

definitively  in  this  sacrament;  because  in  that  case  it  would 
not  be  anywhere  else  except  on  the  altar  where  the  sacrament 
is  consecrated,  whereas  it  is  in  its  proper  form  in  heaven, 
and  under  the  sacramental  species  on  many  altars.  In  like 
manner  it  is  also  plain  that  the  body  of  Christ  is  not  circum¬ 
scriptively  present  in  this  sacrament;  because  it  is  not  there 
after  a  manner  commensurate  with  its  own  proper  quantity, 
as  was  said  in  the  body  of  this  article.  The  fact  that  the 
body  of  Christ  is  limited  in  its  sacramental  presence  to  the 
consecrated  species,  and  is  not  in  any  other  place  on  the  altar, 
is  no  indication  that  it  is  present  either  definitively  or  circum¬ 
scriptively,  but  results  from  the  fact  that  there  only  did  it 
begin  to  be  in  virtue  of  the  consecration  and  conversion  of 
the  bread  and  wine.”  44 

Because  the  whole  Christ  is  thus  sacramentally  present  under 
the  entire  species,  hence  it  follows  that  He  is  present  in  the 
same  way  under  each  part  independently  of  actual  division. 
On  this  point  there  seems  to  have  been  some  differences  of 
opinion  among  the  Scholastics;  which  is  thus  referred  to  by 
St.  Thomas:  “  It  is  manifest  that  the  whole  Christ  is  present 
under  each  part  of  the  species  of  bread,  even  while  the  host 
remains  entire,  and  not  only  when  it  is  broken,  as  some  say. 
They  argue  from  the  example  of  an  image  in  a  mirror,  which 
is  only  one  so  long  as  the  mirror  remains  whole;  but  when 
it  is  broken,  the  image  is  multiplied  according  to  the  number 
of  parts.  Now  in  this  there  is  no  parity ;  because  the  multipli¬ 
cation  of  images  results  from  the  different  reflections  as  caused 
by  the  different  parts  of  the  mirror;  whereas  in  the  Eucharist 
there  is  only  one  consecration  by  reason  of  which  the  body 
of  Christ  is  present  in  the  sacrament.”  45 

4.  The  Accidents  of  Bread  and  Wine. —  According  to  the 

43  Loc.  cit.  d.  10,  a.  unic.  q.  3.  45  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  76,  a.  3. 

44  Loc.  cit.  a.  5  ad  im. 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 


323 


common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics,  as  was  pointed  out  above, 
the  substance  of  bread  and  wine  ceases  to  be  by  being  con¬ 
verted  into  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  accidents  of  bread  and  wine,  as  all  admit,  remain  un¬ 
changed.  Hence  the  question  arises,  how  do  they  exist? 
They  can  obviously  not  inhere  in  the  body  of  Christ,  as  that 
in  its  sacramental  presence  is  without  extension.  Nor  can 
they  naturally  exist  without  inhering  in  some  subject,  as  their 
very  essence  implies  an  exigency  to  inhere.  Consequently, 
their  separate  existence  must  be  based  on  some  special  inter¬ 
vention  of  God’s  wisdom  and  power. 

On  this  point  all  the  Scholastics  are  agreed,  but  they  do 
not  all  take  the  same  view  of  the  nature  of  God’s  special  inter¬ 
vention.  “  Some  there  are,”  says  St.  Thomas,  “  who  hold 
that  the  accidents  inhere  in  the  circumambient  air  as  their  sub¬ 
ject.  But  this  cannot  be;  first,  because  the  air  cannot  re¬ 
ceive  accidents  of  this  kind;  secondly,  the  accidents  are  not 
in  the  same  place  as  the  air,  and  even  expel  the  air  when  moved 
about;  thirdly,  accidents  cannot  pass  from  one  subject  to  the 
other  and  remain  numerically  the  same;  fourthly,  the  air  has 
its  own  proper  accidents  and  it  cannot  have  others  along  with 
these.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  this  is  effected  miraculously  in 
virtue  of  the  consecration;  because  the  words  of  consecration 
do  not  signify  this,  and  they  effect  only  what  they  signify.”  46 

Then  he  continues:  “It  remains  therefore  that  the  acci¬ 
dents  in  this  sacrament  are  without  a  subject  of  inhesion,  and 
this  indeed  can  be  brought  about  by  divine  power.  For  since 
the  effect  has  a  greater  dependence  on  the  first  cause  than  on 
the  second,  God,  who  is  the  first  cause  of  substance  and  acci¬ 
dent,  can  by  His  divine  power  conserve  the  accident  in  being, 
after  withdrawing  the  substance  through  which  it  was  con¬ 
served  as  through  its  proper  cause ;  and  this  He  can  do  in  the 
same  way  in  which  He  also  produces  other  effects  of  natural 
causes  independently  of  these  same  causes,  as  when  He  formed 
a  human  body  in  the  womb  of  the  Virgin  without  the  con¬ 
currence  of  a  male  agent.”  47 


46  Ibid.  q.  77,  a.  1. 


47  Ibid. 


324 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


St.  Bonaventure  uses  almost  the  same  terms,  when  he  says : 
“  It  is  to  be  held  that  the  accidents  can,  by  way  of  miracle, 
exist  without  a  subject  or  substance.  For  since  they  differ 
essentially  from  their  subject  of  inhesion,  there  is  no  re¬ 
pugnance  in  their  being  separated  from  it  by  divine  power.”  48 
Then  rejecting  the  same  opinion  referred  to  by  St.  Thomas, 
he  states :  “  It  is  the  common  teaching  of  theologians  that  the 

Eucharistic  accidents  exist  without  a  subject.”  49  With  this 
common  teaching  Scotus  is  in  full  agreement;  but  he  points 
out  that  as  absolute  accidents  have  their  own  proper  essence, 
they  must  also  have  their  own  proper  existence,  and  so  divine 
power  can,  without  any  contradiction,  cause  them  to  exist  out¬ 
side  the  subject  in  which  they  naturally  inhere.60 

With  the  exception  of  Durandus  and  some  Nominalists,  who 
deny  all  distinction  between  quantity  and  quantified  substance, 
the  Scholastics  are  at  one  in  holding  that  the  Eucharistic  ac¬ 
cidents  inhere  proximately  in  the  quantity  of  bread  and  wine, 
and  that  this  is  sustained  in  being  by  the  power  of  God. 
Hence  when  they  are  said  to  exist  without  a  subject  of  in¬ 
hesion,  it  is  the  remote  subject,  or  the  substance,  that  is  re¬ 
ferred  to.51  However,  even  with  this,  the  question  still  re¬ 
mains,  how  does  God  sustain  them  in  being?  Does  He 
miraculously  provide  some  permanent  mode,  which  takes  in 
their  regard  the  place  of  substance?  Or  are  they  sustained  in 
being  by  His  direct  efficient  intervention? 

St.  Thomas  seems  to  favor  the  former  of  these  two  pos¬ 
sible  suppositions.  For  replying  to  a  difficulty  bearing  on  that 
point,  he  says :  “  While  inhering  in  the  substance  of  bread 

and  wine,  these  accidents,  like  all  others  of  a  similar  kind, 
did  not  have  their  own  proper  existence;  but  it  was  through 
them  that  their  subjects  were  of  such  or  such  a  kind,  just  as 
snow  is  white  by  reason  of  its  whiteness  :  but  after  the  con¬ 
secration  these  same  accidents,  which  remain,  have  existence, 
and  hence  they  are  then  composed  of  existence  and  that  which 
exists,  as  it  was  said  in  the  first  part  in  respect  of  the  angels ; 

48  In  Sent.  TV,  d.  12,  p.  1,  a.  1,  50  Report.  IV,  d.  12,  q.  1,  n.  3-9. 

q.  i.  51  Cfr.  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  lV,  d. 

49  Ibid.  q.  3.  11,  p.  1,  q.  2. 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 


325 


and  together  with  this  there  is  in  them  the  composition  of 
quantitative  parts.” 51a  This  seems  to  imply  that  the  new 
esse  is  some  kind  of  permanent  mode,  by  reason  of  which 
the  accidents  exist  apart  from  their  proper  subject.  And  the 
same  reasoning  he  repeats  a  little  farther  on  in  regard  to 
quantity,  the  proximate  subject  of  these  accidents.52 

Scotus,  on  the  other  hand,  rejects  this  permanent  mode, 
and  holds  that  the  accidents  are  sustained  in  being  by  the  direct 
efficient  influence  of  divine  power.  Together  with  the  quantity 
of  bread  and  wine,  all  the  absolute  qualities  naturally  inherent 
therein  constitute  a  physical  complexus,  and  to  this  God’s 
sustaining  power  is  efficiently  applied.53  St.  Bonaventure 
seems  to  favor  the  same  view,  although  he  does  not  express 
himself  clearly  on  the  point.54 

While  thus  existing  in  a  state  of  separation  from  their 
proper  subject,  the  accidents  are  capable  of  producing  all  their 
natural  effects,  both  physical  and  chemical.  They  act  and  are 
acted  upon  in  the  same  way  as  if  the  substance  of  bread  and 
wine  were  present.  It  is  by  reason  of  them  that  the  sacra¬ 
mental  body  and  blood  of  Christ  can  be  moved  from  place 
to  place ; 55  it  is  they  that  are  touched  and  broken  and  divided, 
not  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ ; 56  it  is  they  that  cor¬ 
rupt  under  the  influence  of  external  agents,  and  thereby  cause 
Christ’s  sacramental  presence  to  cease;  57  it  is  they  that  nourish 
the  flesh,  while  Christ’s  body  and  blood  refresh  the  spirit.58 

In  regard  to  this  last  point  there  was  considerable  discus¬ 
sion  among  the  Scholastics.  “  Some  hold,”  says  St.  Bona¬ 
venture,  “  that  the  Eucharistic  accidents  do  not  nourish  the 
body  in  any  way ;  but  this  is  against  the  testimony  of  our  senses. 
Others  maintain  that,  when  the  Real  Presence  ceases,  the  ac¬ 
cidents  already  in  a  state  of  corruption  are  converted  into 


51a  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  77,  a.  1  ad 

4m. 

52  Ibid.  a.  2,  ad  ira. 

53  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  12,  q.  1. 

54  Ibid.  p.  1,  a.  1. 

55  Cfr.  Thomas,  Theol.  Sum.  Ill, 
q.  76,  a.  3 ;  ibid.  q.  77,  a.  3. 

56  Cfr.  Halens.  Sum.  IV,  q.  10,  m. 


9,  a.  1,  2;  Scotus,  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  12, 
q.  4. 

57  Cfr.  Halens.  op.  cit.  m.  7,  a.  1 ; 
Albert  Magn.  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  12, 
a.  16. 

58  Cfr.  Henry  of  Ghent,  Quodl.  8, 
q.  36 ;  Albert.  Magn.  op.  cit.  d.  13,  a. 
9,  10. 


326 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


the  same  substance  into  which  bread  and  wine  would  have 
been  converted  if  they  had  been  present,  and  thus  they  nourish 
the  body.  This  opinion  is  sufficiently  probable.  Others, 
again,  contend  that  the  accidents  are  not  converted  into  sub¬ 
stance,  but  that  the  substances  of  bread  and  wine  return,  when, 
owing  to  the  corruption  of  the  accidents,  the  sacramental 
presence  ceases.  This  is  the  explanation  given  by  Innocent 
III,  and  I  consider  it  probable  and  safe,  especially  on  account 
of  his  great  authority.’’  59 

St.  Thomas  refers  to  these  different  explanations  in  his 
Commentary  on  the  Sentences ,60  without  definitely  stating  his 
own  view ;  but  in  the  Summa  he  says :  “  It  seems  preferable 

to  hold  that  in  the  consecration  the  accident  of  quantity  be¬ 
comes  the  primary  subject  of  all  subsequent  forms,  and  as 
this  is  proper  to  matter,  quantity  thereby  becomes  capable  of 
discharging  all  the  functions  of  matter  in  its  natural  condi¬ 
tion.”  61  Scotus  rejects  all  these  explanations  and  holds  that 
God  directly  supplies  the  substance  which  ought  to  be  there 
in  the  natural  process  of  decomposition  to  which  the  accidents 
are  subjected.62 

There  was  a  similar  discussion  in  regard  to  the  breaking 
of  Christ’s  body  —  f  radio  corporis  Christi.  In  the  formula 
of  Cardinal  Humbert,  which  Berengarius  was  ordered  to  sub¬ 
scribe,  it  is  said  in  reference  to  the  body  of  Christ,  non  solum 
Sacramento ,  sed  in  veritate  manibus  sacerdotum  tractari, 
frangi,  et  fidelium  dentibus  atteri.  Some  took  this  in  a  literal 
sense,  but  the  common  interpretation  of  the  Scholastics  was 
that  all  these  expressions  can  be  directly  applied  only  to  the 
consecrated  species.  “  The  body  of  Christ,”  argues  St.  Bona- 
venture,  “  is  truly  taken  into  the  stomach,  and  there  it  remains 
so  long  as  the  consecrated  species  are  incorrupt;  but  it  is  not 
masticated,  nor  is  it  broken.”  63 

59  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  12,  p.  i,  a.  2,  61  Op.  cit.  q.  77,  a.  5. 

q*  n  62  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  12,  q.  7. 

60  Op.  cit.  d.  12,  q.  1,  a.  2.  63  Loc.  cit.  a.  3,  q.  1. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 

THE  FORM  OF  CONSECRATION:  THE  MATTER  OF  CONSE¬ 
CRATION:  THE  CONSECRATING  MINISTER:  THE  EUCHA¬ 
RIST  AS  A  SACRAMENT:  THE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  SAC¬ 
RAMENT:  THE  EUCHARIST  AS  A  SACRIFICE 

As  Christ  becomes  present  on  the  altar  in  virtue  of  the  con- 
secratory  action  of  the  priest,  the  Scholastics  enter  into  con¬ 
siderable  detail  regarding  the  consecration  of  the  bread  and 
wine.  They  investigate  both  its  formal  and  material  element, 
and  in  the  same  connection  study  the  sacramental  and  sacrifi¬ 
cial  aspect  of  the  Eucharist.  The  following  is  a  brief  sum¬ 
mary  of  what  they  accomplished  along  these  lines. 

i.  The  Form  of  Consecration. —  There  is  a  general  agree¬ 
ment  among  the  Scholastics  that  the  form  of  consecration 
consists  of  the  words  of  institution,  exclusive  of  the  epiclesis 
or  invocation  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  For  the  consecration  of  the 
bread  they  assign  the  four  words,  Hoc  est  corpus  meum;  and 
for  the  consecration  of  the  wine  they  designate  the  corre¬ 
sponding  form,  Hie  est  calix  sanguinis  mei.  In  regard  to  this 
latter,  however,  St.  Thomas  seems  to  hold  that  the  words  which 
follow  it  in  the  Roman  missal  —  novi  et  aeterni  Testamenti, 
mysterium  fidei,  qui  pro  vobis  et  pro  multis  effundetur  in  re- 
missionem  peccatorum  —  are  also  necessary ; 1  but  whether  he 
considers  them  as  belonging  to  the  substance  of  the  form, 
so  that  without  them  there  would  be  no  consecration,  is  not 
quite  certain. 

There  was  some  difference  of  opinion  in  regard  to  the 
manner  of  reciting  these  words.  In  the  first  place,  Innocent 

1  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  78,  a.  3. 

327 


328 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


III 2  and  Prsepositivus  3  seem  to  have  held  that  they  should 
be  spoken  by  way  of  recitation  only,  in  as  much  as  the  con¬ 
secrating  priest  simply  states  the  historic  fact  that  Christ 
spoke  them  “  the  day  before  He  suffered.”  This  view  is  re¬ 
jected  by  St.  Thomas,4  St.  Bonaventure,5  Scotus,6 7  and  the 
Scholastics  generally,  who  hold  that  the  words  of  consecration 
must  be  spoken  both  in  a  recitative  and  assertive  way.  The 
priest  uses  them  not  only  as  having  once  been  spoken  by 
Christ,  but  also  to  indicate  the  effect  which  they  here  and 
now  produce.  The  two  forms  are  not  merely  speculative 
propositions;  they  are  practical,  effecting  what  they  signify. 

In  the  second  place,  there  was  considerable  discussion  in 
reference  to  the  truth  of  these  propositions.  What  meaning 
must  be  attached  to  the  pronouns  hoc  and  hie,  as  they  are 
spoken  at  the  beginning  of  the  two  forms?  What  the  priest 
holds  in  his  hands  at  the  moment  when  he  utters  them  is  simply 
bread,  or  the  chalice  containing  wine ;  while  at  the  completion 
of  the  forms  the  bread  has  been  changed  into  the  body  of 
Christ,  and  the  wine  has  been  changed  into  the  blood  of 
Christ.  What,  therefore,  do  these  pronouns  indicate  if  they 
are  used  by  way  of  assertion? 

St.  Thomas,  after  adverting  to  the  fact  that  the  forms  are 
practical  propositions,  and  that  transubstantiation  is  effected 
instantaneously  when  the  last  syllable  is  pronounced,  maintains 
that  the  pronouns  hoc  and  hie  indicate  in  an  indeterminate 
way  what  is  common  to  the  terminus  a  quo  and  the  terminus 
ad  quem.  Hence,  in  the  consecration  of  the  bread,  the  sense 
of  the  proposition  is :  That  which  is  contained  under  these 
species  is  my  body;  and  in  the  consecration  of  the  chalice  the 
corresponding  proposition  signifies:  That  which  is  contained 
under  these  species  is  my  blood ? 


2  De  Sacro  Altaris  Mysterio, 
c.  1 7. 

3  Sum.  p.  4. 

4  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  8,  q.  2,  a.  I. 

5  Ibid.  p.  2,  a.  1,  q.  1. 

fi  Ibid.  d.  8,  q.  2,  n.  12  sq. 

7  “  Sic  ergo  hoc  pronomen  hoc 
neque  demonstrat  terminum  ad 
quem  transubstantiationis  determin¬ 


ate,  .  .  .  neque  iterum  demonstrat 
terminum  a  quo  determinate.  Re- 
linquitur  ergo  quod  demonstret  hoc 
quod  est  commune  utrique  termino 
indeterminate.  .  .  .  Communia  sunt 
accidentia  sensibilia.  .  .  .  Unde  sen- 
sus  est :  ‘  Hoc  contentum  sub  his 

speciebus  est  corpus  meum  ’  ”  (Loc. 
cit). 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 


329 


St.  Bonaventure  regards  this  explanation  as  probable,  but 
does  not  consider  it  quite  satisfactory.  The  chief  objection 
to  it,  he  says,  is  that  the  pronoun  thus  really  points  out,  not 
the  body  of  Christ,  but  the  substance  of  bread  in  so  far  as  it 
is  perceptible  by  reason  of  its  accidents.  To  escape  this  diffi¬ 
culty,  he  holds  that  the  pronoun  in  the  form  of  consecration 
appeals  partly  to  the  senses  and  partly  to  the  intellect.  In  so 
far  as  it  appeals  to  the  senses  it  points  out  the  substance  that 
is  to  be  converted;  in  so  far  as  it  appeals  to  the  intellect  it 
designates  the  body  or  blood  of  Christ  which  are  the  terms  of 
this  conversion,  and  of  which  the  bread  and  wine  are  sensible 
signs.8  With  some  slight  modifications  the  same  view  is  also 
defended  by  Alexander  of  Hales 9  and  Richard  of  Middle- 
ton,10  while  Scotus  is  in  favor  of  the  explanation  given  by 
St.  Thomas.11 

In  regard  to  the  causality  of  the  forms  of  consecration  there 
existed  the  same  difference  of  opinion  as  in  reference  to  sacra¬ 
mental  causality  in  general,  concerning  which  an  explanation 
has  been  given  in  a  previous  chapter.  While  some  ascribed 
an  instrumental  efficacy  to  the  words,  others  considered  them 
merely  as  a  conditio  sine  qua  non  of  the  effect  produced  by  the 
omnipotence  of  God.12 

2.  The  Matter  of  Consecration. —  The  proper  matter  for 
consecration,  according  to  the  common  teaching  of  the 
Scholastics,  is  wheaten  bread  and  wine  of  the  grape  —  panis 
triticeus  et  mnum  de  vite.  To  this  conclusion  they  reason 
from  the  fact  that  Christ  consecrated  bread  and  wine,  and 
that,  in  the  common  acceptation  of  the  terms,  bread  is  sup¬ 
posed  to  be  made  of  wheaten  flour  and  wine  to  be  pressed 
from  the  grape.  St.  Thomas,  after  referring  to  some 
antiquated  heretical  views,  says :  “  All  these  and  similar 

errors  are  excluded  by  the  fact  that  Christ  instituted  this 
sacrament  under  the  species  of  bread  and  wine.”  13  And  then 
to  the  question,  whether  bread  must  be  made  of  wheat  flour, 
he  replies :  “  The  kind  of  bread  to  be  used  is  determined  by 

8  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  8,  p.  2,  a.  1,  q.  1.  11  Ibid.  q.  2,  a.  1. 

9  Sum.  IV,  q.  10,  m.  4,  a.  2.  12  Op.  cit.  d.  10,  p.  2,  a.  1,  q.  3. 

10  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  8,  a.  3,  q.  1.  13  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  74,  a.  1. 


330 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


the  more  common  meaning  attached  to  the  term  as  employed 
by  men.  Now  people  more  commonly  use  wheaten  bread; 
for  other  kinds  of  bread  seem  to  be  mere  substitutes  for  it.”  14 
In  a  similar  manner  he  reasons  about  the  wine.15 

The  bread,  moreover,  should  be  unfermented;  but  this  is 
not  necessary  for  the  validity  of  the  sacrament.  St.  Thomas 
states  the  accepted  views  of  theologians  on  this  point  as  fol¬ 
lows  :  “  It  is  necessary  indeed  that  the  bread  should  be 

wheaten ;  for  otherwise  the  sacrament  would  be  invalid.  But 
it  is  not  necessary  for  the  validity  of  the  sacrament  that  the 
bread  should  be  either  unfermented  or  fermented.  ...  It  is, 
however,  proper  that  each  one  should  observe  the  rite  of  the 
church  in  which  he  celebrates. 5,16  Nor  is  it  necessary  for  the 
validity  of  the  sacrament  that  a  small  quantity  of  water  should 
be  mixed  with  the  wine,  although  it  is  enjoined  under  grave 
obligation.  By  the  water  thus  added  is  typified  the  people 
of  God,  who  share  in  the  sacrament;  and  thereby  is  also  re¬ 
called  the  flowing  of  water  from  the  side  of  Christ  as  He  hung 
upon  the  cross.17 

3.  The  Consecrating  Minister. —  That  the  priest  alone  has 
power  to  consecrate  the  Eucharist  is  assumed  by  all  Scholastics 
as  a  matter  that  admits  of  no  discussion.  “  Only  priests  can 
consecrate,”  says  St.  Bonaventure,  “  and  if  any  one  else  at¬ 
tempts  it,  he  accomplishes  nothing.  This  is  the  teaching  of 
our  faith,  which  we  have  received  from  the  Apostles.”  18  But 
on  the  further  question,  whether  all  priests  can  consecrate, 
there  is  found  among  them  some  difference  of  opinion.  Thus 
Hugh  of  St.  Victor,19  Peter  Lombard,20  and  the  author  of 
the  Summa  Sententiarum ,21  hold  that  excommunicated  priests 
are  deprived  of  the  power  of  consecrating.  Peter  Lombard 
assigns  this  reason  for  his  view :  I  Hi  vero,  qni  excommunicati 
sunt,  vel  de  haeresi  manifeste  notati,  non  videntur  hoc  sacra- 
mentum  posse  conficere,  licet  sacerdotes  sint;  quia  nemo  dicit  in 
ipsa  consecratione  offero,  sed  offerimus,  quasi  ex  persona  Ec - 

14  Ibid.  a.  3.  18  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  13,  a.  1,  q.  2. 

15  Ibid.  a.  5.  19  Tn  Ep.  S.  Pauli,  q.  102. 

lfi  Ibid.  a.  4.  20  Sent.  d.  13,  c.  1. 

17  Ibid.  a.  7.  21  Op.  cit.  tr.  6,  c.  9. 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 


331 


clesiae.  Et  ideo,  cum  alia  sacramenta  extra  Ecclesiam  possint 
celebrari ,  de  hoc  non  videtur22 

Later  Scholastics,  on  the  other  hand,  unanimously  reject 
this  reasoning  and  hold  that  the  power  of  consecrating,  which 
is  received  in  ordination  to  the  priesthood,  cannot  be  lost. 
St.  Thomas  answers  the  difficulty,  noted  above,  in  this  way : 
“  In  the  prayers  of  the  Mass  the  priest  speaks  indeed  in  the 
person  of  the  Church,  to  the  unity  of  which  he  belongs,  but 
in  the  consecration  he  speaks  in  the  person  of  Christ,  whose 
place  he  holds  through  the  power  of  ordination.  And  there¬ 
fore  when  an  excommunicated  priest  celebrates  Mass,  he  truly 
consecrates  by  changing  bread  and  wine  into  the  body  and 
blood  of  Christ;  because  he  has  not  lost  the  power  received 
in  his  ordination.  But  because  he  is  separated  from  the  unity 
of  the  Church,  hence  his  prayers  have  no  efficacy.”  23  Then, 
speaking  of  priests  who  have  been  degraded  from  their  priestly 
rank,  he  says :  “  The  power  of  consecrating  the  Eucharist 

pertains  to  the  sacerdotal  character.  Now  the  character,  be¬ 
cause  conferred  by  a  certain  consecration,  is  indelible.  .  .  . 
Hence  it  is  manifest  that  the  power  of  consecrating  is  not  lost 
through  degradation.”  24 

In  this  connection  the  Scholastics  also  consider  the  question, 
whether  a  Mass  celebrated  by  a  good  priest  is  of  greater  value 
than  a  Mass  celebrated  by  a  bad  priest.  The  answer  had  al¬ 
ready  been  given  by  Innocent  III,  who  embodied  this  clause 
in  the  profession  of  faith  required  of  the  Waldensians :  In 
quo  ( sacrificio )  nihil  a  bono  majus,  vel  a  malo  minus  pcrfici 
credimus  sacerdote ,  quia  non  in  merit o  consecrantis ,  sed  in 
verbo  efhcitur  Cr  eat  oris  et  in  virtute  Spiritus  Sancti .24a  The 
common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics  on  the  point  in  question 
is  thus  formulated  by  St.  Bonaventure:  “Speaking  of  the 
Mass,  we  must  first  of  all  consider  what  is  its  substantial 
value,  namely,  the  consecration  of  the  body  and  blood  of 
Christ,  and  this  is  the  same  in  all  cases;  because  one  and  the 
same  thing  is  in  this  regard  effected  by  all  priests.  Next 

22  Loc.  cit.  24  Ibid.  a.  8. 

23  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  82,  a.  7,  ad  24a  DB.  424. 

3m- 


» 


332 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


there  are  in  the  Mass  certain  accidentals,  such  as  petitions, 
prayers,  impetrations,  and  fervor;  in  respect  of  these  the  Mass 
of  a  good  priest  is  of  greater  value,  because  they  lead  to  greater 
devotion  in  those  who  assist.  And  if  any  one  would  rather 
hear  Mass  when  celebrated  by  a  more  devout  priest,  I  believe 
that  he  does  well;  provided,  however,  that  he  at  the  same 
time  believes  that  there  is  no  difference  as  regards  the  sub¬ 
stantial  value.  Otherwise  he  would  fall  into  a  dangerous 
error.  20 

4.  The  Eucharist  as  a  Sacrament. —  According  to  the 
teaching  of  the  Scholastics,  the  Holy  Eucharist  is  a  sacrament 
in  the  true  sense  of  the  term,  but  at  the  same  time  it  is  in 
some  respects  different  from  all  other  sacraments.  The  com¬ 
mon  view  is  thus  presented  by  St.  Thomas :  “  A  religious  rite 

is  called  a  sacrament  from  the  fact  that  it  contains  something 
sacred.  Now  a  thing  may  be  sacred  in  one  of  two  ways: 
absolutely  or  relatively.  And  this  is  the  difference  between 
the  Eucharist  and  other  sacraments  that  are  partly  made  up 
of  sensible  matter:  the  Eucharist  contains  something  that  is 
absolutely  sacred,  namely,  the  very  body  of  Christ;  whereas 
baptism,  for  instance,  contains  something  that  is  sacred  only 
in  relation  to  something  else,  namely,  the  power  of  sanctify¬ 
ing:  and  the  same  is  to  be  said  in  regard  to  confirmation 
and  other  similar  sacraments..  Hence  the  sacrament  of  the 
Eucharist  is  completed  in  the  very  consecration  of  the  matter, 
while  other  sacraments  are  completed  only  in  their  application 
to  the  one  who  is  to  be  sanctified.  And  from  this  also  an¬ 
other  difference  arises :  for  in  the  sacrament  of  the  Eucharist 
that  which  is  the  res  et  sacramcntum  is  found  in  the  matter  it¬ 
self;  and  that  which  is  the  res  tantum  is  in  the  recipient, 
namely,  the  grace  which  is  conferred :  in  baptism,  on  the  other 
hand,  both  are  in  the  recipient;  namely,  the  character,  which 
is  the  res  et  sacramcntum,  and  the  grace  of  justification,  which 
is  the  res  tantum.  And  it  is  the  same  in  the  case  of  the  other 
sacraments.”  26 

Hence  the  sacrament  of  the  Eucharist  does  not  consist  pre- 

25  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  13,  a.  2,  q.  1.  26  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  73,  a.  1. 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 


333 


cisely  in  the  words  or  action  of  transubstantiation,  as  St. 
Thomas  was  inclined  to  hold  when  he  wrote  his  Commentary 
on  the  Sentences;  but  it  is  essentially  constituted  by  the  con¬ 
secrated  species  of  bread  and  wine,  in  so  far  as  they  connote 
and  contain  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ.  The  species,  which 
naturally  indicate  bodily  sustenance,  in  virtue  of  the  consecra¬ 
tion  signify  the  presence  of  spiritual  sustenance  —  the  body 
and  blood  of  Christ  —  and  this  in  its  turn  signifies  the  grace 
to  be  conferred  in  the  reception  of  the  sacrament.  Substan¬ 
tially  the  same  explanation  is  given  by  Alexander  of  Hales,27 
Albertus  Magnus,28  St.  Bonaventure,29  and  Scotus.30 

Although  the  Eucharist  consists  of  two  distinct  species, 
that  of  bread  and  wine,  it  is  nevertheless  only  one  sacrament. 
This  is  the  teaching  of  the  most  representative  Scholastics, 
such  as  Alexander  of  Hales,31  St.  Bonaventure,32  Duns 
Scotus,33  and  St.  Thomas.34  The  reason  given  by  them  is, 
that  the  two  species  together  represent  one  spiritual  refection. 
“  A  thing  is  said  to  be  one,”  argues  St.  Thomas,  “  not  only 
because  it  is  indivisible,  or  continuous,  but  also  because  it  is 
perfect  —  as  one  house  and  one  man.  Now  a  thing  is  one  in 
the  order  of  perfection  by  reason  of  all  those  integrating  parts 
that  are  necessary  for  the  attainment  of  its  end.  Thus  man 
is  integrally  made  up  of  all  the  members  that  are  required 
for  the  operation  of  his  soul,  and  a  house  of  all  those  parts 
that  are  necessary  to  fit  it  for  a  habitation.  And  in  like 
manner  this  sacrament  is  said  to  be  one ;  because  it  is  intended 
for  a  spiritual  refection,  which  is  conformable  to  bodily  re¬ 
fection  in  that  it  consists  of  food  and  drink.”  35 

On  the  other  hand,  from  the  fact  that  the  two  species  con¬ 
stitute  but  one  sacrament,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  Eucharist 
must  be  received  by  all  under  both  species.  During  the  thir¬ 
teenth  century  the  practice  of  the  Church  in  regard  to  lay 
communion  was  in  a  state  of  transition.  In  some  places  the 

27  Sum.  IV,  q.  IO,  m.  3,  a.  3.  32  Loc.  cit.  q.  2. 

28  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  8,  a.  12.  33  Loc.  cit.  q.  1,  n.  4. 

29  Ibid.  p.  2,  a.  2,  q.  1.  34  Ibid.  q.  1,  a.  1. 

30  Ibid.  q.  1.  35  Sum.  Theol.  q.  77,  a.  2. 

31  Loc.  cit.  a.  1. 


334 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


laity  still  received  under  both  species,  and  in  others  only  under 
the  species  of  bread.  St.  Thomas,  who  gives  the  common 
teaching  on  the  point  in  question,  presents  the  matter  in  these 
terms :  “  Regarding  the  use  of  the  sacrament  two  points  may 

be  considered  :  one  in  reference  to  the  sacrament  itself,  and  one 
in  reference  to  those  who  receive  it.  As  regards  the  sacra¬ 
ment  itself,  it  is  indeed  becoming  that  both  be  received,  that 
is,  the  body  and  the  blood,  because  the  perfection  of  the 
sacrament  consists  of  both;  and  therefore,  as  it  belongs  to  the 
priest  to  consecrate  and  complete  the  sacrament,  he  must  in 
no  way  receive  the  body  of  Christ  without  also  receiving  His 
blood. 

“  But  on  the  part  of  those  who  receive  it,  there  is  required 
the  greatest  reverence  and  caution,  lest  something  should  hap¬ 
pen  that  would  desecrate  so  great  a  mystery.  This  is  especially 
the  case  with  regard  to  the  receiving  of  the  blood,  which,  if 
taken  without  proper  caution,  might  easily  be  spilled.  And 
because  in  the  ever  increasing  multitude  of  Christians  there 
are  old  people  and  young,  and  children,  many  of  whom  have 
not  the  necessary  discretion,  nor  take  the  proper  precautions, 
in  receiving  this  sacrament,  hence  it  has  been  very  wisely 
ordained  in  some  churches  that  the  laity  do  not  receive 
communion  under  the  species  of  wine,  but  the  priest 
only.”  36 

5.  Effects  of  the  Sacrament. — “  This  sacrament  produces 
no  effect,”  says  St.  Bonaventure,  “  except  in  him  who  receives 
it  worthily;  and  he  alone  receives  it  worthily  who  prepares 
himself  for  its  reception  as  he  ought.”  37  Then  to  the  ques¬ 
tion,  whether  it  has  any  efficacy  in  the  sinner,  he  replies  : 
“  We  do  not  wish  to  put  limits  to  the  generosity  of  God,  who 
may  and  perhaps  sometimes  does  grant  the  remission  of  all 
sins  in  this  sacrament;  but  it  must  be  said  that  in  accordance 
with  the  common  law  and  general  reason  for  its  institution, 
this  sacrament  is  intended  as  food  for  those  who  are  in  the 
body  of  Christ,  and  all  such  have  charity;  therefore  it  exerts 
its  efficacy  only  in  the  just.  And  its  effect  in  the  just  is  libera- 

36  Ibid.  q.  80,  a.  12.  37  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  12,  p.  2,  a.  1, 

q.  1. 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 


335 


tion  from  venial  faults  and  preservation  from  mortal  sin.”  38 
A  little  farther  on  he  shows  how  this  general  effect  is  attained 
by  a  most  intimate  union  with  Christ.39 

St.  Thomas  considers  the  matter  somewhat  more  in  detail. 
This  sacrament  produces  grace,  because  it  .contains  the  author 
of  grace;  it  represents  the  sufferings  of  the  Savior;  it  is 
given  as  spiritual  food;  it  is  the  sign  of  union  with  the  God- 
Man.40  Mortal  sin  is  an  impediment  to  its  reception,  because 
food  is  not  for  the  dead.41  However,  if  a  person  receives  in 
good  faith,  not  being  conscious  of  the  fact  that  he  is  in  mortal 
sin,  and  at  the  same  time  is  sorry  for  whatever  sins  he  may 
have  committed,  he  receives  forgiveness  through  the  sacra¬ 
ment.42 

6.  The  Eucharist  as  a  Sacrifice. —  Alexander  of  Hales,43  St. 
Thomas,44  and  some  other  Scholastics  give  a  detailed  and 
minute  description  of  the  Mass,  but  none  of  them  examine 
into  the  intimate  nature  of  the  Eucharistic  sacrifice.  Their 
remarks  about  it  are  incidental,  and  hardly  ever  touch  the 
points  that  caused  so  much  discussion  in  later  centuries.  The 
following  statements  of  St.  Thomas  contain  practically  all 
that  can  be  gathered  from  their  writings. 

“  This  sacrament,”  he  says,  “  is  both  a  sacrifice  and  a  sacra¬ 
ment.  It  is  a  sacrifice  in  so  far  as  it  is  offered  to  God;  it  is 
a  sacrament  in  so  far  as  it  is  received  by  men.  Hence  it  has 
the  effects  of  a  sacrament  in  him  who  receives  it;  and  the  ef¬ 
fects  of  a  sacrifice  in  him  who  offers  it  up,  or  also  in  those 
for  whom  it  is  offered.”  45 

In  another  connection  he  gives  this  descriptive  definition  of 
a  sacrifice  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term :  Sacrihcia  proprie 
dicuntur,  quando  circa  res  Deo  oblatas  aliquid  fit ;  sicut  quod 
animalia  occidebantur,  et  comburebantnr:  quod  panis  frangi- 
tur,  et  comeditur,  et  benedicitur ;  et  hoc  ipsum  nomen  sonat , 
nam  sacrificinm  dicitur  ex  hoc,  quod  homo  facit  aliquid 
sacrum:  oblatio  autem  directe  dicitur ,  cum  Deo  aliquid  otfer- 

38  Ibid.  q.  2.  42  Ibid. 

39  Ibid.  q.  3.  43  Sum.  IV,  q.  10,  II. 

*°  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  79,  a.  1.  44  Op.  cit.  q.  83. 

41  Ibid.  a.  3.  45  Op.  cit.  q.  79,  a.  5. 


336 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


tur,  etiamsi  nihil  circa  ipsnm  fiat ;  sicut  dicuntnr  denarii  of¬ 
fer  ri,  vel  panes  in  altari ,  circa  quos  nihil  fit:  unde  omne  sacri- 
ficium  est  ohlatio,  sed  non  convertitur ,46 

Applying  this  to  the  Eucharistic  rite,  he  says  that  it  may 
be  considered  as  an  immolation  of  Christ  as  He  becomes 
present  under  the  sacramental  species.  And  this  for  two  rea¬ 
sons:  First,  because  the  rite  is  representative  of  the  suffer¬ 
ings  and  death  of  Christ  on  the  cross,  when  He  was  truly  im¬ 
molated  for  the  sins  of  the  world.  Secondly,  because  through 
the  Eucharist  we  are  allowed  to  share  in  the  effects  of  Christ’s 
true  immolation.47  Again:  “The  celebration  of  this  sacra¬ 
ment  is  a  certain  representative  image  of  the  passion  of  Christ; 
and  therefore  it  is  said  to  be  an  immolation  of  Christ  Him¬ 
self.”  48  Hence  too,  the  Christian  altar  represents  the  cross, 
whereon  Christ  was  immolated.49 

Furthermore,  this  representation  of  Christ’s  immolation  on 
the  cross  is  verified  in  the  consecration  itself,  and  therefore  it 
is  not  lawful  to  consecrate  the  body  without  the  blood.50  This 
rite  is  a  sacrifice  precisely  in  so  far  as  it  represents  the  passion 
of  Christ,  in  which  He  offered  Himself  to  God  as  a  victim  for 
sin.51  In  the  Eucharistic  sacrifice  as  well  as  in  the  sacrifice  of 
the  cross,  Christ  Himself  is  both  priest  and  victim;  the  officiat¬ 
ing  priest  is  merely  His  ministerial  representative,  acting  in 
His  name  and  person.52  Hence,  although  the  Eucharist  is 
celebrated  in  many  different  places,  and  by  many  different 
priests,  it  is  nevertheless  only  one  sacrifice  —  a  renewal  and 
representation  of  the  one  sacrifice  offered  up  on  the  cross.53 

With  this  teaching  of  St.  Thomas  Duns  Scotus  agrees  in 
so  far  as  he  also  holds  that  the  sacrifice  of  the  Mass  is  an 
objective  representation  of  the  sacrifice  of  the  cross,54  that 
therein  Christ  is  both  victim  and  priest,55  and  that  the  of¬ 
ficiating  priest  acts  in  His  name  and  person;  but  he  differs 
from  it  when  he  places  the  essence  of  this  sacrifice,  not  in  the 


46  II.  II,  q.  85,  a.  3  ad  3m. 

47  Sum.  Theol.  q.  83,  a.  1. 

48  Ibid. 

49  Ibid.  a.  1  ad  im. 

50  Ibid.  q.  80,  a.  12  ad  3m. 


51  Ibid.  q.  79,  a.  7. 

52  Ibid.  q.  83,  a.  1  ad  3m. 
ss  Ibid. 

54  Quodl.  q.  20,  n.  22. 

55  Ibid.  n.  22,  2. 


THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST 


337 


consecration  itself,  but  in  the  oblation  that  follows.56  He  also 
points  out  that,  although  the  value  of  the  Eucharistic  sacrifice 
is  in  itself  infinite,  nevertheless  as  offered  by  the  Church  it  is 
finite  in  its  application  to  the  faithful.57 

Of  the  several  points  touched  in  these  two  chapters,  some 
have  been  defined  by  the  Church,  others  represent  the  common 
teaching  of  theologians,  while  still  others  are  little  more  than 
theological  speculations.  To  the  first  class,  with  which  we 
are  here  more  directly  concerned,  belongs  the  Real  Presence, 
transubstantiation,  the  existence  of  the  accidents  of  bread  and 
wine  independently  of  their  natural  subject  of  inhesion,  the 
form  and  matter  of  consecration,  the  power  of  every  priest 
to  consecrate,  the  freedom  from  mortal  sin  as  a  necessary  dis¬ 
position  for  a  worthy  reception,  the  increase  of  sanctifying 
grace  in  the  worthy  recipient,  and  the  fact  that  the  Holy 
Eucharist  is  both  a  sacrament  and  a  sacrifice.  It  must  be 
noted,  however,  that  nearly  all  these  definitions  were  occa¬ 
sioned  by  the  cavils  of  heretics,  and  that  they  simply  formulate 
in  a  clear  and  definite  way  what  had  always  been  held  to  be  an 
object  of  faith. 

66  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  13,  q.  2. 


57  Quodl.  20,  n.  22. 


CHAPTER  XX 


PENANCE 

PRACTICE  OF  THE  EARLY  MIDDLE  AGES :  TEACHING  OF 

THE  SCHOLASTICS 

In  a  certain  sense,  penance  is  to  the  fallen  Christian  what 
baptism  is  to  the  unregenerated  heathen  —  a  plank  of  safety 
out  of  the  shipwreck.  And  as  such  has  it  always  been  re¬ 
garded  in  the  Church  of  Christ.  In  fact,  the  comparison  was 
already  a  commonplace  in  the  third  century.  And  so,  too, 
was  all  that  is  essential  in  the  doctrine  and  administration  of 
penance.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  matter  of  accidental  de¬ 
tails  many  changes  were  introduced  in  the  course  of  time. 
Some  of  these  appear  at  first  sight  so  striking  that  not  a  few 
thoughtless  critics  have  been  led  to  deny  the  continuity  of  the 
penitential  rite  itself.  Such  a  denial  is,  of  course,  without 
warrant;  for  while  in  the  course  of  many  centuries  the  ex¬ 
ternal  form  of  penance  has  undergone  various  changes,  the 
essentials  of  both  doctrine  and  practice  have  always  remained 
the  same.  The  following  remarks  on  the  penitential  practices 
of  the  early  Middle  Ages  will  make  this  sufficiently  clear. 

A  —  Practice  of  the  Early  Middle  Ages 

During  Patristic  times,  penance  as  administered  by  the 
Church  was  of  two  kinds :  private  and  public.  In  private  pen¬ 
ance  both  the  confession  of  sins  and  the  rite  of  reconciliation 
were  secret;  in  public  penance  sacramental  confession  was  also 
secret,  but  the  works  of  satisfaction  enjoined  and  the  final 
reconciliation  were  public.  Moreover,  under  ordinary  circum¬ 
stances,  reconciliation  was  not  granted  until  due  satisfaction 
had  been  made.  It  was  chiefly  in  regard  to  public  penance 

338 


EARLY  PRACTICE  OF  PENANCE 


339 


that  changes  were  gradually  introduced.  These  changes  were 
determined  partly  by  altered  social  conditions  and  partly  by 
the  varying  attitude  of  the  faithful  in  regard  to  public  pen¬ 
ance.  And  rightly  so :  for  as  public  penance  was  in  great  part 
merely  a  matter  of  discipline,  it  was  quite  proper  that  the 
Church  should  accommodate  her  regulations  in  this  respect  to 
the  needs  of  the  times  and  the  greater  good  of  those  whom 
she  desired  to  benefit.  Hence  we  find  that  in  some  countries 
public  penance  was  never  in  force.  This  was  the  case  in 
England,  and  probably  also  in  Ireland.  In  regard  to  the 
former  country  the  Poenitentiale  Theodori  explicitly  states: 
Reconciliatio  ideo  in  hac  provincia  publice  statuta  non  est,  quia 
et  publica  poenitentia  non  est.1 

It  was  principally  since  the  seventh  century  that  public  pen¬ 
ance  began  to  be  discontinued  in  the  various  countries  in 
which  it  had  been  in  vogue  during  Patristic  times.  Thus 
in  France,  during  the  disorders  of  the  Merovingian  period, 
it  fell  into  almost  complete  desuetude.  And  this  state  of 
things  continued  even  after  public  order  had  been  restored, 
as  is  evident  from  a  statement  of  the  Synod  of  Chalons,  held 
in  813.  The  statement  reads  as  follows:  P  oenitentiam  agere 
juxta  antiquam  canonum  institutionem  in  plerisque  locis  ab 
asu  recessit.2  The  same  Synod,  however,  passed  this  decree : 
Si  quis  publice  peccat,  publice  mulct etur  poenitentia  et 
secundum  ordinem  canonum  pro  merito  suo  excommunicetur 
et  reconcilietur .3  During  the  next  two  centuries  this  legisla¬ 
tion  was  regarded  as  the  general  norm  of  procedure  —  public 
penance  was  to  be  imposed  upon  public  sinners,  at  least  in 
cases  where  the  sin  had  caused  considerable  scandal.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  excommunication  was  not  inflicted  ex¬ 
cept  when  the  sinner  refused  to  do  penance.  Similar  condi¬ 
tions  obtained  also  in  other  countries. 

A  further  mitigation  was  introduced  in  regard  to  the  time 

of  reconciliation.  For  many  centuries  reconciliation  was 

✓ 

ordinarily  granted  only  after  the  penance  enjoined  had  been 
duly  performed.  Practically  the  only  exceptions  to  this  rule 

1  Op.  cit.  13,  4;  cfr.  Hadden  and  2  Mansi,  14,  98. 

Stubbs,  Councils,  III,  187.  3  Ibid. 


340 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


were  those  in  favor  of  the  dying.  To  them  immediate  recon¬ 
ciliation  was  granted  even  if  they  had  put  off  doing  penance, 
although  in  that  case  its  effectiveness  was  not  rarely  called  in 
question.  Thus,  in  the  sixth  century,  St.  Csesarius  of  Arles 
stated  in  reference  to  such  persons:  ‘‘If  any  one,  when  in 
danger  of  death,  asks  to  be  admitted  to  penance,  and,  the 
■favor  having  been  granted,  he  departs  this  life  after  being  thus 
reconciled,  I  confess,  we  do  not  deny  him  what  he  asks,  but 
at  the  same  time  we  do  not  presume  that  he  has  died  well.”  4 
With  reference  to  the  dying  in  general,  Rabanus  Maurus,  to¬ 
wards  the  middle  of  the  ninth  century,  gives  this  direction 
to  his  clergy:  “  In  regard  to  those  who  are  at  the  point  of 
death,  account  must  be  taken  of  their  sincere  conversion  rather 
than  of  the  time  still  left  them  for  doing  penanced’  5  And 
even  before  this,  immediate  reconciliation  was  already  ex¬ 
tended  to  those  in  health;  for  the  Statuta  Bonifatii  contain  this 
general  direction :  “  Let  every  priest  see  to  it  that  penitents  be 

reconciled  immediately  after  their  confession.”  6  However, 
as  appears  from  the  Libri  Poenitentiales,  this  did  not  apply  to 
cases  of  great  public  scandal.  By  the  beginning  of  the 
eleventh  century  immediate  reconciliation  had  become  the 
general  rule,  even  in  the  case  of  public  sinners;  and  there¬ 
after  public  penance  practically  disappeared. 

During  all  these  centuries,  private  penance,  including 
sacramental  confession,  was  much  insisted  upon.  Confession 
was  considered  to  make  even  the  most  grievous  sins  venial, 
that  is,  easily  forgiven.  Thus  Alcuin  states :  “  Believe  me, 

whatever  sin  you  may  have  committed  becomes  venial,  if  you 
are  not  ashamed  to  confess  it  and  to  do  penance.  .  .  .  The 
Lord  is  waiting  for  the  sacrifice  of  your  confession,  so  that 
He  may  show  you  the  sweetness  of  His  mercy;  for  He  wishes 
all  men  to  be  saved  and  desires  no  one  to  perish.”  7  And 
again :  “  God  desires  our  confession,  so  that  He  may  have 

a  just  reason  for  granting  pardon.”  8  In  the  sacred  tribunal 
of  penance  the  priest  is  at  once  intercessor,  advocate,  and 

7  De  Confess.  Pecc.  2;  ML.  ioi, 
622. 

8  Ibid.  622  A. 


4  ML.  67,  1082  C. 

5  Poenit.  14;  ML.  no,  483. 

6  Mansi,  12,  386. 


EARLY  PRACTICE  OF  PENANCE 


34i 


physician.  He  reconciles  the  sinner  to  God,  and,  in  virtue  of 
the  authority  conferred  upon  him  by  the  Church,  loosens  the 
bonds  of  sin.9  The  form  of  absolution  was  still  deprecatory, 
and  the  declarative  form  did  not  come  into  common  use  until 
about  1 200. 10  Even  then  some  Scholastics  still  disputed  the 
lawfulness  of  its  use.11  However,  the  final  acceptation  of 
this  form  shows  that  it  had  always  been  the  common  per¬ 
suasion  that  the  priest  really  absolved  from  sin,  even  if  he 
granted  absolution  in  the  form  of  a  prayer. 

How  the  sacrament  of  penance  was  regarded  in  the  early 
Middle  Ages  appears  most  clearly  from  the  Pseudo-Augustin- 
ian  treatise  De  Vera  et  Falsa  Poenitentia.  This  work  was 
probably  composed  at  the  beginning  of  the  eleventh  century, 
although  Gratian,  about  1140,  regarded  it  as  a  genuine  work 
of  St.  Augustine.  The  points  of  most  interest  in  the  present 
connection  are  the  following: 

1.  The  proper  object  or  matter  of  the  sacrament  of  penance 
are  mortal  sins  :  Sunt  quaedam  peccata  venialia,  quae  oratione 
Dominica  cotidie  solvuntur ,  .  .  .  alia  vero,  quae  sunt  ad 
mortem ,  non  sic ,  sed  per  fructum  poenitentiae  solvuntur .12 
Agenda  est  poenitentia ,  ut  deleantur  criminal 

2.  However  venial  sins  may  also  be  confessed;  and  when 
they  are  frequently  committed,  confession  is  very  advisable: 
Ista  assidua  et  quodam  modo  necessaria  assidua  laventur  con - 
fessione,  assidua  restaur  entur  confessione ; 14  est  enim 
poenitentia  assidue  peccantibus  assidue  necessaria ,15 

3.  The  confession  of  sins  by  catechumens  is  not  necessary: 
Poenitentia  baptizandis  non  est  necessaria ,16 

4.  The  life  of  a  Christian  is  necessarily  a  penitential  life: 
Quantum  sit  appetenda  gratia  poenitentiae  .  .  .,  omnis 
bonorum  vita  conatur  ostendere ; 17  fides  fund  amentum  est 
poenitentiae .18 

5.  This  penance  may  be  repeated  as  often  as  seems  good; 19 


9  Ep.  112;  ML.  100,  337,  sqq. 

10  Regino,  De  Ecclesiast.  Discipl. 
I,  300;  ML.  132,  252. 

11  Morinns,  8.  9.  23  :  p.  537  sq. 

12  Op.  cit.  4,  10:  ML,  11 16. 

13  Ibid.  8,  22;  1121. 


14  Ibid.  8,  21 ;  1120. 

15  Ibid.  8,  20 ;  1 1 19. 

16  Ibid.  8,  19 ;  1119. 

17  Ibid.  1,  1 :  1113. 

18  Ibid.  2.  3  ;  1 1 13. 

19  Ibid.  3,  5-15. 


342 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


but  if  public  penance  must  be  done,  that  may  be  performed 
only  once.20 

6.  Normally  all  men  are  at  one  time  or  another  guilty  of 
mortal  sin;  hence,  referring  to  John  8,  7-9,  the  author  says: 
Nullus  erat  sine  peccato.  In  quo  intelligitur  omnes  crimine 
fuisse  reos,  nam  veniale  semper  remittebatur  per  cerimonias; 
si  quod  igitur  peccatum  in  eis  erat ,  criminate  erat.21 

7.  True  penance  consists  first  of  all  in  a  contrite  confession 
of  the  sins  committed :  Quern  igitur  poenitet  .  .  .  representet 
vitam  suam  Deo  per  sacerdotem,  praeveniat  judicium  Dei  per 
confessionem.  .  .  .  Ex  misericordia  enim  hoc  praecepit 
Dominus,  ut  neminem  poeniteret  in  occulto.  .  .  .  Fit  enim 
per  confessionem  veniale ;  quod  criminate  erat  in  operatione  22 

8.  If  no  priest  be  at  hand,  and  there  is  danger  of  death,  it 
is  advisable  to  confess  even  to  a  layman:  Tanta  itaque  vis 
confessionis  est,  ut  si  deest  sacerdos ,  confiteatur  proximo; 
...  fit  dignus  venia  ex  desiderio  sacerdotis.23 

9.  The  priest  acts  as  the  messenger  of  God  —  nuntius 
Dei ; 24  he  exercises  the  power  of  a  judge  —  in  potestate 
judicis; 25  he  is  vested  with  judicial  power  —  judiciaria 
potestas ,26 

10.  For  secret  sins  private  penance  suffices,  but  for  public 
sins  public  penance  is  proper :  Si  peccatum  occultum  est ; 
sufdciat  ref  err  e  in  notitiam  sacerdotis.  .  .  .  Docemur  publice 
peccantibus  non  proprium,  sed  ecclesiae  sufdcere  meritum ;  .  .  . 
qui  enim  multos  offendit  peccando,  placare  multos  oportet 
satis faciendo. 27 

11.  In  order  to  satisfy  completely  for  one’s  sins,  one  must 
be  assiduous  in  performing  works  of  penance :  Qui  perfectam 
vult  consequi  gratiam  remissionis ,  fructidcet  in  poenitentia.28 

1 2.  True  penance  shows  itself  in  mortification,  sorrow  of 
heart,  and  alms-giving:  Abstinent  a  multis  licitis,  .  .  . 
semper  offerat  Deo  mentis  et  cordis  contritionem,  deinde  et 

20  Ibid,  it,  26. 

21  Ibid.  20,  36;  1129. 

22  Ibid.  10,  25  ;  1122. 

23  Ibid. 

24  Ibid. 


25  Ibid.  15,  30;  1125. 

26  Ibid.  20,  36;  1129. 

27  Ibid.  11,  26  ;  1123. 

28  Ibid.  15,  31 ;  1126. 


EARLY  PRACTICE  OF  PENANCE 


343 


quod  potest  de  possessione ,  ut  semper  puniat  se  ulciscendo , 
quod  commisit  peccando;  poenitere  enim  est  poenam  tenere 

13.  Those  who  neglect  to  do  penance  here  on  earth  shall  be 
punished  in  purgatory :  Prius  purgandus  est  igne  purgationis, 
qui  in  aliud  saeculum  distulit  fructum  conversionis .30 

14.  If  any  one  dies  without  repenting  of  his  sins,  he  is  con¬ 
demned. to  the  pains  of  hell:  Qui  autem  impoenitens  moritur , 
omnino  moritur  et  aeternaliter  cruciatur .31 

The  same  general  outlines  of  early  mediaeval  teaching  on 
penance  might  also  be  drawn  up  from  the  sermons  of  St.  Peter 
Damian,  who  died  in  1072.  Of  those  who  contritely  confess 
their  sins  he  says :  In  fide  Ecclesiae  credat  sibi  peccata  di- 
mitti32  It  is  only  after  the  oris  confessio,  sacramental  con¬ 
fession,  that  works  of  penance  are  in  place.83  If  sufficient 
satisfaction  for  sins  is  not  rendered  here  on  earth,  the  penitent 
must  submit  to  the  pains  of  purgatory:  Cum  in  purgatoriis 
ignibus  perficiendum  sit ,  quidquid  hie  minus  feceris,  quia 
dignos  poenitentiae  fructus  quaerit  Altissimus ,34  He  calls  pen¬ 
ance  the  sacrament  of  confession  —  sacrament  urn  confes- 
sionis35  It  is  the  ordinary  means  of  sanctification  for  saint 
and  sinner  alike:  Via  communis  ad  Deum,  fons  tarn  justis 
quam  peccatoribus  patens ,36 

From  the  foregoing  summary  it  ought  to  be  sufficiently  clear 
that  private  sacramental  penance  did  not  grow  out  of  monastic 
practices,  as  is  so  frequently  contended  by  Protestant  writers 
on  the  subject.  It  was  in  vogue  all  over  the  Christian  world, 
and  the  obligation  of  submitting  to  it  was  insisted  upon  by  the 
secular  clergy  as  well  as  by  the  monks.  Nor  were  the  clergy 
themselves  exempt  from  this  obligation,  although  they  usually 
were  exempt  from  the  obligation  of  submitting  to  public  pen- 
nance.  Much  less  can  it  be  held,  as  many  Protestants  do  hold, 
that  the  obligation  of  sacramental  confession  had  its  origin  in 
the  legislation  of  the  Fourth  Lateran  Council,  convened  in 
1215  under  Innocent  III.  All  that  the  Council  did  was  to 

29  Ibid.  10,  25;  1122.  33  Ibid.  832  D;  833  A. 

30  Ibid.  18,  34;  1128.  34  Ibid.  831  A. 

31  Ibid.  35  Serm.  69;  ML,  901  A. 

32  Serm.  58;  ML,  144,  832  D.  36  Ibid.  901  A. 


344 


MEDI/EVAL  THEOLOGY 


prescribe  certain  limits,  beyond  which  the  faithful  must  not 
neglect  to  confess  their  sins.37  The  obligation  itself  had  ex¬ 
isted  from  the  beginning  of  the  Church,  but  it  was  only  when 
the  faithful  had  become  careless  in  this  respect  that  the  Church 
found  it  necessary  to  enforce  it  by  a  general  law.  Moreover 
local  synods  had  passed  similar  laws  centuries  before,  but  the 
Fourth  Lateran  legislated  for  the  whole  Church. 

B  —  Teaching  of  the  Scholastics 

Most  of  the  Scholastics  consider  penance  under  two  dis¬ 
tinct  heads :  penance  as  a  virtue  and  penance  as  a  sacrament. 
But  they  do  not  all  follow  the  same  order  of  treatment.  Some 
discuss  first  the  virtue  of  penance  and  then  pass  over  to  its 
sacramental  aspect;  while  others  first  explain  what  belongs  to 
the  sacrament  and  thereupon  treat  of  the  virtue  in  connection 
with  the  effects  and  acts  of  penance.  The  former  arrangement 
seems  the  more  logical,  and  will  be  followed  in  this  brief  re¬ 
view  of  their  teaching. 

i.  The  Virtue  of  Penance. —  The  question  whether  penance 
must  be  regarded  as  a  virtue  is  variously  answered  by  the 
Scholastics.  St.  Bonaventure  enumerates  four  different  views 
on  this  point,  each  one  of  which  had  its  defenders  among  the 
Schoolmen.  “  Some  there  are,”  he  says,  “  who  hold  that 
penance  is  not  a  virtue,  but  an  act  of  virtue;  not  of  one  virtue 
in  particular,  but  of  all  together  —  they  all  concur  in  the  pro¬ 
duction  of  that  act.  Just  as  the  chords  of  the  lyre  give  out 
one  musical  note  when  touched  in  accord  with  the  rules  of  the 
musician's  art,  so  do  the  virtues  produce  this  one  act  under 
the  direction  of  prudence.  .  .  .  Others  say  that  penance  is  a 
habitus ,  not  of  virtue  but  of  grace;  nor  does  it  refer  only  to 
the  substance  of  grace,  but  also  to  its  act.  As  the  grace  of 
baptism  is  called  innocence,  so  is  the  grace  of  justification 
called  penance.  ...  A  third  opinion  admits  that  penance  is  a 
virtue,  but  only  in  the  wider  sense  of  the  term.  For  virtue 
in  the  proper  sense  directs  the  agent  towards  good,  while 
penance  recalls  him  from  evil.  .  .  .  The  last  view  is  that  pen- 

37  DB.  437. 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PENANCE 


345 


ance  is  a  habit  of  virtue  —  habitus  virtutis  —  and  of  virtue  in 
its  proper  acceptation,  not  merely  in  a  general  sense.  And 
this,  I  believe,  is  the  more  probable  view.”  38 

This  “  more  probable  view  ”  was  held  by  nearly  all  the  most 
representative  Scholastics,39  Albertus  Magnus  being  the  only 
one  of  note  who  considered  penance  as  a  virtue  in  the  wider 
sense  of  the  term.40  Then  the  further  question  arose  whether 
penance  must  be  regarded  as  a  special  virtue  distinct  from  all 
others.  In  respect  to  this  there  was  again  some  difference  of 
views,  in  as  much  as  a  few  identified  penance  with  justice, 
while  all  the  others  held  it  to  be  a  special  virtue.  Thus  St. 
Thomas  argues :  “  Habits  are  distinguished  according  to  the 

specific  difference  of  their  acts  ;  hence  where  there  are  specif¬ 
ically  different  praiseworthy  acts,  there  it  must  be  admitted 
that  they  are  elicited  by  a  special  virtue.  Now  it  is  manifest 
that  in  penance  there  is  found  a  specifically  different 
praiseworthy  act,  namely,  to  bring  about  the  destruction 
of  past  sin  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  offence  against  God, 
which  does  not  belong  to  any  other  virtue.  Hence  it 
necessarily  follows  that  penance  is  a  special  virtue.”41  St. 
Bonaventure  words  his  reasoning  somewhat  differently,  but 
comes  to  the  same  conclusion.  “  Penance,”  he  says,  “  is  a 
special  virtue,  because  it  has  a  bearing  upon  evil  as  committed 
against  God,  whereby  man  has  made  himself  deserving  of  pun¬ 
ishment.”  42 

However,  although  penance  is  thus  a  special  virtue,  it  is 
nevertheless  reducible  to  the  cardinal  virtue  of  justice,  of  which 
it  is  a  part.  On  this  point  nearly  all  were  agreed,  only  a  few 
contending  that  penance  must  be  reduced  to  charity.  The 
more  common  view  is  thus  set  forth  by  St.  Thomas :  “  Pen¬ 

ance  is  a  special  virtue  not  only  for  the  reason  that  it  causes 
grief  for  sins  committed,  because  for  that  purpose  charity 
would  suffice;  but  rather  for  the  reason  that  the  penitent 


38  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  14,  p.  1,  a.  1, 
q.  1. 

39  Cfr.  Halens.  Sum.  IV,  q.  12,  m. 
1,  a.  1 ;  Thomas,  in  Sent.  IV,  d.  14, 
q.  1,  a.  1;  Scotus,  ibid.  q.  2;  Mid¬ 
dleton,  ibid.  a.  1,  q.  1. 


40  Ibid.  a.  3. 

41  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  85,  a.  2. 

42  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  14,  p.  1,  a.  1. 
q.  2. 


346 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


grieves  for  sins  committed  in  so  far  as  they  are  an  offence 
against  God,  and  at  the  same  time  resolves  to  make 
amends.  Now  to  make  amends  for  an  offence  com¬ 
mitted  against  some  one  does  not  consist  merely  in  a  cessa¬ 
tion  of  the  offence;  but  furthermore  requires  that  a  certain 
compensation  be  made  to  the  person  offended,  just  as  sin  de¬ 
mands  punishment.  .  .  .  But  compensation  and  punishment 
belong  to  the  matter  of  justice,  because  there  is  a  commutative 
aspect  in  both.  Hence,  it  is  manifest  that  penance,  in  so  far  as 
it  is  a  special  virtue,  is  a  part  of  justice.”  43  However,  as  it  is 
the  virtue  of  an  inferior  in  respect  of  his  superior,  it  is  not 
commutative  justice  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term;  because 
that  has  no  place  except  between  equals.44 

Again,  as  penance  is  a  part  of  the  virtue  of  justice,  its  proper 
subject  is  the  will.  Hence,  too,  repentance  is  an  act  of  the 
will,  although  it  usually  also  manifests  itself  in  the  affections.45 
Its  proper  act  consists  in  the  detestation  of  sin  and  the  firm 
purpose  of  amendment,  so  that  thereby  due  compensation  may 
be  made  to  God  for  the  offence  that  resulted  from  past  sins.46 

Penance  as  a  virtue  is  infused  by  God.  This  is  the  common 
teaching  of  the  Scholastics  against  Scotus.47  Considered  as 
an  act,  penance  arises  from  a  variety  of  motives.  The  whole 
process  of  repentance  is  thus  described  by  St.  Bonaventure: 
“  First  it  is  necessary  to  know  God’s  goodness  and  justice,  to 
which  every  sin  is  an  offence  and  as  such  calls  for  punishment 
—  and  one  must  be  conscious  of  having  done  something  that  is 
displeasing  to  God’s  goodness;  this  is  the  consciousness  of 
guilt,  and  thence  results  the  apprehension  of  punishment  as 
inflicted  by  divine  justice.  It  is  also  necessary  to  know  God’s 
mercy,  by  reason  of  which  He  is  prepared  to  grant  forgiveness 
to  everyone  who  sincerely  repents  of  his  sins.  From  the  first 
knowledge  arises  fear;  from  the  second  hope  of  forgiveness: 
then  from  the  two  together  springs  the  desire  and  the  deter¬ 
mination  of  returning  to  God,  of  becoming  reconciled  to  Him, 

43  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  85,  a.  3. 

44  Ibid. 

45  Ibid.  a.  4 ;  Bonavent.  In  Sent. 

IV,  d.  14,  p.  1,  a.  2,  q.  1. 


46  Ibid. 

47  Cfr.  supra,  “  Infused  Virtues.” 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PENANCE 


347 


and  of  rendering  Him  due  satisfaction  by  sorrow  of  heart  and 
other  penitential  works.  If  a  person  thus  starts  out  to  do 
what  in  him  lies,  he  is  disposed  for  justification.”  48 

This  is  substantially  the  common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics, 
though  not  by  all  of  them  expressed  in  the  same  terms.  St. 
Thomas,  for  instance,  puts  it  this  way:  “  Of  penance  we  can 
speak  in  two  ways :  one  way  in  as  much  as  it  is  a  habitus  and 
as  such  it  is  immediately  infused  by  God,  we  only  contributing 
thereto  by  way  of  disposition;  another  way  in  as  much  as  it 
is  an  act,  in  which  we  cooperate  with  God  through  penance. 
Of  these  acts  the  first  principle  is  God’s  operation  in  so  far  as 
He  converts  the  heart,  according  to  Lament,  ult.,  21 :  ‘  Con¬ 

vert  us,  O  Lord,  to  Thee,  and  we  shall  be  converted.’  The 
second  is  an  act  of  faith;  the  third  is  an  act  of  servile  fear, 
by  which  one  is  drawn  away  from  sin  through  the  fear  of 
punishment;  the  fourth  is  an  act  of  hope,  by  which  one  in 
expectation  of  forgiveness  resolves  upon  amending  one’s  life; 
the  fifth  is  an  act  of  charity,  by  which  one  detests  sin  as  it  is 
in  itself  and  not  merely  for  fear  of  punishment;  the  sixth  is 
an  act  of  filial  fear,  by  which  one  through  reverence  for  God 
freely  offers  to  make  amends.  And  thus  it  is  clear  that  the 
act  of  penance  proceeds  from  servile  fear  as  the  first  movement 
of  the  affections  ordained  to  this  end;  but  from  filial  fear  as 
its  immediate  and  proper  principle.”  49 

If  a  person  is  truly  repentant  and  prepared  to  comply  with 
all  the  conditions  laid  down  by  God  for  justification,  he  in¬ 
fallibly  obtains  the  grace  of  God,  no  matter  what  sins  he  may 
have  committed.50  In  connection  with  this  they  usually  in¬ 
quire  into  the  measure  of  sanctifying  grace  that  one  receives  in 
thus  rising  from  grievous  personal  falls.  By  mortal  sin  sanc¬ 
tifying  grace  is  lost,  by  penance  it  is  recovered ;  but  in  what 
measure  is  it  recovered  as  compared  to  the  grace  possessed  be¬ 
fore  sin  was  committed?  Obviously,  three  suppositions  are 

48  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  14,  p.  1,  a.  2,  “  Concedendum  igitur,  quod  omnis 

q.  2.  agens  poenitentiam  super  culpam 

49  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  85,  a.  5.  secundum  assignationem  praedic- 

50  The  common  teaching  of  the  tarn,  quantumcumque  peccaverit,  in- 
Scholastics  on  this  point  is  thus  venit  gratiam  ”  (In  Sent.  IV,  d.  14, 
formulated  by  St.  Bonaventure:  p.  2,  a.  2,  q.  1). 


348 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


possible.  First,  that  penance  places  man  in  the  same  position 
where  he  was  before  he  sinned ;  so  that  he  has  the  same  amount 
of  sanctifying  grace  and  the  same  merits  for  heaven.  Sec¬ 
ondly,  that  penance  restores  the  full  amount  of  grace  and  all 
the  merits  possessed  before  sin  was  committed,  and  adds 
thereto  whatever  is  due  to  the  supernatural  acts  of  penance  it¬ 
self ;  whence  it  would  follow  that  the  sinner  after  his  con¬ 
version  possesses  a  higher  degree  of  grace  and  more  merits 
for  heaven  than  he  did  before  he  sinned.  Thirdly,  that  pen¬ 
ance  does  not  restore  the  grace  and  merits  lost  through  sin, 
and  that  therefore  the  penitent  after  his  conversion  has  only 
that  degree  of  grace  and  those  merits  which  correspond  to  the 
supernatural  acts  involved  in  the  process  of  his  repentance. 

Different  answers  are  given  to  the  question  by  different 
Scholastics.  Some  hold  that  penance  restores  the  same  grace 
that  was  lost  by  sin ;  others  say  that  penance  restores  the  grace 
that  was  lost  and  besides  adds  thereto  in  proportion  to  the 
fervor  of  repentance ;  others,  finally,  maintain  that  the  grace 
conferred  by  penance  is  simply  in  proportion  to  the  disposition 
of  the  penitent,  and  that  all  lost  merits  are  merely  the  cause 
of  accidental  glory  in  heaven.  This  last  seems  to  be  the  view 
of  St.  Thomas,  for  he  says :  “  The  penitent  who  rises  from 

his  sins  in  a  lower  degree  of  charity,  will  indeed  obtain  an 
essential  reward  in  proportion  to  the  degree  of  charity  which 
he  is  found  to  possess;  nevertheless  he  will  have  greater  joy  on 
account  of  the  good  works  which  he  did  in  his  first  charity, 
over  and  above  that  which  results  from  the  works  he  per¬ 
formed  after  his  conversion;  and  this  belongs  to  his  accidental 
reward.”  51  The  same  is  also  held  by  Alexander  of  Hales  52 
and  Richard  of  Middleton.53  In  this  view,  therefore,  the 
merits  lost  by  sin  do  not  revive  through  penance. 

On  the  other  hand,  St.  Bonaventure  54  and  Duns  Scotus  55 
are  in  favor  of  a  full  restoration  of  all  previous  merits.  The 
former  says :  “  It  is  the  common  opinion  of  theologians  that 

51  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  31,  a.  4,  quaes-  53  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  31,  a.  1,  q.  2. 

tiunc.  1,  2,  3;  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  89,  54  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  14,  p.  2,  a.  2, 

a.  5  ad  3m.  q.  3- 

52  Sum.  IV,  q.  12,  m.  4,  a.  5'.  55  Ibid.  d.  22,  q.  umc.  n.  8,  9,  10. 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PENANCE 


349 


works  which  were  at  first  meritorious,  because  they  were 
performed  in  the  state  of  grace  and  therefore  deserving  of  an 
eternal  reward,  become  dead  through  sin  —  because  as  long  as 
there  is  guilt  they  are  on  account  of  the  person's  sinful  condi¬ 
tion  no  longer  deserving  of  reward  —  but  when  grace  returns 
and  makes  the  penitent  worthy  of  life  eternal,  these  same 
works  also  deserve  a  reward,  and  are  therefore  restored  and 
vivified.”  56  Scotus  points  out  that  if  these  meritorious  works 
are  not  restored  at  the  moment  of  conversion,  on  account  of 
the  penitent’s  imperfect  disposition,  then  they  are  restored 
later  on  when  his  disposition  is  more  perfect;  or  at  all  events 
at  the  moment  of  death.57 

2.  The  Sacrament  of  Penance. — “  The  perfection  of  pen¬ 
ance,  ”  argues  Peter  Lombard,  “  consists  of  three  things :  sor¬ 
row,  confession,  satisfaction  —  compunctio  cordis ,  confessio 
oris ,  satisf actio  operis.”  58  These  three  are  essential  on  the 
part  of  the  penitent,  and  when  to  them  is  added  the  absolution 
of  the  priest,  there  results  the  sacrament  of  penance.  True, 
actual  satisfaction  is  not  a  constituent  part  of  the  sacrament, 
but  by  way  of  satisfaction  the  penitent  must  at  least  have  the 
sincere  will  to  perform  the  penance  enjoined  by  the  confessor. 
In  this  sense,  satisfaction  as  well  as  sorrow  and  confession  is 
an  indispensable  requisite  for  a  valid  absolution.  Moreover, 
sorrow  for  sins  must  necessarily  include  a  firm  purpose  of 
amendment;  for  without  such  a  purpose,  either  expressed  or 
implied,  it  would  not  be  true  sorrow.  Hence  the  sacrament 
of  penance  comprises  five  distinct  parts:  sorrow  for  sins,  a 
purpose  of  amendment,  confession,  satisfaction,  and  absolu¬ 
tion.  The  first  four  of  these  must  obviously  be  supplied  by 
the  penitent,  and  the  last  just  as  obviously  by  the  priest  who 
receives  the  confession. 

So  far  all  are  agreed;  but  if  it  be  asked  whether  all  these 
parts  enter  the  constitution  of  the  sacrament,  so  that  they  in 
some  way  belong  to  its  essence,  there  is  some  diversity  of 
opinion.  Scotus  and  his  followers  contend  that  the  acts  of  the 
penitent  are  indeed  necessary  conditions  for  a  valid  absolu- 

56  Loc.  cit.  58  Sent.  IV,  d.  16,  c.  i. 

57  Loc.  cit. 


350 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


tion,  but  deny  that  they  enter  the  constitution  of  the  sacrament. 
Scotus  himself  gives  this  definition  of  the  sacrament  of  pen¬ 
ance:  Absolutio  hominis  poenitentis ,  facta  ccrtis  verbis ,  cum 
dcbita  intentione  prolatis,  a  sacerdote  jurisdictioncm  habcnte, 
ex  institutione  divina  ethcaciter  signific antibus  absolutionem 
animae  a  peccato ,59  According  to  his  view,  it  is  the  absolu¬ 
tion  alone  that  constitutes  the  sacramental  sign.  And  this  he 
expressly  states,  when  he  says  in  another  place :  Hoc  sacra- 
mentum  non  habet  nisi  unum  signum  ut  verba  prolata,  habet 
tantum  formam  et  non  proprie  materiam .60  Or  again : 
Poenitentia,  sacramentum,  nihil  aliud  est  quam  forma  audibilis 
verborum  prolatorum  super  poenitentem  a  sacerdote .61  Hence 
he  says  in  regard  to  the  acts  of  the  penitent :  Sunt  quaedam 
dispositiones  congruae  praeambida  convenientia  ad  suscep- 
tionem  congruam  poenitentiae  sacramentiP 2  Sorrow  for  sins, 
a  purpose  of  amendment,  confession,  and  satisfaction  are  all 
necessary;  but  only  as  requisites  for  absolution,  not  as  parts 
of  the  sacrament.  Substantially  the  same  explanation  is  given 
by  Durandus.63 

However,  the  greater  number  of  the  Scholastics  took  a  dif¬ 
ferent  view  of  the  point  in  question.  The  matter  is  most 
clearly  set  forth  by  St.  Thomas,  who  begins  his  treatise  on 
penance  with  a  brief  consideration  of  the  sacramental  rite. 
He  first  points  out  that  penance  is  a  true  sacrament  of  the  New 
Law,  since  the  acts  of  the  penitent  and  the  absolution  of  the 
priest  together  constitute  a  sacred  sign  which  was  instituted 
for  the  sanctification  of  men.63a  Then  to  the  objection  that 
there  is  no  corporeal  element  in  penance  as  there  is  in  baptism, 
he  replies :  “  By  the  term  corporeal  things,  taken  in  a  wider 

sense,  are  also  understood  exterior  actions  which  can  be  per¬ 
ceived  by  the  senses,  and  in  this  sacrament  they  take  the  place 
of  water  in  baptism  or  of  chrism  in  confirmation.  But  it  must 
be  noted  that  in  those  sacraments  which  confer  a  more  excel¬ 
lent  grace,  a  grace  which  surpasses  the  reach  of  all  human 
acts,  some  corporeal  matter  is  used  by  way  of  exterior  appli- 

59  In  Sent.  TV,  d.  14,  q.  4,  n.  2.  R2  In  Sent.  TV,  d.  16,  q.  1,  n.  13. 

60  Report.  IV,  d.  16,  q.  6,  n.  6.  63  Ibid.  d.  16,  q.  t. 

61  Ibid.  n.  12.  63a  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  84,  a.  1. 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PENANCE 


35i 


cation ;  thus  in  baptism,  which  confers  a  full  remission  of  sins, 
both  as  to  guilt  and  punishment  ;  and  in  confirmation,  which 
gives  the  fullness  of  the  Holy  Spirit;  and  in  extreme  unction, 
which  bestows  perfect  spiritual  health,  flowing  from  the  power 
of  Christ  as  from  a  certain  extrinsic  principle.  Hence,  if  in 
such  sacraments  there  occur  any  human  acts,  they  do  not  be¬ 
long  to  the  essence  of  the  sacramental  rites,  but  are  merely 
requisite  dispositions  for  the  proper  reception  of  those  sacra¬ 
ments.  Whereas  in  those  sacraments  which  produce  effects 
corresponding  to  human  acts,  these  sensible  human  acts  them¬ 
selves  constitute  the  matter  of  the  same  sacraments,  as  hap¬ 
pens  in  penance  and  matrimony.”  64 

From  the  fact  that  the  acts  of  the  penitent  constitute  the  mat¬ 
ter  of  the  sacramental  rite,  it  necessarily  follows  that  in  this 
sacrament  the  minister  does  not  apply  the  matter  to  the  re¬ 
cipient.  These  acts  are  inspired  by  God,  are  then  presented 
by  the  penitent  in  the  tribunal  of  penance,  and  thereupon  re¬ 
ceive  their  sacramental  character  from  the  absolution  of  the 
priest.65  In  a  certain  sense,  the  sins  confessed  by  the  penitent 
may  be  considered  as  the  remote  matter  of  the  sacrament  of 
penance;  for  it  is  upon  them  that  the  acts  of  the  penitent,  as 
the  proximate  matter  of  the  sacrament,  are  made  to  bear.66 
And  these  sins  comprise  all  personal  sinful  acts,  venial  and 
mortal,  although  it  was  chiefly  for  the  forgiveness  of  mortal 
sin  that  the  sacrament  of  penance  was  instituted.67 

The  form  of  the  sacrament  of  penance  consists  in  the  words, 
Ego  te  absolvo :  all  that  precedes  these  words  by  way  of  prayer 
is  simply  intended  to  obtain  the  grace  of  a  proper  disposition 
for  the  penitent.  This  form  is  taken  from  the  promise  which 
our  Savior  made  to  Peter,  when  He  said:  Quodcumque  sol- 
veris  super  t  err  am,  etc.™  It  was  then  that  He  determined 
what  should  be  required  on  the  part  of  the  minister,  although 
He  did  not  indicate  its  efficacy  and  the  origin  of  its  power 
until  after  His  resurrection.69 

As  regards  the  power  of  the  keys,  which  the  priest  uses  in 

fi4  Sum.  Theol.  ITT,  q.  86,  a.  I.  67  Ibid.  a.  1  ad  3m. 

Ibid.  a.  1  ad  2m.  08  Ibid.  a.  3. 

66  Ibid.  a.  2.  69  Ibid.  q.  84,  a.  7. 


352 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


sacramental  absolution,  there  is  no  perfect  agreement  among 
the  Scholastics.  In  this  matter  two  things  must  be  distin¬ 
guished  :  guilt  and  punishment.  According  to  some,  the  priest 
in  giving  absolution  simply  declares  that  the  guilt,  or  sin  itself, 
has  been  taken  away  by  God,  and  then  remits  part  of  the  pun¬ 
ishment  due  to  sin.  This  is  the  view  taken  by  Peter  Lom¬ 
bard,70  Richard  of  St.  Victor 71  and  probably  also  by  St.  Bona- 
venture.  The  latter  holds  that  the  power  of  the  keys  extends 
itself  to  the  forgiveness  of  sin  by  way  of  prayer,  but  not  by 
way  of  imparting  pardon  for  sin.72  Prayer,  he  says,  obtains 
grace;  but  absolution  presupposes  it.73  In  accordance  with 
this  view,  he  interprets  the  words  of  our  Lord,  whose  sins  you 
shall  forgive ,  etc.,  as  having  been  spoken  merely  quantum  ad 
ostensionem,  vel  quantum  ad  poenam.14 

However,  by  far  the  greater  number  of  Scholastics  under¬ 
stood  the  power  of  the  keys  in  a  different  sense.  Thus  St. 
Thomas,  refuting  the  view  of  the  Lombard,  according  to  whom 
the  words,  ego  te  ahsolvo,  signify,  ego  te  absolutnm  ostendo, 
states  very  clearly :  “  It  must  be  said  that  the  interpretation 

of  /  absolve  thee,  as  I  declare  thee  to  have  been  absolved,  is 
indeed  partly  true,  but  not  altogether.  For  the  sacraments  of 
the  New  Law  not  only  signify,  but  also  effect  what  they  sig¬ 
nify.  Hence,  just  as  the  priest  when  he  baptizes  some  one 
declares  by  his  words  and  actions  that  the  recipient  is  interi¬ 
orly  cleansed,  not  only  significatively  but  effectively;  so  like¬ 
wise  when  he  says  I  absolve  thee,  does  he  declare  the  penitent 
to  be  absolved,  not  merely  signihcatively  but  effectively.  Nor 
does  he  say  this  in  any  uncertain  way;  for  just  as  the  other 


70  Sent.  d.  1 8,  n.  4,  5. 

71  De  Potest,  ligandi  et  solvendi. 

72  “  Si  ergo  quaeratur,  utrum  po- 
testas  clavium  se  extendat  ad 
delendam  culpam,  dicendum,  quod 
bene  potest  se  extendere  per  modum 
deprecantis  et  impetrantis :  et  illud 
significatum  est  in  benedictione 
sacerdotum,  Numero  sexto ;  sed 
per  modum  impertientis  non. 
Quoniam  ergo  potestas  sonat  per 
modum  activi  et  impertientis  ex  se; 


hinc  est  quod  potestas  clavium, 
proprie  loquendo,  non  se  extendat 
supra  culpam”  (In  Sent.  IV,  d.  18, 
p.  1,  a.  2,  q.  1). 

73  “  Deprecatio  gratiam  impetrat, 
sed  absolutio  praesupponit.  Nun- 
quam  enim  sacerdos  absolveret 
quemquam,  de  quo  non  praesumerat, 
quod  esset  absolutus  a  Deo  ” 
(Ibid.). 

74  Ibid.  q.  1,  ad  im. 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PENANCE 


353 


sacraments  of  the  New  Law  have  of  themselves  an  infallible 
effect  because  of  the  passion  of  Christ,  although  that  effect  can 
be  impeded  on  the  part  of  the  recipient;  so  it  is  also  in  the  case 
of  this  sacrament.  .  .  .  Consequently,  a  better  interpretation 
is  this :  1  absolve  thee ,  that  is,  I  impart  to  thee  the  sacrament 

of  absolution.”  75 

True,  the  action  of  the  priest  in  giving  absolution  is  only 
ministerial,  but  so  it  is  in  the  administration  of  all  other  sacra¬ 
ments.  Hence  the  objection  that  God  alone  can  forgive  sins, 
St.  Thomas  answers  by  saying :  “  It  is  to  be  held  that  God 

alone  can  absolve  from  sin  by  His  own  authority,  and  thus 
remit  sin ;  nevertheless  priests  do  both  by  reason  of  their  minis¬ 
terial  office,  and  that  in  as  much  as  the  words  of  the  priest  in 
this  sacrament  operate  as  the  instrument  of  divine  power,  just 
as  in  the  other  sacraments.  For  it  is  the  divine  power  that 
operates  interiorly  in  the  case  of  all  sacramental  signs,  whether 
they  are  things  or  words,  as  was  said  above.  Hence,  our  Lord 
mentioned  both,  the  absolving  from  sin  and  the  remission  of 
sins;  for  in  Matthew  He  says,  whatever  you  shall  loosen  upon 
earth ,  etc.,  and  in  John,  whose  sins  you  shall  forgive,  they  are 
forgiven  them.  Nevertheless,  the  priest  says,  I  absolve  thee, 
rather  than,  I  remit  thy  sins,  because  this  is  more  in  accord 
with  the  words  used  by  our  Lord  when  He  conferred  the 
power  of  the  keys  by  which  priests  absolve.  However,  since 
it  is  only  as  God’s  minister  that  the  priest  absolves,  it  is  fitting 
that  something  expressive  of  God’s  authority  be  added,  namely, 
that  he  say :  I  absolve  thee  in  the  name  of  the  Father  and  of 
the  Son  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  or,  by  the  power  of  the  pas¬ 
sion  of  Christ,  or,  by  the  authority  of  God.  .  .  .  Still,  since 
this  is  not  determined  by  the  words  of  Christ,  as  it  is  in  bap¬ 
tism,  the  addition  is  left  to  the  judgment  of  the  priest/’  76 

The  sacrament  of  penance  is  necessary  for  salvation,  but 
not  in  the  same  sense  as  baptism.  The  latter  is  necessary  for 
all  alike,  whereas  the  former  is  necessary  only  for  those  who 
after  baptism  have  fallen  into  mortal  sin.77  Nor  is  it  even 
for  them  absolutely  necessary,  but  only  on  the  supposition  that 

75  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  84,  a.  3  ad  76  Ibid.  q.  84,  a.  3. 

5m.  77  Ibid.  a.  5. 


354 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


they  have  an  opportunity  of  receiving  it;  for  where  there  is  a 
good  will  and  true  sorrow,  and  a  sincere  desire  to  confess, 
God  is  always  able  and  willing  to  forgive  sins  without  the 
sacrament.78 

The  effect  of  the  sacrament  of  penance,  presupposing  the 
good  disposition  of  the  penitent,  consists  in  the  remission  of 
all  sins  truly  repented  of,  and  in  the  canceling  of  the  eternal 
punishment  due  to  sin.79  Temporal  punishment  may  also  be 
canceled,  but  that  depends  on  the  degree  of  cooperation  on  the 
part  of  the  penitent.80 

For  the  worthy  reception  of  the  sacrament  of  penance,  as 
was  remarked  above,  three  things  are  required  on  the  part  of 
the  penitent :  true  sorrow  for  sins,  including  a  firm  purpose  of 
amendment;  confession  of  all  mortal  sins,  in  so  far  as  he  can 
call  them  to  mind  by  diligent  examination  of  conscience ;  and 
the  will  to  render  due  satisfaction  according  to  the  judgment 
of  the  confessor.  In  regard  to  these  requisites  there  is  sub¬ 
stantial  agreement  among  the  Scholastics,  and  a  few  remarks 
will  suffice  to  indicate  the  trend  of  their  teaching. 

In  the  matter  of  sorrow  for  sins,  or  contrition,  they  distin¬ 
guish  between  perfect  and  imperfect  contrition ;  or  also  be¬ 
tween  contrition  and  attrition.  However,  they  do  not  always 
take  this  distinction  in  precisely  the  same  sense  as  do  modern 
theologians.  Both  agree  in  attributing  to  perfect  contrition 
the  power  of  blotting  out  sin,  and  for  that  reason  they  call  it 
perfect ;  while  they  regard  imperfect  contrition  as  being  merely 
a  disposition  thereto,  and  in  so  far  they  consider  it  imperfect. 
But  besides  this,  the  Scholastics  frequently  use  the  two  terms 
in  reference  to  the  presence  or  absence  of  sanctifying  grace  in 
the  soul  of  the  penitent.  Thus  taking  one  and  the  same  act 
of  sorrow,  so  long  as  the  penitent  is  without  sanctifying  grace, 
they  call  it  imperfect  contrition  or  attrition ;  and  the  moment 
he  receives  sanctifying  grace,  they  term  it  simply  attrition.  In 
this  sense  St.  Thomas  says:  Omnis  dolor  de  peccato  in 
habente  gratiam  est  contritio.81  And  in  the  same  sense  St. 
Bonaventure  states:  In  contritione  gratiae  est  contritio  ad 

78  Ibid.  q.  86,  a.  2.  80  Tbid.  a.  4  ad  2m. 

79  Ibid.  a.  1,  4.  81  De  Verit.  q.  28,  a.  8. 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PENANCE 


355 


generandum  vas  novum  et  solidum  per  humorem  gratiae  et 
lacrymanim ;  et  ideo  recte  dicitur  contritio}  non  attritio,  quia 
partium  tritarum  est  unio82 

The  perfection  or  imperfection  of  contrition  depends  ulti¬ 
mately  on  the  motives  by  which  sorrow  for  sin  is  inspired. 
Thus  perfect  contrition  is  conceived  to  flow  from  the  con¬ 
sideration  of  sin  precisely  as  it  is  an  offense  against  God,  who 
is  infinitely  good  and  deserving  of  all  our  love;  while  imper¬ 
fect  contrition  is  held  to  proceed  from  a  less  perfect  motive, 
such  as  the  intrinsic  deformity  of  sin,  the  loss  of  eternal  happi¬ 
ness,  or  even  the  fear  of  positive  punishment.  In  reference  to 
this  St.  Thomas  says  that  the  act  of  penance,  which  leads  to 
the  forgiveness  of  sin,  takes  its  rise  from  servile  fear,  but  has 
filial  fear  as  its  immediate  and  proximate  principle.83 

The  question,  what  kind  of  contrition,  perfect  or  imperfect, 
is  required  for  a  worthy  reception  of  the  sacrament  of  pen¬ 
ance,  is  variously  answered  by  the  Scholastics,  in  keeping  with 
the  different  views  they  entertain  in  respect  to  the  power  of  the 
keys.  In  the  first  place,  those  who  hold  that  the  confessor 
merely  declares  the  penitent  to  be  absolved  from  his  sins  by 
God,  consequently  maintain  that  ordinarily  perfect  contrition 
is  required.  Thus  St.  Bonaventure  compares  penance  in  this 
respect  to  the  reception  of  the  Eucharist.  In  both  cases,  he 
says,  the  recipient  must  have  at  least  probable  reasons  for  be¬ 
lieving  that  he  has  perfect  charity,  in  order  to  be  properly  dis¬ 
posed  for  a  worthy  reception  of  the  sacraments.84 

On  the  other  hand,  those  who  hold  that  the  priest  really  ab¬ 
solves  from  the  guilt  of  sin,  although  only  as  the  instrument 


82  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  1 6,  p.  i,  a.  i, 
q.  i. 

83  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  85,  a.  5. 

84  He  proposes  his  view  in  these 

terms :  “  Sicut  dictum  est,  quod 

non  tenemur  ad  Eucharistian  acce- 
dere  cum  caritate  secundum  veri- 
tatem,  sed  sufficit,  quod  secundum 
probabilitatem ;  sic  dico,  quod  ad 
sacramentum  poenitentiae  non  est 
necesse,  quod  accedat  habens  cari- 
tatem  vel  dispositionem  ad  carita- 


tem  sufficientem  secundum  verita- 
tem,  sed  sufficit  secundum  proba¬ 
bilitatem.  Haec  autem  dispositio 
attritio  est,  quae  frequenter  ob  con- 
fessionem  superadjunctam  et  abso- 
lutionem  sacerdotis  formatur  per 
gratiam,  ut  fiat  contritio  ”  (Ibid.  d. 
1 7,  p.  2,  a.  2,  q.  3).  Hence  it  is 
only  by  way  of  exception  that  at¬ 
trition  suffices  for  a  worthy  recep¬ 
tion  of  the  sacrament  of  penance. 


356 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


of  God,  contend  that  attrition  is  always  sufficient  for  a  worthy 
reception  of  the  sacrament  of  penance;  provided,  of  course, 
that  it  flows  from  some  supernatural  motive.  Hence,  when 
St.  Thomas  defines  contrition  in  so  far  as  it  is  necessary  for 
sacramental  absolution,  he  derives  its  origin  from  only  two 
motives :  fear  and  hope.  Fear,  he  says,  is  the  principal  motive, 
and  with  this  is  associated  hope  of  forgiveness;  for  without 
hope,  fear  would  degenerate  into  despair.85  He  adduces  five 
different  definitions  of  contrition  as  found  in  the  works  of  the 
Fathers,  and  in  not  one  of  them  is  there  question  of  perfect 
charity.  As  an  example  take  the  definition  he  quotes  from  St. 
Isidore  of  Seville :  Contritio  est  compunctio  et  humilitas 
mentis  cam  lacrimis,  veniens  de  recordatione  peccati  et  timore 
judicii.  Or  that  cited  from  St.  Gregory  the  Great:  Contri¬ 
tio  est  humilitas  spiritus,  annihilans  peccatum  inter  spem  et 
timorem.  Both  are  identical  with  our  definition  of  attrition. 
And  these  definitions  St.  Thomas  makes  his  own.86 

This  more  common  view  is  also  defended  by  Duns  Scotus. 
He  defines  contrition  in  a  general  way  as  a  detestation  of  past 
sins  —  displicentia  de  peccato  commisso ,87  which  includes  or 
has  connected  with  it  a  firm  purpose  of  amendment  —  propo- 
situm  cavendi  de  caetero88  Without  such  an  act  of  contrition 
there  is  no  forgiveness ;  because  as  sin  turns  man  away  from 
his  last  end,  so  must  contrition  turn  him  back  to  that  same 
end.89  When  distinguishing  between  perfect  and  imperfect 
contrition,  he  uses  the  terminology  rather  common  at  the  time, 
according  to  which  contrition  was  denominated  perfect  from 
the  presence  of  sanctifying  grace  in  the  soul,  whereas  it  was 
called  imperfect  in  so  far  as  it  preceded  the  advent  of  sancti¬ 
fying  grace.90  In  reference  to  this  use  of  terms,  he  distin¬ 
guishes  two  kinds  of  attrition:  one  that  merits  justification 
de  congruo  without  the  actual  reception  of  the  sacrament,  and 
another  that  justifies  only  when  the  sacrament  is  actually  re¬ 
ceived.91  In  substance,  this  latter  kind  of  attrition  is  identical 

85  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  Suppl.  q.  I,  89  Ibid.  n.  18. 

a.  i.  90  Ibid.  n.  14,  15. 

86  Ibid.  91  In  reference  to  this  second  kind 

87  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  14,  q.  2.  of  attrition  he  says  :  “  Ita  ut  parum 

88  Ibid.  q.  4,  n.  9.  attritus,  attritione  quae  non  habet 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PENANCE 


357 


with  that  required  by  St.  Thomas,  as  explained  in  the  preceding 
paragraph. 

In  regard  to  the  second  requisite  on  the  part  of  the  penitent, 
namely,  confession,  there  is  practically  no  disagreement  among 
the  Scholastics.  The  common  teaching  is  thus  set  forth  by 
St.  Thomas:  “  There  is  a  twofold  obligation  to  confess  our 
sins.  The  first  arises  from  the  divine  law  which  made  con¬ 
fession  a  medicine  for  sin ;  and  by  this  law  not  all  are  bound, 
but  those  only  who  commit  mortal  sin  after  baptism.  The 
second  obligation  results  from  an  ecclesiastical  law,  enacted  in 
a  general  council  under  Innocent  III,  and  by  this  all  are  bound. 
The  purpose  of  the  law  is  to  bring  all  to  a  realization  of  their 
sinfulness,  since  we  all  have  sinned  and  need  the  grace  of  God ; 
a  further  purpose  is  to  prepare  the  faithful  for  a  proper  re¬ 
ception  of  the  Eucharist;  and  finally,  to  enable  pastors  to  know 
their  subjects,  and  so  to  discover  the  wolves  that  may  lie  hid¬ 
den  among  the  flock.”  92 

Here  it  must  be  noted  that  St.  Thomas  extends  the  obliga¬ 
tion  of  confession  even  to  those  who  are  guilty  of  only  venial 
sins,  because  of  the  law  passed  by  the  Fourth  Lateran  in  regard 
to  yearly  confession.  This  was  the  more  common  interpreta¬ 
tion  of  that  law  during  the  Middle  Ages.  Hence,  St.  Bona- 
venture  says  in  regard  to  venial  sins:  Venialia  igitnr  non 
tenetur  quis  confiteri  propter  vinculum  peccati,  sed  hoc  solum 
est  propter  obligationem  praecepti,  quae  obligat  unumquemque 
ad  confitendum.  Et  ideo,  si  non  habeat  nisi  venialia ,  tenetur 
ilia  confiteri;  unde  si  haberet  mortalia ,  quae  confiteretur,  non 
teneretur  ad  venialia .93  However,  St.  Thomas  admits  the 
other  interpretation  as  probable,  even  from  the  wording  of  the 
law,  which  says  that  all  sins  must  be  confessed ;  for  no  one  can 
call  to  mind  all  his  venial  sins.  Hence,  he  concludes,  if  a  per¬ 
son  has  no  mortal  sins  to  confess,  he  complies  with  the  law  by 


rationem  meriti  ad  remissionem  pec¬ 
cati,  .  .  .  recipiat  effectum  sacra- 
menti,  scilicet  gratiam  poeniten- 
tialem,  non  quidem  ex  merito,  quia 
dispositio  interior  non  erat  suffi- 
ciens  per  modum  meriti,  sed  ex 


facto  Dei  assistentis  Sacramento 
suo  ”  (Ibid.  n.  14). 

92  Suppl.  q.  6,  a.  3. 

93  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  17,  p.  2,  a.  2, 
q.  1. 


358 


MEDI/EVAL  THEOLOGY 


presenting  himself  to  his  pastor  and  informing  him  of  his  im¬ 
munity  from  mortal  sin.94 

All  mortal  sins  must  be  confessed  in  specie;  or  as  St.  Bona- 
venture  words  the  common  teaching  of  that  time :  Omnis 
peccati  mortalis  differentiam  necesse  est  confiteri,  sive  sit 
latens,  sive  manifestum,  sive  sit  cordis,  sive  sit  oris.95  In  re¬ 
gard  to  the  circumstances  that  accompany  mortal  sin,  a  dis¬ 
tinction  is  made  by  the  Scholastics  between  those  that  simply 
aggravate  the  guilt  and  those  that  change  the  species  or  kind 
of  the  sin  committed.  According  to  some,  both  kinds  of  cir¬ 
cumstances  must  be  confessed,  while  others  hold  that  there  is 
no  obligation  to  confess  merely  aggravating  circumstances. 
This  latter  seems  to  be  the  more  common  view  among  the 
Scholastics,  and  is  expressed  by  St.  Thomas  in  these  terms : 
“  To  confess  all  circumstances  is  impossible,  yet  there  are  some 
which  it  is  necessary  to  confess :  but  in  this  matter  there  is  a 
difference  of  opinion.  Some  hold  that  all  circumstances  which 
add  notably  to  the  gravity  of  sin  must  be  confessed,  if  they 
occur  to  the  mind  of  the  penitent.  Others  contend  that  it  is 
not  necessary  to  confess  the  circumstances  of  sins  committed, 
except  when  they  are  such  as  to  change  one  sin  into  another; 
and  this  is  the  more  probable  opinion :  but  it  must  be  added, 
that  even  then  confession  of  the  circumstances  is  necessary 
only  when  the  second  sin  is  also  mortal.  And  the  reason  of 
this  is,  that  there  is  no  obligation  of  confessing  venial  sins,  but 
such  only  as  are  mortal.”  96 

Sacramental  confession  can  be  made  only  to  priests  who 
have  jurisdiction  over  the  penitent;  for  they  alone  can  absolve 
from  sin.  But  merely  as  an  act  of  virtue,  one  may  confess 
his  sins  to  any  one,  lay  or  cleric,  from  whom  it  is  reasonable  to 
expect  advice  or  the  help  of  prayer.  And  in  case  of  necessity 
this  is  very  advisable,  although  the  obligation  of  afterwards 
confessing  to  a  priest  still  remains.97 

On  the  part  of  the  priest,  confession  induces  the  obligation 

94  Suppl.  q.  6,  a.  3.  97  Cfr.  Bonavent.  op.  cit.  d.  17,  p. 

95  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  17,  p.  3,  a.  2,  3,  a.  1,  q.  1,  2;  Thomas,  Suppl.  q.  8, 

q.  2.  a.  2-6. 

96  Ibid.  d.  16,  q.  3,  a.  2,  quaesti- 
unc.  5. 


SCHOLASTICS  ON  PENANCE 


359 


of  the  sigillum  or  seal  of  secrecy.98  This  extends  itself  di¬ 
rectly  only  to  the  sins  that  have  been  confessed,  but  indirectly 
also  to  other  things,  the  revelation  of  which  would  be  to  the 
detriment  of  the  penitent  or  bring  odium  upon  the  sacrament.99 

The  last  requisite  on  the  part  of  the  penitent  is  satisfaction. 
The  purpose  of  satisfaction  is  partly  to  satisfy  the  justice  of 
God  for  the  debt  of  temporal  punishment  that  may  still  be 
due  after  the  guilt  of  sin  has  been  blotted  out,  and  partly  to  be 
of  spiritual  benefit  to  the  penitent  himself.  Under  this  latter 
aspect  it  is  intended  both  as  a  medicine  against  past  sins  and 
as  a  preservative  against  future  falls.100  The  general  con¬ 
cept  of  satisfaction,  as  found  in  the  works  of  the  Scholastics, 
is  thus  presented  by  Duns  Scotus :  Operatio  laboriosa  vel 
poenalis  voluntarie  assumpta  ad  puniendum  peccatum  commis¬ 
sion  a  se  et  hoc  ad  placandam  divinam  offensam.101  However, 
the  two  terms,  poenalis  and  voluntarie,  are  taken  in  a  rather 
wide  sense,  as  it  is  commonly  admitted  that  any  good  work 
and  inevitable  afflictions  may  serve  the  purpose  of  satisfac¬ 
tion.102 

The  different  kinds  of  satisfactory  works  are  commonly  re¬ 
duced  to  these  three :  alms-giving,  fasting,  and  prayer.  St. 
Thomas  shows  their  appropriateness  in  this  way:  “  Satisfac¬ 
tion  ought  to  be  such  that  through  it  we  deprive  ourselves  of 
something  for  the  honor  of  God.  Now  we  have  only  three 
kinds  of  goods,  namely,  goods  of  the  soul,  goods  of  the  body, 
and  goods  of  fortune,  that  is,  external  goods.  We  deprive 
ourselves  of  the  goods  of  fortune  by  alms-giving,  and  of  the 
goods  of  the  body  by  fasting;  yet  of  the  goods  of  the  soul 
we  ought  not  to  deprive  ourselves  of  anything  in  regard  to  their 
essence,  so  that  they  are  thereby  diminished,  for  it  is  through 
them  that  we  are  acceptable  to  God ;  but  in  this  way,  that  we 
submit  them  entirely  to  God;  and  this  we  do  through 


»»  103 


prayer. 

In  connection  with  the  sacrament  of  penance,  the  Scholastics 


98  Cfr.  Thomas,  op.  cit.  q.  n,  a. 


1-5- 

99  Ibid. 

100  Ibid.  q.  12,  a.  3. 


101  In  Seni.  IV,  d.  15,  q.  1,  n.  11. 

102  Cfr.  Thomas,  op.  cit.  q.  15,  a. 
1,  2. 

103  Ibid.  a.  3. 


36° 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


also  treat  of  ecclesiastical  censures,  as  the  inflicting  of  them 
implies  the  power  of  the  keys  in  foro  externo.  The  subject 
does  not  properly  belong  to  the  history  of  dogmas,  except  in 
so  far  as  the  power  of  the  Church  to  inflict  censures  comes 
in  question.  And  on  this  point  there  was  no  difference  of 
opinion  in  the  Middle  Ages.104 

104  Cfr.  Thomas,  op.  cit.  q.  21,  22. 


CHAPTER  XXI 


INDULGENCES 

HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT:  THEOLOGICAL  EXPOSITION 

It  was  the  common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics,  as  it  had 
been  of  the  Fathers  before  them,  that  the  remission  of  sin 
does  not  necessarily  include  the  remission  of  all  punishment 
due  to  sin.  In  this  matter  they  distinguished  between  eternal 
and  temporal  punishment.  Eternal  punishment  as  such,  they 
said,  does  not  remain  when  the  guilt  of  mortal  sin  is  blotted 
out :  it  is  either  commuted  into  temporal  punishment,  as  some 
contended;  or  it  is  simply  canceled,  as  others  taught.  But 
of  the  temporal  punishment,  either  resulting  from  commuta¬ 
tion  or  due  for  other  reasons,  a  part  usually  remains,  which 
must  be  expiated  by  works  of  penance.  It  is  the  removal  of 
this  punishment,  which  remains  after  sin  itself  has  been  re¬ 
mitted,  that  forms  the  end  and  object  of  indulgences.  Hence 
an  indulgence  essentially  consists  in  the  remission  of  temporal 
punishment  due  to  sin,  after  the  guilt  of  sin  has  been  for¬ 
given,  either  through  an  act  of  contrition  or  the  sacrament 
of  penance. 

As  will  be  pointed  out  farther  on  in  this  chapter,  the  re¬ 
mission  of  temporal  punishment,  as  gained  by  means  of  an 
indulgence,  is  not  directly  due  to  the  works  of  penance  a  per¬ 
son  may  perform;  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  is  it  purely  the 
effect  of  absolution  pronounced  by  competent  ecclesiastical 
authority.  It  is  effected  by  an  authoritative  substitution  of  the 
satisfactory  merit  of  Christ  or  His  saints,  made  dependent 
for  its  efficacy  on  the  fulfillment  of  certain  conditions.  When 
there  is  question  of  indulgences  for  the  living,  these  condi¬ 
tions  must  be  complied  with  by  the  beneficiary  himself ;  when 
indulgences  are  applicable  to  the  dead,  there  is  required  a 


362 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


vicarious  fulfillment  of  the  conditions  laid  down.  These 
conditions  always  consist  in  the  performance  of  some  work 
of  piety,  either  by  way  of  prayer,  penance  or  alms-deed.  In 
regard  to  indulgences  as  thus  understood,  two  points  come 
up  for  consideration:  the  historical  development  of  the  doc¬ 
trine,  and  its  theological  exposition.  Both  may  be  briefly  out¬ 
lined  as  follows. 

A  —  Historical  Development 

Most  Protestant  writers,  when  referring  to  indulgences,  date 
both  doctrine  and  practice  from  the  early  Middle  Ages.  In 
Patristic  times,  they  say,  indulgences  were  unknown.  It  was 
only  when  the  faithful  had  lost  their  fervor,  and  could  no 
longer  be  induced  to  perform  the  severe  penances  imposed  for 
certain  sins,  that  recourse  was  had  to  the  expedient  of  re¬ 
demptions  and  commutations;  and  from  these,  towards  the 
middle  of  the  twelfth  century,  developed  that  ill-begotten 
progeny  of  sloth  and  covetousness  which  found  a  place  in  later 
Catholic  theology  under  the  name  of  indulgence.  In  their 
view,  consequently,  an  indulgence  is  a  purely  human  inven¬ 
tion;  an  invention,  moreover,  that  is  evil  in  root  and  branch.1 

Passing  by  for  the  present  the  moral  aspect  of  the  doctrine 
in  question,  we  shall  in  this  section  trace  its  origin  and  de¬ 
velopment,  in  so  far  as  that  is  possible,  by  making  a  critical 
use  of  the  historic  data  at  our  disposal.  And  for  this  pur¬ 
pose  we  shall  divide  the  centuries  to  be  considered  into  several 
periods  of  time,  so  that  it  may  appear  at  a  glance  what  develop¬ 
ment  or  change  there  was  as  the  one  passed  into  the  other. 
The  division  commonly  adopted,  and  the  one  that  seems  most 
reasonable,  is  the  following.  First  period:  from  the  first  cen¬ 
tury  to  the  seventh.  Second  period :  from  the  seventh  century 
to  the  twelfth.  Third  period:  from  the  twelfth  century  to  the 
Council  of  Trent,  in  the  sixteenth.  After  that  the  question 
is  of  no  further  historical  interest,  because  the  doctrine  had 
reached  its  full  development. 

1  Cfr.  *Lea,  A  History  of  Auric-  Ablasses  am  Ausgange  des  Mittel- 
ular  Confession  and  Indulgences,  alters, 
vol.  Ill;  *Brieger,  Das  Wesen  des 


HISTORY  OF  INDULGENCES 


363 


1.  From  the  First  Century  to  the  Seventh. —  This  period,  as 
will  be  noted,  embraces  practically  the  whole  Patristic  age. 
During  all  these  centuries,  we  are  told,  indulgences  were  un¬ 
known.  In  one  sense  this  statement  is  true;  in  another  it  is 
false.  Indulgences  were  unknown  as  general  ecclesiastical 
grants  in  favor  of  all  who  cared  to  comply  with  certain  fixed 
conditions  for  obtaining  the  remission  of  temporal  punish¬ 
ment  due  to  sin ;  but  they  were  quite  well  known  as  particular 
grants  in  favor  of  individuals  who  for  one  reason  or  another 
appeared  deserving  of  leniency  in  the  matter  of  penance.  By 
the  beginning  of  the  third  century  it  was  a  well  established 
custom  to  remit  part  of  the  imposed  canonical  penance  at  the 
instance  of  those  who  had  suffered  for  the  faith.  In  these 
cases  it  was  the  bishop  who  granted  the  remission,  but  in  con¬ 
sideration  of  the  intercession  and  sufferings  of  some  particular 
member  of  the  Church.  And  the  remission  thus  granted  was 
believed  to  be  valid  before  God,  so  that  the  temporal  punish¬ 
ment  due  to  sin  was  canceled.  To  this  belief  St.  Cyprian, 
among  many  others,  bears  witness.  “  Those,”  he  says,  “  who 
have  received  the  benefit  of  a  martyr’s  intercession,  are  there¬ 
by  enabled  to  satisfy  the  justice  of  God.”  2 

Now,  if  we  look  only  to  what  is  essential  in  the  matter 
of  indulgences,  namely,  the  authoritative  substitution  of  the 
satisfactory  merit  of  Christ  or  His  saints,  we  have  here  an 
indulgence  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term.  It  was  the  satis¬ 
factory  merit  of  the  martyr,  substituted  by  the  authority  of 
the  bishop  for  the  canonical  penance  still  to  be  performed,  that 
was  believed  to  satisfy  the  justice  of  God  and  thereby  cancel 
the  temporal  punishment  due  to  sin.  Whether  that  belief  was 
well  founded  has  for  the  present  nothing  to  do  with  the  case. 
The  only  point  at  issue  now  is  the  historical  fact  that  indul¬ 
gences  were  known  and  granted  in  the  primitive  Church.  And 
from  what  has  been  said,  that  point  appears  to  be  beyond 
reasonable  doubt. 

Nor  is  this  the  only  form  of  indulgence  we  meet  with  in  the 
early  centuries.  More  than  one  council  acknowledged  the 

2  Ep.  18  (H  2,  523  sq.)  ;  cfr.  Tertul.  Ad  Martyr,  c.  1 ;  ML,  1,  621. 


364 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


right  of  bishops  to  shorten  the  time  of  canonical  penance  for 
any  reasonable  cause,  and  thereby  show  mercy  to  well  disposed 
penitents.3  Yet  any  one  who  is  familiar  with  the  spirit  that 
guided  the  primitive  Church  in  her  dealing  with  penitents,  or 
with  her  valuation  of  things  temporal  and  eternal,  must  under¬ 
stand  that  this  “  mercy  ”  was  not  supposed  to  consist  in  a 
mere  relaxation  of  canonical  penance  as  such;  but  in  a  remis¬ 
sion  of  punishment  before  God.  Neither  councils  nor  bishops 
considered  it  a  “  mercy  ”  to  be  spared  suffering  in  this  world 
and  to  be  made  liable  to  it  in  the  world  to  come.  On  the 
contrary,  the  chief  reason  why  such  severe  penances  were  en¬ 
joined  was  the  well  founded  hope  of  thereby  saving  penitents 
from  the  necessity  of  enduring  much  greater  sufferings  after 
death.  And  hence  dispensation  from  these  penances,  without 
a  corresponding  remission  of  punishment,  would  have  been 
the  very  opposite  of  “  mercy.” 

In  this  sense,  therefore,  it  is  historically  certain  that  in¬ 
dulgences  were  as  well  known  in  the  early  ages  of  the  Church 
as  they  are  to-day.  Perhaps  they  were  not  as  freely  granted 
as  they  are  now,  but  that  is  not  to  the  point.  The  doctrine  that 
the  Church  has  power  to  grant  indulgences  was  firmly  estab¬ 
lished  in  Patristic  times.  It  was  not  invented  by  theological 
speculation  during  the  Middle  Ages,  but  it  is  an  heirloom  of 
Apostolic  preaching  faithfully  transmitted  by  the  primitive 
Church.4 

2.  From  the  Seventh  Century  to  the  Twelfth. —  During  this 
second  period  indulgences  appear  mostly  in  the  form  of  com¬ 
mutations  and  redemptions.  And  in  so  far  the  statement  of 
Protestant  writers,  as  noted  above,  is  true  to  facts.  Penances 
as  then  imposed  were  almost  as  severe  as  those  that  had  been 
in  use  during  the  early  centuries  of  the  Church.  In  fact, 
when  there  was  question  of  public  penance,  they  were  sub¬ 
stantially  the  same.  They  went  by  the  name  of  canonical 
penance,  because  they  were  in  conformity  with  the  canons  or 
rules  established  in  past  ages.  Yet  under  the  changed  con- 

3  Cfr.  Cone.  Ancvr.  can.  2,  5;  4  Cfr.  Hefele,  Conciliengeschich- 

Conc.  Nicaen.  can.  12;  Cone.  Arelat.  te,  I,  226,  415. 

I,  can.  12. 


HISTORY  OF  INDULGENCES 


365 


ditions  of  society,  and  partly  also  because  there  was  a  lack 
of  fervor  on  the  part  of  penitents,  it  was  not  always  feasible 
to  exact  the  rigorous  performance  of  penances  thus  imposed. 
Hence,  when  in  individual  cases  there  appeared  sufficient  rea¬ 
son  for.  so  doing,  these  penances  were  commuted  or  changed 
into  others  of  a  less  burdensome  nature  or  of  shorter  dura¬ 
tion.  Sometimes  the  penance  thus  substituted  consisted  in 
prayers  to  be  recited  or  some  good  work  to  be  performed; 
at  other  times  in  the  payment  of  a  certain  sum  of  money  to 
be  used  for  a  religious  or  charitable  purpose.  In  the  first 
case  we  have  what  is  technically  called  a  commutation;  in  the 
second,  what  is  technically  known  as  a  redemption. 

This  practice  seems  to  have  originated  in  Ireland,  where 
it  existed  as  early  as  the  seventh  century.  Thus  the  Canones 
Hibcrnenses ,  dating  from  about  that  time,  recognize  the  estab¬ 
lished  custom  of  changing  long  fasts  and  other  severe  penances 
into  the  singing  of  psalms  or  good  works  more  in  keeping 
with  the  strength  of  the  penitent.5  A  little  later  the  same 
practice  appears  among  the  Franks.  In  some  places  the  cus¬ 
tom  crept  in  of  allowing  the  penitent  to  hire  a  person  who 
would  perform  the  imposed  penance  in  his  stead.  Thus  the 
Poenitentiale  Cumtneani  contains  the  following  direction : 
“  If  a  penitent  does  not  know  the  psalms  or  is  unable  to  fast, 
let  him  choose  some  pious  person  who  is  willing  to  per¬ 
form  the  penance  enjoined,  and  for  this  let  him  pay  an  equiva¬ 
lent  either  in  money  or  labor.”  6  However,  this  was  generally 
looked  upon  as  an  abuse,  and  hence  in  the  Poenitentiale  Merse- 
burgense  we  read:  “If  any  one  has  received  payment  for 
fasting,  in  case  he  did  it  through  ignorance,  let  him  fast  so 
long  for  himself  as  he  promised  the  other,  and  let  him  give 
to  the  poor  what  he  received  for  his  promise.  Furthermore, 
whosoever  thus  takes  the  sins  of  another  upon  himself,  is  not 
a  true  Christian.”  7 

Commutations  to  the  payment  of  money  for  some  charitable 
purpose  came  into  vogue  about  the  same  time.  Thus  in  the 

5  Op.  cit.  II ;  cfr.  Wasserschleben,  6  Op.  cit.  Prolog. ;  cfr.  Wasser- 
p.  no.  schleben,  p.  463. 

7  Op.  cit.  44. 


366 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Pseudo-Beda,  a  Poenitentiale  that  dates  from  the  beginning 
of  the  eighth  century  we  read:  “  If  perhaps  some  one  is  not 
able  to  fast,  let  him  pay  a  redemption  if  able  to  do  so.  If 
he  be  rich,  let  him  pay  twenty  solidi  instead  of  fasting  for 
seven  weeks.  But  if  he  has  not  sufficient  means,  let  him 
give  ten  solidi ;  and  if  he  is  very  poor,  let  him  give  three.  .  .  . 
At  the  same  time,  let  each  one  well  understand  for  what  pur¬ 
pose  he  must  make  his  contribution;  whether  it  is  to  be  given 
for  the  redemption  of  captives,  or  for  the  sanctuary,  or  for 
the  poor  of  Christ.”  8  That  this  practice  was  open  to  abuse 
is  quite  obvious,  and  hence  it  was  at  times  strongly  opposed 
by  theologians.  In  fact,  the  Council  of  Chalons,  held  in  813, 
stigmatized  some  of  these  penitential  manuals  as  utterly  un¬ 
trustworthy,  “  filled  with  errors  concocted  by  unknown 
authors  —  quorum  sunt  certi  err  ores  et  incerti  auctores 9 
On  the  other  hand,  it  had  the  support  of  men  of  undoubted 
learning  and  approved  sanctity.  Thus  St.  Peter  Damian, 
about  the  middle  of  the  eleventh  century,  laid  down  the  prin¬ 
ciple  that  relaxation  of  penance  might  be  conceded  in  propor¬ 
tion  to  the  alms  given  by  the  penitent.  He  says:  Cum  a 
poenitentibus  terras  accipimus ,  juxta  mensuram  muneris  eis 
de  quantitate  poenitentiae  relaxamus.10  And  a  provincial 
council  held  in  895  gives  the  following  rule  to  be  adhered  to 
in  the  reconciliation  of  those  who  have  committed  murder. 
The  penance  to  be  imposed  on  such  a  person  is  to  last  for 
seven  years.  During  all  this  time  he  remains  excluded  from 
divine  service;  but  already  during  the  first  year  of  his  pen¬ 
ance,  if  on  a  journey  or  sick,  he  can  be  dispensed  from  fast¬ 
ing  on  Tuesdays,  Thursdays,  and  Saturdays.  However,  in¬ 
stead  of  fasting  he  must  give  each  day  one-twelfth  of  a  solidus 
by  way  of  alms.  During  the  second  and  third  year  he  is,  on 
the  days  mentioned,  entitled  to  a  redemption  without  further 
condition.  Finally,  from  the  fourth  to  the  seventh  year  in¬ 
cluded,  he  is  obliged  to  keep  every  year  three  lents  of  forty 
days  each;  but  at  other  times  he  is  dispensed  from  fasting 

8  Op.  cit.  c.  41.  10  Ep.  1 2,  ML,  144,  323  C. 

9  Cone.  cit.  can.  38 ;  Mansi,  14, 

101. 


HISTORY  OF  INDULGENCES  367 

on  Tuesdays,  Thursdays,  and  Saturdays,  while  on  Mondays 
and  Wednesdays  he  is  entitled  to  a  redemption.11 

When  this  remission  of  penance  by  way  of  commutation 
and  redemption  became  general,  indulgences  as  at  present 
understood  had  come  into  existence.  For  the  substituted  work 
was  understood  to  be  effective  in  removing  the  punishment  still 
due  to  sin,  and  therefore  it  was  not  merely  a  relaxation  of 
canonical  penance.  At  the  same  time  there  was  no  longer 
question  of  particular  grants  to  individual  penitents,  as  had 
been  the  case  in  Patristic  times  and  also  in  the  seventh  and 
eighth  centuries;  but  certain  conditions  were  put  down  on  the 
fulfillment  of  which  penitents,  otherwise  disposed,  gained 
either  a  partial  or  a  full  remission  of  whatever  temporal 
punishment  might  still  remain  after  they  had  duly  confessed 
their  sins.  In  this  we  have  not  only  the  essential  requisites 
of  an  indulgence  as  understood  to-day,  but  also  its  outward 
form. 

At  what  precise  time  this  last  development  took  place  is 
not  certain.  The  ruling  of  Tribur,  referred  to  in  a  preceding 
paragraph,  indicates  the  transition.  It  is  general,  but  only  in 
regard  to  one  class  of  penitents.  About  a  century  later  the  de¬ 
velopment  seems  to  have  been  accomplished.  For  in  an  old 
document,  bearing  the  signature  of  Archbishop  Pontius  of 
Arles  (995-1030)  and  of  his  successor  Raimbaldus,  we  meet 
with  an  indulgence  in  its  modern  form.  It  is  granted  to  all 
those  who  visit  the  monastery  of  Mons  Major  and  there  con¬ 
tribute  an  alms  for  the  erection  of  a  church.  The  grant  reads 
as  follows:  “If  a  penitent  comes  to  the  aforesaid  church, 
on  the  day  of  its  dedication  or  once  a  year,  and  there  holds 
vigil  and  gives  an  alms  to  promote  the  building  of  the  Church 
of  Holy  Mary,  which  is  now  in  course  of  construction,  .  .  . 
let  him  be  absolved  from  a  third  part  of  the  penance  imposed 
on  him  for  the  greater  sins;  and  this  remission  is  to  be  reck¬ 
oned  from  the  very  day  on  which  he  holds  his  vigil  to  the  same 
day  the  next  year.  .  .  .  Then,  in  the  case  of  those  who  have 
confessed  less  grievous  sins  and  received  penance  for  the 

11  Cone.  Tribur.  c.  56-58;  Mansi,  18,  157. 


368 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


same,  if  they  come  to  the  dedication,  ...  we  absolve  them 
from  one  half  of  the  penance  received.”  12 

A  few  years  later  indulgences  of  this  kind  began  to  multiply. 
They  were  usually  granted  by  bishops  for  the  building  of 
churches  or  monasteries,  or  for  the  promotion  of  similar  pious 
works.  They  were  all  partial  indulgences,  and  the  alms  was 
supposed  to  bear  some  proportion  to  the  means  of  the  giver  — 
tale  sit,  quatenus  possunt ,13  However,  a  plenary  indulgence 
was  granted  by  Pope  Alexander  II,  in  1063,  to  all  Christians 
who  would  take  up  arms  against  the  Saracens  in  Spain.  The 
grant  reads:  “  We  release  them  from  their  penance  and  con¬ 
cede  them  the  remission  of  their  sins  —  Pocnitentiam  eis 
levamus  et  remissionem  peccatorum  facimusP  14  In  1095 
Urban  II  granted  similar  indulgences  to  the  Crusaders;  15  and 
a  century  later,  Innocent  III  extended  the  privilege  of  gaining 
these  indulgences  to  all  those  who  in  any  way  contributed  to 
the  recovery  of  the  Holy  Land.10 

3.  From  the  Twelfth  Century  to  the  Council  of  Trent. — 
During  the  twelfth  century  the  practice  of  granting  indul¬ 
gences  increased  very  rapidly.  But  this  was  owing  almost  en¬ 
tirely  to  the  action  of  individual  bishops;  for  the  Holy  See, 
as  even  Protestant  writers  admit,  constantly  exercised  a  re¬ 
straining  influence  in  this  matter.17  The  reason  for  the  stand 
thus  taken  by  the  Sovereign  Pontiffs  was  the  fear  that  by  an 
undue  multiplication  of  indulgences  the  Church’s  penitential 
discipline  would  be  relaxed.  This  is  clearly  stated  by  the 
Fourth  Lateran  Council,  held  under  Innocent  III.  The 
practice,  it  says,  is  to  be  restricted,  “  because  by  the  granting 
of  indiscreet  and  superfluous  indulgences  .  .  .  the  keys  of  the 
Church  are  brought  into  contempt  and  sacramental  satisfac¬ 
tion  loses  its  force.”  18  And  in  accordance  with  this,  the 
Council  enacted  the  following  law :  “  When  a  church  is  dedi¬ 

cated,  the  indulgence  granted  must  not  exceed  one  year, 

12  D’Archery,  Spicilegium,  VI,  em  peccatorum,  will  be  explained 

427  sq.  farther  on. 

13  Ibid.  428.  15  Mansi,  20,  816  E. 

14Cfr.  Loofs,  Dogmengeschichte,  16  Mansi,  22,  1067  D. 

p.  494.  The  expression,  remission-  17  Cfr.  Brieger,  Realencyk.  9,  79. 

18  Mansi,  22,  1050. 


HISTORY  OF  INDULGENCES 


369 


whether  one  bishop  be  present  at  the  dedication  or  several; 
and  the  indulgence  granted  on  the  anniversary  of  the  dedica¬ 
tion  must  not  exceed  forty  days  of  the  penance  that  had  been 
enjoined. ”  19  Besides,  forty  days  is  to  be  the  limit  for  all 
indulgences  that  may  be  granted  by  a  bishop  on  other  special 
occasions.20 

The  first  Jubilee  was  published  by  Boniface  VIII  in  1300. 
It  was  a  plenary  indulgence  which  could  be  gained  by  all  those 
who  visited  Rome  in  the  course  of  that  year,  and  during  fifteen 
days  performed  their  devotions  in  the  Basilicas  of  the  Apostles. 
The  Jubilee  itself  was  termed  “  the  year  of  full  remission  and 
of  the  reconciliation  of  the  human  race  —  annus  plenariae  re- 
missionis  et  reconciliationis  humani  generis This  indulgence 
was  at  first  intended  to  be  repeated  only  once  every  hundred 
years,  but  Clement  VI  reduced  the  term  to  fifty  years,  Urban 
VI  to  thirty-three,  and  Paul  II  to  twenty-five  years.  Since 
the  fifteenth  century  the  Jubilee  indulgence  may  be  gained 
even  without  a  visit  to  Rome,  but  usually  a  year  after  it  has 
been  proclaimed  in  Rome  itself. 

In  this  connection  a  word  must  be  said  about  the  expression, 
“  a  plenary  indulgence  of  punishment  and  guilt  ” —  indulgentia 
plena  a  poena  et  culpa  —  which  occurs  in  some  Papal  docu¬ 
ments.  The  phrase,  as  it  stands,  is  ambiguous;  and  it  has 
proved  a  stumbling  block  to  both  Catholics  and  Protestants. 
Some  of  the  former,  when  brought  face  to  face  with  it  refused 
to  believe  that  it  was  authentic.  This  position  was  taken  by 
Maronis,  a  Scholastic  who  wrote  at  the  beginning  of  the  four¬ 
teenth  century.  “  Such  an  indulgence,”  he  says,  “  never  was 
granted  by  the  Holy  See,  nor  ought  it  to  be  taught  as  legiti¬ 
mate.”  21  He  had  many  followers,  and  among  them  Cardinal 
Cusa,  who  held  that  the  expression  was  simply  an  interpolation 
introduced  by  some  irresponsible  indulgence  preacher.  Prot¬ 
estants,  on  the  other  hand,  eagerly  seized  upon  it  as  an  irre¬ 
futable  piece  of  evidence  that  the  Popes  were  carrying  on  a 
most  shameless  traffic  in  pardons  for  sins.22 

Although  there  is  perhaps  no  direct  proof  for  the  genuine- 

19  Ibid.  can.  62.  21  In  IV  Sent.  d.  19,  q.  3. 

20  Loc.  cit.  22  Cfr.  Brieger,  RE,  9,  84  sqq. 


370 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


ness  of  the  phrase  as  it  stands,  still  its  equivalents  occur 
again  and  again,  and  that  in  connections  which  exclude  all 
suspicion  of  interpolation.  Thus  in  the  Bull  of  Martin  V, 
Inter  cunctas,  is  found  the  expression,  “  indulgences  for  the 
forgiveness  of  sin” — indulgentias  in  remissionem  pecca- 
torum.23  It  is  true,  the  meaning  is  clear  enough  from  the  con¬ 
text:  because  one  of  the  conditions  required  for  the  gaining 
of  such  indulgences,  as  is  there  stated,  consists  in  contrite  con¬ 
fession  ;  but  the  ambiguous  expression  is  certainly  genuine. 
And  so  it  is  admitted  to  be  in  other  Bulls,  even  where  the 
meaning  is  not  so  clear.  However,  it  was  never  used  in  the 
sense  ascribed  to  it  by  Protestant  writers,  namely,  that  the 
indulgence  itself  was  supposed  to  effect  the  forgiveness  of 
sin.  And  this  is  now  commonly  admitted  by  those  who  have 
studied  the  documents  in  question  at  first  hand.24 

A  very  clear  explanation  of  this  whole  matter  is  given 
by  John  of  Palts,  who  preached  the  Jubilee  under  Alexander 
VI.  He  was  a  fellow  religious  of  Luther,  and  his  exposition 
is  accepted  as  correct  even  by  Brieger,  a  most  rabid  and  bigoted 
Protestant  writer  on  the  question  of  indulgences.  “  Properly 
speaking,”  writes  Palts,  “  in  virtue  of  an  indulgence  no  one 
is  ever  absolved  from  punishment  and  guilt,  but  from  punish¬ 
ment  only.  However,  it  is  commonly  said  that  during  the 
Jubilee  one  is  absolved  from  both  —  a  poena  et  culpa.  And 
that  saying  is  true,  because  a  Jubilee  is  more  than  a  mere  in¬ 
dulgence  ;  it  includes  authority  to  confess  and  absolve  and  to¬ 
gether  with  this  the  power  to  remit  punishment  by  way  of 
indulgence.  In  this  way  it  includes  the  sacrament  of  penance 
and  together  with  it  an  indulgence  properly  so  called.  For 
the  clearer  understanding  of  the  aforesaid,  it  must  be  noted 
that  the  term  indulgence  may  be  taken  in  one  of  two  ways. 
In  one  wav,  in  so  far  as  it  properly  signifies  the  mere  remis¬ 
sion  of  punishment,  and  in  this  sense  it  does  not  imply  the 
remission  of  guilt;  and  in  another  way,  in  as  much  as  in  a 
wider  sense  it  stands  for  the  Jubilee,  or  for  the  letter  in¬ 
cluding  the  Jubilee,  and  then  it  extends  itself  to  the  remission 

23  Mansi,  27,  1211  B;  DB,  676.  24  Cfr.  Brieger,  loc.  cit. 


HISTORY  OF  INDULGENCES 


37i 


of  sin.  And  the  reason  is  that  usually  when  the  Pope  grants 
a  Jubilee,  he  does  not  concede  a  simple  indulgence,  but  also 
the  faculty  of  confessing  and  absolving  from  all  sins.  And 
in  this  way  the  guilt  is  taken  away  by  the  sacrament  of  penance, 
which  there  intervenes ;  while  the  punishment  is  canceled  by 
the  indulgence,  which  is  there  granted.”  25 

That  indulgences  may  also  be  applied  to  the  dead,  simply 
by  way  of  help,  without  the  exercise  of  ecclesiastical  jurisdic¬ 
tion  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  seems  to  have  been  com¬ 
monly  held  by  mediaeval  theologians.  But,  as  far  as  can  now 
be  ascertained,  the  first  authoritative  reference  to  this  matter 
occurred  only  in  the  fifteenth  century.  Then  Pope  Sixtus  IV 
granted  an  indulgence  that  could  be  applied  to  the  souls  in 
purgatory.  On  that  occasion  he  used  the  expression  “  by  way 
of  help  ” —  per  modum  suffragii  —  which  seems  to  have  caused 
a  great  deal  of  discussion  as  to  its  precise  meaning.  Hence 
a  few  years  later,  in  1477,  he  published  a  Bull  in  which  the 
term  was  explained.  He  says  that  he  makes  use  of  the 
treasure  of  the  Church,  which  consists  of  the  merits  of  Christ 
and  the  saints,  and  this  is  of  benefit  to  the  poor  souls  if  ap¬ 
plied  to  them  by  those  who  fulfill  the  conditions  on  which 
the  indulgence  is  granted.  Per  modum  suffragii ,  therefore, 
means  that  the  indulgence  is  offered  as  a  help ;  it  is  not  a  can¬ 
celing  of  the  temporal  punishment  by  an  act  of  jurisdic¬ 
tion.26 

This  may  be  said  to  complete  the  development  of  the  doc¬ 
trine  on  indulgences.  And  if  we  now  gather  together  what 
has  been  brought  out  more  or  less  clearly  in  the  preceding 
paragraphs,  we  come  to  the  following  result.  1.  In  the  early 
centuries  the  substance  of  the  doctrine  was  well  known,  but 
it  was  presented  under  a  different  form.  An  indulgence  then 
consisted  in  a  relaxation  of  canonical  penance,  which  was 
believed  to  be  valid  before  God,  and  in  that  sense  to  remit 
temporal  punishment  due  to  sin.  This  relaxation  was  always 
a  matter  of  individual  concession.  2.  From  the  seventh  cen¬ 
tury  forward,  simple  relaxation  gave  place  to  commutation 

25  Quoted  by  Brieger,  op.  cit.  88.  26  Ibid.  92. 


372 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


and  redemption.  This  transition  implied  no  change  of  prin¬ 
ciple,  but  only  a  variation  of  form.  The  difference  between 
the  severer  penance  first  imposed  and  the  lighter  into  which 
it  was  changed,  corresponded  to  the  relaxation  of  earlier  times. 
Here,  too,  the  application  was  to  individuals.  3.  During  the 
first  half  of  the  eleventh  century  there  was  a  further  transi¬ 
tion  from  individual  to  general  concessions,  so  that  any  peni¬ 
tent  might  shorten  his  penance  by  the  fulfillment  of  certain 
fixed  conditions.  In  this  transition  the  modern  form  of  in¬ 
dulgences  first  appeared. 

As  regards  indulgences  under  this  new  form,  these  further 
points  may  be  noted.  1.  Like  the  commutations  and  re¬ 
demptions,  the  earliest  indulgences  of  this  kind  were  episcopal, 
and  were  granted  to  those  who  visited  a  certain  church,  either 
on  the  day  of  its  dedication  or  at  some  other  fixed  time,  and 
there  made  an  offering  for  some  pious  purpose.  2.  Originally 
they  were  all  partial  indulgences,  one-half,  or  one-third,  or  one- 
fourth  of  the  imposed  penance  being  remitted.  3.  During 
the  eleventh  century  there  was  as  yet  no  technical  term  for 
these  indulgences.  4.  Up  to  the  twelfth  century  they  affected 
ecclesiastical  life  very  little;  but  after  that  they  seem  to  have 
seriously  interfered  with  the  spirit  of  penance,  so  that  the 
Popes  found  it  advisable  to  restrict  the  power  of  the  bishops 
in  the  matter  of  granting  indulgences.  5.  Plenary  indulgences 
were  usually  granted  by  the  Pope,  and  as  a  general  rule  but 
sparingly.  6.  It  was  never  taught  by  those  in  authority  that 
an  indulgence,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term,  was  equivalent 
to  a  remission  of  sin. 

B  —  Theological  Exposition 

Indulgences  had  practically  no  place  in  theology  until  the 
first  half  of  the  thirteenth  century.  Theologians  accepted  the 
fact  of  commutations  and  redemptions  as  explained  in  the  pre¬ 
ceding  section,  but  seldom  stopped  to  speculate  concerning  their 
precise  nature.  Even  Peter  Lombard  passes  them  by  with  the 
vague  remark  that  the  prayers  and  alms  of  friends  may  be 


THEOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCES 


373 


accepted  as  a  vicarious  penance  in  the  case  of  the  dying.27 
The  first  one  to  attempt  anything  like  a  theological  exposition 
of  indulgences  was  Alexander  of  Hales.28  He  was  followed 
by  St.  Bonaventure  and  St.  Thomas.  The  former  of  these 
two  copied  him  almost  word  for  word,  while  the  latter  took 
the  substance  of  his  teaching  and  presented  it  in  his  own  way. 
Even  later  Scholastics  added  little  of  their  own,  so  that  our 
present  theology  of  indulgences  is  little  more  than  the  teach¬ 
ing  of  Alexander  arrayed  in  a  modern  garb. 

The  first  question  which  he  proposes  to  himself  is,  whether 
indulgences  or  relaxations  really  remit  temporal  punishment 
due  to  sin.  He  answers  that  there  are  two  opinions  concern¬ 
ing  this  matter.  The  first  holds  that  indulgences  are  simply  a 
relaxation  of  the  penance  imposed  by  the  Church,  and  that 
therefore  they  are  valid  only  in  her  forum  and. not  in  the  forum 
of  God  —  in  foro  Ecclesiae,  non  in  foro  Dei .  This  view  he 
rejects  as  altogether  untenable.  And  the  reason  is  that  the 
universal  Church  has  always  taught  the  contrary;  yet  the  uni¬ 
versal  Church  cannot  fall  into  error  concerning  matters  of  this 
kind.  Nor  is  there  any  doubt  as  regards  the  teaching  of  the 
Church ;  because  when  the  Apostle  said,  “  what  I  have  par¬ 
doned  that  Christ  also  hath  pardoned,”  he  referred  also  to 
the  remission  of  punishment  by  way  of  indulgence;  and  the 
power  of  the  Sovereign  Pontiff  is  not  less  than  that  of  the 
Apostle.  Moreover,  as  bishops  share  in  the  power  of  the 
Church,  it  must  be  admitted  that  relaxations  granted  by  them 
are  also  valid  before  God.29 

Then,  in  the  body  of  the  article,  he  explains  how  indulgences 
may  be  granted  without  in  any  way  failing  to  satisfy  the  de¬ 
mands  of  divine  justice.  Because,  aside  from  the  personal 
satisfaction  of  the  penitent,  there  is  the  satisfactory  merit  of 
Christ  and  of  the  Church;  and  this  is  offered  to  God  when  a 
relaxation  of  penance  is  conceded. 29a  Hence  the  penitent 
really  satisfies  for  his  sins,  but  he  does  so  by  drawing  on  the 
treasury  of  the  Church.30 

27  Sent.  IV,  d.  20,  c.  4. 

28  Sum.  IV,  q.  83. 

29  Ibid.  m.  1,  a.  1  ad  im. 


29aLoc.  cit. 

30  Ibid.  a.  1  ad  4m. 


374 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


In  connection  with  the  foregoing,  the  author  inquires 
whether  one  person  can  satisfy  divine  justice  in  place  of  an¬ 
other.  He  answers  with  a  distinction.  Sometimes,  he  says, 
penance  is  imposed  by  way  of  medicine;  and  then,  of  course, 
the  penitent  is  bound  to  perform  it  in  person.  At  other  times 
it  is  enjoined  as  a  compensation  for  the  injury  done  to  God 
by  sin;  and  in  that  case  it  may  be  performed  by  some  one 
else.  For  the  Church  is  the  mystical  body  of  Christ,  in  which 
the  members  are  all  intimately  united  and  mutually  helpful  the 
one  to  the  other.  However,  this  vicarious  satisfaction  is  not 
a  matter  of  individual  choice ;  it  is  of  value  only  when  approved 
by  lawful  superiors.  Moreover,  in  authorizing  it,  superiors 
must  have  due  regard  to  the  disposition  of  the  penitent  and  the 
amount  of  penance  that  is  to  be  imposed  upon  his  substitute. 
On  the  part  of  the  penitent  there  must  be  real  need  of  this 
substitution;  and  then  as  regards  the  amount  of  penance,  it 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  vicarious  penance  is  less  efficacious 
than  that  performed  by  the  penitent  in  person,  and  therefore 
it  ought  to  be  more  severe  in  order  to  give  the  same  satisfac¬ 
tion  to  divine  justice.31 

Touching  the  question  of  authority  in  the  matter  of  grant¬ 
ing  indulgences,  he  teaches  that  it  belongs  exclusively  to 
bishops  and  the  Pope;  so  that  neither  priests  nor  prelates  of 
the  lower  grades,  such  as  priors  and  abbots,  have  any  juris¬ 
diction  in  this  respect.  And  the  reason  is  that  indulgences 
are  nothing  else  than  an  application  of  the  supererogatory 
satisfaction  of  Christ  and  His  saints.  This  satisfaction  con¬ 
stitutes  the  spiritual  treasury  of  the  Church,  which  can  only 
be  at  the  disposal  of  those  through  whom  the  Church  is 
espoused  to  Christ.  It  is  through  the  Pope  and  the  bishops 
that  children  are  begotten  unto  Christ  the  Redeemer,  and  hence 
it  is  their  exclusive  right  to  dispose  of  the  Church’s  spiritual 
treasures  in  favor  of  these  same  children.32  Furthermore,  the 
plenitude  of  this  right  and  power  is  found  only  in  the 
Sovereign  Pontiff ;  because  to  him  is  entrusted  the  welfare  of 
the  whole  Church,  and  therefore  all  others  in  a  position  of 


31  Ibid.  a.  2. 


32  Ibid.  m.  3. 


THEOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCES 


375 


authority  depend  for  the  exercise  of  their  jurisdiction  on  his 
will  and  direction.33 

The  conditions  on  which  the  gaining  of  indulgences  is  made 
to  depend,  although  they  may  be  of  various  kinds,  ought  in 
some  way  to  be  connected  with  sacrifices  in  the  material  order. 
For,  first  of  all,  this  follows  from  the  usage  established  in  the 
Church;  in  as  much  as  indulgences  are  commonly  granted  on 
the  condition  that  alms  be  given,  pilgrimages  be  made,  and 
visits  be  paid  to  churches  and  shrines.  In  the  next  place,  in¬ 
dulgences  are  a  relaxation  of  the  penance  that  should  be  per¬ 
formed  after  the  guilt  of  the  sin  has  been  forgiven;  but  this 
penance  is  always  some  exterior  work,  such  as  fasting,  morti¬ 
fication,  and  so  forth;  consequently  the  conditions  on  which 
indulgences  are  granted  should  also  be  something  exterior,  or 
some  sacrifice  in  the  material  order.  Of  this  kind  are  alms 
for  the  building  and  beautifying  of  churches,  taking  part  in 
the  deliverance  of  the  Holy  Land,  fasting,  bodily  austerities, 
and  pilgrimages.34 

Furthermore,  other  conditions  are  required,  both  on  the 
part  of  the  person  who  wishes  to  gain  an  indulgence  and  on 
the  part  of  him  who  grants  it.  The  former  must  be  in  the 
state  of  grace,  believe  in  the  efficacy  of  indulgences,  and  per¬ 
form  the  prescribed  works  in  a  spirit  of  devotion.  The  latter 
must  have  a  sufficient  reason  for  disposing  of  the  satisfactory 
merits  that  are  in  the  spiritual  treasury  of  the  Church.  Such 
a  justifying  reason  is  found,  for  instance,  in  the  need  there 
is  of  promoting  works  of  piety.  But  in  all  cases  there  must 
be  due  proportion  between  the  value  of  the  indulgence  granted 
and  the  difficulty  of  the  conditions  enjoined.35  Finally,  if 
there  be  a  sufficiently  grave  reason,  the  Pope  may  grant  a 
plenary  indulgence,  which  cancels  all  temporal  punishment  due 
to  sin.36 

Indulgences  may  also  be  applied  to  the  souls  in  purgatory, 
because  the  Sovereign  Pontiff  has  the  right  to  dispose  of  the 
spiritual  treasure  of  the  Church  in  favor  of  all  who  need 
it  and  who  are  in  a  condition  to  benefit  by  his  liberality. 

35  Ibid.  m.  5. 

36  Ibid.  m.  6. 


33  Ibid,  ad  2m. 

34  Ibid.  m.  4. 


376 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Now  when  the  poor  souls  departed  this  life,  they  were  in 
communion  with  the  Church,  and  they  still  are  her  children 
although  suffering  in  another  world.  Hence  they  are  in  a  con¬ 
dition  to  be  helped  by  her  in  their  present  need.  However, 
as  they  are  no  longer  under  the  Pope’s  jurisdiction,  he  can¬ 
not  grant  them  an  indulgence  by  way  of  a  judiciary  sentence; 
but  only  by  way  of  help  and  impetration  —  per  modum  suf- 
fragii  et  impetrationis.31  It  must  be  noted,  therefore,  that  in 
regard  to  this  one  point  alone  —  the  manner  of  application  — 
does  an  indulgence  for  the  dead  differ  from  that  for  the 
living. 

St.  Bonaventure,  as  noted  above,  made  the  teaching  of 
Alexander  his  own.  He  insists  very  strongly  that  indulgences 
are  valid  before  God,  because  if  they  were  not,  the  Church’s 
action  in  granting  them  would  not  be  merciful  but  cruel,  and 
she  would  make  herself  guilty  of  deceiving  those  whom  she 
was  commissioned  by  Christ  to  guide  in  the  way  of  truth.38 
When  speaking  of  indulgences  for  the  dead,  he  is  inclined  to 
favor  the  opinion  of  those  who  hold  that  in  granting  them 
the  Pope  uses  his  judiciary  power.39  In  this  view  he  differed 
from  his  master. 

Albertus  Magnus  adds  nothing  to  the  exposition  given  by 
Alexander.  He  calls  attention  to  the  following  two  definitions 
of  indulgences  given  by  contemporary  theologians:  Magistri 
defininnt  relaxationem  sic:  Est  satisfactions  majoris  in 
minor em  competens  et  discreta  commutatio.  Alii  sic:  Rc- 
laxatio  est  poenae  temporalis  debitae  promissa  diminution 0 
This  latter,  he  holds,  is  the  more  proper  of  the  two;  and  so 
did  many  before  his  time,  although  the  matter  had  been  but 
little  discussed  in  a  speculative  way. 

St.  Thomas  puts  the  teaching  of  Alexander  in  a  somewhat 
different  form,  but  agrees  with  it  on  nearly  every  point.  In 
his  first  article  he  shows  that  indulgences  are  not  merely  a 
relaxation  of  canonical  penance,  but  are  valid  for  the  re¬ 
mission  of  temporal  punishment  due  to  sin.  And  this  remis- 

37  Ibid.  m.  5.  39  ibid  q  ^  COnCi  ^ 

38  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  20,  p.  2,  a.  unic.  40  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  20,  a.  16. 
q.  2. 


THEOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCES 


377 


sion  holds  good  for  the  dead  as  well  as  for  the  living.  After 
calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  an  indulgence  can  be  gained 
only  when  the  guilt  of  sin  has  been  remitted,  either  by  an 
act  of  contrition  or  in  the  sacrament  of  penance,  he  points 
out  the  reason  why  indulgences  are  effective  in  remitting 
temporal  punishment.  The  chief  reason,  he  says,  is  the  unity 
of  the  mystical  body  of  Christ,  many  members  of  which  have 
gathered  more  satisfactory  merits  than  they  need  for  them¬ 
selves,  and  to  that  body  also  belong  the  merits  of  Christ. 
Now,  as  one  person  may  satisfy  for  another,  it  stands  to  rea¬ 
son  that  those  who  have  need  thereof  may  be  benefited  by 
this  supererogatory  merit.  However,  as  neither  the  saints  nor 
Christ  made  over  their  satisfactory  merits  to  individual  per¬ 
sons,  but  left  them  as  a  spiritual  treasure  to  the  Church,  it  is 
only  the  head  of  the  Church  who  can  dispose  of  them  by 
reason  of  the  authority  received  from  Christ  to  this  effect. 
This  is  in  perfect  accord  with  the  practice  of  every  other  society 
of  men.  Community  goods  are  distributed  to  individuals  by 
the  head  of  the  community.  Hence,  just  as  one  would  obtain 
the  remission  of  punishment  if  some  one  else  were  to  satisfy 
the  justice  of  God  in  his  place,  so  does  he  obtain  the  same 
remission  if  the  satisfaction  of  some  one  else  is  distributed 
to  him  by  one  who  has  authority  to  that  effect.41 

Hence  an  indulgence,  even  in  case  of  the  living,  is  not  a 
simple  act  of  absolution  from  the  liability  to  punishment; 
but  it  is  an  authoritative  substitution  of  one  satisfaction  for 
another.  By  a  judiciary  sentence,  the  penitent  receives  a 
designated  amount  of  the  spiritual  treasure  of  the  Church,  and 
therewith  he  pays  to  that  extent  his  indebtedness  to  God.42 
In  itself  every  indulgence  is  of  such  value  as  is  determined 
by  the  person  who  has  authority  to  grant  it,  and  in  this  sense 
it  is  independent  of  the  disposition  of  the  recipient.  But,  on 
•the  other  hand,  unless  the  recipient  is  united  to  Christ  by 
charity,  he  does  not  fulfill  the  conditions  required  for  the 
gaining  of  an  indulgence ;  hence  in  so  far  the  efficacy  of  the 
indulgence  depends  on  his  disposition.  St.  Thomas  sums  up 


41  Suppl.  q.  25,  a.  1. 


42  Ibid.  a.  1  ad  im  et  2m. 


37§ 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


this  point  as  follows :  “  It  must  he  held  that  the  value  of 

indulgences  is  that  which  is  stated  in  their  promulgation,  pro¬ 
vided,  of  course,  the  one  who  grants  them  has  due  authority 
and  the  one  who  receives  them  is  endued  with  charity  and  the 
object  of  their  granting  is  some  pious  cause,  which  embraces 
God’s  honor  and  the  neighbor’s  advantage.”  43 

The  authority  to  grant  indulgences  resides  in  those  who  are 
entrusted  with  the  government  of  the  Church,  that  is,  the 
bishops  and  the  Pope.  However,  the  Pope  alone  can  make 
use  of  this  authority  as  may  seem  good  to  him ;  while  the 
power  of  the  bishops  in  the  matter  of  indulgences  is  limited 
by  his  ordinations.44  The  pie t as  causae  is  sufficiently  verified 
if  the  end  ultimately  intended  is  of  a  spiritual  nature;  hence 
anything  temporal  may  be  included  among  the  conditions  on 
which  an  indulgence  is  granted,  provided  it  be  directed  to  a 
spiritual  end.45  If  the  conditions  are  not  complied  with,  the 
indulgence  is  not  gained;  even  if  the  want  of  compliance  was 
the  result  of  an  oversight  or  of  inability.46 

Duns  Scotus  gives  a  similar  exposition  of  the  doctrine  on 
indulgences.  His  teaching  is  neatly  summed  up  in  the  follow¬ 
ing  definition :  “  An  indulgence  is  the  remission  of  the 

temporal  punishment  due  to  the  actual  sins  of  the  repentant 
and  left  standing  after  sacramental  absolution,  a  remission 
granted  for  reasonable  cause  by  ecclesiastical  prelates  out  of 
the  Church’s  treasury,  that  is,  the  merits  of  Christ  and  the 
saints.47 

Nearly  all  the  chief  points  brought  out  in  the  foregoing 
paragraphs  were  embodied  by  Clement  VI  in  the  Jubilee  Bull 
of  1343.  After  explaining  the  meaning  of  the  spiritual 
treasury  of  the  Church,  he  proceeds:  “(Christ),  indeed, 
founded  this  treasury  that  it  might  be  dispensed  to  the  faith¬ 
ful  unto  their  salvation  through  the  offices  of  St.  Peter,  the 
key-bearer  of  heaven,  and  of  his  successors,  Christ’s  vicars 
upon  earth,  always  for  proper  and  reasonable  cause,  now  for 
the  complete  and  now  for  the  partial  remission  of  the  tem- 

43  Ibid.  a.  2.  46  Ibid.  q.  27,  a.  3. 

44  Ibid.  q.  26,  a.  1-3.  47  Quaest.  Miscellan.  q.  4,  n.  4. 

45  Ibid.  q.  25,  a.  3. 


THEOLOGY  OF  INDULGENCES 


379 


poral  punishment  due  to  sins  —  a  treasury  to  be  devoted 
mercifully  in  general  as  well  as  for  particular  occasion,  as 
under  God  they  deem  expedient,  to  those  who  are  truly  con¬ 
trite  of  heart  and  have  confessed  their  sins.”  48 


CHAPTER  XXII 


HOLY  ORDERS:  EXTREME  UNCTION:  MATRIMONY 

Concerning  the  last  three  sacraments  of  the  New  Law  only 
a  few  remarks  need  be  made  in  the  present  connection.  Holy 
orders  and  extreme  unction  are  treated  rather  briefly  by  the 
Scholastics  themselves,  and  although  a  great  deal  is  said  by 
them  about  matrimony,  still  that  is  mostly  in  regard  to  im¬ 
pediments,  with  which  we  are  not  directly  concerned  in  the 
history  of  dogmas.  Hence  the  following  brief  outline  of 
Scholastic  teaching  on  the  three  sacraments  now  under  con¬ 
sideration  will  suffice  for  our  purpose. 

A  —  Holy  Orders 

A  neat  summary  of  what  is  to  be  held  in  regard  to  holy 
orders  is  thus  given  by  St.  Bonaventure  in  his  Breviloquium: 
“  This,  in  brief,  is  the  doctrine  to  be  held  concerning  the  sacra¬ 
ment  of  orders,  that  it  is  a  sealing  (or  sign)  by  which  spiritual 
power  is  imparted  to  the  one  ordained.  Orders,  though  but 
one  of  the  seven  sacraments,  comprises  nevertheless  seven 
grades.  The  first  is  that  of  door-keeper,  the  second  that  of 
lector,  the  third  that  of  exorcist,  the  fourth  that  of  acolyte, 
the  fifth  that  of  subdeacon,  the  sixth  that  of  deacon,  the  seventh 
that  of  priest.  Preparatory  to  these,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
clerical  tonsure  is  given  and  also  the  office  of  psalmist;  on  the 
other  hand,  they  find  their  complement  in  the  added  grades  of 
episcopacy,  patriarchate,  and  papacy.  By  persons  enjoying 
these  latter  dignities  orders  are  conferred,  and  they  must  be 
dispensed  with  due  attention  to  the  external  sacramental  signs, 
both  as  regards  the  matter  and  the  form,  and  the  proper 

380 


THE  SACRAMENT  OF  ORDERS  381 

solemnity  should  be  observed  as  to  time,  place,  office,  and 
person.”  1 

The  first  part  of  this  extract  contains  the  definition  of  holy 
orders  as  commonly  given  by  the  Scholastics,  and  is  taken  from 
the  Sentences  of  the  Lombard.2,  Order,  as  a  sacrament,  is  a 
certain  seal  or  sign,  by  which  spiritual  power  is  imparted  to 
him  who  is  ordained.  As  St.  Thomas  explains  it.  “  The  term 
signaculum  is  here  not  meant  to  designate  the  interior 
character,  but  signifies  the  external  rite,  which  is  at  once  a 
sign  and  the  cause  of  interior  power;  and  thus  it  is  under¬ 
stood  in  the  given  definition.  However,  if  it  were  taken  for 
the  sacramental  character,  it  would  not  imply  any  impropriety 
of  speech.  For  the  division  of  a  sacrament  into  those  three 
—  sacramentum  tantnm ,  res  et  sacramentum,  res  tantum  — 
is  not,  properly  speaking,  a  division  into  integral  parts.  Be¬ 
cause  that  which  is  the  res  tantum  is  not  of  the  essence  of  a 
sacrament,  and  that  which  is  the  sacramentum  tantum  passes 
away,  while  that  which  is  the  sacramentum  et  res  is  said  to  re¬ 
main.  Hence  it  follows  that  the  interior  character  itself  is 
essentially  and  principally  the  very  sacrament  of  orders.”  3 

That  the  rite  of  ordination  is  a  true  sacrament,  at  least  when 
there  is  question  of  the  major  orders,  is  directly  inferred  from 
the  fact  that  it  is  an  external  sign  instituted  for  the  sanctifica¬ 
tion  of  the  recipient.  “  In  the  reception  of  orders,”  says  St. 
Thomas,  “  there  is  a  certain  consecration  imparted  to  man  by 
means  of  visible  signs,  and  hence  it  is  obvious  that  order  is 
a  sacrament.”  4  And  that  the  rite  confers  sanctifying  grace 
he  proves  from  the  fact  that  the  spiritual  power  is  conferred 
by  it,  which  necessarily  implies  the  grace  requisite  for  its 
proper  use.  “  Hence  just  as  in  baptism,  through  which  man 
becomes  capable  of  receiving  the  other  sacraments,  sanctifying 
grace  is  conferred,  so  likewise  in  the  sacrament  of  orders,  by 
which  man  is  ordained  for  the  dispensation  of  other  sacra¬ 
ments.”  5 

The  sacrament  of  orders  is  one,  but  there  are  several  sacra- 

1  Op.  cit.  VI,  c.  12.  4  Suppl.  q.  34,  a.  3. 

2  Sent.  IV,  d.  24,  c.  to.  5  Ibid.  q.  35,  a.  1. 

3  Suppl.  q.  34,  a.  2  ad  im. 


382 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


mental  rites  of  ordination,  in  each  one  of  which  the  definition 
of  a  sacrament  is  verified.6  The  matter  is  thus  explained  by 
St.  Thomas,  and  substantially  the  same  explanation  is  also 
given  by  most  other  Scholastics.  “  The  division  of  orders,” 
he  says,  “  is  not  that  of  an  integral  into  its  parts,  nor  that  of 
a  universal,  but  that  of  a  potestative  whole;  and  the  nature 
of  it  is  this,  that  the  whole  according  to  its  complete  perfec¬ 
tion  is  in  one,  and  that  in  others  there  is  a  certain  participa¬ 
tion  of  the  same.  And  so  it  is  here:  the  whole  plenitude  of 
this  sacrament  is  in  one  order,  namely,  in  the  priesthood ;  but 
in  the  others  there  is  a  certain  participation  of  the  same  order. 
.  .  .  And  for  this  reason  all  the  orders  are  one  sacrament.”  7 
Or  as  St.  Bonaventure  puts  it :  “  All  grades  of  the  orders  to¬ 

gether  constitute  one  sacrament,  nevertheless  to  each  grade  the 
term  order  is  applied.”  8 

Scotus,  however,  looks  at  the  matter  in  a  somewhat  differ¬ 
ent  light.9  He  holds  that  the  term  order,  as  designating  one 
of  the  seven  sacraments,  is  taken  in  a  generic  sense ;  and  that 
consequently  the  different  grades  are  so  many  specifically  dis¬ 
tinct  sacraments,10 

The  generic  unity  of  these  specifically  different  sacraments 
is  derived  from  the  common  end  for  which  they  were  all 
instituted,  namely,  the  worthy  celebration  of  the  Eucharistic 
rite. 11 

The  Scholastics  distinguish  seven  different  orders,  which  are 
divided  into  two  groups  and  are  respectively  designated  as 
sacred  and  non-sacred;  or  major  and  minor,  as  they  are  known 
to-day.  Various  reasons  are  assigned  by  them  why  the 
number  of  orders  should  be  neither  more  nor  less  than  seven. 


6  Ibid.  Cfr.  DB.  958. 

7  Suppl.  q.  37,  a.  1  ad  2m. 

8  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  24,  p.  1,  a.  2,  q.  4. 

9  He  first  gives  this  general  defi¬ 
nition  of  orders:  “  Ordo  est  gra- 

dus  eminens  in  hierarchia  ecclesi- 

astica,  disponens  ad  congrue  exse- 
quendum  aliquem  actum  excellen- 
tem  in  Ecclesia.”  And  by  the 
“  actum  excellentem  ”  he  under¬ 
stands  any  act  intimately  connected 


with  the  consecration  of  the  Holy 
Eucharist  (Report.  IV,  d.  24,  n.  8). 

10  Then  he  adds  :  “  Sacramentum 
ordinis  est  unum  genere,  habens 
sub  se  plures  species,  .  .  .  quae 
sunt  diversae  rationis  et  alterius 
speciei,  non  tantum  ejusdem  ration¬ 
is  et  speciei,  et  diversae  numero  ” 
(In  Sent.  IV,  d.  24,  n.  13). 

11  Ibid.  n.  14. 


THE  SACRAMENT  OF  ORDERS 


383 


St.  Bonaventure  enumerates  and  rejects  three  different  views, 
and  then  proposes  his  own.  The  priest,  he  says,  in  whom 
the  sacrament  of  orders  is  found  in  all  its  fullness,  has  two 
different  spiritual  powers :  one  over  Christ’s  true  body  in  the 
Holy  Eucharist,  and  another  over  Christ’s  mystical  body  as 
composed  of  the  faithful.  In  the  exercise  of  each  of  these 
powers  he  needs  assistants.  In  the  consecration  of  Christ’s 
true  body  he  is  assisted  by  the  deacon  and  the  subdeacon,  who 
provide  the  matter  for  the  consecration.  Hence  the  orders  of 
these  two  as  well  as  that  of  the  priest,  because  of  their  close 
connection  with  the  Holy  Eucharist,  are  termed  sacred  orders. 
Then  in  the  exercise  of  his  power  over  the  mystical  body  of 
Christ,  the  priest  is  assisted  by  the  ostiarius,  who  admits  the 
faithful  to  the  place  of  worship;  by  the  lector,  who  reads  to 
them  the  sacred  text;  by  the  exorcist,  who  gives  them  aid 
against  the  inroads  of  the  devil;  by  the  acolytes,  who  edify  the 
faithful  by  their  good  example  as  typified  by  the  burning 
candles  which  they  carry.  All  this  is  likewise  referred  to  the 
Holy  Eucharist,  but  only  distantly,  and  hence  the  orders  in 
question  are  called  non-sacred.12  The  exposition  given  by  St. 
Thomas  differs  somewhat  in  regard  to  the  minor  orders,  but 
is  based  upon  the  same  fundamental  idea  that  the  division  of 
orders  was  made  in  reference  to  the  Holy  Eucharist.13 

In  this  connection  the  question  arises,  whether  all  seven 
orders  are  to  be  regarded  as  sacraments,  in  the  sense  explained 
in  a  preceding  paragraph.  The  Scholastics  usually  put  the 
question  in  this  form:  Does  each  one  of  the  seven  orders 
imprint  a  sacramental  character?  In  this  they  seem  to  take 
for  granted  that  all  are  sacraments,  so  that  the  only  question 
open  for  discussion  is,  whether  in  each  ordination  a  character 
is  imprinted.  And  nearly  all  of  them  give  an  affirmative 
answer,  holding  that  this  is  to  be  considered  as  the  more 
probable  view.  Durandus,  however,  contends  that  the  priest¬ 
hood  alone  is  a  true  sacrament;  all  other  orders  must  be  con¬ 
sidered  as  sacramentals.14 

St.  Thomas  presents  the  more  common  view  in  these  terms : 

12  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  24,  p.  2,  a.  2,  13  Suppl.  q.  37,  a.  2. 

q.  4.  14  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  24,  q.  1,  n.  9. 


3§4 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


“  Some  there  are  who  say  that  in  the  priesthood  alone  is  a 
sacramental  character  imprinted;  but  this  is  not  true,  because 
no  one  except  a  deacon  can  licitly  discharge  the  duties  con¬ 
nected  with  that  office,  and  thus  it  is  quite  manifest  that  he 
has  a  spiritual  power  in  regard  to  the  dispensation  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments  which  others  do  not  have.  And  for  this  reason  others 
say  that  all  the  sacred  orders  imprint  a  character,  but  not  so 
the  minor  orders.  Yet  this  again  is  not  to  the  point;  because 
every  order  places  the  recipient  above  the  laity  in  some  grade 
of  power  respecting  the  dispensation  of  the  sacraments. 
Hence,  as  the  character  is  a  sign  whereby  the  recipient  is  dis¬ 
tinguished  from  others,  it  follows  that  in  all  the  orders  a 
character  is  imprinted.  And  a  further  sign  of  this  is  the 
fact  that  these  orders  always  remain,  and  are  never  repeated. 
This  is  the  third  opinion,  which  is  more  common.”  15 

Of  course,  as  all  true  sacraments  of  the  New  Law  have 
been  instituted  by  Christ,  it  follows  from  this  “  third  opinion  ” 
that  the  minor  orders  were  also  instituted  by  Him.  And  so 
these  authors  commonly  maintain.  There  is  indeed  the 
historical  difficulty  that  the  minor  orders  do  not  seem  to  have 
been  in  existence  before  the  third  century;  but  that  is  ex¬ 
plained  by  saying  that  they  were  all  contained  in  the  diaconate. 
“  In  the  primitive  Church,”  says  St.  Thomas,  “  all  the  minor 
offices  were  entrusted  to  the  deacons,  because  of  the  scarcity 
of  ministers.  .  .  .  Nevertheless  the  aforesaid  powers  were  all 
contained  in  the  one  power  of  the  deacon.  But  later  on  divine 
worship  developed  more  fully,  and  then  the  Church  explicitly 
gave  to  different  ministers  the  powers  that  were  implicitly  con¬ 
tained  in  one  order.”  16 

In  this  connection  the  question  is  also  asked,  whether  the 
episcopate  must  be  considered  as  a  distinct  order,  and  con¬ 
sequently  as  a  true  sacrament.  Modern  theologians  answer 
the  question  in  the  affirmative,  but  in  this  they  depart  from 
the  more  common  view  of  the  Scholastics.  With  the  excep¬ 
tion  of  William  of  Auxerre,17  Scotus,18  and  Durandus,19 

15  Suppl.  q.  35,  a.  2.  18  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  24,  q.  unic.  n.  5. 

16  Suppl.  q.  37,  a.  2  ad  2m.  19  Ibid.  q.  6,  n.  8. 

17  Sum.  p.  5,  tr.  8,  q.  I. 


THE  SACRAMENT  OF  ORDERS 


385 


practically  all  of  them  agree  with  St.  Bonaventure,  when  he 
says :  “  The  episcopate  in  so  far  as  it  implies  the  priesthood, 

is  properly  called  an  order;  but  as  distinct  from  the  priest¬ 
hood,  it  signifies  only  a  certain  dignity  or  office  connected 
with  it,  and  is  not  properly  an  order,  nor  is  a  sacramental 
character  imprinted  by  it,  nor  a  new  power  given,  but  by  it  the 
power  of  the  priesthood  is  amplified. ”  20  St.  Thomas  holds 
that  the  episcopate  is  a  distinct  order  in  respect  of  certain 
hierarchical  powers  over  the  mystical  body  of  Christ,  but  not  in 
respect  of  Christ’s  real  body  in  reference  to  which  orders  con¬ 
stitute  a  true  sacrament.21 

Like  all  other  sacraments  of  the  New  Law,  that  of  holy  or¬ 
ders  is  made  up  of  matter  and  form.  On  this  general  fact  all 
Scholastics  are  agreed;  but  there  is  a  considerable  difference  of 
opinion  as  to  what  part  of  the  ordination  rite  constitutes  the 
sacrament  of  orders,  and  consequently  as  to  precisely  what 
part  is  the  matter  and  what  part  is  the  form  of  the  sacrament. 
Up  to  the  ninth  century,  both  the  priesthood  and  the  diaconate 
were  conferred  by  the  imposition  of  hands  and  an  accompany¬ 
ing  prayer,  to  which  rite  was  later  added  the  presentation  of 
the  chalice  and  paten.22  Hence  the  early  Scholastics,  such  as 
Hugh  of  St.  Victor,23  Peter  Lombard,24  and  Innocent  III,25 
commonly  state  that  the  power  of  orders  is  conferred  by  the 
imposition  of  hands  and  the  prayer  that  accompanies  it;  while 
the  fact  of  this  power  having  been  conferred  is. more  distinctly 
expressed  by  the  presentation  of  the  chalice  and  paten.  The 
same  is  taught  by  St.  Bonaventure,26  and  as  regards  the  di¬ 
aconate  also  by  Durandus.27  These  theologians,  therefore, 
would  regard  the  imposition  of  hands  as  the  matter  of  the  sac¬ 
rament  of  orders,  when  conferred  on  the  priest  and  the  deacon, 
and  the  accompanying  prayer  as  the  form. 

But  towards  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century  theological 
opinion  in  this  respect  began  to  undergo  a  change.  The  im¬ 
position  of  hands  was  indeed  still  regarded  as  being  an  in- 

20  Ibid.  p.  2,  a.  2,  q.  3.  24  Sent.  IV,  d.  24,  c.  9. 

21  Suppl.  q.  40,  a.  5.  25  De  Sacro  Altaris  Myst.  I,  c.  9; 

22  Cfr.  Amalarius,  De  Eccl.  Offic.  ML.  217,  779. 

II,  c.  12 ;  ML.  105,  1086.  26  Op.  cit.  d.  24,  p.  2,  a.  1,  q.  4. 

23  De  Sacr.  II,  p.  3,  c.  12.  27  Ibid.  q.  3,  n.  6. 


386 


MEDLEY AL  THEOLOGY 


tegral  part  of  the  rite  of  ordination;  but  equal,  if  not  greater, 
importance  was  attached  to  the  tradition  of  the  instruments  — 
traditio  instrument orum.  Hence,  St.  Thomas,  although  a  con¬ 
temporary  of  St.  Bonaventure  and  on  most  other  points  agree¬ 
ing  with  him  in  doctrine,  refers  only  to  the  traditio  instrumen- 
torum  when  he  explains  the  rite  of  ordination  in  respect  to  the 
different  orders.  After  touching  upon  the  relation  of  the 
sacrament  of  orders  to  the  Holy  Eucharist,  he  says  in  regard 
to  the  ordination  of  priests :  Et  ideo  cum  ordinantur ,  accipi - 
tint  calicem  cum  vino ,  et  patenam  cum  pane ,  accipientes  potes- 
tatem  conficiendi  corpus  et  sanguinem  Christi.  And  then  with 
reference  to  the  deacon  and  subdeacon:  Et  ideo  accipiunt 
calicem  de  manu  episcopi ,  sed  vacuum ,  cum  ordinantur ,28 
This  traditio  instrument  or um  he  regards  as  the  matter  of  the 
sacrament  of  orders,  while  he  considers  the  accompanying 
words,  Accipe  or  Accipite,  etc.,  as  the  form.29  By  this  rite 
alone  is  the  character  imprinted.30 

This  became  practically  the  common  view  of  the  later 
Scholastics,  and  was  embodied  in  the  Decretum  pro  Armenis, 
issued  by  Pope  Eugenius  IV.31  As  to  the  doctrinal  value  of 
that  decree,  and  also  in  regard  to  the  intention  of  the  Pope  in 
issuing  it,  the  opinion  of  theologians  is  divided;  but  they  com¬ 
monly  agree  that  it  was  not  intended  as  a  definition  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  term.  The  matter  is -too  intricate  to  be  dealt  with 
here,  nor  is  a  discussion  of  it  necessary  for  our  purpose. 

The  valid  reception  of  holy  orders  presupposes  the  baptismal 
character  in  the  recipient,32  but  not  necessarily  that  of  con¬ 
firmation;  although  it  is  unlawful  to  confer  the  sacrament  on 
one  who  has  not  been  confirmed.33  Only  a  member  of  the 
male  sex  can  be  validly  ordained.34  For  the  licit  reception  of 
holy  orders  a  certain  definite  age  and  adequate  mental  and 
moral  fitness  are  required;  but.  excepting  the  episcopate,  ordi¬ 
nations  are  valid  even  if  conferred  upon  one  who  has  not  yet 
reached  the  age  of  discretion.35 

28  Suppl.  q.  37,  a.  2.  32  Thomas,  op.  cit.  q.  35,  a.  3. 

29  Ibid.  q.  34,  a.  4.  33  Ibid.  a.  4. 

30  Ibid.  q.  37,  a.  5.  34  Ibid.  q.  39,  a.  I. 

81  DB.  701.  33  Ibid.  a.  2-5. 


EXTREME  UNCTION 


387 


The  administration  of  the  sacrament  of  orders  belongs  to 
the  bishop ;  he  alone  has  power  to  ordain  priests  and  deacons, 
although  simple  priests  may  be  delegated  to  confer  minor  or¬ 
ders. 3(i  The  power  to  ordain  is  not  lost  either  by  heresy, 
simony,  or  any  other  crime.37  Concerning  this  last  point  there 
was  considerable  discussion  during  the  early  Middle  Ages,  as 
was  pointed  out  in  a  previous  chapter;  but  during  the  twelfth 
century  the  matter  was  definitely  settled  by  the  decision  of 
several  councils.38 


B  —  Extreme  Unction 


All  Scholastics  definitely  teach  that  extreme  unction  is  a 
true  sacrament  of  the  New  Law,  but  some  call  in  question  its 
immediate  institution  by  Christ.  Thus  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,39 
Peter  Lombard,40  Alexander  of  Hales,41  and  St.  Bonaven- 
ture,41a  expressly  teach  that  extreme  unction  was  instituted  by 
the  Holy  Spirit  through  the  Apostles.  St.  Thomas  refutes  the 
arguments  advanced  by  these  authors,  and  then  states  the  more 
common  view  as  follows :  “  For  this  reason  others  say  that 

all  the  sacraments  were  instituted  by  Christ  Himself ;  but  some 
of  them,  because  they  presented  greater  difficulty  to  the  belief 
of  His  followers,  He  also  promulgated;  while  others,  such  as 
extreme  unction  and  confirmation,  He  reserved  for  the  Apostles 
to  promulgate.  And  this  view  is  all  the  more  probable,  be¬ 
cause  the  sacraments  belong  to  the  very  foundation  of  the  law, 
and  for  that  reason  their  institution  pertains  to  the  lawgiver ; 
and  again  because  it  is  from  their  institution  that  they  have 
their  efficacy,  and  this  can  only  come  from  a  divine  source.42 

The  sacramental  rite,  according  to  all,  consists  in  the  anoint¬ 
ing  of  the  bodily  senses  with  oil  and  the  accompanying  prayer 
said  by  the  priest.  Hence  oil  is  the  matter  of  the  sacrament, 
and  the  prayer  of  the  priest  is  its  form.  By  oil,  in  this  con- 


36  Cfr.  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  IV,  d. 
25,  a.  1,  q.  1 ;  Thomas,  op.  cit.  q.  38, 
a.  1. 

37  Ibid.  q.  2,  3. ;  ibid.  q.  38,  a.  2. 

38  Mansi,  20,  1209;  19,  509. 


39  De  Sacr.  II,  p.  15,  c.  2. 

40  Sent.  IV,  d.  23,  c.  2. 

41  Sum.  IV,  q.  9,  m.  1,  2. 
41a  In  Sent.  d.  23,  a.  1,  q.  2. 

42  Suppl.  q.  39,  a.  3. 


388 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


nection,  they  understand  olive  oil;  for,  says  St.  Thomas,  that 
is  the  proper  meaning  of  the  term.43 

Thus  far  all  are  agreed;  but  on  two  further  points  there  is 
among  them  a  difference  of  opinion.  First,  what  is  the  effect 
of  the  consecration  of  the  oil  by  the  bishop?  Secondly,  is  the 
form  of  this  sacrament  deprecatory  or  indicative? 

In  regard  to  the  first  point  St.  Bonaventure  says :  “  There 

are  some  who  hold  that  the  oil  itself  is  the  matter  of  this  sacra¬ 
ment,  and  that  by  the  episcopal  consecration  of  the  oil  the 
sacrament  is  constituted;  then  the  anointing  that  follows  is 
simply  the  use  or  dispensation  of  the  sacrament.  But  this  is 
contrary  to  the  very  name  of  the  sacrament,  and  also  to  the 
common  view  of  theologians.  Hence,  it  is  better  to  say  that, 
just  as  in  baptism,  the  matter  of  the  sacrament  is  water,  and  in 
confirmation  it  is  chrism,  so  in  extreme  unction  it  is  oil  conse¬ 
crated  by  the  bishop.”  44  St.  Thomas  refers  to  the  same  dif¬ 
ference  of  opinion,  and  gives  the  same  solution  as  St.  Bona¬ 
venture.45  Moreover  the  consecration  of  the  oil  by  a  bishop 
is  necessary  for  the  validity  of  the  sacrament.46 

There  is  a  similar  but  more  pronounced  difference  of  opinion 
in  regard  to  the  form.  In  the  various  liturgical  books  of  the 
time,  and  in  others  of  a  later  date,  there  is  found  a  vast  variety 
of  forms,  some  of  them  deprecatory  and  others  indicative.47 
Hence,  as  St.  Bonaventure  states,  -some  theologians  went  even 
so  far  as  to  say  that  no  definite  form  was  required  in  extreme 
unction.48  However,  this  view  is  rejected  by  nearly  all 
Scholastics  of  any  note.  Yet  there  is  no  agreement  among 
them  as  to  what  the  proper  form  ought  to  be.  Thus  St. 
Thomas  contends  that  the  form  must  be  deprecatory,  and  for 
this  view  he  assigns  the  following  reasons.  First,  because  the 
deprecatory  form  is  evidently  indicated  by  the  words  of  St. 
James;  secondly,  because  it  is  the  form  used  by  the  Church  of 
Rome;  thirdly,  the  nature  of  the  sacrament  itself  requires  it, 
since  it  is  administered  to  the  dying  who  are  thereby  recom- 

43  Ibid.  a.  4.  47  Cfr.  J.  Kern,  Tractatus  de  Ex- 

44  In  Sent.  d.  23,  a.  1,  q.  3.  trema  Unctione,  c.  3. 

45  Suppl.  q.  29,  a.  5.  48  Loc.  cit.  q.  4. 

46  Ibid.  a.  6. 


EXTREME  UNCTION 


389 


mended  to  the  mercy  of  God.49  The  same  view  is  also  taken 
by  St.  Bonaventure,  who  reasons  about  the  matter  in  a  similar 
way.50 

Albertus  Magnus,  on  the  other  hand,  while  admitting  that 
the  deprecatory  form  is  valid,  argues  that  the  indicative  form 
ought  to  be  used.  For  he  says,  speaking  of  the  Church  in 
Germany,  “  in  this  part  of  the  world  all  the  most  ancient 
liturgical  books  have  the  indicative  form,  and  conclude  the  rite 
by  a  prayer.  And  these  are  the  words  written  in  those  most 
ancient  books,  which,  because  of  their  great  antiquity,  I  can 
heardly  read :  Ungo  hos  oculos  oleo  sanctificato  in  nomine , 
etc.;  to  which  is  added :  Per  istam  sanctissimam  unctionem  et 
suam  piissimam,  etc.51  This  appears  really  to  be  a  mixed 
form,  but  the  author  takes  the  first  part  only  as  the  form 
proper.  Richard  of  Middleton  52  and  some  others  took  a  simi¬ 
lar  stand. 

The  subject  of  extreme  unction  is  any  person  who  has  come 
to  the  age  of  discretion  and  is  in  danger  of  death  from  sick¬ 
ness.  This  sacrament,  says  St.  Thomas,  is  a  spiritual  medi¬ 
cine,  and  as  bodily  medicine  is  not  administered  to  those  who 
are  in  health,  neither  must  this  spiritual  medicine.53  Further¬ 
more,  it  is  the  last  remedy  against  the  ills  of  the  soul  that 
the  Church  has  at  her  disposal,  and  therefore  it  ought  not  to 
be  given  to  any  one  who  is  suffering  from  a  slight  ailment,  but 
to  those  only  who  are  about  to  depart  this  life.  Hence,  it  is 
properly  called  the  sacrament  of  the  dying.54  However,  it 
ought  not  be  deferred  till  the  last  moment,  but  should  be  ad¬ 
ministered  when  it  is  reasonably  supposed  that  the  sickness 
may  prove  fatal.55 

As  extreme  unction  does  not  imprint  a  character,  it  may  be 
repeated  on  given  conditions.  Precisely  what  these  condi¬ 
tions  are  is  not  so  clear  from  the  writings  of  the  Scholastics. 
Before  the  twelfth  century  it  seems  to  have  been  more  or  less 
customary,  at  least  in  many  places,  to  repeat  extreme  unction 

49  Op.  cit.  q.  29,  a.  8. 

50  Loc.  cit. 

51  Ibid.  a.  4. 

52  Ibid.  a.  1,  q.  4. 


53  Op.  cit.  q.  32,  a.  1. 

54  Suppl.  q.  32,  a.  2. 

55  Ibid.  a.  2  ad  im. 


390 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


in  the  same  sickness  and  even  in  the  same  danger  of  death, 
if  it  so  happened  that  the  sick  person  appeared  to  be  in  need 
of  special  spiritual  help.56  Then  a  discussion  arose  concern¬ 
ing  this  practice,  and  thereafter  most  theologians  decided  that 
extreme  unction  ought  not  to  be  administered  more  than  once 
in  the  same  danger  of  death.  Not  a  few,  however,  made  an 
exception  in  favor  of  those  who  were  grievously  sick  for  more 
than  a  year.57  In  keeping  with  this,  many  Manuals  for  the  use 
of  priests  in  those  times  have  this  rule  in  regard  to  the  repeti¬ 
tion  of  extreme  unction :  Potest  iterari,  sed  non  pro  eadem 
infirmitate ,  nisi  ultra  annum  protrahatur ,58 

St.  Thomas  decides  the  question  as  follows :  “  In  regard 

to  the  administration  of  this  sacrament,  one  must  not  only 
consider  the  fact  of  sickness,  but  also  the  gravity  of  the  sick¬ 
ness  in  question :  for  it  ought  not  to  be  given  except  to  those 
sick  persons  who,  according  to  human  judgment,  seem  to  be 
nearing  death.  Now  certain  sicknesses  are  not  of  long  dura¬ 
tion;  hence,  if  in  these  the  sacrament  be  then  administered 
when  the  patient  seems  to  be  in  danger  of  death,  it  is  reason¬ 
able  to  assume  that  he  does  not  recover  from  that  dangerous 
condition  except  by  a  cure  of  the  illness  itself,  and  thus  he 
should  not  be  anointed  again.  But  if  he  suffers  a  relapse,  that 
must  be  considered  another  sickness,  and  then  he  can  again  be 
anointed.  Other  forms  of  sickness,  however,  are  of  long  dura¬ 
tion,  such  as  hectic  fever,  dropsy,  and  the  like :  in  such  cases 
extreme  unction  should  not  be  given  except  when  there  ap¬ 
pears  to  be  danger  of  death ;  and  when  the  patient  recovers 
from  that  particular  danger,  the  same  sickness  remaining,  and 
then  is  again  reduced  to  a  similar  condition,  he  can  again  be 
anointed;  because  it  is  a  new  state  of  sickness,  although  the 
sickness  itself  remains  the  same.”  59 

St.  Bonaventure  looks  at  this  matter  in  a  somewhat  different 

56  Cfr.  Kern,  op.  cit.  p.  331  sqq.  annum  protrahatur,  ita  quod  in  uno 

57  Thus  Hugh  of  Strasburg,  a  anno  propter  eandem  infirmitatem 
pupil  of  Albertus  Magnus,  writes:  nemo  bis  inungatur  ”  (Opera  B.  Al- 
“  Si  saepe  infirmatur  quis  ad  mor-  berti,  t.  34,  p.  232). 

tern  saepe  potest  inungi ;  sed  in  una  58  Cfr.  Launoi,  opp.  t.  I,  p.  553. 
infirmitate  non  debet  quis  bis  in-  59  Suppl.  q.  33,  a.  2. 
ungi,  nisi  eadem  infirmitas  ultra 


EXTREME  UNCTION 


39i 


light.  According  to  him,  the  proper  effect  of  extreme  unction 
is  the  remission  of  venial  sins,  and  as  one  may  commit  venial 
sins  after  having  been  anointed,  it  is  obvious  that  the  ad¬ 
ministration  of  the  sacrament  may  be  repeated.  Still  in  the 
practical  application  of  this  fundamental  idea,  he  comes  to 
practically  the  same  conclusion  as  St.  Thomas.  “  When  there 
is  question  of  a  protracted  illness,”  he  says,  “  some  hold  that 
extreme  unction  may  be  repeated  after  a  year  has  elapsed;  but 
that  position  is  altogether  absurd  —  as  if  the  administration 
of  the  sacraments  were  to  be  regulated  by  the  movements  of 
the  stars.  It  is  therefore  better  to  say  that  no  sick  person 
should  be  anointed  except  when  he  is  presumably  approaching 
his  end;  and  this  will  be  in  such  a  state  of  his  sickness  that 
nature  cannot  long  bear  up  under  it,  and  so  he  will  either 
overcome  it  or  be  overcome  by  it.  If  therefore  he  recovers 
somewhat  and  continues  to  live,  although  he  is  not  really  cured, 
still  he  is  cured  of  an  extremely  dangerous  condition;  and 
hence,  if  his  condition  again  becomes  worse,  he  can  and  should 
receive  the  sacrament  of  extreme  unction  again,  because  he 
may  again  have  fallen  into  venial  sin.”  60 

There  is  found  among  the  Scholastics  a  similar  diversity  of 
opinion  in  regard  to  the  principal  effect  of  extreme  unction, 
as  distinct  from  sanctifying  grace  which  is  either  conferred  or 
augmented  by  every  sacrament.  St.  Bonaventure,  as  stated  in 
the  preceding  paragraph,  holds  that  it  is  the  remission  of  venial 
sins  in  so  far  as  they  would  be  an  obstacle  to  the  soul’s  imme¬ 
diate  entrance  into  heaven.  During  life,  he  says,  it  is  very 
difficult  to  avoid  venial  sins,  and  they  may  almost  be  regarded 
as  an  incurable  evil;  but  when  death  draws  nigh  that  evil  can 
be  cured  in  respect  of  its  consequences,  and  so  the  merciful 
God  has  provided  extreme  unction  as  a  means  to  take  away 
the  guilt  of  venial  sins,  and  also  part  of  the  punishment  due 
to  them.  “  Hence,”  he  continues,  “  this  sacrament  was  prin¬ 
cipally  instituted  for  the  healing  and  alleviating  of  man’s  spir¬ 
itual  infirmity,  that  is,  of  venial  sin;  and  secondarily  also  for 

60  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  23,  a.  2,  q.  3  ad  3m. 


392 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


the  cure  and  alleviation  of  his  bodily  infirmity,  by  way  of 
strengthening  the  soul  which  rules  the  body.”  61 

He  calls  this  the  common  view  of  theologians,  and  he  de¬ 
fends  it  against  the  opinion  of  those  who  held  that  extreme 
unction  was  directly  intended  as  a  remedy  against  the  conse¬ 
quences  and  remains  of  sin,  both  personal  and  original,  and 
indirectly  against  the  ills  of  the  body  as  resulting  from  sin.62 
Substantially  the  same  view  as  that  of  Bonaventure  is  taken 
by  Alexander  of  Hales,63  Richard  of  Middleton,64  Duns  Sco- 
tus,65  Durandus,66  and  many  others.  However,  it  can  hardly 
be  termed  the  “  common  ”  view  of  the  Scholastics,  as  not  a  few 
of  them,  among  whom  are  Albertus  Magnus 67  and  St. 
Thomas,68  defended  the  opinion  rejected  by  St.  Bonaventure. 
Pointing  out  that  extreme  unction  was  instituted  by  our 
Savior  as  a  spiritual  medicine,  St.  Thomas  draws  this  con¬ 
clusion  :  “  The  purpose  of  medicine  is  to  expel  sickness. 

Hence  this  sacrament  was  chiefly  instituted  to  cure  the  sickness 
of  sin.  .  .  .  Consequently  it  is  intended  as  a  remedy  against 
those  defects  by  reason  of  which  man  is  spiritually  infirm,  in 
the  sense  that  he  does  not  have  perfect  vigor  as  regards  the 
acts  of  grace  during  life  or  of  glory  after  death.  Now  these 
defects  are  nothing  else  than  a  certain  debility  and  ineptitude 
left  in  us  as  a  consequence  of  actual  or  original  sin ;  and  against 
this  debility  man  is  strengthened-  through  the  sacrament  of 
extreme  unction.”  69 

Hence,  all  the  Scholastics  are  agreed  that  the  sacrament  of 
extreme  unction  is  in  one  way  or  another  a  remedy  against 
sin  or  its  consequences ;  and  as  sin  usually  enters  the  soul 
through  the  senses  of  the  body,  it  follows  naturally  that  these 
senses  should  be  anointed  in  the  administration  of  the  sacra¬ 
ment.  And  this  appears  to  have  been  the  common  teaching 
of  theologians  during  the  Middle  Ages.  “  The  soul,”  says  St. 
Bonaventure,  “  rules  and  guides  the  body  by  reason  of  a  three¬ 
fold  power:  that  of  sensation,  procreation,  and  locomotion; 

61  Ibid.  a.  I,  q.  I.  66  Ibid.  q.  I. 

62  Ibid.  67  Ibid.  a.  I,  14. 

63  Sum.  IV,  q.  5,  m.  7,  a.  2.  68  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  65,  a.  I. 

64  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  23,  a.  1,  q.  3.  69  Suppl.  q.  30,  a.  1,  2. 

65  Ibid.  q.  unic. 


THE  SACRAMENT  OF  MATRIMONY 


393 


hence  the  organs  of  these  powers  should  be  anointed.  And 
as  there  are  five  organs  of  sensation,  namely,  the  mouth,  the 
eyes,  the  nostrils,  the  ears,  and  the  hands,  and  as  the  loins  are 
for  the  purpose  of  generation,  and  the  feet  for  the  purpose  of 
locomotion,  it  is  these  seven  parts  that  are  anointed. ” 70 

However,  although  there  are  thus  seven  distinct  anointings, 
each  with  its  own  form,  there  is  only  one  sacrament  of  ex¬ 
treme  unction.  For  as  all  the  members  which  are  anointed 
constitute  one  nature,  and  it  is  for  this  one  nature  that  the 
remedy  is  provided,  the  different  anointings  constitute  one 
sacramental  rite.71  Or  as  St.  Thomas  puts  it:  “Although 
the  sacramental  actions  in  this  case  are  many,  nevertheless  they 
are  all  united  in  one  perfect  action  —  the  unction  of  all  the 
external  senses,  which  are  the  source  of  man’s  internal  ills.”  72 


C  —  Matrimony 

“  A  sacrament,”  reasons  St.  Thomas  when  speaking  of 
matrimony,  “  provides  for  man,  by  means  of  some  sensible 
sign,  a  remedy  of  divine  grace  against  sin;  and  as  this  is  veri¬ 
fied  in  the  case  of  matrimony,  the  matrimonial  rite  must  be 
numbered  among  the  sacraments.”  73  The  conclusion  is  ac¬ 
cepted  by  all  Scholastics,  although  Peter  Lombard 74  and 
Durandus75  are  sometimes  adduced  as  denying  that  the  sacra¬ 
ment  of  matrimony  produces  grace.  And  most  probably  even 
these  two  are  accused  unjustly,  as  both  of  them  teach  that 
matrimony  provides  a  remedy  against  concupiscence,  which 
remedy  must  finally  be  reduced  to  the  grace  of  God.76  How¬ 
ever,  some  early  canonists  seem  to  have  taken  the  position  just 
mentioned,  and  it  is  probably  to  them  that  St.  Bonaventure 
refers  when  he  says:  “  Some  there  were  who  said  that  this 
sacrament  does  not  confer  any  grace;  and  to  the  objection  that 
all  the  sacraments  of  the  New  Law  give  grace,  they  replied  by 
saying  that  this  must  be  understood  of  the  sacraments  insti- 


70  In  Sent.  d.  23,  a.  2,  q.  3. 

71  Ibid.  q.  3  ad  3m. 

72  Stippl.  q.  29,  a.  2  ad  2m. 

73  Ibid.  q.  42,  a.  1. 


74  Sent.  IV,  d.  2. 

75  Tn  Sent.  V,  d.  26,  q.  3,  n.  12. 

76  Cfr.  Pesch,  Praelect.  VII,  p. 

316,  317. 


394 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


tuted  in  the  New  Law.”  77  This  answer  implies  the  view,  also 
held  by  some  others,  that  matrimony,  even  as  a  sacrament,  was 
already  instituted  in  paradise. 

That  matrimony  is  a  true  sacrament  according  to  the  teach¬ 
ing  of  the  Church,  is  thus  stated  by  Scotus:  Communiter 
tenet  Ecclesia  sacramentum  matrimonii  esse  septimum  inter 
ecclesiastic  a  sacramenta,  et  de  sacramentis  Ecclesiae  non  est 
aliter  sentiendum  quam  sentit  Ecclesia  Romana .78  .  And  he  de¬ 
fines  the  sacrament  of  matrimony  as  follows  :  Signum  sensi¬ 
ble ,  ex  institutions  divina  significans  efdcaciter  gratiam  con- 
ferri  contrahentibus  ad  conjunctionem  eorum  in  contractu  per- 
petuo  observandam? 9  This  definition  embodies  the  common 
teaching  of  the  Scholastics,  although  most  of  them  define 
matrimonv  in  reference  to  the  union  between  man  and  woman. 
Thus  Peter  Lombard  writes:  Sunt  igitur  nuptiae  vel  matri- 
moniiim  viri  mulierisque  conjunctio  maritalis  inter  legitimas 
personas ,  individuam  vitam  retinens.8 0  This  union  or  con- 
junctio,  as  St.  Thomas  points  out,  consists  primarily  in  a  con¬ 
tract  which  unites  two  individuals  in  reference  to  the  procrea¬ 
tion  and  education  of  their  offspring,  and  to  common  domestic 
life;  then,  consequent  upon  this,  but  not  constituting  the  es¬ 
sence  thereof,  is  the  union  of  bodies  and  of  souls  between  the 
contracting  parties.81  Consequently,  matrimony  is  essentially 
complete  without  the  act  of  procreation.82 

Hence  the  external  sign  of  the  sacrament  consists  in  the 
marital  consent  of  man  and  woman,  in  so  far  as  that  consent 
signifies  the  union  of  Christ  with  His  Church.  “  Since  matri¬ 
mony  is  a  sacrament,”  argues  the  Lombard,  “  it  is  both  a 
sacred  sign  and  the  sign  of  a  sacred  thing,  namely,  of  the 
union  of  Christ  with  His  Church,  according  to  the  teaching 
of  the  Apostle.”  83  Thus  the  natural  contract,  which  from 
the  beginning  of  the  human  race  constituted  matrimony  as  an 
ofdcium  naturae ,  was  elevated  by  Christ  to  the  dignity  of  a 
sacrament.  Viewed  under  its  material  aspect,  therefore, 

77  Op.  cit.  d.  26.  a  2,  q.  2.  81  Suppl.  q.  44.  a.  1. 

78  In  Sent.  TV,  d.  26.  n.  13.  82  Ibid.  q.  42,  a.  4. 

79  Report.  TV,  d.  26,  n.  20.  83  Sent.  d.  26,  c.  6. 

80  Sent.  d.  37,  c.  2. 


THE  SACRAMENT  OF  MATRIMONY 


395 


Christian  marriage  is  the  same  as  that  of  pre-Christian  times; 
only  its  formal  aspect,  or  sacramental  significance,  is  dif¬ 
ferent.84 

From  this  it  follows  that  the  ministers  of  the  sacrament  are 
the  contracting  parties  themselves,  and  they  are  also  the  proxi¬ 
mate  efficient  cause  of  the  marital  bond  which  results  from  the 
sacramental  contract.  However  the  remote  efficient  cause  of 
that  bond  is  God,  who  instituted  the  sacrament  as  the  source 
of  an  indissoluble  union  between  man  and  woman,  and  there¬ 
fore  its  perpetuity  depends  on  His  will.  As  a  consequence, 
when  matrimony  has  been  consummated  by  the  bodily  union 
of  husband  and  wife,  it  is  dissoluble  only  by  the  death  of  one 
of  the  parties;  but  so  long  as  it  has  not  yet  been  thus  con¬ 
summated,  it  may  be  dissolved  by  one  of  the  contracting 
parties  entering  religion  and  taking  the  solemn  vow  of  chas¬ 
tity.  The  former  of  these  two  conclusions  follows  from  the 
very  nature  of  Christian  marriage  85  and  the  latter  is  known 
from  the  teaching  of  the  Church.86 

The  matter  and  form  of  this  sacrament  consist  of  the  words 
or  actions  of  the  contracting  parties  by  which  their  mutual 
consent  is  expressed.  “  Just  as  in  the  case  of  penance,”  argues 
St.  Thomas,  “  the  sacrament  of  matrimony  is  perfected  by  the 
acts  of  the  persons  to  whom  the  sacrament  is  applied.  And 
therefore,  as  in  penance  there  is  no  other  matter  than  that 
which  consists  in  the  acts  of  the  penitent,  which  themselves 
hold  the  place  of  matter,  so  it  is  also  in  matrimony.”  87  And 
again :  “  The  words  by  which  the  matrimonial  consent  is  ex¬ 

pressed  are  the  form  of  this  sacrament;  while  the  blessing  of 
the  priest  is  merely  a  sacramental,  and  in  no  wise  the  sacra¬ 
mental  form.”  88  However,  not  any  kind  of  consent  given 
with  a  view  to  marriage  constitutes  a  matrimonial  contract  or 
a  sacramental  rite.  It  must  first  of  all  have  a  bearing  upon 
marriage  as  here  and  now  contracted;  if  it  is  merely  given  in 
reference  to  a  future  marriage,  it  results  simply  in  an  engage- 

84  Cfr.  Thomas,  Stippl.  q.  42,  a.  2:  86  Ibid.  q.  61,  a.  1-3;  Bonavent. 

ibid.  q.  45,  a.  1 ;  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  loc.  cit.  q.  2. 

IV.  d.  26,  a.  2,  q.  1.  87  Snppl.  q.  42.  a.  1  ad  2m. 

85  Cfr.  Ibid.  d.  27,  a.  3,  q.  1 ;  88  Ibid.  a.  1  ad  im. 

Thomas,  Snppl.  q.  62,  a.  1-5. 


396 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


ment  of  the  parties  concerned.89  Secondly,  it  must  be  the 
consent  of  persons  who  are  in  every  way  free  and  competent 
to  enter  a  matrimonial  contract.  Nor  is  it  sufficient  that  the 
persons  in  question  be  naturally  competent,  but  they  must  also 
be  free  from  all  impediments  that  have  been  established  by  the 
positive  law,  either  divine  or  ecclesiastical.90 

Finally,  although  all  the  Scholastics  speak  of  matrimony 
with  due  respect,  and  look  upon  it  as  a  holy  state,  nevertheless 
they  are  unanimous  in  placing  perpetual  virginity  on  a  higher 
level  of  Christian  perfection.  This  conclusion  they  derive  both 
from  the  example  of  Christ,  the  teaching  of  St.  Paul,  and  from 
the  nature  of  the  two  states  in  respect  to  the  service  of  God. 
Matrimony  is  good,  but  perpetual  virginity  freely  vowed  to 
God  is  better.91 

89  Ibid.  q.  43,  a.  I.  91  Cfr.  Thomas,  Sum.  Theol.  II. 

90  Cfr.  Thomas,  Suppl.  q.  50,  a.  II,  q.  152,  a.  4,  5 ;  Bonavent.  op.  cit. 
unicus;  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  d.  39,  a.  2 ;  Middleton,  ibid.  a.  4,  q.  2. 
36-42;  Scotus,  Ibid.  d.  34-42. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 


MARIOLOGY 

SANCTIFICATION  BEFORE  BIRTH:  IMMACULATE  CONCEP¬ 
TION:  DIVINE  MOTHERHOOD:  VENERATION 

With  the  exception  of  a  few  subordinate  points,  dogmatic 
Mariology  was  fully  developed  during*  Patristic  times.  Mary 
was  universally  honored  as  the  Virgin  Mother  of  God,  free 
from  all  stain  of  sin,  full  of  grace,  the  holiest  of  God's  crea¬ 
tures,  conformable  to  her  divine  Son  in  His  untold  sufferings 
and  the  dissolution  of  death,  but  also  sharing  with  Him  the 
glory  of  His  resurrection  by  being  herself  raised  from  the 
dead  and  assumed  into  heaven.  All  this  was  a  matter  of 
Catholic  belief  before  the  Scholastics  began  to  systematize  the 
teaching  of  the  Fathers.1  Hence  there  was  little  room  for 
development  in  the  Mariological  teaching  of  the  Church,  ex¬ 
cept  by  way  of  setting  forth  certain  details  which  had  been 
only  lightly  touched  upon  by  Patristic  writers.  And  to  this 
the  Scholastics  chiefly  devoted  themselves  in  their  studies  of 
the  many  privileges  and  prerogatives  of  the  Mother  of  God. 

A  —  Sanctification  Before  Birth 

“  That  the  Blessed  Virgin  was  sanctified  in  her  mother’s 
womb,”  writes  St.  Bonaventure,  “  is  a  matter  which  the 
Church  holds  to  admit  of  no  doubt.  And  this  appears  from 
the  fact  that  the  whole  Church  celebrates  the  feast  of  her 
nativity,  which  she  would  certainly  not  do  if  Mary  had  not 
been  sanctified  before  her  birth.”  2  And  then,  to  show  the  rea¬ 
sonableness  of  this  teaching,  he  argues  from  the  principle  laid 
down  by  St.  Bernard,  who  says :  “  That  which  we  read  to 

1  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  441  sqq.  2  In  Sent.  Ill,  p.  1,  a.  1,  q.  3. 


397 


398 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


have  been  conferred  on  others,  cannot  be  held  to  have  been 
denied  to  the  Virgin.”  Holy  Scripture  bears  witness  that  the 
Prophet  Jeremias  and  John  the  Baptist  were  thus  privileged, 
and  how  much  more  should  not  this  same  privilege  have  been 
granted  to  the  Virgin,  who  exceeded  them  both  in  purity  and 
perfection  of  virginity?  They  indeed  were  distinguished  for 
their  virginity,  but  in  her  to  perfect  virginity  was  joined 
miraculous  fecundity.  They  were  sanctified  in  the  womb  be¬ 
cause  they  were  sent  to  announce  the  Holy  of  Holies,  how 
much  more,  then,  was  it  not  becoming  that  she  should  be  thus 
sanctified  who  was  to  bear  God  in  her  womb?3 

This  reasoning  of  the  Seraphic  Doctor  summarizes  the  argu¬ 
ments  that  were  commonly  advanced  by  the  Scholastics  to 
prove  the  point  in  question.  It  is  ultimately  her  divine  mother¬ 
hood  to  which  Mary  owes  all  her  privileges,  and  as  this  is  a 
dignity  that  exceeds  all  others  ever  granted  to  any  creature, 
her  privileges  are  in  consequence  the  very  highest  that  God 
can  bestow.  In  this  sense  St.  Thomas  argues,  when  he  says : 
“  It  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  she,  who  brought  forth  the 
Only  Begotten  of  the  Father  full  of  grace  and  truth,  received 
greater  privileges  of  grace  than  all  others.”  4 

This  sanctification  in  the  womb  was  so  perfect,  that  in  view 
of  it  the  Blessed  Virgin  was  preserved  from  all  personal  sin. 
On  this  point  all  Scholastics  are  agreed.  St.  Thomas  outlines 
the  common  reasoning  as  follows:  “  God  so  prepares  and 
endows  those  whom  He  chooses  for  some  particular  office, 
that  they  are  capable  of  fulfilling  it.  .  .  .  Now  the  Blessed 
Virgin  was  chosen  by  God  to  be  His  Mother.  Therefore  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  God,  by  His  grace,  made  her  worthy  of 
that  office.  .  .  .  But  she  would  not  have  been  worthy  to  be 
the  Mother  of  God,  if  she  had  ever  sinned.  First,  because  the 
honor  of  the  parents  reflects  on  the  child,  .  .  .  and  conse¬ 
quently,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Mother's  shame  would  have 
reflected  on  her  Son.  Secondly,  because  of  the  singular  af¬ 
finity  between  her  and  Christ,  who  took  flesh  from  her :  .  .  . 
Thirdly,  because  of  the  singular  manner  in  which  the  Son  of 

4  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  27,  a.  1. 


3  Ibid. 


SANCTIFICATION  OF  THE  VIRGIN 


399 


God,  who  is  divine  wisdom,  dwelt  in  her,  not  only  in  her  soul 
but  in  her  womb.  .  .  .  We  must  therefore  confess  simply  that 
the  Blessed  Virgin  committed  no  actual  sin,  neither  mortal 
nor  venial;  so  that  what  is  written  is  fulfilled:  Thou  art  all 
fair ,  0  my  love,  and  there  is  not  a  spot  in  thee.”  5 

To  these  reasons  for  belief  in  Mary’s  sinlessness,  which 
are  all  taken  from  her  relation  to  her  divine  Son,  St.  Bona- 
venture  adds  another  which  is  based  upon  her  relation  to  the 
fallen  race  and  her  triumph  over  the  devil.  “  It  was  also  be¬ 
coming,”  he  argues,  “  that  the  Blessed  Virgin,  through  whom 
our  disgrace  was  to  be  taken  away,  should  conquer  the  devil 
so  completely  that  she  did  not  yield  to  him  in  the  slightest 
degree.  Hence,  it  is  to  her  that  St.  Bernard  and  St.  Augus¬ 
tine  apply  the  verse  in  Genesis :  '  She  shall  crush  thy  head / 

If  then  the  suggestion  of  evil  is  the  head  of  the  devil,  no 
suggestion  of  this  kind  ever  found  entrance  into  the  mind  of 
the  Virgin,  so  that  she  was  preserved  from  both  mortal  and 
venial  sin.  .  .  .  Consequently,  as  the  Blessed  Virgin  is  the 
advocate  of  sinners,  the  glory  and  crown  of  the  just,  the 
spouse  of  God,  the  bridal  bed  of  the  whole  Trinity,  and  in  a 
most  special  manner  the  couch  whereon  the  Son  reposes,  it  was 
but  right  that,  by  a  special  grace  of  God,  in  her  sin  should  have 
no  place.”  15 

In  connection  with  Mary’s  preservation  from  all  personal 
sin,  the  Scholastics  discuss  the  question  whether  also  the  in¬ 
clination  to  sin  —  the  fomes  peccati  —  was  extinguished  in  her 
sanctification.  On  that  point  there  is  no  agreement  in  their 
views.  All  indeed  admit  that  Mary’s  natural  inclinations  were 
fully  subject  to  reason  assisted  by  grace,  but  there  is  a  differ¬ 
ence  of  opinion  as  to  what  this  subjection  really  implied.  In 
regard  to  the  point  in  question,  the  Schoolmen  usually  distin¬ 
guished  a  twofold  sanctification  of  the  Blessed  Virgin :  the  first 
took  place  before  her  birth,  as  already  indicated;  the  second 
was  effected  at  the  moment  when  she  conceived  her  divine  Son. 
This  latter  was  regarded  as  a  complement  of  the  former,  in 
the  sense  that  it  increased  sanctifying  grace  in  her  soul  and 

5  Ibid.  a.  4. 


9 


6  In  Sent.  Ill,  p.  1,  a.  2,  q.  1. 


4°o 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


thereby  rooted  her  more  firmly  in  her  opposition  to  sin.  In 
accordance  with  this  distinction,  the  following  three  views  were 
formed  in  regard  to  the  extinction  of  the  fomes  peccati . 

Some  there  were,  as  St.  Bonaventure  testifies,7  who  denied 
the  extinction  of  the  fomes  altogether,  but  held  that  it  was  put 
to  sleep  or  fettered  in  the  first  sanctification,  so  that  thereafter 
the  natural  appetite  never  rose  in  rebellion  against  the  dictate 
of  reason.  Then,  in  the  second  sanctification,  this  condition 
of  inactivity  on  the  part  of  the  natural  appetite  was  intensified 
by  an  increase  of  grace ;  but  the  fomes  still  continued  to  exist. 

Others  admitted  the  extinction  of  the  fomes ,  but  in  this 
respect  made  a  distinction  between  person  and  nature.  This 
was  the  view  taken  by  Alexander  of  Hales.  In  the  first  sancti¬ 
fication,  he  says,  the  fomes  was  extinguished  as  regarded  the 
person  of  the  Blessed  Virgin,  but  in  the  second  as  regarded 
her  nature.  In  the  first  she  was  purified  in  such  a  way  that 
she  never  fell  into  sin ;  in  the  second,  so  as  to  bring  forth  her 
child  without  sin.  In  the  first  sanctification  the  fomes  was 
extinguished  in  so  far  as  it  would  have  made  her  prone  to 
evil;  in  the  second,  furthermore,  in  so  far  as  it  would  have 
been  an  obstacle  to  good.8  This  view  St.  Bonaventure  terms 
unintelligible.9 

Others,  finally,  held  that  in  the  first  sanctification  the  fomes 
was  fettered,  and  in  the  second  it  was  extinguished.  This  is 
the  view  taken  by  St.  Thomas,10  St.  Bonaventure,11  Albertus 
Magnus,12  Richard  of  Middleton,13  .TEgidius  Romanus,14  and 
Durandus.15  St.  Thomas  puts  it  in  this  way:  “  In  order  to 
understand  the  question  at  issue,  it  must  be  observed  that  the 
fomes  is  nothing  else  than  a  certain  inordinate,  but  habitual, 
concupiscence  of  the  sensitive  appetite;  for  actual  concu¬ 
piscence  is  a  sinful  motion.  Now  sensual  concupiscence  is 
said  to  be  inordinate,  in  so  far  as  it  rebels  against  reason;  and 
this  it  does  by  inclining  to  evil,  or  hindering  from  good.  Con¬ 
sequently  it  is  essential  to  the  fomes  to  incline  to  evil,  or 


7  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  3,  p.  1,  a.  2,  q.  2. 

8  Sum.  Ill,  q.  9,  m.  2,  a.  5. 

9  Loc.  Clt. 

10  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  27,  a.  3. 

11  Loc.  cit. 


12  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  3,  a.  6. 

13  Ibid.  a.  1,  q.  4. 

14  Ibid.  q.  1,  a.  4. 

16  Ibid.  q.  3. 


# 


SANCTIFICATION  OF  THE  VIRGIN 


401 


hinder  from  good.  Wherefore  to  say  that  the  fomes  was  in 
the  Blessed  Virgin  without  an  inclination  to  evil,  is  to  combine 
two  contradictory  statements. 

“  In  like  manner  it  seems  to  imply  a  contradiction  to  say  that 
the  fomes  remained  as  to  the  corruption  of  nature,  but  not 
as  to  personal  corruption.  For,  according  to  Augustine,  it  is 
lust  that  transmits  original  sin  to  the  offspring.  Now  lust 
implies  inordinate  concupiscence,  not  entirely  subject  to  rea¬ 
son  :  and  therefore,  if  the  fomes  were  entirely  taken  away  as 
to  personal  corruption,  it  could  not  remain  as  to  the  corrup¬ 
tion  of  nature. 

“  It  remains,  therefore,  for  us  to  say,  either  that  the  fomes 
was  entirely  taken  away  from  her  by  her  first  sanctification 
or  that  it  was  fettered.  Now  that  the  fomes  was  entirely 
taken  away,  might  be  understood  in  this  sense,  that,  by  the 
abundance  of  grace  bestowed  on  the  Blessed  Virgin,  such  a 
disposition  of  the  soul’s  powers  was  granted  to  her,  that  the 
lower  powers  were  never  moved  without  the  command  of 
reason ;  just  as  we  have  stated  above  to  have  been  the  case  with 
Christ,  who  certainly  did  not  have  the  fomes  of  sin ;  as  also 
was  the  case  with  Adam,  before  he  sinned,  by  reason  of  orig¬ 
inal  justice :  so  that  in  this  respect  the  grace  of  sanctification  in 
the  Virgin  had  the  force  of  the  primitive  gift  of  righteousness. 
And  although  this  appears  to  be  part  of  the  dignity  of  the 
Virgin  Mother,  yet  it  is  somewhat  derogatory  to  the  dignity 
of  Christ,  without  whose  power  no  one  had  been  freed  from 
the  first  sentence  of  condemnation.  .  .  .  Consequently,  just  as 
before  the  immortality  of  the  flesh  of  Christ  rising  again,  none 
obtained  immortality  of  the  flesh,  so  it  seems  unfitting  to  say 
that  before  Christ  appeared  in  sinless  flesh,  His  Virgin 
Mother’s  or  anyone  else’s  flesh  should  be  without  the  fomes 
which  is  called  the  lave  of  the  flesh  or  of  the  members . 

“  Therefore  it  seems  better  to  say  that  by  the  sanctification  in 
the  womb,  the  Virgin  was  not  freed  from  the  fomes  in  its  es¬ 
sence,  but  that  it  remained  fettered:  not  indeed  by  an  act  of 
her  reason,  as  in  holy  men,  since  she  had  not  the  use  of  reason 
from  the  first  moment  of  her  existence  in  her  mother’s  womb, 
for  this  was  the  singular  privilege  of  Christ:  but  by  way  of  the 


402 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


abundant  grace  bestowed  on  her  in  her  sanctification,  and  still 
more  perfectly  by  Divine  Providence  preserving  her  sensitive 
soul,  in  a  singular  manner,  from  any  inordinate  movement. 
Afterwards,  however,  at  the  conception  of  Christ’s  flesh,  in 
which  for  the  first  time  immunity  from  sin  was  to  be  con¬ 
spicuous,  it  is  to  be  believed  that  entire  freedom  from  the 
fomes  redounded  from  the  Child  to  the  Mother.”  16 

This  view  was  commonly  held  by  the  more  representative 
Scholastics  up  to  the  time  of  Scotus.  He,  however,  was  not 
satisfied  with  it;  but  instead  defended  the  opinion,  rejected  by 
St.  Thomas,  that  the  fomes  was  entirely  extinguished  by  the 
Virgin’s  first  sanctification.17  This  has  since  become  the  com¬ 
mon  teaching  of  theologians,  and  is  certainly  more  in  keeping 
with  the  doctrine  of  the  Immaculate  Conception. 

Along  with  the  extinction  of  the  fomes ,  the  Scholastics  also 
defend  Mary’s  confirmation  in  grace.  This  they  usually  con¬ 
nect  with  the  second  sanctification;  although  even  before  that 
sanctification  took  place,  Divine  Providence  preserved  her  from 
all  personal  sin.  Hence,  in  a  certain  sense,  Mary  was  impec¬ 
cable.  However,  her  impeccability  differed  both  from  that 
of  Christ  and  of  the  blessed  in  heaven.  Mary  was  a  pure 
creature  and  still  on  her  way  to  the  state  of  final  blessedness  ; 
hence  she  was  rendered  impeccable  exclusively  through  the 
abundance  of  grace  which  she  received.  St.  Thomas  explains 
it  in  this  way :  “  The  power  of  sinning  may  be  taken  away 

in  one  of  two  ways :  First,  by  the  union  of  the  free  will  with 
its  last  end,  which  so  entirely  fills  it  that  no  defect  remains; 
and  this  is  brought  about  by  the  vision  of  God  in  glory;  hence, 
in  no  person  who  is  still  on  the  way  to  heaven  is  the  power  of 
sinning  taken  away  in  such  a  manner.  .  .  .  Secondly,  the 
power  of  sinning  may  be  removed  by  the  infusion  of  such  an 
abundance  of  grace  that  thereby  all  defects  are  expelled:  and 
so  it  was  removed  in  the  case  of  the  Blessed  Virgin  when  she 
conceived  the  Son  of  God.  All  power  of  sinning  was  taken 
away,  although  the  Virgin  herself  still  remained  in  statu 

16  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  27,  a.  3.  17  In  Sent.  II,  d.  29,  n.  4;  d.  32, 

11.  4;  III,  d.  3. 


THE  IMMACULATE  CONCEPTION 


403 


viae.”  18  Or  as  St.  Bonaventure  briefly  puts  it:  “  Not  only 
was  sanctifying  grace  given  to  the  Virgin  in  her  second  sanc¬ 
tification,  but  also  the  grace  whereby  she  was  confirmed  in 
good ;  and  this  was  granted  to  her  because  she  was  so  closely 
united  to  her  Son  that  He  could  in  no  way  permit  her  to  be 
separated  from  Himself.”  19 

B  —  The  Immaculate  Conception 

Nearly  all  Patristic  writers  laid  down  principles  from  which 
belief  in  the  Immaculate  Conception  flows  as  a  natural  conse¬ 
quence  ;  although  there  is  hardly  one  among  them  who  taught 
the  doctrine  so  explicitly  that  his  words  do  not  admit  of  a 
different  explanation.20  The  fact,  too,  that  from  the  middle 
of  the  eighth  century  forward  the  feast  of  the  Conception  of 
the  Virgin  Mary  was  observed  in  ever  widening  circles,  with 
at  least  the  tacit  acquiescence  of  the  Church,  is  a  sign  that 
Christian  consciousness  was  fast  awaking  to  the  truth  of  this 
doctrine.  The  impulse  came  from  the  East,  but  it  found  a 
ready  response  among  the  faithful  in  western  lands. 

It  was  in  this  stage  of  its  development  that  the  doctrine  of 
the  Immaculate  Conception  was  subjected  to  a  thorough  study 
by  the  Scholastics,  and,  strange  to  say,  it  was  by  nearly  all  of 
them  set  aside  as  not  sufficiently  in  harmony  with  the  Church’s 
teaching  on  the  universality  of  original  sin  and  of  the  redemp¬ 
tion.  St.  Anselm,  St.  Bernard,  Peter  Lombard,  Alexander 
of  Hales,  Bonaventure,  Albertus  Magnus,  and  St.  Thomas, 
though  tenderly  devout  to  God’s  holy  Mother  and  ever  ready 
to  defend  her  many  privileges  and  prerogatives,  nevertheless 
taught  quite  definitely  that  she  was  conceived  in  sin  as  all  the 
rest  of  mankind.  Christ  alone,  they  held,  was  immune  from 
the  original  stain. —  In  this  we  seem  to  have  a  striking  proof 
of  the  fact  that  sometimes  the  sensus  Udelium  is  a  safer  guide 
in  matters  of  faith,  not  yet  clearly  defined,  than  the  prevailing 
views  of  theologians. 

18  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  3,  q.  1,  a.  2. 

19  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  3,  p.  1,  a.  2,  q.  3. 


20  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  443  sqq. 


404 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


However,  by  way  of  explanation  of  the  strange  phenome¬ 
non  just  referred  to,  it  must  be  noted  that  at  the  time  there 
stood  some  serious  difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  theological  ex¬ 
position  and  acceptance  of  the  doctrine  in  question.  First  of 
all,  most  of  the  theologians  of  the  day,  as  was  shown  in  a 
previous  chapter,  had  only  an  imperfect  understanding  of  the 
nature  and  transmission  of  original  sin.  Secondly,  a  way  had 
to  be  found  of  reconciling  the  doctrine  of  the  universality  of 
the  redemption  with  the  exemption  from  all  sin  of  one  who 
had  descended  from  the  fallen  Adam.  Thirdly,  the  biological 
fact  of  conception  itself  was  not  well  understood,  it  being  the 
common  teaching  at  the  time  that  the  spiritual  soul  was  not 
infused  into  the  body  of  the  child  until  the  organism  had  suf¬ 
ficiently  developed.  In  consequence,  many  interpreted  the  Im¬ 
maculate  Conception  to  mean  either  that  the  act  of  procreation 
was  without  sin  on  the  part  of  the  parents,  or  that  the  body 
of  the  child  was  preserved  from  contracting  the  original  stain. 
Hence  the  strange  question  found  in  the  works  of  nearly  all 
Scholastics:  “  Whether  the  Blessed  Virgin  was  purified  from 
original  sin  before  animation?  ”  As  is  obvious,  in  such  a  con¬ 
fused  state  of  things  there  is  much  to  excuse  the  erroneous 
teaching  to  which  even  the  greatest  thinkers  of  the  golden  age 
of  Scholasticism  committed  themselves. 

With  this  premised,  we  may  first  give  a  brief  resume  of  the 
arguments  usually  advanced  against  the  doctrine  of  the  Im¬ 
maculate  Conception,  and  then  indicate  those  that  were  urged 
in  its  favor. 

Among  the  first  who  came  out  clearly  against  the  Immacu¬ 
late  Conception,  as  then  understood,  was  St.  Bernard.  His 
presentation  of  the  question  brings  out  strikingly  the  con¬ 
fusion  of  ideas  referred  to  above.  Protesting  against  the 
contemplated  introduction  of  the  feast  in  the  church  of  Lyons, 
he  asks:  “Whence  therefore  comes  the  sanctity  of  the  con¬ 
ception  ?  Is  she  said  to  have  been  prevented  by  sanctification, 
so  that  she  was  holy  when  conceived,  and  for  this  reason  her 
conception  itself  was  holy,  just  as  she  is  said  to  have  been 
sanctified  in  the  womb,  and  in  consequence  was  holy  in  her 
birth?  But  she  could  not  be  holy  before  she  existed;  for  in 


THE  IMMACULATE  CONCEPTION 


405 


truth  she  had  no  existence  before  she  was  conceived.  Or  was 
there  perhaps  in  the  marital  embrace  of  her  parents  sanctity 
communicated  to  the  conception,  so  that  she  was  at  the  same 
time  sanctified  and  conceived  ?  But  how  could  there  be  sanc¬ 
tity  without  the  sanctifying  Spirit,  or  how  could  there  be  an 
association  of  the  Holy  Spirit  with  sin?  Or  surely,  howr  was 
there  no  sin,  where  concupiscence  was  not  absent?  Unless 
perhaps  some  one  would  say  that  she  was  conceived  of  the 
Holy  Ghost  and  not  of  man.  But  such  a  thing  is  hitherto  un¬ 
heard  of.” 

From  this  it  will  be  seen  that  the  writer  makes  all  manner 
of  suppositions,  except  the  right  one  —  that  her  soul  might 
have  been  sanctified  by  the  infusion  of  sanctifying  grace  when 
united  to  the  body.  And  in  keeping  with  his  false  supposi¬ 
tions,  he  draws  his  false  conclusion:  “  If  therefore  she  could 
in  no  way  be  sanctified  before  her  conception,  because  she  did 
not  yet  exist;  and  neither  in  her  conception  on  acount  of  the 
sin  that  was  there ;  it  remains  that  w^e  must  believe  her  to  have 
been  sanctified  after  her  conception  when  already  existing  in 
the  womb,  and  that  in  consequence  the  exclusion  of  sin  caused 
her  birth  to  be  holy,  but  not  her  conception.”  21 

St.  Anselm,  whose  concept  of  original  sin  was  substantially 
the  same  as  that  of  modern  theologians,  and  who  stated  so 
clearly  that  under  God  nothing  could  be  conceived  to  be  more 
pure  than  the  Virgin  Mother,22  nevertheless  fell  into  the  same 
error  concerning  the  Immaculate  Conception.  Thus  when 
Boso,  his  interlocutor  in  the  Car  Deus  Homo,  makes  the  state¬ 
ment  that  the  Virgin  was  conceived  in  original  sin,  because 
she  too  had  sinned  in  Adam,  he  answers :  “  We  ought  not  to 

think  it  strange  if  we  cannot  see  the  reason  why  the  wisdom  of 
God  so  disposed  matters,  but  we  must  admit  with  due  rever¬ 
ence  that  in  His  hidden  ways  there  is  something  we  do  not 
understand.”  23 

Alexander  of  Hales,  at  the  very  beginning  of  his  inquiry, 
enunciates  the  principle  that  whatever  grace  could  be  con¬ 
ferred  upon  the  Blessed  Virgin,  was  conferred  upon  her;  but 

21  Ep.  174,  n.  7.  23  Op.  cit.  II,  c.  16. 

22  De  Concept.  Virgin,  c.  18. 


40  6 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


among  these  possible  graces  he  does  not  find  that  of  the  Im¬ 
maculate  Conception.  He  points  out  that  she  could  not  be 
purified  before  her  conception,  nor  in  her  conception,  nor  be¬ 
fore  the  infusion  of  her  soul;  but  only  after  she  had  been  con¬ 
ceived,  as  other  saints  had  also  been  purified,  and  therefore 
her  birth  was  holy.24 

St.  Bonaventure,  in  some  respects,  comes  nearer  to  the  point, 
but  in  the  end  he  also  decides  against  the  doctrine.  Putting 
the  question  whether  the  soul  of  the  Blessed  Virgin  was  sanc¬ 
tified  before  contracting  original  sin,  he  answers :  “  Some 

there  are  who  say  that  in  the  soul  of  the  glorious  Virgin  the 
grace  of  sanctification  prevented  the  stain  of  original  sin. 
And  they  assign  this  reason :  It  was  becoming  that  the  soul 
of  the  glorious  Virgin  should  be  sanctified  in  a  more  excellent 
manner  than  the  souls  of  all  other  saints,  not  only  as  regards 
the  abundance  of  sanctity,  but  also  in  respect  of  the  accelera¬ 
tion  of  time ;  and  therefore  at  the  very  instant  of  creation  grace 
wras  given  her,  and  in  the  same  instant  her  soul  was  infused 
into  the  body.”  25 

In  this  there  is  obviously  no  misunderstanding  of  the  true 
doctrine ;  but  though  the  doctrine  is  thus  rightly  understood, 
the  author  does  not  see  his  way  towards  making  it  his  own. 
For  he  continues:  “But  the  position  of  others  is  this,  that 
the  sanctification  of  the  Virgin  -followed  the  contraction  of 
original  sin;  and  for  this  reason,  that  no1  one  was  free  from 
the  guilt  of  original  sin  save  only  the  Son  of  the  Virgin.  For 
as  the  Apostle  says  in  the  third  chapter  of  his  Epistle  to  the 
Romans:  All  have  sinned  and  need  the  glory  of  God. 

.  .  .  And  this  manner  of  speaking  is.  more  common  and  more 
reasonable  and  more  safe.  More  common,  I  say,  because 
nearly  all  hold  that  the  Blessed  Virgin  was  infected  with 
original  sin.  .  .  .  More  reasonable,  because  nature  precedes 
grace,  either  in  the  order  of  time  or  in  the  order  of  nature; 
and  hence  St.  Augustine  says  that  one  must  first  be  born  be¬ 
fore  one  can  be  reborn.  .  .  .  Hence,  it  is  necessary  to  hold 
that  the  infection  of  original  sin  preceded  sanctification.  More 

25  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  3,  p.  1,  a.  1,  q.  2. 


24  Sum.  Ill,  q.  9,  m.  2. 


THE  IMMACULATE  CONCEPTION 


407 


safe,  because  it  is  more  in  harmony  with  the  piety  of  faith 
and  the  authority  of  the  saints.”  26 

Albertus  Magnus  summarizes  his  view  on  the  subject  in 
these  terms :  “  It  must  be  held  that  the  Blessed  Virgin  was 

sanctified  in  the  womb  before  her  birth;  but  what  precise  day 
or  hour  this  was  accomplished,  no  man  can  know,  except  by 
way  of  revelation :  unless  one  wants  to  hold  that  it  took  place 
shortly  after  animation.”  27 

The  same  position  is  taken  by  St.  Thomas,  although  since 
the  end  of  the  fourteenth  century  ever  so  many  attempts  have 
been  made  to  show  that  he  did  not  oppose  the  doctrine  as 
rightly  understood.  He  treats  the  subject  in  many  different 
places,  but  the  following  extracts  will  suffice  to  indicate  his 
mind  on  the  point  in  question. 

In  his  Summa  Theologica  he  first  gives  several  reasons  why 
the  Blessed  Virgin  could  not  have  been  sanctified  before  ani¬ 
mation,  and  then  gives  this  general  argument :  “  And  thus, 

in  whatever  manner  the  Blessed  Virgin  would  have  been  sanc¬ 
tified  before  animation,  she  could  never  have  incurred  the 
stain  of  original  sin:  and  thus  she  would  not  have  needed  re¬ 
demption  and  salvation  which  is  by  Christ,  of  whom  it  is 
written:  He  shall  save  His  people  from  their  sins.  But  this 
is  unfitting,  through  implying  that  Christ  is  not  the  Saviour 
of  all  men,  as  He  is  called.  It  remains,  therefore,  that  the 
Blessed  Virgin  was  sanctified  after  animation.”  28  Then  to 
the  objection  that  “  the  purity  of  the  Blessed  Virgin  would 
have  been  greater  if  she  had  never  been  stained  by  the  con¬ 
tagion  of  original  sin,”  he  replies :  “  If  the  soul  of  the  Blessed 

Virgin  had  never  incurred  the  stain  of  original  sin,  this  would 
be  derogatory  to  the  dignity  of  Christ,  by  reason  of  His  being 
the  universal  Saviour  of  all.  Consequently  after  Christ,  who, 
as  the  universal  Saviour  of  all,  needed  not  to  be  saved,  the 
purity  of  the  Blessed  Virgin  holds  the  highest  place.  For 
Christ  did  not  contract  original  sin  in  any  way  whatever,  but 
was  holy  in  His  very  conception,  according  to  Luke  1,  35: 
The  Holy  which  shall  he  horn  of  thee,  shall  he  called  the  Son 

2«  Ibid. 

27  Ibid.  a.  5 ;  a.  3,  4. 


28  Op.  cit.  Ill,  q.  27,  a.  2. 


408 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


of  God.  But  the  blessed  Virgin  did  indeed  contract  original 
sin,  but  was  cleansed  therefrom  before  her  birth  from  the 
womb.”  2y 

Then  the  further  objection,  that  “  no  feast  is  celebrated  ex¬ 
cept  of  some  saint,  and  that  some  keep  the  feast  of  the  Con¬ 
ception  of  the  Blessed  Virgin,”  he  answers  by  saying:  “  Al¬ 
though  the  Church  of  Rome  does  not  celebrate  the  Conception 
of  the  Blessed  Virgin,  yet  it  tolerates  the  custom  of  certain 
churches  which  do  keep  that  feast;  wherefore  this  is  not  to  be 
entirely  reprobated.  Nevertheless  the  celebration  of  this  feast 
does  not  give  us  to  understand  that  she  was  holy  in  her  con¬ 
ception.  But  since  it  is  not  known  when  she  was  sanctified, 
the  feast  of  her  Sanctification,  rather  than  the  feast  of  her 
Conception,  is  kept  on  the  day  of  her  conception.”  30 

He  proposes  the  same  doctrine  in  his  Commentaries  on  the 
Sentences ,  where  he  says:  “  The  sanctification  of  the  Blessed 
Virgin  could  not  fittingly  precede  the  infusion  of  her  soul, 
because  then  she  was  not  capable  of  sanctification;  but  neither 
could  it  take  place  at  the  very  instant  when  her  soul  was  in¬ 
fused  into  her  body,  so  that  through  grace  she  was  preserved 
from  incurring  original  sin.  For  of  all  the  human  race  Christ 
alone  has  this  singular  privilege  that  He  does  not  need  redemp¬ 
tion,  because  He  is  our  Head ;  but  all  others  must  be  redeemed 
by  Him.  Now  this  could  not  be,  if  another  soul  were  found 
that  had  never  been  infected  with  the  original  stain ;  and  there¬ 
fore  this  was  not  conceded  even  to  the  Blessed  Virgin,  nor  to 
any  one  else  besides  Christ.”  31 

The  same  reasoning  recurs,  almost  word  for  word,  in  his 
Commentary  on  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans  32  in  his  Qitodli- 
beta .33  in  his  Expositio  Salutationis  Angelicaep 4  and  in  his 
Compendium  Theologicum ,35  Hence,  any  effort  to  make  St. 
Thomas  an  advocate  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Immaculate  Con¬ 
ception,  or  to  show  that  he  was  not  opposed  to  the  doctrine  as 
understood  at  the  present  time,  is  at  best  misdirected.  His 

29  Ibid,  ad  2m.  32  Op.  cit.  in  V,  12. 

30  Ibid,  ad  3m.  33  Op.  cit.  6,  a.  7. 

31  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  3,  q.  1,  a.  1,  sol.  34  Op.  cit.  1. 

1  ad  im.  35  Op.  cit.  c.  224  (al.  232). 


THE  IMMACULATE  CONCEPTION 


409 


arguments  are  not  urged  against  a  misinterpretation  of  the 
doctrine,  but  against  the  doctrine  itself.  This  does  not  de¬ 
tract  from  his  fame  as  a  theologian,  or  as  a  devout  client  of 
the  Mother  of  God;  but  only  shows  that  even  in  theology 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  development. 

However,  although  the  most  representative  Scholastics  prior 
to  the  fourteenth  century  were  thus  resolutely  opposed  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  Immaculate  Conception,  there  were  never  want¬ 
ing  others,  though  of  lesser  fame,  who  with  equal  resolution 
defended  Mary’s  prerogative  by  every  means  in  their  power. 
Among  these  was  Vincent  of  Beauvais,  a  Dominican  and  con¬ 
temporary  of  St.  Thomas,  who,  referring  to  the  feast  of  the 
Conception,  says  very  definitely:  “  But  now,  because  she  is 
venerated  by  the  authority  of  the  whole  Church,  it  is  evident 
that  she  was  preserved  in  every  way  from  original  sin,  and  by 
her  was  not  only  taken  away  the  malediction  of  mother  Eve, 
but  all  were  filled  with  blessing.  The  Virgin  was  subject  to  no 
fault  when  she  was  born,  nor  did  she  contract  original  sin 
before  she  was  sanctified  in  the  womb.”  36 

The  doctrine  was  also  defended  by  Eadmer,  disciple  and 
biographer  of  St.  Anselm.  He  uses  practically  the  same  argu¬ 
ment  that  was  some  two  hundred  years  later  employed  by 
Scotus  —  potnit ,  decuit ,  fecit.  “  Could  not  God,”  he  asks, 
“  grant  to  the  human  body  of  which  He  prepared  for  Himself 
a  temple,  in  which  He  dwelt  corporeally,  and  of  which  He  as¬ 
sumed  human  nature  into  the  unity  of  person,  that,  although 
conceived  amid  the  thorns  of  sin,  it  should  nevertheless  be  al¬ 
together  preserved  from  the  sting  of  these  thorns?  He  evi¬ 
dently  could.  If,  then,  He  willed,  He  did.  And  indeed, 
whatever  in  the  order  of  dignity  He  willed  in  regard  to  any¬ 
one  apart  from  His  own  person,  that,  O  Most  Blessed  of 
women,  He  surely  willed  in  regard  to  thee.  .  .  .  Out  of  the 
sinful  mass,  therefore,  He  could  preserve  a  human  nature  free 
from  all  stain  of  sin,  and  from  it  unite  a  human  nature  to  His 
own  person,  so  that  He  was  a  true  man  and  yet  in  no  way  de¬ 
tract  from  the  holiness  of  His  divinity.”  37 

36  Laudes  V.  Mariae,  c.  5,  6.  _ 37  De  Conceptione  Sanctae  Ma- 

riae,  n.  8. 


4io 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Besides  these  two,  there  were  many  others  who  defended 
the  doctrine  of  the  Immaculate  Conception,  as  is  quite  evident 
from  the  statement  of  St.  Bonaventure  referred  to  in  a  previ¬ 
ous  paragraph.  However,  it  was  reserved  for  Duns  Scotus 
to  turn  the  tide  of  theological  opinion  completely  in  its  favor. 
This  he  did  chiefly  by  removing  the  principal  difficulty  urged 
against  it,  namely,  that  such  a  privilege  conferred  on  a  pure 
creature  would  be  derogatory  to  the  dignity  of  Christ  as  the 
universal  Savior;  and  secondarily  also  by  clarifying  the  con¬ 
cept  of  original  sin. 

Assuming  the  principle  upon  which  the  adversaries  of  the 
Immaculate  Conception  built  their  arguments,  namely,  that 
Christ  is  the  redeemer  and  mediator  of  all,  he  makes  it  the 
foundation  of  his  own  arguments  for  the  doctrine.  “  The 
most  perfect  mediator,”  he  argues,  “  has  a  most  perfect  way 
of  mediating  for  any  person  in  whose  behalf  he  mediates. 
But  Christ  is  the  most  perfect  mediator.  Therefore  Christ 
had  the  most  perfect  way  possible  of  mediating  in  behalf  of 
any  creature  or  person  in  respect  of  whom  He  was  the  medi¬ 
ator.  But  in  respect  of  no  person  had  He  a  more  excellent 
way  than  in  respect  of  Mary ;  therefore,  etc.  But  this  would 
not  have  been  the  case  unless  He  merited  for  her  preservation 
from  original  sin.  And  this  I  prove  in  three  ways:  First, 
in  reference  to  God  to  whom  He  reconciled  her;  secondly,  in 
reference  to  the  evil  from  which  He  freed  her;  thirdly,  in 
reference  to  the  obligation  under  which  He  was  in  regard  to 
the  person  whom  He  reconciled.”  38 

Then,  after  completing  the  argument,  he  answers  the  ob¬ 
jection  that  Mary  was  subject  to  the  punishment  consequent 
upon  original  sin,  and  therefore  to  original  sin  itself.  His  an¬ 
swer  is :  “A  mediator  can  reconcile  a  person  in  such  a  man¬ 
ner  that  all  useless  punishment  is  taken  away,  while  afflictions 
that  are  useful  remain.  Original  guilt  would  not  have  been 
useful  to  Mary;  but  temporal  pains  were  useful  to  her,  be¬ 
cause  by  bearing  them  she  merited ;  therefore,  etc.”  39 

Finally  he  sums  up  the  whole  question  in  this  way:  “  God 

38  In  Sent.  Ill,  q.  I,  n.  4  sqq.  39  Ibid.  n.  8. 


THE  IMMACULATE  CONCEPTION 


4i  i 

could  bring  it  about  that  she  never  contracted  original  sin; 
He  could  also  have  brought  it  about  that  she  should  have  been 
in  the  state  of  original  sin  for  only  one  instant;  He  could  also 
have  brought  it  about  that  she  should  have  been  infected  with 
original  sin  for  some  time,  and  in  the  last  instant  of  that  time 
have  been  purified  therefrom.  .  .  .  Which  of  these  three  pos¬ 
sible  ways  He  actually  did  choose,  God  knows.  If  it  does  not 
contravene  the  authority  of  the  Church  and  of  Holy  Scripture, 
it  seems  probable  that  what  is  more  excellent  must  be  attributed 
to  Mary.”  40  Hence,  he  does  not  wish  to  decide  the  question 
on  his  own  authority,  but  he  makes  it  quite  clear  what  he 
thinks  of  the  doctrine  under  discussion. 

The  position  taken  by  Scotus  in  favor  of  the  Immaculate 
Conception  proved  decisive.  His  own  order  took  up  the  de¬ 
fense  without  delay,  in  which  it  was  soon  joined  by  the  Bene¬ 
dictines,  the  Cistersians,  the  Carmelites,  and  the  Augustinians. 
The  Dominicans  alone  held  back,  owing  to  the  authority  of  St. 
Thomas,  whom  they  all  interpreted  as  being  against  the  doc¬ 
trine.  At  the  same  time  the  University  of  Paris  censured  a 
thesis  which  John  de  Montesa,  a  Dominican,  had  presented  for 
his  doctorate,  and  in  which  he  stated:  Beatam  Mariam  Vir- 
ginem  et  Dei  Genitricem  non  contraxisse  peccatum  originate 
est  expresse  contra  fid  cm;  and  later  on  exacted  from  all  candi¬ 
dates  for  the  doctorate  a  promise  under  oath  that  they  would 
defend  the  doctrine  of  the  Immaculate  Conception.  In  1439, 
the  Council  of  Basle,  after  it  had  become  schismatical,  de¬ 
clared  that  the  doctrine  was  conformable  to  faith  and  reason, 
and  prohibited  all  further  arguing  against  it.  Still  the  con¬ 
tention  on  the  part  of  the  Dominicans  was  continued,  until 
Sixtus  IV,  in  1483,  issued  the  Constitution  Grave  nimis,  in 
which  he  reprobated  all  opposition  to  what  had  meanwhile 
become  the  accepted  teaching  of  the  Church.  Thereafter  it 
was  regarded  as  a  matter  of  reproach  to  speak  against  the 
Immaculate  Conception,  and  finally,  in  1854,  the  doctrine  was 
defined  by  Pius  IX,  in  the  Bull  Ineffabilis  Deus.41 

40  Ibid.  n.  9.  41  DB.  1641. 


412 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


C  —  Divine  Motherhood 

Mary's  right  to  the  title,  Mother  of  God,  was  proclaimed 
by  Christian  antiquity  and  solemnly  defined  by  the  Council  of 
Ephesus.42  The  reason  for  the  title  is  thus  stated  by  St. 
Thomas :  “  Every  word  that  signifies  a  nature  in  the  concrete 

can  stand  for  any  hypostasis  of  that  nature.  Now,  since  the 
union  of  the  Incarnation  took  place  in  the  hypostasis,  as  was 
above  stated,  it  is  manifest  that  this  word  God  can  stand  for 
the  hypostasis  having  a  human  and  a  divine  nature.  There¬ 
fore  whatever  belongs  to  the  divine  and  to  the  human  nature 
can  be  attributed  to  that  person:  both  when  a  word  signifying 
the  divine  nature  is  employed  to  stand  for  it,  and  when  a  word 
is  used  signifying  the  human  nature.  Now,  conception  and 
birth  are  attributed  to  the  person  and  hypostasis  in  respect  of 
that  nature  in  which  it  is  conceived  and  born.  Since,  there¬ 
fore,  the  human  nature  was  taken  by  the  divine  person  in  the 
very  beginning  of  the  conception,  as  stated  above,  it  follows 
that  it  can  be  truly  said  that  God  was  conceived  and  born  of 
the  Virgin.  Now,  from  this  is  a  woman  called  a  man’s  mother, 
that  she  conceived  him  and  gave  birth  to  him.  Therefore 
the  Blessed  Virgin  is  truly  called  the  Mother  of  God.  For  the 
only  way  in  which  it  could  be  denied  that  the  Blessed  Virgin  is 
the  Mother  of  God  would  be  one-of  these  two:  either  that  the 
humanity  was  first  subject  to  conception  and  birth,  before 
this  man  was  the  Son  of  God,  as  Photinus  said  ;  or  that  the 
humanity  was  not  assumed  into  unity  of  the  hypostasis  or 
person  of  the  Word  of  God,  as  Nestorius  maintained.  But 
both  of  these  opinions  are  erroneous.  Therefore  it  is  heret¬ 
ical  to  deny  that  the  Blessed  Virgin  is  the  Mother  of  God.”  42a 

This  is  the  common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics  as  regards 
the  fact  of  Mary’s  divine  motherhood;  but  there  is  some  dif¬ 
ference  in  their  views  in  reference  to  her  cooperation  in  the 
conception  of  her  Son.  St.  Bona  venture  puts  the  state  of  the 
question  this  way:  “  Since  Mary  is  the  Mother  of  Christ  and 
truly  conceived  Him,  it  must  be  held  without  all  doubt  that 

42  Cfr.  vol.  I,  p.  396  sqq.  42 a  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  35,  a.  4. 


DIVINE  MOTHERHOOD 


4i3 


she  truly  cooperated  with  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  conception 
of  her  Son,  and  this  is  commonly  and  generally  held  by  teach¬ 
ers  of  theology.  But  regarding  the  manner  of  cooperating 
different  men  have  different  views.  Some  prefer  to  say  that 
the  Virgin  Mary  cooperated  only  by  supplying  the  material 
principle.  But  others  hold  that  she  cooperated  in  the  educ¬ 
tion  of  the  ultimate  form  and  in  the  preparation  of  the  mat¬ 
ter,  although  not  in  the  whole  process.  And  others,  finally, 
hold  a  view  that  is  intermediate  between  these  two.”  43 

Then,  after  refuting  the  first  and  second  opinion,  he  gives 
his  own  in  these  terms :  “  Because  the  first  opinion  claims  too 

little  and  the  second  too  much,  hence  their  untenableness  di¬ 
rects  us  in  the  way  to  the  truth.  And  for  this  reason  it  seems 
preferable  to  hold  the  intermediate  view,  namely,  that  power 
was  divinely  communicated  to  the  Blessed  Virgin,  by  which  she 
supplied  the  matter  for  the  conception  —  the  matter,  I  say, 
not  only  in  so  far  as  it  had  the  nature  of  matter  or  passive 
potency,  but  also  in  the  sense  that  it  was  disposed  and  suitable 
for  the  production  of  the  child.  However,  as  the  operation 
of  this  power  was  necessarily  successive,  and  as  the  body  of 
Christ  could  not  fittingly  be  produced  by  successive  operation, 
hence  it  was  that  the  Holy  Spirit  by  His  infinite  power  brought 
the  matter  to  its  ultimate  perfection.  .  .  .  Hence  the  whole 
substance  of  Christ’s  body  was  taken  from  His  Mother;  and 
therefore  if  we  wish  to  think  and  speak  logically,  we  must 
say  that  the  Virgin  was  the  Mother  of  Christ  in  a  truer  sense 
than  any  other  mother  is  the  mother  of  her  own  child.”  44 
St.  Thomas  also  refers  to  the  three  different  opinions  men¬ 
tioned  above,  and  after  a  brief  discussion  of  them  adopts  the 
first,  namely,  that  Mary  was  simply  passive  in  the  conception 
of  her  Son.  And  he  takes  this  view,  because  in  generation, 
according  to  Aristotle,  all  activity  is  on  the  part  of  the  father. 
Hence  he  says :  “  Since,  therefore,  the  Blessed  Virgin  was 

not  Christ’s  father,  but  His  mother,  it  follows  that  it  was  not 
given  to  her  to  exercise  an  active  power  in  His  conception. 
.  .  .  We  must  therefore  say  that  in  Christ’s  conception  itself 

43  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  4,  a.  3,  q.  1.  44  Ibid. 


4H 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


she  did  not  cooperate  actively,  but  merely  supplied  the  matter 
thereof.  Nevertheless,  before  the  conception  she  cooperated 
actively  in  the  preparation  of  the  matter,  so  that  it  should  be 
apt  for  the  conception;  ’ 45  Hence  “  this  conception  had  three 
privileges  — -  that  it  was  without  original  sin ;  that  it  was  not 
of  man  only,  but  of  God  and  man ;  that  it  was  a  virginal  con¬ 
ception.  And  all  three  were  effected  by  the  Holy  Ghost.”  46 

In  keeping  with  this  difference  of  views,  the  Scholastics  also 
differ  in  answering  the  further  question,  whether  the  concep¬ 
tion  of  Christ  was  natural  or  miraculous.  St.  Bonaventure 
answers  that  under  one  aspect  it  was  natural  and  under  an¬ 
other  it  was  miraculous.  It  was  natural  in  so  far  as  the  Vir¬ 
gin  had  the  natural  power  to  prepare  the  matter  for  the  con¬ 
ception  ;  it  was  miraculous  in  so  far  as  the  Virgin  had  received 
the  supernatural  power  to  cooperate  in  the  conception  itself.47 
St.  Thomas  agrees  that  the  conception  was  both  natural  and 
miraculous,  but  as  he  denies  that  the  Virgin  actively  cooperated 
in  the  conception,  he  gives  a  different  reason.  He  says : 
“  Besides  the  union  of  two  natures  in  one  person,  which  was 
effected  in  the  conception  of  Christ,  and  which  is  the  miracle 
of  all  miracles,  there  was  also  this  other  miracle  that  the 
Virgin,  remaining  a  virgin,  conceived  the  God-Man.  For  in 
order  that  a  conception  may  be  said  to  be  natural,  it  is  neces¬ 
sary  that  it  be  affected  by  the  agent  in  a  natural  manner,  and 
by  means  of  matter  that  is  naturally  apt  for  the  conception. 

.  .  .  Now  the  matter  supplied  by  the  Virgin  was  the  same  as 
that  from  which  the  body  of  man  may  be  formed  naturally ; 
but  the  power  forming  the  body  was  divine.  Hence  it  must 
be  said  that  the  conception  of  Christ  was  simply  miraculous, 
but  natural  in  some  respect.”  48 

In  the  divine  motherhood  thus  understood,  the  Scholastics 
recognized  the  source  of  all  the  graces  and  privileges  bestowed 
on  Mary.  St.  Thomas  formulates  the  common  teaching  in 
this  way :  “  In  every  genus,  the  nearer  a  thing  is  to  the  prin¬ 

ciple,  the  greater  also  is  the  part  which  it  has  in  that  principle ; 
whence  Dionysius  says  that  angels,  being  nearer  to  God,  have 

45  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  32,  a.  4.  47  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  4,  a.  3,  q.  2. 

46  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  32,  a.  4.  48  Ibid.  q.  2,  a.  2. 


VENERATION  OF  THE  VIRGIN 


4i5 


a  greater  share  than  men  in  the  effects  of  the  divine  good¬ 
ness.  Now  Christ  is  the  principle  of  grace,  authoritatively 
as  to  His  Godhead,  instrumentally  as  to  His  humanity :  whence 
it  is  written :  Grace  and  truth  came  by  Jesus  Christ.  But  the 
Blessed  Virgin  Mary  was  nearest  to  Christ  in  His  humanity: 
because  He  received  his  human  nature  from  her.  Therefore 
it  was  due  to  her  to  receive  a  greater  fullness  of  grace  than 
others.”  49  Hence,  too,  “  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  Blessed 
Virgin  received  in  a  high  degree  both  the  gift  of  wisdom  and 
the  grace  of  miracles  and  even  of  prophecy,  just  as  Christ 
had  them.  But  she  did  not  so  receive  them  as  to  put  them 
and  suchlike  graces  to  every  use,  as  did  Christ:  but  accord¬ 
ing  as  it  befitted  her  condition  of  life.”  60 

D  —  Veneration  of  Mary 

The  principle  that  underlies  all  true  devotion  to  the  Blessed 
Mother  of  God  is  thus  neatly  expressed  by  St.  Bonaventure: 
“  Whatever  terms  are  used  to  set  forth  the  Christian  faith, 
they  must  be  far  removed  from  error  and  expressive  of  devo¬ 
tion ;  and  this  in  a  most  special  manner  when  they  refer  to  the 
Virgin  Mary.  For  by  conceiving  and  bringing  forth  the  Truth 
Itself,  she  has  exterminated  all  heresy  throughout  the  whole 
world,  and  also  merited  reconciliation  for  the  entire  race ;  and 
therefore  devotion  to  her  ought  to  burn  with  great  intensity 
in  the  hearts  of  all  Christians.”  51 

And  this  is  the  common  view  of  all  the  Schoolmen,  nearly 
every  one  of  whom  manifested  a  tender  devotion  to  the  Mother 
of  God.  As  Mother  of  the  Redeemer,  she  was  regarded  as 
the  cause  of  the  world’s  salvation  —  a  thought  that  had  been 
expressed  over  and  over  again  in  the  earliest  ages  of  Christian¬ 
ity.  Furthermore,  as  the  recipient  of  the  most  extraordinary 
graces,  among  which  shone  in  a  special  manner  her  virginal 
purity,  she  was  endowed  in  her  own  person  with  an  attractive¬ 
ness  that  led  all  hearts  captive,  and  bound  them  to  herself  in 
the  most  ardent  love  and  tender  devotion.  Hence  the  many 

49  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  27,  a.  5'.  51  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  4,  a.  3,  q.  3. 

50  Ibid.  a.  5  ad  3m. 


416 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


panegyrics  that  were  preached  in  her  honor  by  the  most  learned 
men  of  the  day,  the  numerous  treatises  composed  to  set  forth 
her  virtues,  the  multiplication  of  feasts  and  pious  practices 
in  every  part  of  the  Christian  world.  Those  were  the  ages 
of  faith,  and  faith  gathers  her  children  instinctively  around 
the  throne  of  God’s  own  sweet  Mother. 

Yet  all  this  devotion  did  not  blind  the  Scholastics,  nor  the 
faithful  in  general,  to  the  limitations  that  must  necessarily  be 
placed  upon  the  veneration  to  which  Mary  can  justly  lay  claim. 
“  Although  the  honor  which  is  paid  her,”  argues  Alexander 
of  Hales,  “  is  in  some  way  referred  to  Him  who  became  in¬ 
carnate  in  her  womb,  nevertheless  from  this  it  does  not  fol¬ 
low  that  she  may  be  honored  with  divine  worship.  Still  the 
honor  that  is  her  just  due  has  a  special  excellence  of  its  own. 
Although  paid  to  a  pure  creature,  yet  it  is  not  shared  in  by 
any  other  saint.  It  is  in  a  manner  a  disposition  to  divine 
worship,  but  not  divine  worship  itself.  When  I  worship  the 
Mother  of  God  because  of  her  sublime  dignity,  I  do  not  wor¬ 
ship  her  as  the  creative  cause  of  my  being,  and  therefore  I 
do  not  pay  her  divine  honor ;  but  because  I  worship  her  as  the 
Mother  of  God,  I  honor  her  as  the  Mother  of  the  Creator, 
and  this  on  account  of  the  Creator  Himself.  Hence  the  foun¬ 
dation  of  her  honor  is  the  honor  of  the  Creator;  but  the  honor 
itself  is  that  which  is  due  to  a  creature.”  52 

St.  Bonaventure  uses  almost  the  same  terms.  “  The  most 
Blessed  Virgin  Mary,”  he  says,  “  is  a  pure  creature,  and  there¬ 
fore  she  does  not  rise  to  the  height  of  divine  honor  and  wor¬ 
ship.  But  because  she  has  the  most  excellent  name,  so  that 
nothing  more  excellent  can  be  bestowed  on  any  mere  creature, 
hence  it  is  that  she  is  not  merely  entitled  to  the  ordinary 
honor  of  dulia,  but  to  the  singular  honor  of  hyperdulia.  And 
that  most  excellent  name  is  this,  Virgin  Mother  of  God, 
which  in  truth  is  of  such  exalted  dignity,  that  not  only  the  way¬ 
farers  on  earth  but  also  the  blessed  in  heaven,  not  only  men 
but  the  angels  also,  reverence  her  by  paying  her  the  tribute 
of  special  honor.  For  by  the  fact  that  she  is  the  Mother  of 

52  Sum.  q.  30,  m.  3,  a.  2  ad  2m. 


VENERATION  OF  THE  VIRGIN 


417 


God,  she  is  raised  above  all  other  creatures,  and  hence  it  is  be¬ 
coming  that  she  be  honored  and  venerated  more  than  all. 
And  this  honor  it  has  become  customary  among  teachers  to 
call  hyperdiilia.”  53 

Thus  also  St.  Thomas  reasons.  “  Since  latria  is  due  to  God 
alone/’  he  says,  “  it  is  not  due  to  a  creature  so  far  as  we 
venerate  a  creature  for  its  own  sake.  .  .  .  Since,  therefore, 
the  Blessed  Virgin  is  a  mere  rational  creature,  the  worship 
of  latria  is  not  due  to  her,  but  only  that  of  dulia ;  but  in  a 
higher  degree  than  to  other  creatures,  in  as  much  as  she  is 
the  Mother  of  God.  For  this  reason  we  say  that  not  any 
kind  of  dulia  is  due  to  her,  but  hyperdulia.”  54  And  again: 
“  The  honor  due  to  the  king's  mother  is  not  equal  to  the  honor 
which  is  due  to  the  king:  but  is  somewhat  like  it,  by  reason  of 
a  certain  excellence  on  her  part.”  55 

63  In  Sent.  Ill,  d.  9,  a.  1,  q.  3.  65  Ibid.  a.  5  ad  im. 

54  Sum.  Theol.  Ill,  q.  25,  a.  5. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 


ESCHATOLOGY 

In  their  treatment  of  eschatological  subjects  the  Scholastics 
are  very  diffuse.  They  indulge  in  lengthy  speculations  on 
points  for  the  establishing  of  which  neither  reason  nor  revela¬ 
tion  furnishes  sufficient  data.  In  these  speculations  we  need 
not  follow  them,  as  it  would  be  little  to  the  purpose  in  a  work 
that  is  concerned  only  with  doctrines  whose  development  is 
likely  to  issue  into  definite  results  along  the  lines  of  faith. 
Hence  the  following  brief  remarks  on  the  four  principal  es¬ 
chatological  topics,  the  resurrection  of  the  dead,  the  general 
judgment,  the  eternal  blessedness  of  the  elect,  and  the  everlast¬ 
ing  sufferings  of  the  reprobate,  must  here  suffice. 

i.  The  Resurrection  of  the  Dead. —  The  fact  of  the  resur¬ 
rection  is  treated  by  all  Scholastics  as  an  article  of  Christian 
belief,  which  from  the  earliest  times  found  a  place  in  the 
Creed.  However  they  adduce  various  arguments  to  prove 
that  the  teaching  of  faith  is  acceptable  to  reason.  Thus  they 
point  to  the  resurrection  of  Christ  as  the  exemplar  and  prom¬ 
ise  of  our  resurrection.  He  is  our  Head,  we  are  His  mem¬ 
bers  ;  and  as  the  Head  rose  from  the  dead,  so  is  it  also  fitting 
that  the  members  should  rise  again.1  They  also  argue  that 
the  fitness  of  a  full  eternal  recompense,  either  by  way  of 
reward  or  punishment,  makes  the  resurrection  of  the  dead 
appear  most  probable  even  from  the  standpoint  of  reason. 
It  was  the  whole  man  who  practiced  virtue  or  indulged  in 
vice;  and  therefore  it  should  also  be  the  whole  man  who 
reaps  the  everlasting  recompense  of  his  mortal  deeds.2 

1  Cfr.  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  2  Cfr.  Thomas,  op.  cit.  a.  1-3; 
43,  a.  1,  q.  1 ;  Thomas,  Suppl.  q.  75,  Bonavent.  loc.  cit.  q.  1. 
a.  1,  2;  Scotus,  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  43, 


ESCHATOLOGY 


419 


However  the  act  of  resuscitating  the  dead  is  supernatural, 
and  implies  the  exercise  of  divine  power.3  St.  Thomas  holds 
that  Christ  as  God-Man  is  both  the  efficient  and  exemplary 
cause  of  the  resurrection  of  the  dead,  and  that  His  sacred 
humanity  acts  in  reference  to  the  effect  as  the  instrument  of 
the  Godhead.4  Furthermore,  as  they  all  explain,  in  the  resur¬ 
rection  there  are  three  things  to  be  considered:  First,  the 
gathering  together  of  the  material  that  constituted  man’s 
body  during  life;  secondly,  the  disposing  of  that  material  for 
its  union  with  the  soul ;  thirdly,  the  actual  reunion  of  soul  and 
body.  Of  these  three,  only  the  last  is  strictly  supernatural 
and  as  such  must  be  effected  by  divine  power.5  “  In  regard 
to  the  other  two,”  says  St.  Thomas,  “  God  will  make  use  of 
the  ministry  of  the  angels.  But  as  the  soul  was  immediately 
created  by  God,  so  shall  it  also,  without  the  intervention  of 
the  angels,  be  again  united  to  its  body  by  the  immediate  action 
of  God.  And  the  same  must  be  held  with  regard  to  the 
glorification  of  the  body:  God  will  glorify  the  body  imme¬ 
diately,  without  the  ministry  of  the  angels;  the  same  way  as 
He  immediately  glorifies  the  soul.”  6 

The  resurrection  will  take  place  in  one  instant  of  time,  at 
the  moment  when  the  angels  have  gathered  the  dust  and  dis¬ 
posed  the  body  for  its  second  union  with  the  soul.7  The 
resurrection  will  be  universal,  not  only  in  the  sense  that  all 
the  dead  shall  rise  again,  but  also  that  all  must  die  before  the 
second  advent  of  the  Lord.8  Those  who  are  already  risen 
from  the  dead  and  are  now  with  body  and  soul  in  heaven, 
as  our  Blessed  Savior  and  His  Holy  Mother,  will  of  course 
neither  die  nor  rise  a  second  time ;  but  Henoch,  Elias,  and  the 
saints  that  rose  from  their  tomb  on  the  occasion  of  our 
Savior’s  death,  must  probably  be  counted  among  those  who 
shall  rise  on  the  last  day.9 

All  shall  rise  numerically  the  same  human  beings  as  they 


3  Ibid.  q.  5 ;  Albert  Magn.  ibid.  a. 
4.  5 ;  Scotus,  ibid.  q.  5,  n.  7. 

4  Op.  cit.  q.  76,  a.  1,  2. 

5  Cf  r.  Bonavent.  loc.  cit. ;  Middle- 
ton,  ibid.  a.  3,  q.  3. 

6  Loc.  cit.  a.  3. 


7  Ibid.  q.  77,  a.  4 ;  Scotus,  Report. 
IV,  d.  63,  q.  5,  n.  4-9. 

8  Cfr.  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  IV,  d. 
63,  a.  1,  q.  2 ;  Thomas,  ibid.  q.  unica, 
a.  1;  Scotus,  ibid.  q.  1,  n.  11. 

0  Ibid. 


420 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


were  before  death.  The  common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics 
on  this  point  is  formulated  by  St.  Thomas  as  follows :  “  The 

necessity  of  admitting  the  resurrection  arises  from  this,  that 
man  may  attain  his  last  end  for  which  he  was  created.  For 
this  end  he  cannot  attain  during  the  present  life,  nor  while 
his  soul  is  separated  from  the  body;  and  if  he  could  in  no 
way  attain  it,  he  would  have  been  created  in  vain.  And  be¬ 
cause  numerically  the  same  being  that  was  made  for  a  certain 
end  must  attain  thereto,  lest  it  appear  to  have  been  made  in 
vain;  hence  it  is  that  numerically  the  same  man  must  rise 
again.  And  this  is  the  case  only  when  numerically  the  same 
soul  is  united  to  numerically  the  same  body ;  for  unless  identi¬ 
cally  the  same  man  were  restored,  it  would  not  be  a  resurrec¬ 
tion  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term.  Hence  to  say  that 
numerically  the  same  man  shall  not  rise  again,  is  heretical, 
and  derogates  from  the  truth  of  Holy  Scripture,  which  teaches 
the  resurrection  of  the  dead.”  10 

In  the  philosophical  system  of  St.  Thomas  this  numerical 
identity  is  easily  understood;  for  as  according  to  it  the  im¬ 
mortal  soul  is  the  only  substantial  form,  nothing  further  is 
required  than  that  this  soul  should  again  be  united  to  the 
same  materia  prima  that  was  in  the  body  during  life.  And 
this  is  all  that  St.  Thomas  postulates  in  his  teaching  on  the 
subject.11  But  in  the  system  of  Scotus  there  appears  a  much 
greater  difficulty  as  regards  the  numerical  identity  of  the 
body.  For  according  to  him,  man’s  body  does  not  result 
from  the  union  of  the  spiritual  soul  with  prime  matter;  but 
it  is  constituted  as  a  body  by  the  forma  corporeitatis,  and  this 
form  is  lost  in  the  dissolution  of  the  elements  of  man’s  body 
after  death.  Hence  in  the  resurrection  a  new  form  must  be 
educed,  and  consequently  the  body  thus  constituted  is  not 
numerically  the  same.  He  meets  the  difficulty  by  stating  that 
the  reproduction  of  numerically  the  same  form  is  not  im¬ 
possible  to  God’s  omnipotence,  and  in  this  way  there  will  be 
identity  of  body  as  well  as  of  soul.12 

There  is  also  found  in  the  writings  of  the  Scholastics  some 

10  Suppl.  q.  79,  a.  2.  12  Loc.  cit.  q.  3,  n.  1-20. 

11  Ibid.  a.  2  ad  3m.  * 


ESCHATOLOGY 


421 


difference  of  opinion  in  regard  to  the  material  elements  that 
shall  again  be  united  to  the  soul  in  the  resurrection.  If  the 
nourishment  taken  during  life  is  converted  into  man's  bodily 
substance,  it  is  obviously  impossible  that  the  whole  amount 
of  substance,  thus  formed  in  the  course  of  many  years,  should 
be  made  use  of  to  constitute  the  risen  body.  Hence  some 
hold,  as  Thomas  points  out,13  that  the  human  body  consists, 
properly  speaking,  only  of  that  portion  of  his  bodily  sub¬ 
stance  which  each  individual  derived  from  his  parents  by  way 
of  generation,  and  consequently  this  alone  will  be  taken  up 
again  by  the  soul  on  the  last  day.  However,  this  view  was 
commonly  rejected  as  philosophically  untenable,  and  most  of 
the  Scholastics  hold  that  so  much  of  each  one’s  “  true  bodily 
substance  ”  will  be  taken  up  again  in  the  resurrection  as 
suffices  for  a  perfect  body  in  the  state  of  maturity.14  In  the 
case  of  infants  God  will  supply  additional  matter,  so  that  they 
too  may  rise  in  a  state  of  perfect  development.15 

As  the  body  is  ultimately  the  handiwork  of  God,  it  will 
after  the  resurrection  be  possessed  of  all  the  perfections  due 
to  its  nature ; 16  and  this,  according  to  the  more  common 
opinion,  will  be  the  case  even  with  the  bodies  of  the  repro¬ 
bate.17  The  difference  of  the  reprobate  and  the  elect,  as 
regards  their  respective  bodies,  arises  solely  from  the  different 
spiritual  condition  of  their  souls.  Hence  in  the  case  of  the 
former,  the  body  remains  grossly  material,  and  although  im¬ 
mortal,  in  the  sense  that  it  cannot  die,  it  is  susceptible  of  the 
same  kinds  of  sufferings  as  it  was  during  its  earthly  exist¬ 
ence;18  whereas  in  the  case  of  the  latter,  the  body  after  its 
own  manner  shares  in  the  glory  of  the  soul,  and  is  thereby 
spiritualized  and  made  independent  of  the  laws  of  space  and 
time  by  which  it  was  bound  down  in  the  days  of  its  sojourn 
on  earth.19  In  regard  to  the  glorified  body,  the  Scholastics 


13  In  Sent.  II,  d.  30,  a.  1. 

14  Cfr.  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  IV,  d, 
64,  a.  2,  q.  1,  2;  Thomas,  ibid.  q.  1, 
a.  2;  Scotus,  ibid.  q.  1,  n.  15. 

45  Ibid. 

16  Cfr.  Thomas,  Suppl.  q.  81,  a. 


^  17  Ibid.  q.  86,  a.  1 ;  Bonavent.  In 
Sent.  IV,  d.  44,  p.  1,  a.  3,  q.  2. 

18  3,  2  3 

19  Ibid.  q.  82-85 ;  Scotus,  In  Sent. 
IV,  d.  49,  q.  13-16. 


422 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY 


restate  and  explain  philosophically  the  teaching  of  St.  Paul 20 
and  of  St.  Augustine,21  without  adding  anything  really  new 
in  the  line  of  dogmatic  development. 

2.  The  General  Judgment. —  Immediately  upon  the  resur¬ 
rection  of  the  dead  follows  the  general  judgment,  which  will 
mark  the  end  of  time  for  the  race  of  man.  In  itself  it  is  a 
public  ratification  of  the  sentence  already  passed  at  the  mo¬ 
ment  of  each  one’s  death.  Various  reasons  are  adduced  by 
the  Scholastics  for  the  fitness  of  such  a  general  and  public 
judgment.  St.  Thomas  speaks  of  it  as  a  detailed  representa¬ 
tion  of  the  world’s  history,  a  mere  glance  at  which  will  reveal 
to  every  one  the  justice,  wisdom,  and  goodness  of  God  in  all 
His  ways;  and  at  the  same  time  it  is  intended  as  a  separation 
of  the  good  and  the  bad,  who  shall  then  be  known  for  what 
they  really  were  during  their  life  on  earth.22  It  also  serves 
the  purpose  of  giving  due  honor  to  the  Savior  of  mankind, 
whom  so  many  despised  or  ignored  when  they  should  have 
given  Him  their  undivided  service.23  Lastly,  it  will  be  a 
public  justification  of  God’s  faithful  servants  so  often  mis¬ 
judged  by  enemies  and  friends,  and  a  public  condemnation 
of  that  hypocritical  holiness  of  life  which  sought  only  its  own 
glorification.24 

Hence  there  will  be  a  general  revelation  of  each  one’s  deeds, 
both  good  and  bad.  On  this  point  there  is  no  difference  of 
opinion,  save  only  in  regard  to  the  sins  of  the  elect  that  have 
been  blotted  out  by  sincere  repentance.  Thus  Peter  Lombard 
holds  that  these  sins  shall  not  be  made  known,  as  the  evil 
done  by  them  has  been  repaired ; 25  but  this  view  is  commonly 
rejected  as  untenable.  For,  as  St.  Thomas  argues,  “  from 
this  it  would  follow  that  the  penance  done  for  these  sins 
would  not  become  known  either,  at  least  not  perfectly;  and 
that  would  detract  much  from  the  glory  of  the  saints  and 
from  the  praise  due  to  God  for  having  so  mercifully  freed 
them  from  their  sins.20  Furthermore,  this  revelation  of  their 

20  I  Cor.  15.  24  Id.  In  Sent.  loc.  cit. 

21  De  Civit.  Dei,  22,  9.  25  Sent.  IV,  d.  45. 

22  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  48,  q.  I,  a.  I.  26  Suppl.  q.  87,  a.  2. 

23  Cfr.  Thomas,  Suppl.  q.  90,  a.  2. 


ESCHATOLOGY 


423 


sins  will  not  be  a  cause  of  shame  to  the  saints,  as  is  quite 
obvious  from  the  case  of  Mary  Magdalene  whose  sins  are 
publicly  recited  in  the  church.27 

This  revelation  of  each  one’s  conscience,  both  to  himself 
and  to  all  others,  is  spoken  of  by  the  Scholastics  as  the  reading 
of  the  book  of  life  —  libri  vitae.  It  consists  in  an  instanta¬ 
neous  cognition  of  all  that  was  recorded  by  each  one’s  con¬ 
science  during  life;  and  the  efficient  cause  of  this  cognition  is 
a  special  enlightenment  of  the  intellect  on  the  part  of  God. 28 
There  is  some  difference  of  opinion  in  regard  to  the  reprobate, 
as  to  the  manner  in  which  they  shall  be  enabled  to  read  the 
book  of  life.  Unlike  the  elect,  they  do  not  behold  the  es¬ 
sence  of  God,  and  therefore  they  do  not  seem  to  have  an 
adequate  means  of  instantaneous  cognition ;  hence  St.  Thomas 
concludes:  Singula  consider abunt,  sed  non  in  instanti,  sed 
in  tempore  brevissimoP 

As  the  reading  of  the  book  of  life,  so  likewise  the  passing 
of  the  judicial  sentence  will  most  probably  consist  in  an 
intellectual  enlightenment,  whereby  each  individual  is  made 
to  understand  his  eternal  condition  as  here  and  now  irrevo¬ 
cably  fixed.  “  In  regard  to  this  question,”  says  St.  Thomas, 
“  nothing  can  be  defined  with  certainty ;  nevertheless  it  is  held 
to  be  more  probable  that  the  whole  judgment,  both  as  regards 
the  examination,  the  accusation  of  the  wicked,  the  commenda¬ 
tion  of  the  good,  and  the  sentence  passed  upon  each,  is  simply 
a  mental  process.  For  if  the  deeds  of  each  one  were  to  be 
recited  by  word  of  mouth,  an  immeasurable  length  of  time 
would  be  required.  .  .  .  Hence  it  is  probable  that  what  is  said 
in  Matthew,  c.  25,  must  be  interpreted,  not  as  a  verbal,  but  as 
a  mental  process.”  30 

The  judgment  will  be  general  in  the  sense  that  all  rational 
creatures  of  God  will  be  present,  and  that  each  one  shall  re¬ 
ceive  a  recompense  according  to  his  works.  However  most 
of  the  Scholastics  take  the  term  judgment  in  three  different 

27  Ibid.  a.  2  ad  3™.  29  Ibid.  a.  3. 

28  Cfr.  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  30  Ibid.  q.  88,  a.  2. 

43,  a.  2;  Thomas,  Suppl.  q.  87,  a. 

1-3* 


424 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


senses,  and  in  accordance  with  this  distinction  they  make  the 
judgment  either  general  or  limit  it  to  certain  classes.  In  the 
first  sense  it  is  merely  a  public  manifestation  of  each  one’s 
spiritual  condition  and  of  the  recompense  that  is  his  due;  and 
so  considered  the  judgment  will  be  general  in  the  full  sense 
of  the  term.  In  the  second  sense  it  implies  an  examination 
of  those  to  be  judged  and  the  passing  of  a  sentence  on  the 
part  of  the  judge;  and  under  this  aspect  the  judgment  will 
not  be  general.  “  For  some  are  judged  and  perish,  others  are 
not  judged  and  perish;  some  are  judged  and  reign,  others  are 
not  judged  and  reign/’  31  In  the  third  sense  judgment  means 
simply  condemnation,  and  refers  only  to  the  wicked  whose 
state  is  already  fixed.  These  are  of  two  classes :  the  evil 
spirits  who  were  judged  by  God  immediately  after  their  fall, 
and  infidels  whose  obstinate  blindness  here  on  earth  was  the 
beginning  of  their  final  judgment.32  Later  theologians,  how¬ 
ever,  usually  reject  this  distinction,  and  hold  that  the  judgment 
applies  in  the  same  sense  to  all  who  had  the  use  of  reason 
during  life. 

According  to  the  common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics,  the 
judgment  will  be  presided  over  by  Christ,  the  Redeemer  of 
the  world.  “  To  judge,”  argues  St.  Thomas,  “  implies  do¬ 
minion  in  him  who  pronounces  judgment.  Hence  Christ  will 
be  the  judge  in  as  much  as  He  has  dominion  over  men,  in 
respect  of  whom  it  is  chiefly  that  the  final  judgment  will  take 
place.  Now,  He  is  our  Lord  not  only  by  reason  of  creation, 
.  ,  .  but  also  by  reason  of  the  redemption,  which  He  wrought 
in  His  human  nature.  .  .  .  And  because  through  the  redemp¬ 
tion  He  restored  not  only  mankind,  but  all  creation,  in  as  much 
as  by  reason  of  man’s  restoration  all  creatures  were  placed 
in  an  ameliorated  condition;  .  .  .  hence  it  is  that  Christ 
through  His  passion  merited  to  have  dominion,  not  only  over 
men,  but  over  all  creatures,  and  consequently  to  act  as  their 
judge.”  33  However,  He  will  judge  ex  virtute  divinitatis ,34 

31  Cfr.  Lombard,  Sent.  d.  47,  c.  3.  33  Suppl.  q.  qo,  a.  1. 

32  Cfr.  Bonavent.  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  34  Ibid.  a.  1  ad  2m. 

47,  a.  1,  q.  3;  Thomas,  op.  cit.  q.  89, 

a.  5-8. 


ESCHATOLOGY 


425 


With  Christ  others  will  be  associated  in  the  judgment;  not, 
however,  as  judges  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term.  The  com¬ 
mon  teaching  of  the  Scholastics  on  this  point  is  thus  set  forth 
by  St.  Bonaventure:  “  One  is  said  to  be  a  judge  in  a  cause 
for  one  or  other  of  two  reasons :  either  because  it  pertains 
to  him  to  pronounce  judgment,  or  because  he  takes  part  in 
such  pronouncement,  in  as  much  as  some  judges  cooperate 
with  and  in  some  measure  give  counsel  to  the  chief  judge. 
He,  therefore,  who  pronounces  judgment  is  the  chief  judge; 
and  such  is  Christ  alone,  as  is  clear  from  Matthew  xxv, 
wherein  is  described  the  procedure  of  the  judgment.  Those, 
however,  who  cooperate,  also  partake  of  the  title  and  dignity 
of  judge;  and  such  are  those  saintly  men  who  have  added  to 
the  works  prescribed  by  the  commandments  the  supereroga¬ 
tory  perfection  of  the  counsels.  Now,  such  are  chiefly  the 
Apostles,  as  leaders,  and  their  close  followers.  Their  par¬ 
ticipation,  however,  will  not  be  unto  the  giving  of  counsel, 
because  the  Lord  hath  no  need  of  counsel;  but  it  will  be  the 
honor  of  being  near  the  judge,  and,  according  to  the  word 
of  the  Lord,  we  can  call  this  the  honor  of  sitting  in  judgment 
with  Him/’  35  And  the  same  honor  will  also  be  granted  to 
the  good  angels.30 

Christ  will  appear  in  His  glorified  humanity  to  the  elect 
and  the  reprobate  alike,  but  His  divinity  will  be  seen  only 
by  the  elect.  However,  even  the  reprobate  shall  know  with 
the  utmost  certainty  that  He  is  truly  God,  and  they  shall  be 
forced  to  acknowledge  this  to  their  greater  shame.37  St. 
Thomas,38  St.  Bonaventure,39  and  nearly  all  Scholastic  theo¬ 
logians  hold  that  the  facial  vision  of  God  on  the  part  of  the 
reprobate  is  impossible ;  whereas  Scotus  contends  that  it  could 
be  effected  by  God’s  absolute  power.40  Practically  all  Scho¬ 
lastics  are  of  opinion  that  the  judgment  will  take  place  in 
the  early  morning  hours,  at  the  time  when  Christ  rose  from 
the  dead.41  They  also  regard  it  as  likely  that  Christ  will  ap- 

35  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  4 7,  a.  1,  q.  I.  38  Loc.  cit. 

36  Ibid.  q.  2.  39  Loc.  cit.  q.  2. 

37  Ibid.  d.  48.  a.  1,  q.  2,  3;  Thom-  40  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  48,  q.  1,  n.  1-10. 

as,  loc.  cit.  a.  3;  Halens.  Sum.  Ill,  41  Cfr.  Thomas,  Suppl.  q.  47,  a.  3. 

q.  25,  m.  4. 


426 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


pear  on  Mount  Olivet,  and  that  those  who  are  to  be  judged 
shall  be  gathered  around  Him  in  that  neighborhood.42 

Immediately  after  the  last  judgment  there  will  be  a  uni¬ 
versal  conflagration  in  which  all  the  works  of  man  shall  be 
destroyed.  Animal  and  plant  life  shall  then  cease  to  exist, 
and  the  material  elements  shall  all  be  renovated  by  a  purifying 
flame,  so  that  there  results  a  new  heaven  and  a  new  earth. 
Furthermore,  according  to  St.  Thomas,  the  terrestrial  globe 
shall  then  be  endowed  with  a  peculiar  brightness  like  that  of 
the  heavenly  bodies,  all  movement  shall  come  to  an  end,  and 
thenceforth  there  shall  be  an  everlasting  calm.43 

3.  The  Punishment  of  Hell. —  St.  Bonaventure  mentions 
and  refutes  two  antiquated  heresies  in  regard  to  the  eternity 
of  hell,  and  then  states  the  accepted  teaching  of  the  Church 
in  these  terms:  “Therefore  the  third  position  is  reasonable 
and  in  accordance  with  the  teaching  of  faith,  namely,  that  the 
punishment  of  the  wicked  is  eternal;  and  this  Holy  Scripture 
manifestly  declares,  faith  confirms,  and  right  reason  ap- 
proves.”  44  Then,  as  the  teaching  of  Holy  Scripture  and  of 
faith  is  quite  obvious,  he  develops  the  argument  from  reason 
as  follows.  “  First,  by  way  of  antithesis  it  is  eminently  fit¬ 
ting  that  as  the  virtuous  receive  an  eternal  reward,  so  the 
wicked  should  be  condemned  *to  everlasting  punishment. 
Secondly,  this  is  not  only  fitting,  but  also  necessary;  because 
justice  requires  that  each  one  be  recompensed  according  to 
his  works.  Now  the  wicked  have  sinned  against  an  eternal 
and  infinite  good,  and  for  that  reason  they  deserve  an  eternal 
punishment.  Furthermore,  they  are  immovably  fixed  in  their 
perversity,  and  therefore  their  guilt  is  everlasting;  hence,  as 
guilt  and  punishment  must  be  in  proportion,  it  follows  that 
their  punishment  should  be  eternal.”  40  The  same  argument 
had  already  been  indicated  by  St.  Augustine  40  and  St.  Ber¬ 
nard,47  and  was  still  further  developed  by  St.  Thomas.48 

When  speaking  about  the  punishment  of  hell,  the  Scholas- 

42  Tbid.  q.  48,  a.  4  4fi  De  Civit.  Dei,  21,  II. 

43  Tbid.  q.  91,  a.  2.  47  De  Gratia  et  Lib.  Arbitr.  c.  9, 

44  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  44,  p.  2,  a.  I,  n.  28. 

q.  i.  48  Suppl.  q.  99*  a.  I. 

45  Ibid. 


ESCHATOLOGY 


427 


tics  say  practically  nothing  in  regard  to  the  pain  of  loss. 
They  presuppose  that  this  is  most  intense,  as  it  is  measured 
by  the  happiness  that  would  have  been  theirs  had  they  been 
faithful  in  the  service  of  God.49  But  presupposing  this,  they 
treat  at  great  length  of  the  positive  pain,  or  the  pain  of  sense, 
inflicted  on  the  reprobate.  The  following  points  may  be 
briefly  noted. 

As  the  pain  of  loss  corresponds  to  the  sinner's  turning  away 
from  God,  so  the  pain  of  sense  corresponds  to  his  inordinate 
turning  to  creatures.  He  made  them,  to  all  intents  and  pur¬ 
poses,  his  last  end ;  and  now  they  are  converted  by  divine 
justice  into  instruments  of  the  most  exquisite  torture.50 
Hence  the  pain  of  sense,  argues  St.  Bonaventure,  is  caused 
by  the  four  elements  that  constitute  the  material  world  —  air, 
earth,  fire,  and  water.51  Or  as  St.  Thomas  puts  it :  “  Ac¬ 

cording  to  St.  Basil,  in  the  last  purification  of  the  world  there 
will  be  a  separation  of  the  elements,  and  whatever  is  pure  and 
of  a  refined  nature  will  remain  in  the  higher  regions  for  the 
glory  of  the  blessed;  but  whatever  is  vile  and  filthy  shall  be 
cast  into  hell  for  the  punishment  of  the  damned:  so  that,  as 
to  the  blessed  every  material  creature  shall  be  a  source  of 
joy,  so  in  like  manner  to  the  damned  all  creatures  shall  be  a 
cause  of  torment.”  52 

It  is  the  common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics  that  hell  is  a 
subterranean  place,  most  probably  situated  at  the  center  of 
the  earth.  “  Its  arrangement,”  says  St.  Thomas,  “  is  such  as 
corresponds  to  the  extreme  misery  of  those  detained  therein. 
Hence  there  is  both  light  and  darkness,  but  in  such  a  way  as 
to  intensify  the  torments  of  the  lost.  In  itself  the  seeing  of 
things  is  a  source  of  delight,  .  .  .  but  under  certain  conditions 
it  becomes  a  cause  of  suffering,  namely,  when  we  see  things 
that  are  hurtful  or  repugnant  to  us.  And  therefore  the  dis¬ 
position  of  light  and  darkness  in  hell  must  be  such  that  nothing 
is  seen  distinctly,  but  that  those  things  which  can  afflict  the 
heart  are  perceived  as  wrapt  in  a  certain  shadowy  gloom. 

49  Cfr.  Thomas,  op.  cit.  q.  98,  a.  9.  51  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  44,  p.  2,  a.  2, 

50  Ibid.  q.  97,  a.  I.  q.  2. 

52  Op.  cit.  q.  47,  a.  I. 


428 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Hence,  properly  speaking,  it  is  a  place  of  darkness.  Never¬ 
theless,  by  divine  disposition  there  is  just  sufficient  light  to 
make  those  things  visible  which  can  torture  the  soul :  and  this 
follows  from  the  very  position  of  the  place;  because  in  the 
center  of  the  earth,  where  hell  is  said  to  be  situated,  there  can 
be  no  fire  except  such  as  is  dim  and  dull  and  smoky.”  53 

The  principal  agent  used  by  God  in  causing  the  pain  of 
sense  is  material  fire.  This  is  the  teaching  of  Peter  Lom¬ 
bard  54  Alexander  of  Hales,55  Albertus  Magnus,56  St. 
Thomas,57  St.  Bonaventure,58  Duns  Scotus,59  and  all  repre¬ 
sentative  Scholastics.  “  Whatever  may  be  said  about  the  fire 
that  tortures  souls  while  separated  from  their  bodies,”  argues 
St.  Thomas,  “  the  fire  by  which  the  bodies  of  the  reprobate  are 
tormented  after  the  resurrection  must  be  corporeal;  because 
the  body  cannot  be  afflicted  except  by  corporeal  agents  of 
pain.”  60  Furthermore,  the  fire  of  hell  is  specifically  the  same 
as  the  fire  that  we  use  here  on  earth,  although  in  some  myste¬ 
rious  way  it  burns  without  consuming  or  being  consumed.61 
The  material  nature  of  this  fire  was  defended  by  the  Scho¬ 
lastics  against  Avicenna  and  other  Arabian  philosophers  who 
denied  the  resurrection  of  the  body,  and  consequently  con¬ 
tended  that  the  term  fire,  when  used  in  connection  with  the 
punishment  of  hell,  must  be  taken  in  a  metaphorical  sense. 

Again,  it  is  also  the  common  teaching  of  the  Scholastics 
that  this  same  material  fire  afflicts  the  evil  spirits  and  human 
souls  while  in  the  state  of  separation  from  their  bodies.  But 
when  they  try  to  explain  how  this  is  possible,  they  severally 
advance  somewhat  different  views.  Thus  Albertus  Magnus 
practically  contents  himself  with  stating  the  fact  as  contained 
in  Holy  Scripture,  and  then  affirming  that  God  in  His  wisdom 
and  power  must  have  ways  and  means  of  afflicting  spirits 
through  the  agency  of  matter.62  St.  Bonaventure  admits  that 
material  fire  as  such  cannot  affect  spiritual  substances  directly, 


53  Suppl.  q.  97,  a.  4. 

54  Sent.  IV,  d.  44,  c.  6. 

55  Sum.  II,  q.  1 16,  m.  4. 

56  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  44,  a.  37. 

57  Ibid.  a.  4. 


58  Breviloq.  VII,  c.  6. 

59  Report,  d.  44,  q.  3,  n.  19. 

60  Suppl.  q.  97,  a.  4. 

61  Ibid.  a.  6. 

62  Loc.  cit. 


ESCHATOLOGY 


429 


but  it  may  do  so  in  an  indirect  way;  for  divine  justice  may 
use  it  for  the  purpose  of  producing  in  the  intellect  and  will  a 
condition  of  fearsome  apprehension  and  loathing  repugnance, 
which  results  in  unbearable  mental  and  physical  torture.  Both 
evil  spirits  and  disembodied  souls  may  be  shut  up  within  the 
lire  as  in  a  prison,  and  thus  be  made  to  experience  all  the 
horrors  that  one  naturally  associates  with  earthly  dungeons. 
Moreover,  human  souls  always  retain  their  sensitive  faculties, 
by  reason  of  which  they  can  in  some  way  be  brought  under  the 
influence  of  material  agents.03 

St.  Thomas  examines  three  different  views  on  this  sub¬ 
ject,  and  then  rejects  them  as  inadmissible.  The  first  of  these 
holds  that  spirits  are  terrified  at  the  mere  sight  of  fire;  the 
second  maintains  that  fire  is  apprehended  by  them  as  hurtful, 
and  from  this  apprehension  results  an  agony  of  dread  and 
sadness;  the  third  contends  that  spirits  are  physically  afflicted 
by  God  Himself,  who  acts  in  the  fire.  After  setting  aside 
these  explanations  as  insufficient,  he  gives  his  own  in  these 
terms:  “It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  gather  all  these  dif¬ 
ferent  ways  together  into  one,  so  that  it  may  become  intel¬ 
ligible  how  a  spirit  can  suffer  from  material  fire.  Let  us  say, 
then,  that  it  is  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  fire  for  spirits 
to  be  united  to  it  by  way  of  location,  just  as  any  other  thing 
localized  is  in  a  place ;  but  over  and  above,  in  so  far  as  the  fire 
in  question  is  an  instrument  of  divine  justice,  it  has  also  the 
power  of  holding  these  spirits  bound  to  itself ;  and  in  this  the 
fire  is  truly  hurtful  to  the  spirit,  in  as  much  as  the  soul,  seeing 
that  the  fire  is  thus  the  cause  of  its  involuntary  detention,  is 
tormented  by  the  fire.”  64 

Substantially  the  same  explanation  is  given  by  Duns  Scotus. 
In  the  first  place,  he  says,  the  lost  spirits  are  detained  in  one 
place  by  the  fire;  then  they  apprehend  this  detention;  from 
this  arises  a  repugnance  to  being  thus  detained ;  next  this 
repugnance  is  vividly  realized ;  finally,  from  the  realization 
of  their  imprisoned  condition,  thus  always  before  their  minds, 
there  results  an  intense  agony  of  suffering  and  despair.65 

63  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  44,  a.  3,  q.  2.  65  Report.  IV,  d.  44,  q.  2,  n.  9; 

64Suppl.  q.  70,  a.  3.  cfr.  In  Sent.  ibid.  n.  n. 


430 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


Morally  the  reprobate  are  in  a  state  of  unalterable  perver¬ 
sion  :  they  cling  to  their  past  sins,  although  they  at  the  same 
time  shrink  from  them  as  the  cause  of  their  torture ; 66  they 
hate  God,  not  as  He  is  in  Himself,  but  in  so  far  as  they  ex¬ 
perience  the  rigor  of  His  justice;67  they  likewise  hate  all 
created  beings,  but  more  especially  the  blessed  in  heaven, 
whose  happiness  fills  them  with  a  most  intense  envy.68  Still, 
with  all  this,  they  do  not  sin;  because  their  very  condition  of 
obduracy  in  evil  is  a  punishment  for  their  past  misdeeds.69 

4.  The  Joys  of  Heaven. —  Heaven  is  a  place  where  the  elect 
see  God  face  to  face,  as  He  is  in  Himself ;  and  from  this  in¬ 
tuitive  vision  of  the  triune  God  results  a  state  of  ecstatic  joy 
and  unspeakable  happiness.  On  this  point,  considered  as  a 
mere  fact,  there  never  was  a  difference  of  opinion  among  the 
Scholastics.  Furthermore,  nearly  all  of  them  are  agreed  that 
the  elect  are  placed  in  full  possession  of  their  essential  happi¬ 
ness  as  soon  as  they  have  satisfied  the  justice  of  God  for  their 
past  sins.  Early  in  the  fourteenth  century,  Pope  John  XXII, 
while  still  a  simple  theologian,  advanced  it  as  his  private  opin¬ 
ion  that  the  intuitive  vision  of  God’s  essence  might  be  de¬ 
layed  even  in  the  case  of  souls  already  perfectly  pure  in  the 
sight  of  God;  but  his  view  met  with  strong  opposition,  as 
being  out  of  harmony  with  the  teaching  of  the  Church.70 
Almost  half  a  century  before  that  unguarded  statement  was 
made,  St.  Thomas  had  stigmatized  the  opinion  it  expressed 
as  heretical.71  And  in  1336,  Benedict  XII  thus  defined  the 
traditional  teaching:  Homines  pios  plcne  pnrgatos  vel  justos 
ex  hac  vita  dec e dentes  statim  consequi  beatitudinem  et  visione 
Dei  beatifica  perfrui  .  .  .  definimnsd 2 

Most  Scholastics  divide  beatitude  into  objective  and  formal. 
By  the  former  they  understand  God  Himself,  who  as  the  Su¬ 
preme  Good  perfectly  satisfies  every  rational  tendency  of  the 
elect.  By  the  latter  they  designate  that  operation  of  the  soul 

66  Cfr.  Thomas,  op.  cit.  q.  98,  a.  70  Cfr.  Chartular  Universit.  Pa- 

1,  2.  ris.  t.  II,  n.  970-987. 

67  Ibid.  a.  5.  71  Suppl.  q.  69,  a.  2. 

68  Ibid.  a.  7,  9.  72  Mansi,  25,  986  D. 

69  Ibid.  a.  6. 


ESCHATOLOGY 


43i 


or  spirit  by  which  God  is  possessed  as  the  source  of  ecstatic 
fruition.  In  regard  to  objective  beatitude  there  is  no  room 
for  discussion,  as  apart  from  God  there  is  no  object  the  pos¬ 
session  of  which  can  be  the  source  of  perfect  blessedness. 
Besides,  on  this  point  the  teaching  of  Holy  Scripture  is  so 
clear  that  it  excludes  all  further  development  of  doctrine. 
But  matters  look  quite  different  when  the  question  of  formal 
beatitude  comes  up  for  consideration.  For  although  it  is  a 
matter  of  faith  that  the  blessed  see  God  face  to  face,  or  as 
Benedict  XII,  defined  it,  visione  intuitiva  et  etiam  faciali, 
nulla  mediant  c  creatura  in  rati  one  visi  se  habente,  nevertheless 
both  the  act  of  this  vision  itself  and  its  relation  to  the  essence 
of  beatitude  have  always  been  a  subject  of  discussion  among 
theologians.  Only  a  few  passing  remarks  can  here  be  made 
about  the  points  in  question. 

As  the  intuitive  vision  of  God  is  an  act  of  the  intellect,  it 
must  obviously  be  explained  in  terms  of  human  knowledge. 
Now  in  human  knowledge,  according  to  the  common  teaching 
of  the  Scholastics,  four  things  come  up  for  consideration:  the 
intellect,  the  object,  the  impressed  species  —  species  impressa, 
and  the  expressed  species  —  species  expressa.  Of  itself  the 
intellect  does  not  represent  one  object  rather  than  another; 
and  therefore,  in  order  to  represent  a  particular  object,  it  must 
first  be  determined  or  modified  by  a  likeness  derived  from 
that  same  object.  This  modification  is  called  the  species  im¬ 
pressa ,  which  is  a  virtual  representation  of  the  object  in  ques¬ 
tion.  Thus  modified,  the  intellect  produces  the  species  ex¬ 
pressa,  or  the  act  of  knowing,  which  is  a  vital  and  formal 
representation  of  the  object  as  known. 

Applying  this  exposition  of  the  genesis  of  human  knowl¬ 
edge  to  the  beatific  vision,  the  Scholastics  studied  the  question 
in  reference  to  the  following  three  points:  First,  does  the 
beatific  vision  postulate  a  species  impressa ?  Secondly,  does 
it  postulate  a  species  expressa ?  Thirdly,  in  whatever  way  the 
first  two  points  be  decided,  must  the  intellect  be  supernaturally 
strengthened  by  the  light  of  glory  —  lumen  gloriae  —  in  or¬ 
der  to  see  God  face  to  face? 

Some  of  the  older  Scholastics,  whom  St.  Bonaventure  takes 


432 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY) 


occasion  to  refute,73  identified  the  beatific  vision  with  God's 
own  eternal  and  uncreated  knowledge,  in  a  similar  way  as  they 
identified  sanctifying  grace  with  the  Holy  Spirit.  Somewhat 
like  this  is  the  opinion  defended  by  Henry  of  Ghent,  who 
distinguishes  in  the  blessed  a  created  and  an  uncreated  beati¬ 
tude.  The  former,  he  says,  consists  in  acts  of  the  intellect 
and  will,  which  as  such,  even  in  this  connection,  do  not  imply 
proper  knowledge  of  God;  whereas  the  latter  is  an  immediate 
communication  of  God,  or  of  objective  beatitude,  to  the  soul 
by  way  of  circuminsession  —  per  cir  cumins  essionem  vel  Map- 
sum.  It  is  in  this  that  beatitude  properly  consists,  and  in 
so  far  it  is  not  a  perfection  of  the  faculties,  but  of  the  soul’s 
substance.74 

St.  Bonaventure  defines  formal  beatitude  as  induentia  Dei 
in  animam,  quae  est  ipsa  deiformitas  et  satietas .75  In  his  ex¬ 
planation  of  this  definition  he  states  that  beatitude  consists 
of  two  parts:  the  deification  of  the  soul  and  its  faculties  which 
is  a  habit  or  quality,  and  the  corresponding  acts  of  the  intel¬ 
lect  and  will.  Hence  it  is  neither  a  mere  act,  nor  a  mere 
habit,  but  a  combination  of  the  two;  and  thus  it  may  be  com¬ 
pared  to  a  natural  habit  of  knowledge  which  is  always  in  act, 
or  by  which  man  always  actually  contemplates  the  object 
known.76 

In  none  of  these  explanations  is  there  a  definite  attempt 
made  to  analyze  the  act  of  knowledge  in  so  far  as  it  proceeds 
from  the  intellect.  And  hence  the  explanations  themselves 
are  vague  and  unsatisfactory.  In  this  respect  the  exposition 
of  St.  Thomas  is  much  more  explicit.  After  setting  aside  the 
opinion  of  some  Arabian  philosophers  as  to  the  nature  of 
human  knowledge,  he  proceeds :  “  Since  in  all  cognition 

there  is  need  of  some  form  by  which  the  object  is  known  or 
seen,  the  form  by  which  the  intellect  is  perfected,  in  order  to 
have  a  cognitive  vision  of  separated  substances,  is  not  the 
quiddity  which  the  intellect  abstracts  from  composite  things, 
as  is  maintained  by  the  first  opinion;  nor  is  it  an  impression  of 

73  In  Sent.  TIT,  d.  14,  a.  I,  q.  1.  75  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  49,  p.  1,  a.  uni- 

74Quodl.  13,  q.  1 2.  cus,  q.  1. 

76  Ibid.  q.  1  ad  5m. 


ESCHATOLOGY 


433 


the  separated  substance  remaining  in  our  intellect,  as  is  held 
by  the  second;  but  it  is  the  separated  substance  itself  which  is 
united  to  our  intellect  as  a  form,  so  that  this  substance  itself 
is  both  the  object  which  is  known  and  the  form  by  which  it 
is  known. 

“  But  whatever  may  be  said  in  regard  to  other  separated 
substances,  this  is  undoubtedly  the  explanation  to  be  accepted 
in  regard  to  the  intuitive  vision  of  God ;  because  by  whatever 
other  form  our  intellect  be  perfected,  it  necessarily  remains 
incapable  of  seeing  God’s  essence.  However  the  explanation 
just  given  must  not  be  understood  in  the  sense  that  the  divine 
essence  is  properly  the  form  of  our  intellect,  or  that  from  its 
union  with  our  intellect  results  a  something  that  is  strictly 
one,  as  is  the  case  when  matter  and  form  are  united  in  the 
natural  order  of  things;  but  in  this  other  sense,  that  the  re¬ 
lation  of  the  divine  essence  to  our  intellect  is  proportionately 
the  same  as  that  of  form  to  matter.  .  .  .  And  that  this  suf¬ 
fices  to  make  our  intellect  capable  of  seeing  the  divine  essence 
by  means  of  that  same  essence,  may  be  shown  as  follows.  .  .  . 
In  the  matter  of  knowledge,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the 
intellect  itself  as  matter,  and  the  intelligible  species  as  its 
form;  hence  the  intellect  in  the  act  of  knowing  is  composed 
of  the  two.  Consequently,  given  a  self-subsistent  being,  which 
is  pure  intelligibility,  that  being  can  of  itself  act  as  the  form 
by  which  the  intellect  knows.  For  since  it  is  pure  form, 
without  any  admixture  of  matter,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent 
it  from  discharging  the  functions  of  form  in  regard  to  the 
intellect;  and  thus  become  in  a  manner  part  of  the  composite, 
which  is  the  intellect  in  act.  Because  a  thing  is  intelligible  in 
so  far  as  it  is  in  act.  .  .  .  Hence  it  follows  that  the  divine 
essence,  since  it  is  pure  actuality,  can  be  the  form  by  which 
the  intellect  knows;  and  this  is  the  beatific  vision.”  77 

In  this  exposition,  as  is  quite  obvious,  both  the  species  im- 
pressa  and  the  species  expressa,  as  taken  in  the  strict  meaning 
of  the  respective  terms,  are  eliminated  from  the  intuitive 
vision  of  God.  Their  place  is  taken  by  the  divine  essence, 

77  Suppl.  q.  92,  a.  1. 


434 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


which  unites  itself  immediately  to  the  intellect,  and  through 
this  immediate  union  is  seen  face  to  face.  The  explanation 
agrees  perfectly  with  the  definition  of  Benedict  XII,  issued 
some  sixty  years  later.  It  reads  as  follows:  Dednimus: 
quod  secundum  communcm  Dei  ordinationem  animae  sanc¬ 
torum  omnium  .  .  .  vident  divinam  essentiam  visione  intui- 
tiva  et  ctiam  faciali,  nulla  mediante  crcatura  in  ratione  objecti 
visi  se  habente,  sed  divina  essentia  immediate  se  nude,  dare 
et  aperte  eis  ostendente,  quodque  sic  vident es  eadem  divina 
essentia  perfruuntur.78 

It  is  true,  neither  St.  Thomas  nor  Pope  Benedict  suppose 
the  intellect  to  be  merely  passive  in  the  beatific  vision ;  on  the 
contrary,  they  imply  that  the  vision  itself  is  an  intellectual  act; 
but  what  they  wish  to  exclude  is  the  species  as  a  created  repre¬ 
sentation  of  the  Godhead ;  for  that  representation  would  al¬ 
ways  be  analogous,  and  as  such  it  could  not  be  nor  lead  to  a 
proper  knowledge  of  God.  Substantially  the  same  position  is 
taken  by  Duns  Scotus.79  Hence,  if  the  term  species  expressa 
be  understood  in  a  wider  sense,  as  simply  designating  an  act 
of  knowledge,  it  may  evidently  be  employed  without  prejudice 
to  the  faith. 

For  this  intuitive  vision  of  God,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  cognitive 
act,  the  intellect  must  be  disposed  and  strengthened  by  the 
light  of  glory,  which  in  some  way  corresponds  to  the  light  of 
faith  here  on  earth.  The  fact  is  generally  admitted  by  the 
Scholastics,  but  most  of  them  are  rather  vague  when  they 
attempt  to  explain  the  nature  of  this  light.  St.  Thomas  puts 
his  exposition  this  way:  “Everything  that  is  elevated  to 
what  exceeds  its  nature,  must  be  prepared  by  some  disposition 
above  its  nature;  as,  for  example,  if  air  is  to  receive  the  form 
of  fire,  it  must  be  prepared  by  some  disposition  for  such  a 
form.  Now  when  any  created  intellect  sees  the  essence  of 
God,  the  essence  of  God  itself  becomes  the  intelligible  form 
of  the  intellect.  Hence  it  is  necessary  that  some  supernatural 
disposition  should  be  added  to  the  intellect  in  order  that  it 
may  be  elevated  to  such  a  great  and  sublime  height.  Since 

79  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  49,  q.  3,  n.  6. 


78  DB.  530. 


ESCHATOLOGY 


435 


* 


the  natural  power  of  the  created  intellect  does  not  avail  to 
enable  it  to  see  the  essence  of  God,  as  was  shown  in  the 
preceding  article,  it  is  necessary  that  the  power  of  understand¬ 
ing  should  be  aided  by  divine  grace.  This  increase  of  the 
intellectual  powers  is  called  the  illumination  of  the  intellect, 
as  we  also  call  the  intelligible  object  itself  by  the  name  of 
light  or  illumination. ”  80 

Again:  “  This  light  is  required  to  see  the  divine  essence, 
not  as  a  similitude  in  which  God  is  seen,  but  as  a  perfec¬ 
tion  of  the  intellect,  strengthening  it  to  see  God.  There¬ 
fore  it  may  be  said  that  this  light  is  not  to  be  described  as  a 
medium  in  which  God  is  seen,  but  by  which  He  is  seen;  and 
such  a  medium  does  not  take  away  the  immediate  vision  of 
God.”  81  Furthermore,  this  light  can  in  no  wise  be  natural 
to  any  creature,  but  only  to  the  divine  nature;  and  therefore 
by  it  the  rational  creature  is  made  deiform.82 

At  the  time  when  St.  Thomas  wrote,  no  decision  on  this 
matter  had  yet  been  given  by  the  Church ;  and  hence  a  few 
later  Scholastics,  especially  Durandus,83  controverted  his  view, 
and  argued  that  the  mere  fact  of  the  divine  essence  being 
intimately  present  to  the  human  intellect  eliminates  the  neces¬ 
sity  of  the  light  of  glory  as  a  previous  disposition.  However, 
the  Council  of  Vienne  (1311-1312)  decided  against  this  teach¬ 
ing  by  rejecting  a  thesis  in  which  it  was  stated,  quod  anima 
non  indiget  Inmine  gloriae,  ipsam  elevante,  ad  Deum  videndum 
et  eo  beate  fruendum.84 

There  was  greater  divergence  of  views  among  the  Scho¬ 
lastics  as  regards  the  essence  of  beatitude.  All  were  agreed 
that  the  blessedness  of  the  elect  must  comprise  at  least  three 
acts:  an  act  of  intuitive  vision,  an  act  of  love,  and  an  act  of 
fruition  or  joy.  The  first  of  these  is  an  act  of  the  intellect, 
while  the  other  two  proceed  from  the  will.  In  regard  to  them 
the  question  arose,  and  is  still  under  discussion,  what  is  their 
precise  relation  to  the  essence  of  beatitude?  Are  all  three  of 
them  constitutive,  so  that  if  one  be  eliminated  beatitude  itself 

83  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  49,  q.  2,  n.  24. 

84  DB.  475. 


80  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  12,  a.  5* 

81  Tbid.  a.  =;  ad  im. 

82  Ibid.  a.  5  ad  3™. 


436 


MEDIAEVAL  THEOLOGY 


is  destroyed?  Or  is  only  one  of  them  essential,  or  at  most 
two?  And  if  so,  which  of  them?  Setting  aside  merely  ac¬ 
cidental  and  minor  differences,  the  views  of  the  Scholastics 
on  this  point  may  be  reduced  to  the  following  three.  First: 
Beatitude  consists  essentially  in  the  intuitive  vision  of  God, 
and  from  this  flow  the  complementary  acts  of  love  and  frui¬ 
tion.  Second :  The  essence  of  beatitude  comprises  both  the 
intuitive  vision  of  God  and  an  act  of  love,  but  in  such  a  way 
that  the  intuitive  vision  is  merely  inchoative  and  receives  its 
essential  complement  from  the  act  of  love.  Third :  Beatitude 
consists  essentially  in  an  act  of  love,  to  which  the  intuitive 
vision  is  presupposed  as  a  necessary  condition,  and  from 
which  fruition  flows  as  a  connatural  consequence. 

The  first  of  these  three  views  is  put  forward  by  St.  Thomas. 
Admitting  that  beatitude  is  the  proper  object  of  the  will,  since 
it  is  the  possession  of  the  Supreme  Good,  he  holds  that  the 
act  of  the  will  does  nevertheless  not  constitute  the  essence  of 
beatitude.  For,  he  argues,  “  that  act  is  man’s  last  end,  taken 
subjectively,  by  reason  of  which  he  is  placed  in  such  a  relation 
to  God  that  the  will  rests  perfectly  satisfied  in  Him.  But 
only  the  vision  of  God  by  the  intellect  is  such  an  act;  because 
by  that  only  is  there  established  a  certain  contact  of  God  with 
the  faculties  —  since  everything  that  is  known  is  in  him  who 
knows  in  so  far  as  it  is  known;  just  as  also  bodily  contact 
with  something  agreeable  to  the  senses  induces  a  quieting  of 
the  affections.  And  therefore  man’s  last  end  consists  in  an 
act  of  the  intellect;  and  thus  beatitude,  which  is  man’s  last 
end,  is  in  the  intellect  as  its  proper  subject.  However,  that 
which  belongs  to  the  will,  namely,  its  resting  in  the  end  ob¬ 
tained,  which  may  be  termed  delectation,  is  the  formal  com¬ 
plement  of  the  essence  of  beatitude,  as  supervening  upon  the 
intuitive  vision  in  which  the  substance  of  beatitude  consists; 
so  that  thus  there  is  attributed  to  the  will  both  the  first  rela¬ 
tion  to  the  end,  in  as  much  as  it  desires  its  attainment,  and 
also  the  last,  in  so  far  as  it  rests  in  the  end  already  attained/’  85 

The  second  opinion  is  defended  by  Richard  of  Middle- 

85  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  49,  q.  1,  a.  1,  sol.  2. 


ESCHATOLOGY 


437 


ton, 80  and  also  by  St.  Bonaventure.87  Both  of  them  teach 
that  by  way  of  genesis  beatitude  is  first  in  the  intellect,  in  as 
much  as  it  has  its  inception  in  the  intuitive  vision  of  God ;  but 
it  receives  its  essential  perfection  in  the  will,  which  is  united 
to  God  in  the  act  of  love  and  possesses  Him  as  the  object  of 
blessed  fruition. 

The  third  view  is  that  of  Scotus.  He  admits  that  both  the 
intellect  and  will  possess  God  as  their  immediate  object;  and 
also  that  by  way  of  genesis  beatitude  is  first  in  the  intellect, 
in  as  much  as  without  the  intuitive  vision  there  could  be  no 
immediate  union  of  the  will  with  the  divine  essence.  But  the 
essence  of  beatitude  consists  in  only  one  operation  —  that  of 
the  will.88  The  will  is  man’s  noblest  faculty,  just  as  charity 
is  the  highest  of  virtues.89  It  is  right,  therefore,  and  obvious 

too,  that  the  full  and  complete  and  perfect  possession  of  man’s 

end  is  an  act  of  unitive  love;  not  of  a  love  of  concupiscence, 
but  of  benevolence,  which  finds  its  perfect  expression  in  this 
utterance :  “  The  infinite  goodness  of  God  is  to  me  an  ob¬ 

ject  of  complacency,  and  by  accepting  Him  and  delighting  in 
Him,  I  simply  desire  Him  to  possess  all  the  goodness  He  does 
possess.”  90 

After  setting  forth  their  views  on  the  essential  blessedness 
of  the  elect,  the  Scholastics  usually  enter  into  rather  lengthy 
discussions  of  a  number  of  subordinate  points,  more  or  less 
intimately  connected  with  the  state  of  eternal  beatitude.  The 
chief  of  these  are  the  dotes,  or  spiritual  dowry  of  the  blessed; 
the  aureolae,  or  special  crowns  corresponding  to  certain  states 
in  life  and  the  perfect  practice  of  certain  virtues;  the  acci¬ 
dental  happiness  that  arises  from  various  created  sources ;  the 
perpetuity  of  that  blissful  state;  the  impeccability  of  the  elect; 
their  social  relations,  and  kindred  subjects.  But  these  discus¬ 
sions  need  not  be  reviewed  in  the  present  connection ;  because, 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  points,  the  subjects  discussed  are 
likely  to  remain  a  matter  of  speculation  until  we  shall  have 
attained  the  blessed  vision  of  God. 

86  Ibid.  a.  i,  q.  6.  88  In  Sent.  IV,  d.  49,  q.  3,  n.  6,  5 ; 

87  Ibid.  T,  d.  1,  a.  2,  q.  unica ;  II,  q.  4,  n.  6,  5. 

d.  38,  a.  1,  q.  2;  Breviloq.  VII,  c.  7.  89  Ibid.  q.  4,  n.  13-18. 

90  Ibid.  q.  5,  n.  4. 


CHAPTER  XXV 


MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES:  MEDIAEVAL  COUNCILS  1 

It  was  stated  in  the  introduction  to  this  volume  that  the 
development  of  dogmas  during  the  Middle  Ages  was  little 
influenced  by  the  aberration  of  heretics  and  consequent  de¬ 
cisions  of  councils.  That  this  statement  is  perfectly  correct 
must  be  evident  from  what  has  been  said  in  the  preceding 
chapters.  Such  heresies  as  did  arise  were  either  slight  modi¬ 
fications  of  errors  condemned  centuries  before,  or  they  were 
simply  momentary  disturbances  caused  by  individual  fanati¬ 
cism  or  indiscreet  zeal  for  the  purity  of  ecclesiastical  life. 
With  one  or  two  exceptions,  they  did  not  spring  from  intel¬ 
lectual  difficulties  regarding  any  particular  doctrine,  as  had 
been  the  case  with  all  the  great  heresies  of  the  fourth,  fifth, 
and  sixth  centuries.  Hence  they  led  to  little  or  no  theological 
discussion,  and  consequently  they  did  not  affect  the  normal 
development  of  doctrine.  It  was  owing  to  the  ephemeral 
nature  of  these  heresies  that  the  numerous  ecumenical  coun¬ 
cils  held  during  the  Middle  Ages  treated  them  only  in  passing. 
It  was  usually  not  for  the  purpose  of  giving  dogmatic  de¬ 
cisions  that  these  councils  were  convoked,  but  rather  for  the 
sake  of  bringing  about  ecclesiastical  reforms,  or  settling  diffi¬ 
culties  between  the  Church  and  the  State.  And  this  being  the 
case,  the  following  brief  outline  of  mediaeval  heresies  and 
councils  will  suffice  for  the  proper  understanding  of  the  various 
questions  that  have  thus  far  been  treated  in  the  present  vol¬ 
ume. 

1  Cfr.  Hefele,  Conciliengeschich-  tory,  I;  Doellinger,  Beitraege  zur 
te.  V ;  Marion,  Histoire  de  l’Eglise,  Sektengeschichte  des  Mittelalters. 
II;  Funk,  Manual  of  Church  His- 


438 


MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES 


439 


A  —  Medieval  Heresies 

In  regard  to  the  errors  of  Gottschalk,  Berengar.ius,  Roscelin, 
Abelard,  and  Gilbert  de  la  Porree,  nothing  need  be  said  on  the 
present  occasion,  as  a  summary  of  them  has  been  given  in 
the  preceding  chapters.2  It  need  only  be  added  that  their 
false  views  did  not  find  favor  with  men  of  wide  influence,  and 
as  a  result  they  soon  disappeared  from  the  theological  world. 
Some  of  them  were  indeed  revived  by  later  heretics,  but  of 
that  it  will  be  more  convenient  to  say  something  in  its  own 
proper  place.  Hence  at  present  we  may  devote  our  atten¬ 
tion  to  such  heretical  vagaries  and  tendencies  as  have  thus 
far  either  not  been  taken  note  of  at  all  or  else  only  in  a 
passing  wav. 

i.  Peter  de  Bruys  and  the  Petrobrusians. —  Concerning  the 
person  and  life  of  Peter  de  Bruys  little  is  known.  Practically 
our  only  source  of  information  is  a  letter  of  Peter  the  Venera¬ 
ble,  abbot  of  Cluny,3  and  a  brief  statement  of  Abelard  in  his 
Introductio  ad  Theologiamd  According  to  these  authorities, 
he  was  a  priest  who  had  disgraced  himself  and  in  consequence 
was  chased  from  his  church  by  his  own  parishioners.5  After 
that  he  traveled  for  about  twenty  years  through  Southern 
France  and  the  neighboring  countries,  causing  great  disturb¬ 
ance  by  his  fierce  invectives  against  the  Church  and  some  of 
her  doctrines.  He  was  burnt  to  death  at  St.  Giles  in  1137, 
the  enraged  people  having  cast  him  into  the  fire  which  he  him¬ 
self  had  made  of  broken  crucifixes.6  His  work  was  continued 
by  the  Cluniac  monk  Henry  of  Lausanne,  who  was  condemned 
by  the  Council  of  Rheims  in  1148. 

From  the  statements  of  Peter  the  Venerable  and  Abelard, 
the  teaching  of  these  sectaries  may  be  reduced  to  the  following 
points : 

(a)  The  baptism  of  children  is  invalid,  because  they  are 

2Cfr.  cc.  1-4,  17.  4  Op.  cit.  IT.  c.  4. 

3  Epistola  sive  Tractatus  adver-  5Cfr.  ML,  189,  790. 
sus  Petrobrusianos  Hereticos,  ML,  6  ML,  189,  723  A. 

189,  719-850. 


440  MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


unable  to  make  an  act  of  faith;  hence  all  those  who  have  re¬ 
ceived  the  sacrament  in  childhood,  must  be  rebaptized. 

(b)  God  may  be  adored  and  worshiped  anywhere,  and 
therefore  it  is  unlawful  to  build  churches;  those  that  have  been 
built  already  should  be  torn  down  and  destroyed. 

(c)  No  veneration  must  be  paid  to  crucifixes,  because  they 
are  instruments  of  punishment;  hence  wherever  a  crucifix  is 
found,  it  should  be  broken  to  pieces  and  cast  into  the  fire. 

(d)  Christ  changed  bread  and  wine  into  His  body  and  blood 
only  once,  and  He  did  not  give  the  same  power  to  His  priests ; 
hence  He  is  not  really  and  personally  present  in  the  Eucharist. 

(e)  Prayers,  alms-deeds,  and  other  pious  works  for  the  de¬ 
parted  are  useless.  Church  music,  singing,  and  ecclesiastical 
ceremonies  generally  should  be  abolished.  God  simply  laughs 
at  them :  He  is  pleased  only  with  the  worship  of  the  heart. 

For  the  time  being,  Peter  and  Henry  had  many  followers 
and  several  synods  were  held  to  counteract  their  influence, 
but  after  their  death  the  sect  to  which  Peter  had  given  his 
name  slowly  disappeared. 

2.  Tanchelm  and  Eon  de  Stella.  —  Tanchelm  was  an  escaped 
monk,  who  gathered  around  him  a  large  following  with  which 
he  traveled  from  place  to  place  in  the  Low  Countries.  He 
claimed  to  be  the  equal  of  Jesus  Christ  and  to  have  received 
as  his  special  mission  the  reformation  of  ecclesiastical  and  re¬ 
ligious  life.  At  the  same  time,  however,  his  conduct  was 
shockingly  immoral,  and  so  was  that  of  his  immediate  follow¬ 
ers.  As  he  violently  denounced  the  authority  of  the  Church 
and  all  priestly  ministrations,  he  caused  widespread  disturb¬ 
ance  wherever  he  went.  Finally,  in  1115,  he  was  slain  by  a 
cleric.  Much  of  the  harm  wrought  by  him  was  repaired  by 
the  zeal  and  prudence  of  St.  Norbert. 

Some  twenty  years  later,  a  similar  disturbance  was  caused 
by  Eon  de  Stella,  a  Breton  nobleman.  He  gave  himself  out 
as  the  Son  of  God,  the  Judge  of  the  living  and  dead.  His 
extraordinary  claim  he  tried  to  establish  by  an  appeal  to  the 
liturgical  text:  “Per  enm  (Eon)  qui  venturus  est  judicare 
vk'os  ct  mortuos  et  saeculum  per  ignem.  He  fiercely  inveighed 
against  all  worldly  possessions  on  the  part  of  the  Church, 


MEDIEVAL  HERESIES 


441 


and  also  preached  a  kind  of  communism  which  secured  him  vast 
numbers  of  adherents.  He  was  condemned  by  the  Council 
of  Rheims  in  1148,  and  some  years  later  died  in  prison. 

About  the  same  time,  considerable  agitation  along  these  lines 
was  carried  on  by  Arnold  of  Brescia,  who  violently  declaimed 
against  the  Church’s  possession  of  landed  property,  and  also 
against  the  temporal  power  of  the  Pope.  According  to  Otto 
of  Freising,  “  he  held  that  no  cleric  having  property,  no  bishop 
holding  fiefs,  no  monk  who  was  not  truly  poor,  could  hope 
for  salvation.”  7  He  was  condemned  by  the  Second  Lateran 
Council,  in  1139,  but  continued  his  propaganda  for  some  time 
longer  in  France  and  Switzerland.  In  1155  he  was  executed 
by  Barbarossa,  on  account  of  his  connection  with  the  revolu¬ 
tion  which  had  broken  out  at  Rome. 

3.  Amalric  of  Bene  and  David  of  Dinant. —  Towards  the 
end  of  the  twelfth  century,  the  Moorish  commentaries  on 
Aristotle  gave  rise  to  various  false  views  among  the  professors 
of  the  University  of  Paris.  Some  held  that  what  is  true  in 
philosophy  may  be  false  in  theology,  that  authority  alone  can¬ 
not  give  full  certainty,  and  that  the  Christian  religion,  like  all 
others,  contains  both  truth  and  falsehood.  Others  taught 
pantheistic  doctrines,  identifying  the  creature  with  the 
Creator.  To  this  latter  class  belonged  Amalric  of  Bene  and 
David  of  Dinant.  Amalric  held  that  all  Christians  are  mem¬ 
bers  of  Christ,  in  the  sense  that  by  way  of  identification  they 
are  all  other  Christs;  while  David  maintained  that  God  is 
primary  matter,  from  which  all  other  beings  are  derived  by 
some  kind  of  pantheistic  evolution.  The  teaching  of  Amalric 
was  condemned  by  the  University  of  Paris  in  1206,  and  also 
by  Pope  Innocent  III,  to  whom  he  had  appealed  for  an  authori¬ 
tative  decision.  Some  years  later,  1209  or  1210,  a  synod 
held  at  Paris  renewed  this  condemnation  and  also  ordered  the 
writings  of  David  to  be  committed  to  the  flames. 

However,  the  error  of  Amalric  spread  rapidly,  both  among 
the  clergy  and  laity.  In  a  few  years  after  his  death,  which  oc¬ 
curred  in  1207,  numerous  adherents  in  France,  Italy,  Ger- 


7  Cfr.  Hefele,  op.  cit.  V,  861,  881. 


442 


MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


many,  and  Switzerland  proclaimed  him  as  their  prophet.  They 
were  known  by  various  names,  Amalricians,  Brethren  of  the 
Free  Spirit,  or  more  generally,  Beghards  and  Beguines.  They 
held  a  threefold  incarnation  of  God:  of  the  Father  in  Abra¬ 
ham,  of  the  Son  in  Christ,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost  in  each 
Christian.  Because  of  this  incarnation,  each  individual 
Christian  is  God  in  as  true  a  sense  as  was  Christ  Himself. 
In  their  preaching  they  severely  criticized  the  Church  and  the 
priesthood,  and  at  the  same  time  they  claimed  for  themselves 
absolute  freedom  to  indulge  their  sensual  appetites.  Their 
errors  were  repeatedly  condemned  by  provincial  synods,  but  it 
was  only  by  the  active  intervention  of  the  Inquisition  that  the 
sect  was  finally  rooted  out. 

4.  The  Cathari  or  Albigenscs. —  These  heretics  are  usually 
considered  as  the  lineal  descendants  of  the  fourth-century 
Manichaeans,  for  whose  conversion  St.  Augustine  had  labored 
with  singular  success.  Since  his  time  they  had  practically  dis¬ 
appeared  from  the  West,  but  in  the  seventh  and  eighth  cen¬ 
turies  they  sprang  up  anew  in  the  Eastern  Empire,  where  they 
went  by  the  name  of  Paulicians.  Two  centuries  later  they  ap¬ 
peared  under  the  name  of  Bogomiles  among  the  Bulgarians, 
and  thence  made  their  way  into1  Western  Europe.  In  Italy 
they  called  themselves  Patarini,  while  in  the  South  of  France 
the/ adopted  the  name  of  Cathari.  In  this  latter  country  their 
stronghold  was  the  city  of  Albi,  and  hence  the  French  branch 
of  the  sectaries  came  to  be  known  as  the  Albigenses. 

Doctrinally  these  heretics  belonged  to  two  different  schools. 
The  Cathari  of  France  were  for  the  most,  part  strict  Mani¬ 
chaeans,  who  believed  in  the  existence  of  two  eternal  prin¬ 
ciples,  each  of  which  was  regarded  as  the  creator  of  a  different 
world.  The  Patarini  of  Italy,  on  the  other  hand,  held  the  evil 
principle  to  be  simply  a  fallen  angel,  whom  they  called  Satan 
and  identified  with  the  God  of  the  Old  Testament.  Aside 
from  this  fundamental  difference  in  their  belief,  both  parties 
were  agreed  on  most  other  points  of  doctrine.  They  believed 
in  the  migration  of  souls,  and  as  a  consequence  forbade  the 
killing  of  animals.  Their  worship  consisted  chiefly  in  the 
recital  of  the  Lord’s-  prayer,  and  all  ecclesiastical  ceremonies, 


MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES 


443 


the  sacraments,  veneration  of  the  saints,  and  the  like,  were  re¬ 
jected  by  them.  Churches  they  regarded  as  useless,  and  there¬ 
fore  destroyed  them  wherever  they  could.  They  were  opposed 
to  all  civil  government  ;  held  oaths,  capital  punishment,  and 
wars  to  be  unlawful;  disapproved  of  marriage,  abstained  from 
flesh-meat,  and  observed  long  fasts.  However,  these  austeri¬ 
ties  were  practiced  only  by  the  Perfect,  who  had  received 
the  consolamentum  or  spiritual  baptism.  The  rank  and  file 
were  allowed  to  indulge  their  sensual  appetite  to  the  fullest  ex¬ 
tent.  For  them  it  was  sufficient  to  promise  that  they  would 
receive  the  consolamentum  at  the  hour  of  death. 

As  these  sectaries  caused  great  civil  disorder  as  well  as 
religious,  and  were  moreover  protected  by  powerful  nobles, 
Pope  Innocent  III  found  it  necessary  to  organize  a  crusade 
against  them,  and  so  come  to  the  assistance  of  the  persecuted 
Catholics.  The  conflict  lasted  for  twenty  long  years,  and  led 
to  much  bloodshed  on  both  sides.  In  the  beginning  milder 
measures  had  been  used,  and  the  prayers  and  preaching  of  St, 
Dominic  had  met  with  considerable  success;  but  the  awful 
ravages  committed  by  the  heretics  made  the  use  of  force  against 
them  inevitable.  Their  power  was  at  last  broken,  but  only 
when  the  fair  countryside  had  been  changed  to  a  desert. 
Even  then  many  persevered  in  their  error,  and  it  was  only  the 
constant  vigilance  and  severe  measures  of  the  Inquisition  that 
finally  succeeded  in  extirpating  the  sect  completely.8 

5.  The  Waldensians. —  This  sect,  like  so  many  others  in 
the  Middle  Ages,  sprang  from  the  misdirected  zeal  of  a  well 
intentioned  man.  Its  founder  was  a  certain  Waldes,  a  wealthy 
broker  of  Lyons  in  France.  After  reading  the  story  of  St. 
Alexius,  he  made  up  his  mind  to  follow  that  holy  man’s 
example.  Hence,  about  1177,  he  disposed  of  his  wealth,  and 
became  a  poor  preacher  of  penance.  His  object  was  to  re¬ 
store  the  simplicity  of  life  which  had  distinguished  the  early 
Christians.  In  a  short  time  he  gathered  around  him  numerous 
companions,  and  these  he  sent  out  to  preach  the  gospel  of 
poverty  wherever  they  could  get  a  hearing.  Although  ex- 

8  Cfr.  Funk,  op.  cit.  I,  350 ;  Hefele,  op.  cit.  V,  827  sqq. 


444 


MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


pelled  from  Lyons,  they  were  at  first  left  unmolested  by 
ecclesiastical  authority.  However,  in  1184,  Pope  Lucius  III 
excommunicated  them  together  with  other  heretics.  In  this  ex- 
communication  they  are  referred  to  as  the  Humiliati  or  Poor 
Men  of  Lvons. 

Unlike  the  early  Christians,  whom  they  professed  to  imitate, 
these  sectaries  not  only  relincjuished  their  possessions,  but  also 
avoided  all  manual  labor,  and  therefore  depended  for  their 
livelihood  upon  alms.  But  as  their  number  increased  very 
rapidly,  this  mode  of  existence  became  too  precarious,  and  so 
they  divided  into  two  classes  —  the  Perfect  and  the  Believers. 
While  the  former  complied  strictly  with  the  demands  of  abso¬ 
lute  poverty,  the  latter  were  allowed  to  own  worldly  posses¬ 
sions.  The  Perfect  bound  themselves  by  the  vows  of  poverty, 
chastity,  and  obedience,  and  thus  in  a  manner  constituted  a 
religious  association.  At  the  same  time,  they  were  doctrinally 
unsound.  They  not  only  denied  the  lawfulness  of  oaths,  of 
military  service,  and  of  the  death  penalty  for  criminals;  but 
also  rejected  the  doctrine  of  purgatory,  of  intercession  for  the 
dead,  and  of  indulgences.  Moreover  the  Italian  branch  main¬ 
tained  that  the  value  of  the  sacraments  depended  on  the  per¬ 
sonal  sanctity  of  the  minister,  a  view  that  had  been  condemned 
by  the  Church  centuries  before.  - 

Under  Innocent  III  serious  efforts  were  made  to  reclaim 
these  deluded  men,  and  large  numbers  returned  to  the  Church, 
but  others  persevered  in  their  error.  They  were  no  longer 
satisfied  with  claiming  Waldes  as  their  founder,  but  contended 
that  they  were  a  remnant  of  the  primitive  Christians  who  had 
remained  faithful  to  Apostolic  traditions  when,  through  the 
misdirected  liberality  of  Constantine,  the  Church  had  fallen 
a  victim  to  the  seduction  of  wealth  and  power.  In  the  six¬ 
teenth  century  most  of  them  threw  in  their  lot  with  the  Re¬ 
formers,  and  through  these  Waldensians  many  Protestants 
later  on  tried  to  establish  their  claim  to  Apostolic  succession.9 

6.  John  Wiclif. —  Like  many  a  self-constituted  reformer 
before  him  and  since,  Wiclif  started  out  with  the  laudable  in- 


9  Cfr.  Hefele,  op.  cit.  V,  726  sqq. 


MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES 


445 


tention  of  counteracting  certain  tendencies  that  threatened  the 
purity  of  ecclesiastical  life.  Many  of  the  clergy  in  his  day 
were  more  intent  upon  the  accumulation  of  wealth  than  upon 
the  saving  of  souls.  Against  these  he  preached  the  poverty  of 
Christ  and  the  Apostles.  Then,  to  destroy  the  evil  at  its  root 
as  he  conceived  it,  he  began  to  attack  the  Church’s  right  to 
possess  property,  and  advocated  a  state-supported  clergy.  He 
was  especially  violent  in  his  denunciation  of  religious  orders, 
many  of  which  possessed  vast  estates  and  great  wealth.  From 
these  polemics  against  abuses,  real  or  imaginary,  he  by  de¬ 
grees  passed  over  to  attacks  on  monasticism  as  an  institution 
and  finally  on  the  Papacy  itself.  To  such  lengths,  however, 
he  did  not  go  until  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Western  Schism 
in  1378.  From  that  time  forward  till  his  death  in  1384,  he 
fell  into  many  doctrinal  errors ;  and  these  he  spread  all  through 
England  by  means  of  wandering  preachers,  historically  known 
as  Lollards,  that  is,  sowers  of  tares. 

The  teaching  of  Wiclif  was  condemned  by  two  synods  held 
in  London,  the  one  in  May  and  the  other  in  November  of 
1382.  At  the  first  two  lists  of  propositions  drawn  from  the 
writings  of  Wiclif  were  examined  and  condemned.  The  most 
important  of  the  condemned  errors  are  the  following:  (a) 
The  substance  of  bread  and  wine  remain  after  the  consecra¬ 
tion.  (b)  The  accidents  of  bread  and  wine  do  not  exist  with¬ 
out  a  subject,  (c)  In  the  Holy  Eucharist  Christ  is  not  really 
and  truly  present  in  the  same  sense  that  He  is  in  heaven,  (d) 
A  priest  or  a  bishop  who  is  in  the  state  of  mortal  sin  cannot 
consecrate,  baptize,  or  administer  any  other  sacrament,  (e) 
If  a  person  is  truly  sorry  for  his  sins,  he  has  no  need  of  con¬ 
fession.  (f)  When  the  Pope  leads  a  wicked  life,  he  loses  all 
his  power  except  such  as  he  received  from  the  Emperor,  (g) 
For  clerics  to  own  temporal  possessions  is  against  the  teaching 
of  Holy  Scriptures,  (h)  It  is  a  sin  to  found  religious  orders, 
whether  they  own  property  or  not.  (i)  Whoever  belongs  to 
a  religious  order  is  by  that  very  fact  excluded  from  the  com¬ 
munion  of  saints.10 

10  Cfr.  Hefele,  op.  cit.  VI,  p.  954  sqq. 


446  MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


After  the  second  of  these  synods,  Wiclif  retired  to  his  vicar¬ 
age  at  Lutterworth,  where  he  spent  his  remaining  days  in  writ¬ 
ing  his  chief  work,  entitled  Trialogus.  In  this  he  develops  his 
erroneous  views  on  predestination,  the  Church,  and  the  Holy 
Eucharist.  God  predestines  men  to  eternal  life  irrespective 
of  their  merit,  the  Church  is  made  up  only  of  the  predestined, 
and  the  substance  of  bread  and  wine  remain  in  the  Holy 
Eucharist  together  with  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ.  Forty- 
five  propositions,  taken  partly  from  this  book  and  partly  from 
his  other  writings,  were  condemned  by  the  Council  of  Con¬ 
stance  and  by  Pope  Martin  V.11 

7.  John  Hus. —  Owing  to  the  severe  measures  taken  both  by 
the  ecclesiastical  and  secular  authorities,  Wiclifism  practically 
disappeared  from  England  soon  after  its  author’s  death.  But 
it  found  a  home  on  the  continent,  and  especially  in  Bohemia, 
where  it  was  ardently  defended  by  John  Hus.  He  was  at  the 
time  professor  at  the  University  of  Prague,  and  an  eloquent 
preacher.  He  took  over  the  entire  teaching  of  Wiclif,  except 
his  error  on  the  Holy  Eucharist.  In  opposition  to  that  he  firmly 
maintained  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation  as  taught  by  the 
Church.  In  1403,  the  University  of  Prague  condemned  a 
number  of  Wiclif ite  theses,  but  this  had  little  effect  upon  Hus 
and  his  fellow  admirers  of  the  English  heretic.  Then,  in 
1411,  he  himself  was  excommunicated,  and  every  community 
that  presumed  to  harbor  him  was  threatened  with  an  interdict. 
He,  however,  continued  to  preach  as  before,  and  in  his  justifi¬ 
cation  appealed  from  the  Pope  to  a  general  council.  He  had  a 
staunch  supporter  in  his  friend,  Jerome  of  Prague. 

On  the  5th  of  November,  1414,  the  Council  of  Constance, 
convened  for  the  purpose  of  terminating  the  schism,  held  its 
first  session.  Hus  had  secured  a  “  safe  conduct  ”  from  Em¬ 
peror  Sigismund,  and  came  to  the  Council  without  any  mis¬ 
givings  as  to  the  favorable  issue  of  the  case  against  him.  He 
seems  to  have  been  firmly  convinced  that  he  was  perfectly 
orthodox  in  his  teaching.  However,  after  a  preliminary 
examination,  he  was  imprisoned  in  a  Dominican  monastery, 

11  Mansi,  27,  1207  sqq. 


MEDIAEVAL  COUNCILS 


447 


where  he  remained  from  the  6th  of  December  till  Palm  Sun¬ 
day.  A  formal  charge  of  heresy  was  brought  against  him  in 
a  general  congregation  of  cardinals  and  bishops  on  the  5th  of 
June,  and  was  thereafter  discussed  in  four  different  sessions  of 
the  Council.  These  discussions  led  to  the  formulation  of  thirty 
propositions,  which  Hus  was  called  upon  to  retract.12  As  he 
constantly  refused  to  do  so,  on  the  plea  that  he  had  never 
taught  heretical  doctrines  and  that  he  could  not  retract  the 
truth  without  offending  God,  he  was  degraded  from  his  priestly 
rank  and  handed  over  to  the  secular  arm.  The  Emperor 
ordered  him  to  be  burned  at  the  stake,  and  this  sentence  was 
carried  out  on  the  6th  of  July,  1415.  Although  his  friend, 
Jerome  of  Prague,  met  the  same  fate  eleven  months  later, 
it  was  not  until  after  twenty  years  of  civil  war  that  the  Husite 
troubles  in  Bohemia  were  finally  settled.13 

Protestant  writers  frequently  state  that  Wiclif  and  Hus 
were  Prereformers,  who  began  the  work  that  Luther  was 
destined  to  perfect  in  the  sixteenth  century.  But  as  Loofs  14 
and  other  Protestant  dogmatic  historians  point  out,  all  these 
so-called  Prereformers  rejected  every  fundamental  principle 
upon  which  Protestantism  is  based.  They  went  astray  on 
particular  doctrines,  but  clung  tenaciously  to  the  Catholic  con¬ 
cept  of  salvation  through  the  ministerial  intervention  of  the 
Church  instituted  by  Christ.  Neither  the  right  of  private 
judgment  in  the  interpretation  of  Scripture,  nor  the  doctrine 
of  justification  through  faith  alone,  formed  either  an  essential 
or  an  integral  part  of  any  heresy  before  the  sixteenth  century. 
Yet  the  two  together  make  up  the  very  essence  of  Protestant¬ 
ism. 


B  —  Medieval  Councils 

What  was  said  in  the  preceding  section  in  regard  to  mediaeval 
heresies,  may  here  be  applied  to  mediaeval  councils  —  they 
contributed  very  little  to  the  development  of  dogma.  Exclu- 

12  Ibid.  1209  sqq. 

13  Cfr.  Hefele,  op.  cit.  VII,  66- 
240. 


14  Dogmengeschichte,  635-658. 


448  MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


sive  of  the  Council  of  Trent,  which  forms  in  a  manner  the 
dividing  line  between  mediaeval  and  modern  times,  ten  ecumen¬ 
ical  councils  were  held  during  the  Middle  Ages,  and  of  these 
only  five  dealt  to  any  considerable  extent  with  doctrinal  matter. 
They  are  the  following:  The  Fourth  Lateran  (1215);  the 
Second  of  Lyons  (1274);  the  Council  of  Vienne  (1311- 
1312) ;  the  Council  of  Constance  (1414-1418),  and  the  Coun¬ 
cil  of  Florence  (1438-1445).  And  even  these  five  were  not 
qonvened  for  the  purpose  of  giving  dogmatic  decisions;  their 
primary  object  was  either  the  promotion  of  the  crusades,  the 
settling  of  difficulties  between  Church  and  State,  the  reforma¬ 
tion  of  discipline,  the  union  of  the  East  and  West,  or  the 
termination  of  schisms.  Furthermore,  as  will  be  shown  in  the 
following  paragraphs,  such  dogmatic  decisions  as  were  given 
amounted  to  little  more  than  restatements  of  what  was  already 
a  matter  of  faith. 

1.  The  Fourth  Lateran  Council. —  In  his  letter  of  convoca¬ 
tion,  addressed  to  the  bishops  of  Christendom,  Pope  Innocent 
III  stated  the  purpose  of  the  Council  in  these  terms:  “  Two 
things  I  have  especially  at  heart:  The  recovery  of  the  Holy 
Land  and  the  reformation  of  the  whole  Church.”  The  attain¬ 
ment  of  this  twofold  object,  therefore,  was  to  constitute  the 
chief  topic  of  discussion  and  legislation.  In  accordance  with 
the  Pope’s  wishes,  on  November  11,  1215,  four  hundred  and 
twelve  bishops,  some  eight  hundred  abbots  and  priors,  besides 
numerous  substitutes  of  absent  prelates,  gathered  in  the  Lateran 
Basilica  to  begin  the  work  outlined  for  them  by  the  Sovereign 
Pontiff.  Only  three  sessions  were  held,  in  which  seventy 
capitula  were  drawn  up,  containing  definitions  against  heretics, 
a  decree  in  reference  to  the  next  crusade,  and  disciplinary 
canons.15  It  is  only  of  the  first  that  a  brief  summary  need  be 
given  in  the  present  connection. 

The  chief  heretics  in  question  were  the  Cathari  and  Walden- 
sians,  of  whom  a  short  account  has  been  given  in  the  preced¬ 
ing  section.  In  opposition  to  them,  the  Council  drew  up  a 
creed  which  contained  the  Church’s  teaching  on  the  various 

15  Cfr.  Hefele,  op.  cit.  V,  872  sqq. ;  Mansi,  22,  982  sqq. 


MEDIAEVAL  COUNCILS 


449 


points  of  doctrine  either  denied  or  distorted  by  the  sectaries. 
The  first  part  sets  forth  what  is  to  be  held  in  regard  to  the 
Blessed  Trinity,  and  then  specially  emphasizes  the  fact  that 
this  triune  God  is  the  one  sole  principle  of  all  created  beings. 
All  things  whatsoever,  material  and  spiritual,  angels,  men,  and 
demons,  were  created  by  God;  and  as  created  by  Him,  they 
were  all  good  ;  but  some  of  them  became  evil  through  a  per¬ 
verse  use  of  their  free  will. 

The  second  part  states  the  doctrine  of  the  Incarnation,  the 
properties  of  Christ's  human  nature,  the  work  of  the  redemp¬ 
tion,  the  Savior’s  death,  resurrection  and  ascension  into 
heaven.  Then  brief  reference  is  made  to  the  resurrection  of 
the  dead,  the  last  judgment,  and  the  eternity  of  heaven  and 
hell. 

The  third  part  deals  with  the  Church  and  the  sacraments, 
which  points  were  especially  attacked  by  the  Cathari.  Particu¬ 
lar  mention  is  made  of  the  Holy  Sacrifice,  in  which  Christ  is 
both  the  sacrificing  priest  and  the  immolated  victim.  The 
bread  and  wine  are  “  transubstantiated  ”  into  His  body  and 
blood,  and  this  transubstantiation  cannot  be  effected  except  by 
a  duly  ordained  priest.  In  regard  to  baptism  it  is  stated  that 
the  Trinitarian  formula  must  be  used,  and  that  it  is  valid  no 
matter  by  whom  conferred.  If  any  one  falls  into  sin  after 
baptism,  he  can  always  obtain  forgiveness  by  means  of  true 
penance.  Finally,  the  attainment  of  eternal  life  is  possible, 
not  only  for  those  who  observe  virginal  chastity,  but  also  for 
all  others  who  live  in  the  married  state. 

In  the  second  capitulum  the  teaching  of  Abbot  Joachim  on 
the  Blessed  Trinity  is  condemned.  As  was  pointed  out  in 
another  chapter,16  Joachim  contended  against  the  Lombard 
that  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost,  are  not  one  essence,  one 
nature,  or  a  quaedam  summa  res.  The  Council  further  defines 
that  the  Father  is  the  principium  quod  as  regards  the  genera¬ 
tion  of  the  Son,  and  that  the  Father  and  Son  together  are 
principium  quod  in  respect  to  the  procession  of  the  Holy 
Spirit.  This  is  followed  by  a  rejection  of  the  pantheistic 

16  Cfr.  c.  4. 


450  MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


views  of  Amalric  of  Bene,  as  noted  in  the  preceding  section 
of  this  chapter.  It  is  from  this  Council  that  the  Inquisition 
dates  its  origin. 

2.  The  Second  Council  of  Lyons. —  When  Michael  Palaeolo- 
gus,  in  1261,  wrested  Constantinople  from  its  Latin  Emperor 
Baldwin  II,  ecclesiastical  union  between  East  and  West  was 
again  dissolved.  It  was  principally  to  restore  this  union  that 
Gregory  X  determined  to  convene  a  general  council  at  which 
both  the  Greek  and  Latin  Church  should  be  represented,  al¬ 
though  ecclesiastical  reform  and  recovery  of  the  Holy  Land 
were  also  to  be  considered.  The  Greek  Emperor  favored  the 
plans  of  the  Sovereign  Pontiff,  perhaps  not  so  much  from  a 
desire  of  promoting  the  union  as  through  hope  of  thereby  ob¬ 
taining  much  needed  help  against  the  dethroned  Baldwin.  At 
a  synod  held  in  Constantinople  he  succeeded  in  prevailing  on  the 
Greek  bishops  to  subscribe  to  the  following  three  points,  which 
he  considered  essential  to  the  union:  Acknowledgment  of  the 
papal  primacy,  the  right  of  appeal  to  Rome,  and  mentioning 
of  the  Pope’s  name  in  the  liturgy.  As  regarded  the  Filioque 
clause  of  the  Symbol,  the  bishops  admitted  that  its  dogmatic 
content  could  not  be  called  in  question,  but  its  addition  to  the 
Symbol  was  against  the  ruling  of  the  Council  of  Ephesus,  and 
therefore  was  not  to  be  tolerated.  * 

On  his  part,  the  Pope  sent  a  symbol  of  faith  to  the  Emperor, 
in  which,  besides  a  general  outline  of  Catholic  teaching,  were 
contained  the  various  points  of  doctrine  till  then  objected  to  by 
the  schismatics.  It  stated  the  procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
from  the  Father  and  the  Son,  the  unlawfulness  of  rebaptizing 
those  who  had  already  been  baptized,  the  existence  of  purga¬ 
tory  and  the  efficacy  of  suffrages  for  the  dead,  the  immediate 
reception  into  heaven  of  the  departed  who  have  fully  satisfied 
for  their  sins,  the  septenary  number  of  the  sacraments,  the 
validity  of  consecration  whether  fermented  or  unfermented 
bread  is  used,  the  lawfulness  of  second,  third,  or  fourth  mar¬ 
riages,  and  the  indissolubility  of  the  marriage  bond  during  the 
lifetime  of  the  contracting  parties.  Then  followed  a  clear 
statement  of  the  privileges  of  the  Roman  Church,  the  Pope’s 


MEDIAEVAL  COUNCILS 


451 


universal  jurisdiction,  and  his  competency  to  decide  questions 
of  faith.17 

In  his  answer  to  the  Pope,  Emperor  Michael  declared  him¬ 
self  ready  to  accept  the  symbol  as  a  sincere  expression  of  his 
own  belief,  and  wished  to  submit  to  the  authority  of  the 
Sovereign  Pontiff.  However,  he  asked  as  a  favor  that  the 
Greek  Church  might  be  permitted  to  retain  its  own  Creed, 
without  the  addition  of  the  Filioque  clause ;  and  also  its  ecclesi¬ 
astical  rites,  such  as  they  had  been  before  the  schism.  Finally, 
he  added,  the  legates  had  been  instructed  to  repeat  and  explain 
his  personal  declaration  at  the  Council.18  A  similar  declara¬ 
tion  was  made  by  the  archbishops  of  the  Eastern  Church, 
promising  to  accept  the  proposed  union,  and  to  yield  the  Pope 
that  reverence  and  obedience  which  had  been  customary  before 
the  schism.19 

The  Council  opened  on  May  7,  1274,  in  the  Cathedral  of 
St.  John.  There  were  present  about  five  hundred  bishops,  and 
over  a  thousand  inferior  prelates.  St.  Thomas  was  to  have 
taken  part  in  the  Council  as  a  theologian,  but  died  on  his  way 
thither,  at  the  early  age  of  forty-nine.  St.  Bonaventure,  on 
the  other  hand,  was  present  at  the  first  four  sessions,  and  ren¬ 
dered  such  valuable  services  that  the  success  of  the  Council  was 
largely  due  to  his  efforts.  But  before  the  sixth  and  last  session 
of  the  Council,  he  also  died.  It  was  early  Sunday  morning, 
July  15,  and  on  the  same  day  he  was  buried  in  the  church  of 
his  religious  brethren,  the  Minorites  of  Lyons.  It  is  sometimes 
stated  that  he  presided  at  the  Council,  but  this  is  obviously  a 
mistake,  since  the  Pope  himself  was  present  at  all  the  public 
sessions. 

The  Greek  representatives  did  not  arrive  at  Lyons  until 
June  24.  They  took*  part  in  the  Council  for  the  first  time  on 
July  6,  when  the  fourth  session  was  held.  On  that  occasion 
they  abjured  the  schism,  and  declared  that  they  and  those 
whom  they  represented  returned  freely  to  the  obedience  of  the 
Roman  Church,  accepting  in  all  its  parts  the  symbol  of  faith 

17  Mansi,  24,  70  A  sqq.  19  Ibid.  74. 

18  Ibid.  67. 


452  MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


that  had  been  submitted  to  their  consideration  before  the 
Council.20  Thus  the  schism  was  healed,  but  only  for  a  time. 
After  the  death  of  Emperor  Michael,  in  1282,  the  enemies  of 
the  union,  of  whom  there  were  not  a  few  both  among  the 
bishops  and  priests,  brought  his  successor,  Andronikus,  over 
to  their  side  and  thereby  the  schism  was  renewed. 

The  Council  closed  with  the  sixth  session,  which  was  held  on 
July  16.  The  work  of  the  Council  was  summed  up  in  thirty- 
one  canons,  nearly  all  of  which  deal  with  matters  of  discipline 
and  reform.  At  the  close  of  the  last  session,  the  Pope  de¬ 
clared  that  two  objects  for  which  the  Council  had  been  con¬ 
vened  had  been  attained- — The  union  of  Christendom  and  the 
taking  of  effective  measures  for  the  recovery  of  the  Holy 
Land;  but  the  third,  the  reformation  of  morals,  was  still  in  a 
very  unsatisfactory  condition.  Then,  with  a  prayer  and  his 
blessing,  he  dissolved  the  Council. 

3.  The  Council  of  Vienne. —  The  Council  held  its  first  ses¬ 
sion  on  October  16,  131 1,  in  the  Cathedral  of  Vienne  in  France. 
In  his  opening  address,  Pope  Clement  V  assigned  the  following 
three  objects  for  the  attainment  of  which  the  Council  had  been 
convened.  1.  the  settlement  of  the  question  whether  the 
Knights  Templar  should  be  suppressed;  2.  the  procuring  of 
assistance  for  the  Holy  Land ;  3..  the  reformation  of  morals 
and  of  the  clergy.  The  number  of  bishops  present  is  uncer¬ 
tain.  From  some  sources  it  appears  that  there  were  as  many 
as  three  hundred,  while  according  to  others  there  were,  only 
one  hundred  and  fourteen.  The  Pope  himself  presided.21 

The  suppression  of  the  Knights  Templar  had  been  de¬ 
manded  by  Philip  the  Fair  of  France.  His  ostensible  reason 
was  that  the  order  had  fallen  away  from  its  original  purpose, 
and  was  utterly  corrupt  both  as  regarded  morals  and  faith. 
He  brought  forward  many  witnesses  to  prove  his  point,  but  his 
motives  were  justly  suspected;  and  historically  the  true  state  of 
things  is  even  now  far  from  being  clearly  understood.  At  all 
events,  Pope  Clement,  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Council, 
suppressed  the  order  *and  assigned  its  temporalities  to  the 

21  Cfr.  Hefele,  op.  cit.  VI,  515  sqq. 


20  Cfr.  Hefele,  op.  cit.  VI,  141. 


MEDIAEVAL  COUNCILS 


453 


Knights  of  St.  John.  He  took  every  possible  measure  to  be 
just  to  all  concerned,  but  the  story  of  the  suppression  does  not 
make  pleasant  or  edifying  reading. 

The  doctrinal  decisions  of  the  Council  were  occasioned  by 
certain  accusations  brought  against  Peter  John  Olivi,  and  by 
the  errors  of  the  Beghards  and  Beguines.  John  Olivi  was  a 
learned  and  pious  Franciscan,  who  put  forward  somewhat 
extreme  and  partly  untenable  views  on  religious  poverty.  This 
brought  upon  him  the  enmity  of  some  of  his  own  brethren,  who 
in  consequence  accused  him  also  of  other  doctrinal  errors. 
The  matter  was  first  examined  into  by  a  commission  appointed 
by  the  Superior  General  of  the  Franciscans,  with  the  result 
that  thirty-four  propositions  taken  from  Olivi’s  writings  were 
censured  as  rash  and  dangerous.  Olivi  defended  himself,  and 
denied  the  authority  of  the  commission  to  decide  in  matters 
of  doctrine.  Then  the  discussion  was  taken  up  by  the  Council, 
but  only  three  of  the  thirty- four  propositions  were  selected 
for  further  investigation.  They  are  the  following:  i,  that 
Christ  was  still  living  when  the  soldier  pierced  His  side  with  a 
spear;  2,  that  the  rational  soul  is  not  of  itself  —  per  se  —  the 
form  of  the  body;  3,  that  children  do  not  receive  sanctifying 
grace  and  the  infused  virtues  in  baptism.  The  first  two  were 
condemned,  but  the  third  was  declared  to  be  less  probable  than 
the  contrary  view.22 

Against  the  Beghards  and  Beguines  two  canons  were  drawn 
up,  the  first  of  which  condemns  their  manner  of  life,  while  the 
second  points  out  and  censures  their  errors.  These  are  in  sub¬ 
stance  as  follows:  1.  It  is  possible  to  acquire  so  high  a 
degree  of  perfection  here  on  earth  as  to  become  impeccable, 
and  altogether  incapable  of  further  increase  in  sanctity.  2. 
Those  who  have,  acquired  this  degree  of  perfection  are  no 
longer  bound  to  fast  or  pray,  and  can  freely  indulge  the  incli¬ 
nations  of  the  body.  3.  Such  persons  are  not  subject  to  any 
authority,  not  even  to  that  of  the  Church.  4.  They  enjoy 
here  on  earth  the  same  happiness  as  the  blessed  in  heaven.  5. 
Rational  nature  is  of  itself  capable  of  enjoying  the  beatific 


22  Mansi,  25,  410  E  sq. 


454  MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 

vision,  and  needs  not  the  light  of  glory  in  order  to  see  God. 
6.  To  practice  virtue  is  a  matter  that  belongs  exclusively  to 
the  imperfect.  7.  To  kiss  a  woman  is  a  mortal  sin,  because 
nature  does  not  incline  thereto ;  but  to  satisfy  the  lusts  of  the 
flesh  is  not  a  sin,  because  that  is  according  to  nature.  8.  It 
is  an  imperfection  to  reverence  the  body  of  Christ  when  it  is 
elevated  during  Mass,  because  this  interferes  with  the  perfec¬ 
tion  of  contemplation.23 

4.  The  Council  of  Constance. —  The  primary  purpose  of  this 
Council  was  to  terminate  the  Western  Schism.  That  schism 
had  grown  out  of  the  contested  election  of  Urban  VI,  who  suc¬ 
ceeded  Gregory  XI  on  April  8,  1378.  As  far  as  can  now  be 
determined,  the  election  was  valid.  For  although  there  was 
during  the  conclave  a  great  popular  outcry  for  an  Italian  Pope, 
still  the  freedom  of  the  cardinals  was  not  interfered  with;  and 
when  the  election  was  over,  all  of  them  spontaneously  offered 
their  homage  to  the  new  Pontiff.  It  was  not  until  several 
weeks  after  the  coronation,  when  Urban  had  already  proved 
himself  a  stern  master,  that  some  of  the  disappointed  cardinals 
began  to  feel  that  they  had  been  unduly  influenced  in  their 
choice  by  fear  of  the  people.  When  it  became  evident  that 
Urban  was  bent  upon  carrying  out  his  strict  views,  the  majority 
of  the  Sacred  College  repudiated  his  election  as  invalid,  and  on 
September  20  chose  Robert  of  Geneva  as  the  new  Pope.  He 
took  the  name  of  Clement  VII. 

Although  the  greater  part  of  Christendom  remained  faith¬ 
ful  to  Urban,  nevertheless  France  and  a  few  other  countries 
recognized  Clement  as  the  lawful  successor  of  St.  Peter,  and 
thus  the  schism  was  started.  When  Urban  died  in  1389,  he 
was  succeeded  by  Boniface  IX ;  and  when  Clement  died  in  1394, 
he  received  a  successor  in  the  person  of  Benedict  XIII.  Thus 
Rome  and  Avignon  divided  the  Christian  world  into  two 
obediences.  Boniface  was  to  all  appearances  the  true  Pope, 
and  so  was  Gregory  XII  who  succeeded  him  in  1406 ;  but  many 
learned  and  holy  men  yielded  obedience  to  Benedict.  Matters 
became  even  worse  when  the  Council  of  Pisa,  in  1409,  at- 


23  Ibid.  410  A. 


MEDIAEVAL  COUNCILS 


455 


tempted  to  depose  the  two  rivals  and  in  their  place  elected  Alex¬ 
ander  V.  As  neither  Gregory  nor  Benedict  recognized  the 
authority  of  the  Council,  the  result  was  a  third  claimant  of  the 
Papal  crown ;  and  although  Alexander  died  within  a  year  after 
his  election,  his  place  was  taken  by  John  XXIII. 

It  was  whilst  ecclesiastical  affairs  were  in  this  state  of  utter 
confusion  that  the  Council  of  Constance  was  convened.  The 
initiative  was  taken  by  the  cardinals  of  all  three  obediences, 
whose  plans  for  a  reunion  of  Christendom  were  strongly  sup¬ 
ported  by  Emperor  Sigismund.  Of  the  three  Popes,  John 
alone  had  been  induced  to  give  a  reluctant  consent  to  the  calling 
of  a  general  council,  while  Gregory  and  Benedict  steadfastly  re¬ 
fused  to  countenance  any  movement  in  that  direction.  Hence 
if  Gregory  was  the  true  Pope,  as  is  practically  certain  that  he 
was,  the  Council  was  simply  an  illegitimate  gathering  of  pre¬ 
lates,  who  had  no  authority  to  legislate  for  the  whole  Church. 
It  was  only  when  after  the  resignation  of  Gregory,  and  the 
deposition  of  Benedict  and  John  as  doubtful  Popes,  Martin  V 
was  validly  elected,  that  the  Council  became  legitimate.  By 
that  time  forty-two  sessions  had  already  been  held,  and  several 
doctrinal  decisions  had  been  given,  all  of  which  were  neces¬ 
sarily  without  force  until  approved  by  the  new  Pope.24  The 
election  of  Pope  Martin  took  place  on  November  8,  1417,  just 
three  years  after  the  opening  of  the  Council. 

The  doctrinal  decisions  above  referred  to  bore  chiefly  on  the 
errors  of  Wiclif  and  Hus,  and  they  were  embodied  in  the  con¬ 
demnation  of  these  same  errors  by  the  Pope,  as  contained  in  the 
Bulls  Inter  cunctas  and  In  eminentis,  published  February  22, 
1418. 25  Hence  there  can  be  no  doubt  as  regards  their  validity. 

Considerable  discussion  was  subsequently  caused  in  regard 
to  the  proposition  that  a  general  council  has  its  authority  im¬ 
mediately  from  God,  and  that  it  is  superior  to  the  Pope.  This 
view  was  adopted  and  promulgated  in  the  fourth  and  fifth  ses¬ 
sions,  but  at  the  time  the  Council  was  still  illegitimate,  and 
therefore  incapable  of  defining  matters  of  faith.  Further- 

24  Cfr.  Hefele,  op.  cit.  VII,  66  25  Mansi,  27,  1207  E  sqq. 

sqq. ;  Salembier,  The  Great  Schism 
of  the  West,  275  sqq. 


456  MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


more,  subsequent  Roman  Pontiffs  always  repudiated  the  doc¬ 
trine  as  unorthodox;  and  Martin  V,  at  the  close  of  the  Coun¬ 
cil,  approved  only  in  a  general  way  what  had  been  enacted  by 
conciliar  procedure  in  matters  of  faith  —  in  materia  fidei  con- 
ciliariter  statuta.  It  is,  moreover,  quite  probable  that  the 
Council  merely  intended  its  declaration  to  meet  a  special  diffi¬ 
culty,  and  therefore  to  have  only  temporary  force.20 

5.  The  Council  of  Florence. —  One  of  the  means  chosen  by 
the  Council  of  Constance  to  bring  about  a  reformation  of 
morals,  and  also  to  counteract  the  ever  increasing  heretical 
tendencies  of  the  times,  was  the  frequent  convening  of  general 
councils.  It  was  determined  that  the  next  one  should  be 
called  after  five  years,  the  one  after  that  seven  years  later,  and 
thereafter  one  should  be  held  every  ten  years.  This  legislation 
had  been  agreed  upon  before  the  election  of  the  new  Pope,  and 
it  was  obviously  inspired  by  a  distrust  of  the  Papacy,  which  in 
its  turn  had  been  engendered  by  the  sad  experience  of  the  forty 
years  of  schism  before  the  Council.  Although  Pope  Martin 
had  bound  himself  by  no  personal  pledge  in  this  matter,  he 
called  a  council  at  Pavia  in  1423,  which,  owing  to  an  epidemic, 
was  shortly  after  transferred  to  Sienna.  It  accomplished 
practically  nothing,  and  was  dissolved  in  the  spring  of  1424. 

The  next  council  was  convened  at  Basle,  but  before  it  met 
Martin  V  had  passed  away.  He  was  succeeded  by  Eugenius 
IV.  The  Council  held  its  first  session  in  1431,  under  the 
presidency  of  Cardinal  Cesarini.  But  as  nothing  was  accom¬ 
plished,  the  Pope  resolved  to  transfer  it  to  an  Italian  city. 
This  occasioned  a  restatement  of  the  claim  advanced  at  Con¬ 
stance,  that  general  councils  are  superior  to  the  Pope.  Matters 
were  allowed  to  drag  on  till  1437,  when  the  Pope  dissolved  the 
Council.  Its  refractory  members,  however,  continued  to  hold 
sessions,  and  in  1439  even  elected  an  anti-Pope  who  took  the 
name  of  Felix  V.  Meanwhile  the  Greeks  had  again  applied 
for  reunion,  and  to  facilitate  negotiations  for  this  purpose,  the 
Pope  convened  a  council  at  Ferrara  in  1438.  After  much  use¬ 
less  discussion,  which  only  showed  the  unwillingness  of  the 

26  Cfr.  Funk,  Kirchengeschichtliche  Abhandlungen,  I,  489  sqq. ;  Salem- 
bier,  op.  cit.  306. 


MEDIEVAL  COUNCILS 


457 


Greeks  to  yield  a  whole-hearted  submission  to  the  Holy  See,  the 
Council  was  transferred  to  Florence. 

There  the  same  discussion  was  taken  up  again,  with  the  re¬ 
sult  that  finally  an  agreement  was  reached  which  apparently 
satisfied  both  parties.  The  Greeks  admitted,  as  their  fore¬ 
fathers  had  done  at  the  Second  Council  of  Lyons,  that  the 
Latin  teaching  on  the  procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit  from  the 
Father  and  the  Son  was  perfectly  orthodox.  An  understand¬ 
ing  was  also  reached  on  the  four  other  points  that  had  formed 
a  matter  of  controversy  —  purgatory,  the  commencement  of 
the  beatific  vision  as  soon  as  souls  are  purified  from  their  sins, 
the  use  of  unleavened  bread  in  the  Eucharist,  and  the  primacy 
of  the  Roman  Church.  After  this  the  union  was  once  more 
established,  and  the  Pope  embodied  the  five  points  referred 
to  in  the  Bull  Laetantur  coeli,  which  was  published  with  the 
concurrence  of  the  Council,  July  6,  1439.  However,  the  union 
was  destined  to  be  almost  as  shortlived  as  that  which  had 
been  established  at  Lyons,  nearly  two  hundred  years  before. 
It  appears  that  the  Greeks  were  animated  by  political  motives 
rather  than  by  the  desire  of  being  in  communion  with  the  Holy 
See.  Hence,  when  the  Turks,  in  1453,  took  Constantinople, 
the  schism  was  renewed.27 

After  the  departure  of  the  Greek  representatives,  the  Council 
also  received  the  submission  of  the  Armenians  and  the  Jacob¬ 
ites,  on  each  of  which  occasions  a  doctrinal  decree  was  issued, 
setting  forth  many  points  of  teaching  in  regard  to  which  con¬ 
formity  was  required.28  The  Council  was  dissolved  in  1445, 
after  it  had  been  transferred  from  Florence  to  the  Lateran 
at  Rome. 

27  Cfr.  Hefele,  op.  cit.  VII,  426 
sqq. 


28  Cfr.  DB.  695'  sqq. ;  703  sqq. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 


THE  PROTESTANT  REFORMATION :  THE  COUNCIL  OF 

TRENT  1 

Centuries  before  Luther  was  born,  the  reformation  of  the 
Church  in  her  head  and  members  had  been  earnestly  desired 
and  repeatedly  attempted  by  Popes  and  councils.  Side  by  side 
with  the  strong  faith  and  genuine  piety  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
there  was  a  widespread  corruption  of  morals  and  a  correspond¬ 
ing  laxity  of  discipline.  There  was  urgent  need  of  a  reforma¬ 
tion,  and  this  need  was  universally  felt ;  but  it  was  to  be  a  ref¬ 
ormation  of  practice,  not  of  belief.  The  faith  of  the  Church 
had  ever  been  preserved  in  its  pristine  purity,  and  at  the  time 
of  Luther’s  revolt  her  teaching  was  orthodox  in  every  respect. 
ETnfortunately,  it  was  precisely  her  faith  and  her  teaching  that 
were  finally  made  the  chief  objects  of  attack,  and  consequently 
what  was  at  first  heralded  as  a  reformation  of  her  morals 
ended  in  a  revolt  against  her  authority.  The  genesis  of  this 
revolt  and  the  checks  opposed  to  it  by  the  Church  form  the 
subject  matter  of  the  present  chapter. 


A  —  The  Protestant  Reformation 

That  at  the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth  century  there  was  a 
combination  of  circumstances  which  favored  a  religious  up¬ 
heaval,  or  a  breaking  away  from  ecclesiastical  authority,  is  to¬ 
day  conceded  by  all  impartial  students  of  church  history.  In 
the  first  place,  respect  for  the  authority  of  the  Pope  had  been 
considerably  weakened  during  the  forty  years  of  the  Western 

1  Cfr.  Grisar,  Luther,  especially  Christendom ;  Schwane,  Histoire 
vol.  I ;  Denifle,  Luther  und  Luther-  des  Dogmes,  VI ;  Hefele,  Concili- 
tum  ;  Moehler,  Symbolism  ;  *Gaird-  engeschichte,  VIII,  IX ;  Swoboda, 
ner  Lollardy  and  the  Reformation  Das  Concil  von  Trient. 
in  England;  *Schaff,  Creeds  of 

458 


THE  PROTESTANT  REFORMATION 


459 


Schism.  The  Papacy,  which  till  then,  in  spite  of  the  short¬ 
comings  of  individual  Popes,  had  been  universally  regarded 
with  the  greatest  reverence,  lost  much  of  its  ancient  prestige 
through  the  divided  obedience  of  the  Christian  world.  The 
unseemly  spectacle  of  rival  claimants  anathematizing  one  an¬ 
other  and  clinging  desperately  to  the  entirely  human  ambi¬ 
tion  of  occupying  the  first  place,  did  not  a  little  towards  shak¬ 
ing  men’s  confidence  in  the  divine  shepherding  of  Christ’s 
vicar  on  earth.  Hence  the  growing  tendency,  first  manifested 
at  the  Council  of  Constance,  to  subordinate  the  Pope’s 
authority  to  that  of  a  general  council.  The  Pope  was  still  re¬ 
garded  as  the  vicar  of  Christ;  but,  in  the  opinion  of  not  a  few, 
he  was  a  vicar  who  needed  watching  and  from  whose  decisions 
one  might  appeal  to  a  higher  court. 

Another  factor  that  prepared  men’s  minds  for  the  sixteenth- 
century  revolt  is  found  in  the  decay  of  Scholasticism,  and  in 
the  consequent  low  ebb  of  theological  learning.  This  condition 
was  not  universal,  but  it  was  widespread.  The  idle  specula¬ 
tions  and  senseless  quibblings  of  the  Nominalists  had  replaced 
the  comprehensive  and  deep  studies  of  St.  Thomas  and  St. 
Bonaventure.  Ockam,  Gregory  of  Rimini,  and  Gabriel  Biel 
were  regarded  by  many  as  the  highest  authorities  in  the 
theological  world ;  and  they  were  at  best  unsafe  guides.  They 
discredited  the  ability  of  human  reason  to  discern  the  truth 
even  in  its  own  legitimate  sphere  of  mental  activity,  and  in 
consequence  they  clung  blindly  to  the  teaching  of  the  Church. 
As  a  result,  when  that  authority  was  impugned,  at  least  so 
far  as  it  resided  in  the  Pope,  there  was  practically  nothing 
left  but  recourse  to  the  Scriptures  read  and  interpreted  by  the 
individual  under  the  guidance  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Thus  the 
way  was  opened  for  the  introduction  of  the  fundamental  prin¬ 
ciples  of  Protestantism,  the  right  of  private  judgment  in 
matters  of  faith. 

As  a  third  factor  in  bringing  about  a  religious  cataclysm, 
although  of  somewhat  subordinate  importance,  we  may  assign 
the  paganizing  tendency  of  the  Renaissance.  The  revival  of 
classical  learning  brought  with  it  a  love  of  pagan  ideals,  and 
these  ideals  were  all  too  often  made  the  standard  of  moral 


460  medieval  heresies  and  councils 


conduct.  They  corrupted  both  mind  and  heart,  and  sapped  the 
very  foundation  of  Christianity.  And  what  made  the  effect 
all  the  more  terrible  and  far-reaching,  even  if  it  did  not  directly 
touch  the  masses,  was  the  fact  that  many  of  those  who  fell 
victims  to  the  new  paganism  belonged  to  the  ranks  of  the 
clergy.  In  the  past  not  a  few  priests  and  bishops  had  given 
scandal  by  their  loose  morality;  but  even  they,  as  a  general 
rule,  had  preserved  the  faith ;  whereas  now,  where  Humanism 
had  done  its  work,  even  faith  was  lost,  and  with  the  loss  of 
faith  all  respect  for  ecclesiastical  authority  was  at  an  end. 
This  explains  the  numerous  defections  of  the  clergy  when  the 
religious  revolt  was  started.  It  was  not  only  immorality  that 
drove  them  into  the  camps  of  the  innovators,  although  that 
too  had  much  to  do  with  it;  but  also  the  fact  that  they  had 
already  suffered  shipwreck  in  the  faith  as  taught  by  the 
Church. 

With  the  ground  thus  prepared,  there  was  nothing  strange 
about  the  success  that  attended  Luther’s  preaching  of  revolt 
against  ecclesiastical  authority.  Whatever  may  have  been  his 
personal  motives  at  the  beginning  of  his  career  as  a  reformer, 
it  was  not  a  reformation  of  morals  that  constituted  his  life 
work,  nor  a  purifying  of  the  faith  from  human  accrescences, 
as  he  tried  to  plead  in  his  own  justification ;  it  was  neither  more 
nor  less  than  an  attempt  to  substitute  a  new  religion  for  the 
Christianity  that  had  been  preached  by  the  Apostles  and  handed 
down  by  the  Church.  And  for  such  a  substitution  the  ground 
had  been  prepared  by  the  various  agencies  briefly  indicated  in 
the  preceding  paragraphs. 

There  is  no  need,  in  this  place,  of  studying  the  psychological 
processes  by  which  Luther  was  led  to  the  adoption  of  his  two 
fundamental  principles;  the  right  of  private  judgment  in 
matters  of  faith  and  justification  by  faith  alone.  That  belongs 
rather  to  his  personal  history,  and  has  been  admirably  done 
by  Hartmann  Grisar  in  his  monumental  work  referred  to  at 
the  beginning  of  the  present  chapter.  It  suffices  to  state  that 
these  two  principles  formed  the  doctrinal  basis  of  the  whole 
movement,  and  were  adopted  by  all  other  so-called  reformers, 
no  matter  how  much  they  might  differ  from  Luther’s  views 


THE  PROTESTANT  REFORMATION 


461 


in  regard  to  other  points  of  doctrine.  It  must  be  added,  how¬ 
ever,  that  the  first  principle  —  the  right  of  private  judgment 
—  was  admitted  only  to  a  limited  extent.  Each  particular 
leader  claimed  its  unlimited  use  for  himself,  but  at  the  same 
time  he  denied  it  to  all  others.  Hence  the  constant  wrangling 
among  the  representatives  of  the  reform  movement,  and  the 
bitter  invectives  they  hurled  at  each  other  in  their  doctrinal 
disputes.  On  the  other  hand,  the  second  principle  —  justifica¬ 
tion  by  faith  alone  —  was  admitted  by  all. 

The  root  of  this  principle  is  found  in  the  superficial  and 
inaccurate  views  on  justification  defended  by  the  Nominalists. 
While  they  admitted  the  teaching  of  the  Church  that  man  is 
justified  by  the  infusion  of  sanctifying  grace,  and  that  good 
works  performed  in  the  state  of  grace  are  meritorious  of  a 
supernatural  reward,  they  held  that  all  this  was  simply  the 
result  of  a  positive  ordination  on  the  part  of  God.  In  it¬ 
self,  according  to  their  teaching,  grace  as  understood  by  the 
Church  is  superfluous  for  salvation.  For  everything  depends 
on  God’s  will,  and  it  is  only  by  reason  of  His  acceptation  that 
any  action  is  deserving  of  a  supernatural  reward. 

It  was  in  this  school  of  theological  thought  that  Luther 
himself  had  received  his  training,  and  he  pushed  its  principles 
to  their  last  conclusion.  Only  through  the  merits  of  Christ 
is  justification  possible,  and  that  only  in  so  far  as  God  accepts 
them  as  our  own.  This  He  will  do  if  we  place  our  full  con¬ 
fidence  in  Him,  and  thus  appropriate  by  faith  what  belongs 
to  Christ.  No  interior  change  is  thereby  wrought  in  us,  save 
only  as  regards  the  attitude  of  our  will  towards  God.  Hence 
neither  the  sacraments  nor  good  works  have  any  direct  con¬ 
nection  with  justification;  it  is  faith  alone,  in  the  sense  of  trust 
and  confidence,  that  justifies  us  in  the  sight  of  God. 

This  view  on  justification  had  been  worked  out  by  Luther, 
at  least  in  all  its  essentials,  as  early  as  1516;  but  it  was  not 
until  1520  that  he  openly  stated  the  final  conclusion  of  his 
system  in  the  words :  “  A  Christian  who  believes  cannot,  even 

if  he  should  so  wish,  lose  his  soul  by  any  sin  however  great; 
since  no  sin,  except  unbelief,  can  damn  him.”  Meanwhile,  in 
his  ninety-five  theses  affixed  to  the  door  of  the  university 


462  MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


church  of  Wittenberg,  he  had  taken  his  public  stand  against 
the  Church’s  teaching  on  indulgences.  Ostensibly  he  aimed 
his  attack  merely  at  abuses  connected  with  the  preaching  of 
indulgences,  but  in  reality  it  was  the  doctrine  itself  that  he 
had  in  view.  Hence  the  statement  made  by  him  in  course  of 
the  controversy  that  ensued :  “  Let  us  hold  to  this,  that  an 

indulgence  is  not  what  the  Pope  declares  it;  and  if  an  angel 
from  heaven  says  otherwise,  he  is  not  to  be  believed.”  And 
by  way  of  argument  he  urged  the  claim  advanced  by  St.  Paul : 
“  I  have  from  God  all  I  teach ;  ”  but  unlike  St.  Paul,  he  had 
no  way  of  establishing  his  claim. 

When  Leo  X,  who  then  occupied  the  pontifical  chair,  was 
informed  of  the  threatening  situation  in  Germany,  he  offered 
Luther  the  alternative  of  retracting,  or  of  presenting  himself 
for  trial  at  Rome.  However,  through  the  intervention  of 
Luther’s  friend  and  protector,  the  elector  of  Saxony,  Cardinal 
Cajetan  was  sent  to  Germany  with  full  power  to  decide  the 
case.  Luther  was  dissatisfied  with  the  decision  given,  and  ap¬ 
pealed  “  from  Leo  ill  informed  to  Leo  better  informed;  ”  and 
a  few  days  later,  realizing  the  hopelessness  of  his  case,  he 
appealed  to  a  future  general  council.  Leo  fully  understood 
the  gravity  of  the  situation,  but  was  anxious  to  avoid  extreme 
measures  ;  hence,  when  he  published  the  Bull  on  indulgences, 
wherein  he  set  forth  the  Catholic  doctrine,  he  made  no  mention 
of  Luther’s  name. 

The  following  year,  1519,  a  doctrinal  discussion  was  ar¬ 
ranged  to  be  held  at  Leipzig,  between  Eck,  a  professor  of 
Ingolstadt,  and  Carlstadt,  Luther’s  former  teacher.  Luther 
himself  was  also  present,  and  in  the  course  of  the  dispute 
denied  that  the  primacy  was  of  divine  institution  and  that 
general  councils  were  infallible.  This  he  followed  up  with 
the  publication  of  three  pamphlets.  The  first  of  these  was 
an  appeal  “  To  the  Christian  Nobles  of  the  German  Nation,” 
which  was  intended  to  stir  up  the  princes  against  the  Church. 
The  second  was  entitled,  “  On  the  Babylonian  Captivity,”  and 
in  it  he  rejected  the  Sacrifice  of  the  Mass  and  all  the  sacra¬ 
ments  except  baptism  and  the  Eucharist.  The  third  contained 
a  summary  of  his  own  teaching  under  the  title,  “  Of  Christian 


THE  PROTESTANT  REFORMATION  463 

Liberty.”  This  latter  he  sent  to  the  Pope,  together  with  a 
flattering  personal  letter. 

Leo’s  answer  was  the  Bull  Exsurge  Domine,  which  con¬ 
demned  Luther's  teaching  and  demanded  a  retraction  within 
sixty  days,  threatening  excommunication  in  case  he  failed  to 
retract.  When  Luther  received  this  bull,  he  publicly  com¬ 
mitted  it  to  the  flames  at  Wittenberg,  with  the  words :  “  As 
thou  hast  troubled  the  saints  of  the  Lord,  so  may  the  everlast¬ 
ing  Are  trouble  and  consume  thee.”  Then  he  published  the 
pamphlet  entitled,  “  Against  the  Bull  of  Antichrist,”  in  which 
he  calls  the  Pope  “  a  damned  obstinate  heretic.”  Summoned 
to  appear  before  the  imperial  diet  held  at  Worms  in  1521,  he 
was  given  another  opportunity  to  retract;  but,  backed  up  by 
the  revolutionary  freebooters  under  Franz  von  Sickingen  and 
Ulrich  von  Hutten,  he  refused.  Then  the  ban  of  the  empire 
was  placed  upon  him,  but  he  found  safety  in  the  Wartburg. 

Thus  the  die  was  cast,  and  the  religious  revolution  which 
was  destined  to  drag  away  vast  numbers  from  the  Church  of 
Christ  had  become  an  accomplished  fact.  Of  the  further  de¬ 
velopment  of  that  revolution  only  this  much  need  be  said  in  the 
present  connection,  that  Luther’s  claim  to  a  divine  mission 
was  advanced  by  many  others,  with  the  result  that  reformer 
was  pitted  against  reformer,  and  thus  the  non-Catholic  religious 
world  became  a  veritable  chaos.  What  one  affirmed,  the  other 
denied ;  and  soon  there  were  almost  as  many  opinions  in  the 
revolutionary  camps  as  there  were  heads.  Out  of  this  chaos, 
however,  three  great  Protestant  bodies  emerged,  the  Lutheran, 
the  Calvinist,  and  the  Anglican,  which,  together  with  a  number 
of  smaller  sects,  in  course  of  time  claimed  the  greater  part  of 
Northern  Europe  as  their  own.  The  chief  points  of  their 
heretical  teaching  may  be  briefly  outlined  as  follows. 

1.  Holy  Scripture. —  The  only  source  of  divine  revelation 
is  the  written  word  of  God  as  contained  in  the  Bible.  The 
Bible,  moreover,  does  not  include  the  deutero-canonical  books, 
that  is,  those  books  whose  divine  origin  and  inspiration  were 
at  first  called  in  question  by  some,  but  which  were  finally  rec¬ 
ognized  by  the  wThole  Church  as  sacred,  canonical,  and  in¬ 
spired.  However,  later  Protestants  usually  include  in  their 


464  MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


canon  the  deutero-canonical  books  of  the  New  Testament. 
Furthermore,  the  Bible  is  to  be  interpreted,  not  according  to 
the  authority  of  the  Church,  but  according  to  the  private  judg¬ 
ment  of  each  individual  believer,  assisted  by  the  direct  inward 
illumination  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

2.  Original  Sin. —  Our  first  parents  were  constituted  in  the 
state  of  original  justice,  which  consisted  of  certain  high  and 
noble  gifts  wherewith  the  souls  of  Adam  and  Eve  wrere  en¬ 
dowed;  but  these  gifts  were  natural  and  essential  to  perfect 
human  nature.  Hence  by  the  fall,  in  which  original  justice 
was  lost,  human  nature  was  essentially  corrupted  and  the  soul 
was  deprived  of  perfections  that  belonged  to  its  natural 
integrity.  In  consequence,  original  sin  is  an  essential  corrup¬ 
tion  of  our  nature,  and  as  irremovable  as  that  nature  itself. 
Some  of  the  Reformers  defined  it  as  “  the  very  substance  of 
fallen  man,”  but  the  majority  agreed  with  Calvin  that  it  is 
“  the  hereditary  depravity  and  corruption  of  our  nature,  which 
first  made  us  worthy  of  God's  wrath,  and  also  produces  in  us 
works  which  Scripture  calls  works  of  the  flesh.”  2 

3.  Free  Will. —  Luther  asserted  that  man  never  had  a  free 
wall,  whereas  Calvin  maintained  that  free  will  was  lost  by  the 
fall.  Moreover,  according  to  both,  the  fall  was  due  to  an 
irresistible  necessity  and  divine  predestination.  As  man  has 
no  free  will,  there  is  no  room  for-  merit ;  and  so-called  good 
works  have  no  relation  to  man’s  eternal  salvation.  Nay,  in 
so  far  as  they  are  the  works  of  man,  they  are  positively  sin¬ 
ful  —  they  are  venial  sins  in  the  case  of  believers,  and  mortal 
sins  in  the  case  of  unbelievers.  Moreover,  the  observance  of 
the  divine  precepts,  even  by  the  just,  is  an  impossibility. 

4.  Grace  and  justification. —  As  man’s  nature  is  essentially 
corrupt,  grace  and  justification  do  not  consist  in  an  interior 
supernatural  quality,  but  are  simply  the  pardon  of  sin  and  the 
imputation  of  the  merits  of  Christ.  Both  are  obtained  by  a 
firm  confidence  in  the  goodness  and  mercy  of  God,  result¬ 
ing  in  an  absolute  conviction  and  positive  assurance  that  all 
sins  have  been  forgiven.  According  to  Luther,  justification 

2  Instit.  I,  2,  c.  1,  n.  8. 


THE  PROTESTANT  REFORMATION 


465 


is  so  completely  the  work  of  God  that  man  is  entirely  passive; 
whereas  Calvin  admitted  the  active  cooperation  of  man,  but 
only  under  an  irresistible  and  invincible  divine  impulse. 

5.  Predestination. —  As  justification  is  entirely  the  work 

of  God,  without  free  cooperation  on  the  part  of  man,  it  neces¬ 
sarily  implies  the  doctrine  of  absolute  and  unqualified  pre¬ 
destination.  And  this  doctrine  was  at  first  commonly  admitted 
by  the  Reformers;  but  it  was  afterwards  abandoned  by  all  ex¬ 
cept  Calvin.  The  latter  made  it  a  fundamental  doctrine  of  his 
theological  system.  He  defines  it  as  follows :  “  We  call 

predestination  the  eternal  decree  of  God,  by  which  He  deter¬ 
mined  what  He  willed  to  be  done  with  every  man.  For  all 
are  not  created  in  a  like  condition,  but  to  some  is  preordained 
eternal  life,  to  others  eternal  damnation.  Hence  according  as 
each  one  is  created  for  one  or  the  other  end,  we  say  that  he  is 
predestined  to  life  or  to  death.”  3  Yet  God  is  not  unjust  or 
cruel  in  regard  to  the  reprobate ;  for  “  those  whom  He  de¬ 
votes  to  damnation  are  by  a  just  and  blameless  but  incompre¬ 
hensible  judgment  shut  off  from  all  access  to  life.”4  Hence 
they  can  have  no  real  faith,  nor  are  they  ever  justified,  nor  did 
Christ  die  for  their  salvation.5 

6.  The  Sacraments. —  From  their  erroneous  concept  of 
justification,  the  Reformers  were  logically  led  to  the  rejection 
of  the  sacraments  as  means  or  causes  of  grace.  Hence  they 
considered  them  only  as  pledges  of  the  divine  promises  for 
the  remission  of  sins,  and  means  of  confirming  man’s  faith 
in  this  remission.  Moreover,  of  the  seven  sacraments  ad¬ 
mitted  by  the  Church,  they  retained  only  two :  Baptism  and 
the  Lord’s  Supper.  Furthermore,  according  to  Calvin,  the 
efficacy  of  these  two  sacraments  is  restricted  to  the  elect.  In 
regard  to  the  Eucharist  all  were  agreed  that  the  doctrine  of 
transubstantiation  must  be  rejected.  The  Real  Presence  was 
also  denied  by  all  except  Luther,  who  favored  the  theory  of 
impanation ;  but  even  according  to  him,  Christ  is  not  really 
present  in  the  Eucharist  except  at  the  moment  of  communion. 
The  laity  as  well  as  the  officiating  minister  must  receive  com- 

3  Op.  cit.  I,  3,  c.  2,  n.  5.  5  Ibid. 

4  Ibid.  n.  7. 


466  MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


munion  under  both  kinds.  The  Eucharist  is  not  a  sacrifice, 
and  therefore  the  Mass  as  a  sacrificial  rite  must  be  abolished. 

7.  The  Church. —  As  the  Reformers  rejected  all  the  sacra¬ 
ments  except  baptism  and  the  Eucharist,  there  is  no  Christian 
priesthood  as  understood  by  Catholics.  On  the  other  hand, 
every  Christian  is  both  priest  and  teacher  ;  and  it  is  only  for 
the  sake  of  order  and  greater  efficiency  that  ministers  are  ap¬ 
pointed.  by  the  congregation.  Hence  the  Church  is  not  an 
hierarchical  institution,  but  is  simply  an  association  of  equals 
who  acknowledge  Christ  as  their  head.  Moreover,  the  real 
Church  of  Christ  is  invisible,  or  at  least  was  so  for  centuries 
until  the  rise  of  Protestantism.  The  Pope,  like  any  other 
minister,  simply  holds  a  place  of  honor;  he  has  no  jurisdiction 
over  the  faithful. 

8.  The  Communion  of  Saints. —  As  justification  is  obtained 
by  faith  alone,  there  is  no  bond  of  prayer  and  helpfulness 
uniting  all  the  children  of  God  into  one  body.  Hence  neither 
must  we  pray  for  the  dead  nor  invoke  the  saints.  There  is  no 
other  mediator  besides  Christ,  and  through  Him  each  in¬ 
dividual  believer  has  direct  access  to  God.  Furthermore,  as 
faith  justifies  man  perfectly  in  the  sight  of  God,  there  can  be 
no  purgatory,  nor  is  there  room  for  indulgences ;  all  this  must 
be  swept  away  as  so  much  popish  invention.6 

From  this  brief  summary  it  will  be  seen  that  Protestant¬ 
ism  differs  from  all  preceding  heresies.  In  the  centuries  that 
went  before,  heretics  had  denied  one  or  other  doctrine  of  the 
Church,  but,  with  the  sole  exception  of  Arius,  left  the  Christian 
religion  as  such  untouched.  The  Reformers,  on  the  other 
hand,  brought  about  a  fundamental  change  in  that  religion. 
Practically  very  little  was  retained  of  the  Church’s  teaching 
aside  from  her  doctrine  on  God,  the  Blessed  Trinity,  and  the 
divinity  of  Christ.  And  in  course  of  time,  even  in  regard  to 
these,  errors  sprang  up  that  tended  to  sweep  away  the  last 
vestige  of  Christianity.  Nor  was  this  merely  an  accidental 
outcome  of  the  revolutionary  movement  initiated  by  Luther; 
it  was  the  logical  result  of  his  rejection  of  ecclesiastical 
authority  in  matters  of  faith  and  morals. 

6  Cfr.  Moehler,  op.  cit. 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT 


467 


B  —  The  Council  of  Trent 

Throughout  their  contention  with  Rome,  Luther  and  his  fol¬ 
lowers  appealed  from  the  Pope  to  a  general  council;  but  when 
after  many  difficulties  and  delays  the  council  finally  met,  they 
refused  to  attend.  Their  excuse  was,  though  not  expressed  in 
these  precise  terms,  that  they  would  not  be  allowed  to  act  as 
judges  of  the  faith.  It  was  with  them  no  longer  a  question 
of  arriving  at  the  truth  on  the  points  under  discussion,  but 
solely  of  how  they  might  most  effectively  impose  their  views 
on  the  rest  of  Christendom.  Hence  if  their  own  cause  was 
judged  in  their  absence,  it  was  entirely  their  own  fault. 

The  Council  was  convened  by  Paul  III,  and  opened  at  Trent 
on  December  13,  1545.  After  the  eighth  session,  1547,  it  was 
transferred  to  Bologna,  where  it  was  prorogued  in  1549.  In 
1551,  Pope  Julius  III  transferred  it  back  to  Trent,  but  it  was 
suspended  the  following  year.  Again  reassembled  at  Trent 
in  1561,  it  concluded  its  sessions  there  in  1563  and  was  dis¬ 
solved.  The  final  decrees  were  signed  by  252  members,  where¬ 
as  at  the  first  session  only  40  bishops  had  been  present. 

Protestant  writers  usually  contend  that  the  Council  met  for 
the  sole  purpose  of  counteracting  the  movement  set  on  foot 
by  the  Reformers;  but  this  contention  is  not  based  on  facts  as 
known  to  history.  Its  purpose  was  not  only  to  condemn  error, 
but  also  to  define  the  truth.  Hence  not  only  its  canons,  but 
its  capitula  also  contain  definitions  of  doctrine.  There  was 
at  the  time  need  of  a  definite  exposition  of  Catholic  teaching, 
and  that  exposition  was  given  in  clear  and  explicit  terms. 
Besides,  the  Council  was  also  called  to  effect  a  thorough  ref¬ 
ormation  of  discipline  and  morals,  which  object  was  alto¬ 
gether  independent  of  the  disturbance  caused  by  Luther  and 
his  associates.  Hence  the  work  of  defining  the  faith  and  re¬ 
forming  discipline  proceeded  side  by  side  from  the  beginning 
of  the  Council  to  the  end.  On  the  other  hand,  most  of  the 
definitions  of  the  Council  were  occasioned  by  the  errors  of  the 
day;  but  the  contents  of  these  definitions  are  simply  a  clear 
statement  of  Catholic  teaching  irrespective  of  all  errors.  They 
are  the  witness  of  the  Holy  Spirit  to  the  cause  of  truth. 


468  MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


The  various  dogmatic  and  disciplinary  decrees  were  passed 
in  the  4th,  5th,  6th,  7th,  13th,  14th,  21st,  22nd,  23rd,  24th, 
and  25th  sessions.  With  regard  to  matters  of  faith,  which 
alone  need  be  considered  in  the  present  connection,  the  par¬ 
ticular  doctrine  in  question  is  usually  first  stated  in  a  positive 
form  and  embodied  in  a  capitulum  or  chapter,  and  then  the 
contrary  errors  are  condemned  in  the  canons  that  follow.  A 
brief  summary  of  the  Council’s  teaching  is  here  subjoined. 

1.  Holy  Scripture  and  Tradition  (sess.  4). —  The  Council 
first  lays  down  the  principle  that  the  Catholic  faith  is  contained 
both  “  in  written  books  and  in  the  unwritten  traditions  which 
were  received  by  the  Apostles  from  the  lips  of  Jesus  Christ 
Himself,  or  were  transmitted,  after  a  manner  of  speaking, 
from  hand  to  hand  by  the*  Apostles  themselves  from  the  dicta¬ 
tion  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  have  come  down  to  us.”  Next 
the  Canon  of  Scripture  is  promulgated.  It  contains  all  the 
deutero-canonical  books  rejected  by  the  Reformers,  and  is 
identical  with  that  of  Pope  Damasus  published  at  the  end  of 
the  fourth  century.  Then  the  Council  declares  that  it  “  re¬ 
ceives  and  venerates  with  like  sentiments  of  piety  and  rever¬ 
ence  all  the  books  of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments,  for  the 
one  God  is  the  author  of  both ;  and  also  the  traditions  relating 
to  faith  and  morals,  as  having  been  dictated  either  orally  by 
Christ,  or  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  preserved  by  an  unbroken 
succession  in  the  Catholic  Church.  Furthermore,  all  are 
anathematized  who  refuse  to  receive,  as  sacred  and  canonical, 
these  books  in  their  entirety  and  with  all  their  parts,  as  they 
have  been  wont  to  be  read  in  the  Catholic  Church  and  are  found 
in  the  old  Latin  Vulgate  edition.”  Lastly,  it  is  stated  that  it 
is  the  exclusive  right  and  duty  of  the  Church  to  pass  judgment 
on  the  true  sense  and  interpretation  of  the  Sacred  Writings. 

2.  Original  Sin  (sess.  5). —  Leaving  undecided  the  dispute 
between  the  Thomists  and  Scotists,  as  to  whether  Adam  was 
created  in  the  state  of  grace  or  elevated  thereto  subsequent  to 
his  creation,  the  Council  puts  its  teaching  on  original  sin  in  the 
form  of  anathematisms,  which  state  the  Catholic  doctrine  and 
at  the  same  time  condemn  the  contrary  errors.  However, 
no  clear  definition  of  original  sin  itself  is  given,  although 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT 


469 


all  the  elements  of  such  a  definition  are  stated.  The  follow¬ 
ing  are  the  most  important  points  contained  in  the  decree. 

(a)  “  If  any  one  does  not  confess  that  the  first  man,  Adam, 
when  he  had  transgressed  the  commandment  of  God  in  para¬ 
dise,  immediately  lost  the  holiness  and  justice  wherein  he  had 
been  constituted;  and  that  he  incurred,  through  the  offense  of 
that  prevarication,  the  wrath  and  indignation  of  God,  and  con¬ 
sequently  death,  with  which  God  had  previously  threatened 
him,  and,  together  with  death,  captivity  under  his  power  who 
thenceforth  had  the  empire  of  death ,  that  is  to  say ,  the  devil, 
and  that  the  entire  Adam,  through  that  offense  of  prevarica¬ 
tion,  was  changed,  in  body  and  soul,  for  the  worse;  let  him 
be  anathema.” 

(b)  “  If  any  one  asserts,  that  the  prevarication  of  Adam 
injured  himself  alone,  and  not  his  posterity;  and  that  the  holi¬ 
ness  and  justice,  received  from  God,  which  he  lost,  he  lost 
for  himself  alone,  and  not  for  us  also;  or  that  he,  being  de¬ 
filed  by  the  sin  of  disobedience,  has  only  transferred  death, 
and  pains  of  the  body,  into  the  whole  human  race,  but 
not  sin  also,  which  is  the  death  of  the  soul;  let  him  be  ana¬ 
thema.” 

(c)  “  If  any  one  asserts,  that  the  sin  of  Adam  —  which  in 
its  origin  is  one,  and  being  transfused  into  all  by  propagation, 
not  by  imitation,  is  in  each  one  as  his  own  —  is  taken  away 
either  by  the  power  of  human  nature,  or  by  any  other  remedy 
than  the  merit  of  one  mediator,  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ ,  who 
hath  reconciled  us  to  God  in  his  own  blood .  made  unto  us 
justice,  sanctification,  and  redemption;  or  if  he  denies  that  the 
said  merit  of  Jesus  Christ  is  applied,  both  to  adults  and  to  in¬ 
fants,  by  the  sacrament  of  baptism  rightly  administered  in  the 
form  of  the  Church;  let  him  be  anathema.” 

(d)  “  If  any  one  denies  that  infants,  newly  born  from  their 
mothers’  wombs,  even  though  they  be  sprung  from  baptized 
parents,  are  to  be  baptized;  or  says  that  they  are  baptized  in¬ 
deed  for  the  remission  of  sins,  but  that  they  derive  nothing 
of  original  sin  from  Adam,  which  has  need  of  being  expiated 
by  the  laver  of  regeneration  for  the  obtaining  of  life  everlast¬ 
ing  —  whence  it  follows  as  a  consequence,  that  in  them  the 


470  MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


form  of  baptism,  for  the  remission  of  sins,  is  understood  to  be 
not  true,  but  false  — ;  let  him  be  anathema.” 

(e)  “  If  any  one  denies,  that,  by  the  grace  of  our  Lord  Jesus 
Christ,  which  is  conferred  in  baptism,  the  guilt  of  original 
sin  is  remitted;  or  even  asserts  that  the  whole  of  that  which 
has  the  true  and  proper  nature  of  sin  is  not  taken  away;  but 
says  that  it  is  only  canceled,  or  not  imputed;  let  him  be 
anathema.  For  in  those  who  are  born  again,  there  is  nothing 
that  God  hates ;  ...  so  that  there  is  nothing  whatever  to  re¬ 
tard  their  entrance  into  heaven.  But  this  holy  Synod  con¬ 
fesses  and  holds  that  in  those  who  are  baptized  there  remains 
concupiscence,  or  an  incentive  to  sin;  which  while  it  is  left  as 
an  occasion  of  struggle,  cannot  injure  those  who  consent  not, 
but  resist  manfully  by  the  grace  of  Jesus  Christ;  yea,  he  who 
shall  have  striven  lawfully  shall  be  crowned.  This  con¬ 
cupiscence,  which  the  Apostle  sometimes  calls  sin,  the  holy 
Synod  declares  that  the  Catholic  Church  has  never  understood 
to  be  called  sin,  as  being  truly  and  properly  sin  in  those  born 
again,  but  because  it  is  of  sin,  and  inclines  to  sin.  And  if  any 
one  holds  the  contrary,  let  him  be  anathema.” 

(f)  “  The  same  holy  Synod  doth  nevertheless  declare,  that 
it  is  not  its  intention  to  include  in  this  decree,  where  original 
sin  is  treated  of,  the  blessed  and  immaculate  Virgin  Mary,  the 
Mother  of  God;  but  that  the  constitutions  of  Pope  Sixtus  IV, 
of  happy  memory,  are  to  be  observed,  under  the  penalties  con¬ 
tained  in  the  said  constitutions,  which  it  renews.”  7 

3.  Justification  (sess.  6). —  As  the  Protestant  error  on  justi¬ 
fication  was  most  fundamental,  the  Council  discussed  this  point 
in  all  its  details.  Justification  is  described  as  “  the  transfer¬ 
ence  of  man  from  the  state  in  which  he  is  born  as  the  son  of 
the  first  Adam,  to  the  state  of  grace  and  adoption  of  the  sons 
of  God  through  the  second  Adam,  Jesus  Christ,  our  Saviour.” 
This  transference  is  effected  by  means  of  the  sacrament  of 
baptism,  received  in  deed  or  at  least  in  desire.8 

In  the  case  of  adults,  the  first  motion  towards  justification 
is  the  work  of  God,  who  by  His  grace  calls  and  moves,  the 


7  Cfr.  DB.  787  sqq. 


8  Ibid.  796. 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT 


47i 


sinner  to  repentance;  but  man  must  freely  cooperate  with  the 
grace  that  is  given.  Then  God  continues  the  work,  in  as  much 
as  He  offers  His  grace,  which  enables  the  sinner  to  elicit  acts 
of  faith,  holy  fear,  and  hope;  and  also  to  begin  to  love  God  as 
the  fount  of  all  justice,  to  be  sorry  for  his  sins,  and  to  re¬ 
solve  to  be  baptized  and  to  begin  a  new  life,  having  the  firm 
purpose  to  observe  all  the  commandments  of  God.9 

After  this  preparation,  justification  itself  takes  place.  It 
does  not  consist  in  the  imputation  of  the  merits  of  Christ,  nor 
merely  in  the  remission  of  sins,  but  in  an  inward  sanctification 
and  renewal  through  the  reception  of  the  gifts  of  habitual  grace 
and  the  virtues  of  faith,  hope,  and  charity.  These  gifts  are 
infused  into  the  soul  by  God  through  the  merits  of  Christ  and 
the  instrumentality  of  the  sacrament  of  baptism.  They  are 
permanent  gifts,  in  the  sense  that  they  inhere  in  the  soul  until 
destroyed  by  sin.  Faith  alone  does  not  justify,  but  it  is  the 
indispensable  beginning,  basis,  and  root  of  justification.  If 
not  accompanied  by  hope  and  charity,  it  is  profitless  and  dead. 
It  is,  moreover,  not  identical  with  confidence  in  God’s  good¬ 
ness  or  the  assurance  that  our  sins  have  been  forgiven  through 
the  merits  of  Christ.  Furthermore,  we  cannot  know  with  the 
certainty  of  faith  that  we  are  in  the  state  of  grace;  for  we 
never  have  the  absolute  assurance  that  we  complied  in  every 
respect  with  the  conditions  upon  which  our  justification  was 
made  to  depend.10 

Once  justified,  man  is  capable  of  performing  meritorious 
works,  which  lead  to  an  increase  of  sanctifying  grace  and  give 
him  a  title  to  an  eternal  reward.  With  God’s  help  he  is  able 
to  observe  the  divine  precepts,  and  to  this  he  is  strictly  obliged 
under  pain  of  sin.  By  an  abuse  of  his  free  will,  he  can  re¬ 
fuse  to  cooperate  with  the  grace  of  God,  and  thus  again  fall 
away  from  the  state  of  justification.  Moreover,  without  a 
special  privilege,  such  as  was  granted  to  the  Blessed  Virgin, 
he  cannot  throughout  his  life  avoid  all  venial  sins.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  is  heretical  to  say  that  every  good  work  of 
the  just  is  in  itself  sinful,  though  not  imputed  to  him  unto 

9  Ibid.  797,  798;  cfr.  813,  814,  818,  10  Ibid.  799,  802,  819,  824. 


472 


MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


damnation.  And  it  is  an  error  to  hold  that  good  works  are 
vitiated  by  the  hope  of  an  eternal  reward;  or  that  the  sorrow 
for  sins  which  springs  from  the  motive  of  fear  is  not  good  and 
praiseworthy.11 

Even  the  just  have  no  certain  knowledge  of  their  predestina¬ 
tion  to  eternal  life,  or  of  their  final  perseverance,  unless  this 
has  been  specially  revealed  to  them  by  God.  No  one  can 
persevere  without  God’s  special  help;  but  he  must  have  con¬ 
fidence  in  the  divine  assistance,  which  he  can  always  obtain 
by  prayer.  The  grace  of  justification  is  given,  not  to  the  elect 
only,  but  to  others  also;  nor  has  God  predestined  any  one  to 
damnation.12 

Justification  may  be  lost,  not  only  by  the  sin  of  infidelity, 
but  by  any  other  grievous  sin.  It  can  be  recovered  in  the 
sacrament  of  penance,  which  was  instituted  as  a  remedy  against 
sins  committed  after  baptism.  The  worthy  reception  of  this 
sacrament  requires  sorrow  for  sins,  a  purpose  of  amendment, 
absolution,  and  the  will  to  render  satisfaction  for  the  temporal 
punishment  which  often  remains  due  to  sins  after  the  guilt 
and  eternal  punishment  have  been  remitted.  Sanctifying 
grace  is  lost  by  every  mortal  sin;  but  faith  is  lost  only  by  the 
sin  of  heresy  or  infidelity.  Those  who  have  faith  without 
charity  are  yet  to  be  regarded  as  Christians.13 

4.  The  Sacraments  in  General:  Baptism  and  Confirmation 
(sess.  7). —  As  a  means  by  which  the  grace  of  justification  is 
first  bestowed,  then  increased,  and  also  restored  after  having 
been  lost  by  sin,  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  instituted  the  seven 
sacraments  of  the  New  Law;  and  these  sacraments  differ  from 
those  of  the  Old  Law,  not  only  in  their  external  rites  and 
ceremonies,  but  also  in  their  efficacy.  This  efficacy  is  derived 
from  their  institution,  in  as  much  as  Christ  meant  them  to  be 
practical  signs  or  instrumental  causes  of  grace.  Elence  they 
do  not  merely  excite  the  faith  or  devotion  of  the  recipient, 
but  in  a  true  sense  confer  the  grace  which  God  himself  pro¬ 
duces  in  the  soul.  Moreover,  their  efficacy  is  independent  of 
the  faith  and  merit  of  the  minister;  grace  is  conferred  ex  opere 

11  Ibid.  803,  804,  818,  828-830.  13  Ibid.  807,  808,  837-840. 

12  Ibid.  805,  806,  825-827,  832. 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT 


473 


operato,  through  the  merits  of  Christ.  However,  in  the  re¬ 
cipient  certain  dispositions  are  required  in  order  to  fit  him  for 
the  reception  of  grace.14 

Some  sacraments  are  necessary  means  of  grace  for  all; 
others  only  for  certain  classes  of  persons.  However,  even 
the  former  are  not  all  of  equal  necessity;  nor  are  all  the  sacra¬ 
ments  of  equal  dignity.  For  their  proper  administration  a 
duly  appointed  minister  is  required,  on  whose  part  nothing 
more  is  necessary,  by  way  of  validity,  than  the  use  of  the 
essential  rite  instituted  by  Christ,  with  the  intention  of  at 
least  doing  what  the  Church  does.15  Three  sacraments, 
baptism,  confirmation,  and  orders,  imprint  a  character  or 
indelible  spiritual  seal  on  the  soul;  hence  they  cannot  be  re¬ 
peated.10 

Baptism  is  necessary  for  salvation.  The  matter  required 
for  its  validity  is  natural  water.  Christian  baptism  is  es¬ 
sentially  different  from  that  of  John  the  Baptist.  It  can  be 
validly  administered  by  heretics.  Infants  also  must  be  bap¬ 
tized  ;  nor  may  their  baptism  be  repeated  when  they  have 
reached  the  age  of  reason.  They  are  truly  enrolled  among 
the  faithful,  and  they  are  not  at  liberty  later  on  to  repudiate 
the  obligations  of  their  baptismal  vows.17 

Confirmation  is  not  a  mere  empty  ceremony  that  originated 
in  the  catechetical  examinations  to  which  Christian  youths 
were  of  old  subjected.  It  is  a  true  sacrament  in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  term.  A  bishop  only  is  its  ordinary  minister.18 

5.  The  Sacrament  of  the  Holy  Eucharist  (sess.  13). — “  In 
the  first  place,  the  holy  Synod  teaches,  and  openly  and  simply 
professes,  that  in  the  august  sacrament  of  the  Holy  Eucharist, 
after  the  consecration  of  the  bread  and  wine,  our  Lord  Jesus 
Christ,  true  God  and  man,  is  truly,  really,  and  substantially 
contained  tinder  the  species  of  these  sensible  things.”  The 
sacrament  was  instituted  by  the  Savior  when  He  was  about 
to  depart  out  of  this  world  to  the  Father,  that  He  might  leave 
us  a  memorial  of  His  passion,  a  sovereign  remedy  and  pro- 


14  Ibid.  844-856. 

15  Ibid.  846,  853,  854. 

16  Ibid.  852. 


17  Ibid.  857-870. 

18  Ibid.  871-873. 


474 


MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


tection  against  sin,  and  a  most  efficacious  means  of  grace. 
It  is  the  spiritual  food  and  life  of  the  soul,  the  symbol  and 
bond  of  unity  and  charity,  and  a  pledge  of  eternal  glory.19 

“  The  most  Holy  Eucharist  has  indeed  this  in  common  with 
the  rest  of  the  sacraments,  that  it  is  a  symbol  of  a  sacred  thing, 
and  is  a  visible  form  of  an  invisible  grace;  but  there  is  found 
in  the  Eucharist  this  excellent  and  peculiar  thing,  that  the 
other  sacraments  have  then  first  the  power  of  sanctifying  when 
one  uses  them,  whereas  in  the  Eucharist,  before  being  used, 
there  is  present  the  Author  of  sanctity  Himself.  .  .  .  And  this 
faith  has  ever  been  in  the  Church  of  God,  that,  immediately 
after  the  consecration,  the  veritable  body  of  our  Lord,  and 
His  veritable  blood,  together  with  His  soul  and  divinity,  are 
under  the  species  of  bread  and  wine;  but  the  body  indeed 
under  the  species  of  bread,  and  the  blood  under  the  species  of 
wine,  by  the  force  of  the  words;  but  the  body  under  the 
species  of  wine,  and  the  blood  under  the  species  of  bread, 
and  the  soul  under  both,  by  the  force  of  that  natural  connec¬ 
tion  and  concomitancy  whereby  the  parts  of  Christ  our  Lord, 
who  hath  now  risen  from  the  dead ,  to  die  no  more,  are  united 
together;  and  the  divinity,  furthermore,  on  account  of  the 
admirable  hypostatical  union  thereof  with  His  body  and 
soul.”  20 

“  And  because  Christ,  our  Redeemer,  declared  that  which 
He  offered  under  the  species  of  bread  to  be  truly  His  own 
body,  therefore  has  it  ever  been  the  firm  belief  in  the  Church 
of  God,  and  this  holy  Synod  doth  now  declare  it  anew,  that 
by  the  consecration  of  the  bread  and  of  the  wine,  a  conversion 
is  made  of  the  whole  substance  of  the  bread  into  the  body  of 
Christ  our  Lord,  and  of  the  whole  substance  of  the  wine  into 
His  blood;  which  conversion  is  by  the  holy  Catholic  Church 
suitably  and  properly  called  Transubstantiation.”  21 

Hence  divine  worship  is  due  to  the  Blessed  Sacrament,  and 
it  should  be  reserved  both  for  the  adoration  of  the  faithful  and 
for  the  communion  of  the  sick.  The  proper  disposition  for 
its  reception  presupposes  the  state  of  grace;  and  if  one  is  in 

19  Ibid.  874,  875.  21  Ibid.  877. 

20  Ibid.  876. 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT 


475 


mortal  sin,  he  must  first  have  recourse  to  the  sacrament  of 
penance.  Where  the  proper  dispositions  are  found,  it  is  the 
urgent  desire  of  the  Council  that  the  Holy  Eucharist  be 
frequently  received  by  the  faithful.22 

6.  The  Sacraments  of  Penance  and  Extreme  Unction 
(sess.  14). —  The  sacrament  of  penance  was  instituted  by 
Christ  for  the  remission  of  sins  committed  after  baptism,  as 
appears  from  His  own  words:  “  Receive  ye  the  Holy  Ghost: 
whose  sins  you  shall  forgive,  they  are  forgiven  them :  and 
whose  sins  you  shall  retain,  they  are  retained.”  Sacramental 
absolution  is  a  judicial  act,  and  can  be  imparted  only  by  a  min¬ 
ister  who  has  the  priestly  character.  The  fact  that  the  absolv¬ 
ing  priest  is  in  the  state  of  mortal  sin  does  not  invalidate  his 
absolution:  but  the  want  of  jurisdiction  does.  On  the  part  of 
the  penitent  are  required,  (a)  supernatural  sorrow;  (b)  con¬ 
fession,  as  complete  as  reasonably  possible,  of  unconfessed 
mortal  sins:  (c)  satisfaction  for  the  temporal  punishment  that 
usually  still  remains  to  be  expiated.23 

Extreme  unction  was  instituted  by  Christ  and  promulgated 
by  St.  James.  It  removes  from  the  soul  the  remaining  ef¬ 
fects  of  forgiven  sins,  and  gives  a  special  grace  to  those  in 
danger  of  death  by  sickness.  If  necessary,  it  even  forgives 
sins;  and  as  a  secondary  effect,  restores  health  of  body  when 
God  judges  it  expedient.  The  matter  of  this  sacrament  is 
olive  oil  blessed  by  a  bishop;  its  form  consists  in  the  prayers 
used  in  the  application  of  the  matter  to  the  various  senses  by 
a  priest.24 

7.  The  Sacrifice  of  the  Mass  (sess.  22). —  The  Holy 
Eucharist  was  instituted  by  Christ  not  only  as  a  sacrament,  but 
also  as  a  true  sacrifice,  which  must  be  offered  to  God  con¬ 
tinually  in  His  Church  by  the  Apostles  and  their  successors  in 
the  priesthood.  As  a  sacrifice  it  is  the  image  of  the  great 
sacrifice  of  the  cross,  with  which  it  is  identical  both  in  victim 
and  in  priest,  differing  only  in  the  manner  of  offering. 
Through  it  are  applied  the  merits  of  Christ’s  passion  and 
death,  both  to  the  living  and  to  the  souls  departed.  Hence 

22  Ibid.  878,  879,  880.  24  Ibid.  907-910. 

23  Ibid.  894-906. 


476  MEDIAEVAL  HERESIES  AND  COUNCILS 


it  does  not  detract  from  the  efficacy  or  the  universality  of  the 
sacrifice  of  the  cross.25 

8.  The  Sacrament  of  Orders  (sess.  23). —  A  true  sacrifice 
presupposes  a  true  priesthood.  The  Christian  priesthood  was 
instituted  by  Christ  at  the  Last  Supper,  and  its  principal  power 
and  office  is  to  consecrate  and  offer  in  sacrifice  the  true  body 
and  blood  of  Christ.  The  hierarchy,  consisting  of  bishops, 
priests,  and  ministers,  is  divinely  instituted.  Bishops  are 
superior  to  priests,  and  have  the  power  to  confirm  and  ordain. 
Orders  are  divided  into  major  and  minor;  those  below  the 
priesthood  are,  as  it  were,  preparatory  to  that  dignity.  The 
sacrament  of  orders  imprints  an  indelible  character;  hence 
once  a  priest,  always  a  priest.26 

9.  The  Sacrament  of  Matrimony  (sess.  24). —  Christian 
marriage  is  a  true  sacrament,  and  as  such  it  is  subject  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Church.  When  consummated,  it  is  abso¬ 
lutely  indissoluble  except  by  death ;  and  a  second  marriage  dur¬ 
ing  the  life  of  the  first  partner  is  by  divine  law  null  and  void. 
The  Church  has  the  power  to  constitute  impediments  render¬ 
ing  marriage  invalid.27 

10.  Purgatory :  Veneration  of  Saints  and  Images:  Indul¬ 
gences  (sess.  25). —  The  decree  on  purgatory  affirms  the  exist¬ 
ence  of  a  place  of  purgation  and  the  utility  of  prayers  and 
other  suffrages  for  the  dead.  It  rules  that  all  the  more  diffi¬ 
cult  and  subtle  questions,  which  do  not  contribute  to  edifica¬ 
tion,  should  be  avoided  by  preachers  in  their  sermons  to  the 
faithful.28  In  the  same  session,  the  veneration  of  the  saints, 
of  their  relics,  and  of  images,  was  declared  lawful  and  benefi¬ 
cial.29  Lastly,  it  was  defined  that  Christ  gave  His  Church 
the  power  to  grant  indulgences,  that  their  use  is  salutary  for 
the  faithful,  and  the  custom  of  granting  them  is  to  be  con¬ 
tinued  in  the  Church.30 

To  the  foregoing  summary  of  Catholic  teaching,  as  con¬ 
tained  in  the  chapters  and  canons  of  the  Council  of  Trent,  may 
be  added  the  doctrine  on  the  Blessed  Trinity,  on  the  Incarna- 

25  Ibid.  939,  940,  948-956.  28  Ibid.  983. 

26  Ibid.  957-968.  29  Ibid.  984-988. 

27  Ibid.  969-982.  30  Ibid.  989. 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT 


477 


tion,  the  divine  motherhood  of  Mary,  and  her  perpetual  vir¬ 
ginity,  as  reaffirmed  against  the  Socinians  in  the  Constitution 
of  Paul  IV,  Cum  quorundam ,  August  7,  1 555-31  Also  the 
declaration  of  the  primacy  of  the  Roman  Church  and  of  the 
Sovereign  Pontiff  as  successor  of  St.  Peter,  which  was  em¬ 
bodied  in  the  Tridentine  profession  of  faith.32  The  teach¬ 
ing  of  the  Council  was  somewhat  later  adapted  for  the  use 
of  parish  priests  in  their  instructions  to  the  people,  in  the 
Roman  Catechism,  which  was  then  published  by  order  of 
Pius  V.  Thus  a  strong  barrier  was  opposed  to  the  revolution¬ 
ary  movement  of  the  sixteenth-century  Reformers,  and  the 
faith  preached  by  the  Apostles  was  once  more  set  forth  with 
that  clear  definiteness  which  is  always  the  prerogative  of  truth. 

31  Ibid.  993.  32  Ibid.  999. 


CHAPTER  XXiVII 


NEO-SCHOLASTIC  THEOLOGIANS 

The  Council  of  Trent  not  only  opposed  a  strong  barrier 
to  the  revolutionary  movement  of  the  sixteenth-century  Re¬ 
formers,  but  it  also  laid  the  foundation  of  activities  which 
in  a  short  while  produced  splendid  results  along  every  line 
of  ecclesiastical  life.  A  succession  of  able  and  deeply  reli¬ 
gious  Popes,  a  large  number  of  earnest  and  profoundly  learned 
theologians,  a  vast  multitude  of  holy  religious  and  many  great 
saints,  an  inexhaustible  supply  of  zealous  preachers  and  self- 
sacrificing  missionaries  —  all  these  worked  together  in  bring¬ 
ing  about  a  thorough  reform  of  morals  both  among  the  clergy 
and  laity  and  also  in  carrying  the  glad  tidings  of  the  Gospel 
to  the  uttermost  ends  of  the  earth.  It  was  a  marvelous  re¬ 
vival  of  Catholic  life,  and  a  most  convincing  proof  of  the  in- 
defectibility  of  the  Church  as  a  divine  institution  for  the  salva¬ 
tion  of  the  world.  The  evil  seed  sown  by  the  Reformers  in¬ 
deed  still  bore  its  evil  fruit,  and  sometimes  even  in  Catholic 
circles  ;  but  the  vigorous  spirit  of  revived  Catholicism  ever  de¬ 
vised  effective  remedies,  and  thus  within  the  Church  herself 
comparatively  little  harm  resulted. 

Most  of  these  varied  activities,  however,  supplied  matter 
for  church  history  rather  than  for  the  history  of  dogmas. 
True,  during  the  latter  part  of  the  sixteenth  century,  and  dur¬ 
ing  nearly  the  whole  of  the  seventeenth,  there  was  displayed 
in  many  countries  an  intense  theological  interest,  and  much 
useful  work  was  accomplished;  but  it  was  mostly  by  way  of 
commenting  on  mediaeval  teaching  in  the  light  of  the  decisions 
given  at  Trent.  On  the  other  hand,  while  there  was  no  want 

1  Cfr.  Schwane,  V,  24  sqq. ;  K.  derte ;  *Loofs,  Leitfaden  zum  Stu- 
Werner,  Franz  Suardk  und  die  dium  der  Dogmengeschichte ;  Hef- 
Scholastik  der  letzten  Jahrhun-  ele,  The  Life  of  Cardinal  Ximenes. 

478 


NEO-SCHOLASTIC  THEOLOGIANS 


479 


of  profound  theological  speculation,  few  of  the  topics  dealt 
with  were  of  a  nature  that  promised  definite  and  universally 
accepted  results.  They  rather  constituted  so  many  school 
differences,  and  are  apt  to  remain  such  for  ages  to  come.  Fi¬ 
nally,  though  there  was  frequent  occasion  for  authoritative  pro¬ 
nouncements  on  the  errors  of  the  day,  these  pronouncements 
were  for  the  most  part  little  more  than  practical  applications 
of  dogmatic  decisions  given  by  previous  councils.  There  are 
indeed  exceptions  to  this,  as  will  be  pointed  out  below ;  but 
these  exceptions  are  not  as  numerous  as  one  might  at  first  be 
led  to  believe  when  taking  up  the  study  of  the  documents  in 
question.  Hence,  in  a  compendious  work  like  the  present,  it 
seems  advisable  merely  to  summarize  the  more  important 
points  of  post-Tridentine  theology,  without  entering  into  any 
detail  as  regards  the  dogmatic  developments  which  are  still  in 
course  of  formation.  The  following  outline,  therefore,  must 
suffice  for  our  present  purpose. 

In  regard  to  the  revival  of  theological  studies  after  the 
Council  of  Trent,  two  points  are  especially  deserving  of  notice. 
The  first  is  the  change  of  textbook  employed  in  the  schools; 
and  the  second  is  the  shifting  of  the  center  of  theological 
activities  from  France  to  Spain.  This  latter  point  is  of  interest 
chiefly  because  it  marked  the  breaking  away  from  the  Nominal¬ 
istic  tendencies  which  since  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth  cen¬ 
tury  had  begun  to  dominate  the  University  of  Paris.  The 
former,  on  the  other  hand,  effected  a  general  improvement  in 
theological  studies,  both  by  providing  a  broader  and  more 
solid  basis  upon  which  to  build,  and  by  promoting  clearness  of 
thought  and  precision  of  reasoning.  Up  to  the  middle  of 
the  sixteenth  century,  the  S ententiarum  Libri  Quatuor  of  the 
Lombard  had  been  almost  universally  used  as  a  text  of 
Scholastic  prelections;  but  thereafter  this  honor  was  accorded 
to  the  Summa  Theologica  of  St.  Thomas,  except  in  the  schools 
of  the  Scotists,  where  theffime-honored  custom  of  commenting 
on  the  Sentences  was  retained. 

This  new  theology,  which  was  already  in  process  of  forma¬ 
tion  when  the  Council  of  Trent  began  its  work,  is  usually 
designated  as  Neo-Scholasticism.  Its  first  distinguished  rep- 


480 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


resentative  was  Francis  de  Vittoria.  He  was  born  in  1488, 
and  taught  theology,  first  for  some  years  at  Valladolid,  and 
then,  from  1526  to  1544,  at  Salamanca.  Being  a  member  of 
the  Dominican  order,  he  took  St.  Thomas  as  his  guide;  and 
as  not  only  his  own  younger  brethren,  but  also  many  other 
religious  and  even  seculars  attended  his  lectures,  he  secured  a 
large  circle  of  admirers  for  the  Angel  of  the  Schools.  Nor 
were  his  lectures  merely  a  running  commentary  on  the  text  of 
the  Summa,  but  he  adapted  its  principles  and  solutions  to  the 
needs  of  his  own  time.  And  even  more  than  St.  Thomas  had 
done  before  him,  he  emphasized  the  positive  aspect  of  theology, 
making  an  exensive  use  of  Holy  Scripture  and  the  writings 
of  the  Fathers.  Thus  he  replaced  the  idle  speculations  of  de¬ 
cadent  Scholasticism  by  a  theological  system  that  was  at 
once  thorough  and  comprehensive.  In  consequence  he  is 
justly  regarded  as  the  founder  of  Neo-Scholasticism,  which  is 
little  else  than  the  Scholasticism  of  the  thirteenth  century 
brought  up  to  date  and  developed  along  positive  lines. 

Among  the  many  distinguished  disciples  of  Vittoria,  Domini- 
cus  de  Soto,  Bartholomew  Carranza,  and  Melchior  Cano  are 
deserving  of  special  mention.  All  three  were  sent  as  theo¬ 
logians  to  the  Council  of  Trent,  and  also  ranked  high  as 
lecturers  on  theology,  at  Valladolid,  Alcala,  and  Salamanca. 
Cano,  however,  considerably  tarnished  his  fame  by  his  unrea¬ 
sonable  opposition  to  the  Society  of  Jesus,  whose  growing 
success  in  the  schools  seems  to  have  inspired  him  with  envy. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  gained  immortal  renown  by  his  famous 
work  De  Locis  Theologicis,  which  inaugurated  a  new  era  in 
the  treatment  of  fundamental  theology.  Lucid  in  style  and 
thorough  in  treatment,  it  is  justly  regarded  as  a  model  treatise 
on  theological  method.  The  author  enumerates  ten  loci,  or 
sources  of  theological  arguments,  each  of  which  he  treats  in 
a  separate  book.  These  sources  are,  Holy  Scripture,  oral 
tradition,  the  Catholic  Church,  the  councils,  the  Fathers,  the 
Roman  Church,  the  Scholastic  theologians,  natural  reason  as 
manifested  in  science,  philosophy,  and  history.  To  these  is 
added  a  final  book  that  treats  of  the  use  and  application  of  the 
loci  in  theological  polemics. 


NEO-SCHOLASTIC  THEOLOGIANS 


481 


The  work  thus  begun  by  the  Dominicans  at  Salamanca  was 
ably  continued  by  members  of  the  same  order  during  the  second 
half  of  the  sixteenth  century.  Thus  Bartholomew  de  Medina, 
utilizing  the  writings  of  his  predecessors  in  the  theological 
chair,  published  two  volumes  of  commentaries  on  the  Sumnia 
of  St.  Thomas;  and  also  a  volume  on  moral  theology,  in 
which  he  defends  the  principles  of  probabilism.  Towards  the 
end  of  the  century,  Dominicus  Banez  developed  his  doctrine 
of  physical  predetermination  in  reference  to  the  action  of  ef¬ 
ficacious  grace,  and  thus  became  the  founder  of  Neo-Thomism. 
His  opposition  to  Molina’s  teaching  on  the  scientia  media  was 
not  only  strong  but  violent,  and  largely  on  account  of  it  he 
gave  a  decidedly  forced  interpretation  of  St.  Thomas’  doctrine 
on  the  foreknowledge  of  God.  On  both  points  he  had  numer¬ 
ous  followers  in  his  own  order,  as  will  be  noted  in  the  follow¬ 
ing  chapter. 

Besides  the  Dominicans,  many  other  religious  orders  were 
established  at  Salamanca.  Among  them  were  the  Augustin- 
ians,  the  Hieronymites,  the  Norbertines,  and  the  Discalceated 
Carmelites.  The  last  named  published  a  large  commentary 
on  the  Summa  of  St.  Thomas,  usually  cited  as  Salmanticenses. 
The  first  edition,  in  nine  folio  volumes,  appeared  in  1631,  under 
the  title:  Collegii  Salmanticensis  fratrum  discalceatorum  B. 
M.  de  Monte  Carmeto  primitivae  observantiae  Cursus 
theologicus,  Summam  theologicam  D.  Thomae  Doctoris 
Angelici  complectens,  juxta  miram  ejusdem  Angelici  Praecep- 
toris  doctrinam  et  omnino  consone  ad  earn ,  quam  Complutense 
Collegium  ejusdem  ordinis  in  suo  artium  cursu  tradit.  The 
last  clause  of  this  title  refers  to  a  work  on  the  philosophy  of 
Aristotle  and  St.  Thomas,  in  five  volumes  folio,  which  had 
been  published  in  1624  at  Alcala.  The  dogmatic  standpoint 
of  the  Salmanticenses  is  strictly  Thomistic,  and  to  some  extent 
also  reve.als  the  anti-Jesuit  bias  of  Banez  and  his  followers. 

The  Scotist  school  of  theology  had  also  a  number  of  dis¬ 
tinguished  representatives  during  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries.  Among  them  may  be  mentioned  Gregory  Ruiz, 
John  Ovando,  John  of  the  Incarnation,  Hugh  Cavelli,  and 
John  Poncius.  The  last  two  were  Irish  Franciscans,  but 


4  82 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


taught  theology  at  the  Ara  Coeli  in  Rome.  Their  contem¬ 
porary  and  brother  in  religion,  Luke  Wadding,  published  the 
works  of  Scotus  in  twenty-six  folio  volumes,  together  with 
a  running  commentary.  The  first  volume  appeared  at  Lyons 
in  1657.  Unlike  most  other  theologians  of  that  time,  the 
Scotists  continued  to  use  the  Sentences  of  the  Lombard  as  the 
text  of  their  prelections,  and  to  write  commentaries  on  them 
as  had  been  done  by  the  Scholastics  of  the  Middle  Ages. 
Thus  Mastrius,  who  died  in  1673,  wrote  the  Disputationes 
Theologicae  in  4  Libris  Sententiarum,  which  were  published 
two  years  after  his  death.  A  few  years  later  appeared  the 
Scotus  Academicus  by  Frassen,  and  the  Summa  Theologiae 
Scotisticae  by  Dupasquier.  The  latter  work  is  regarded  as  the 
best  presentation  of  the  theology  of  Scotus.  On  the  other 
hand,  Bartholomew  de  Barberiis,  Gaudentius  of  Brixen,  and 
not  a  few  others  adhered  closely  to  the  teaching  of  St.  Bona- 
venture. 

By  the  side  of  the  older  religious  orders,  nearly  all  of  which 
were  intensely  active  in  the  fields  of  theology,  the  Society 
of  Jesus  took  a  distinguished  position  almost  from  its  incep¬ 
tion.  Approved  by  Paul  III  in  1540,  two  of  its  first  members, 
Salmeron  and  Laynez,  were  sent  as  the  Pope’s  theologians  to 
the  Council  of  Trent,  where  both  of  them  gave  proof  of  their 
profound  learning  no  less  than  of  their  religious  fervor. 
However,  it  was  with  Toletus,  later  created  cardinal,  that 
Jesuit  theology  first  made  its  way  into  the  schools.  He  had 
received  his  theological  training  at  Salamanca,  and  in  1559 
was  appointed  to  teach  theology  at  the  Roman  College.  He 
taught  with  great  success,  and  wrote  a  valuable  commentary 
on  the  Summa  of  St.  Thomas.  After  his  elevation  to  the 
cardinalate,  he  was  succeeded  in  his  chair  of  theology  by 
Gregory  de  Valentia,  who  had  previously  taught  at  Dillingen. 
As  this  latter  also  had  studied  under  the  Dominicans  at  Sala¬ 
manca,  the  theology  of  St.  Thomas  was  naturally  adopted  by 
the  Society  as  its  own.  This  was  entirely  in  accord  with  the 
wishes  of  St.  Ignatius,  who  always  had  a  great  admiration 
for  the  Angel  of  the  Schools. 

While  Toletus  and  de  Valentia  were  establishing  the  theo- 


NEO-SCHOLASTIC  THEOLOGIANS 


483 


logical  reputation  of  the  Society  at  Rome,  Peter  Fonseca  and 
Louis  Molina  met  with  similar  success  at  Evora  in  Portugal. 
The  latter  is  best  known  as  the  author  of  a  work  on  the  scientia 
media ,  of  which  something  will  be  said  in  the  following 
chapter;  but  he  proved  his  profound  theological  learning  along 
other  lines  as  well.  Besides  a  commentary  on  the  first  part  of 
the  Summa  and  several  historical  treatises,  he  wrote  a  monu¬ 
mental  work  under  the  title,  De  Justitia  et  Jure,  which  secured 
for  him  an  international  reputation.  From  Evora,  where  he 
had  taught  dogmatic  theology  for  twenty  years,  he  was  trans¬ 
ferred  to  Madrid  and  appointed  to  the  chair  of  moral 
theology.  There  he  died  in  1600,  at  the  age  of  sixty-five. 

About  the  same  time  two  other  Spanish  Jesuits  were  mak¬ 
ing  a  name  for  themselves  as  distinguished  lecturers  and 
writers  on  theology.  They  were  Gabriel  Vasquez  and 
Francis  Suarez.  Vasquez  taught  dogmatic  theology  for 
twenty-nine  years,  first  at  Alcala  and  then  at  the  Jesuit  col¬ 
lege  in  Rome.  He  was  both  original  and  profound,  and  is 
sometimes  called  the  Augustine  of  Spain.  He  wrote  a  large 
commentary  of  the  Summa  of  St.  Thomas,  which  has  always 
been  held  in  great  esteem.  Suarez,  usually  styled  Doctor 
Eximius,  lectured  on  philosophy  at  Avila  and  Segovia,  and 
on  theology  at  Valladolid,  Rome,  Alcala,  Salamanca,  and 
finally  at  the  new  university  of  Coimbra.  In  the  latter  place 
he  taught  from  1597  until  his  death  in  1617.  His  fame  as  a 
professor  of  theology  was  so  great  that  pupils  flocked  to 
Coimbra  from  far  and  near.  He  wrote  voluminously  both  on 
philosophy  and  theology.  His  commentary  on  the  Summa 
alone  comprises  twenty  volumes. 

In  the  first  half  of  the  seventeenth  century,  three  other 
Jesuit  theologians  acquired  great  distinction,  namely,  Ruiz 
de  Montoya,  Martinez  Ripalda,  and  John  de  Lugo,  created 
cardinal  by  Urban  VIII.  De  Montoya  taught  theology  at 
Cordova  and  Seville,  and  published  a  work  of  remarkable 
depth  of  thought  and  closeness  of  reasoning  on  the  omnis¬ 
cience  and  scientia  media  of  God.  He  also  wrote  commen¬ 
taries  on  parts  of  the  Summa.  Ripalda,  professor  of  theology 
at  Salamanca,  is  considered  by  many  as  one  of  the  greatest 


484 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


theologians  after  the  Council  of  Trent.  His  most  celebrated 
work  is  entitled  De  Ente  Supernaturali.  In  an  appendix  to 
this  work  he  gives  a  thorough  refutation  of  the  errors  of 
Baius.  His  treatise  on  redemption  and  grace  made  such  an 
impression  that  he  was  called  the  Cyril  of  modern  times.  De 
Lugo  lectured  on  theology  at  the  Roman  College  from  1621 
to  1641,  when  he  was  raised  to  the  cardinalate.  He  won 
great  renown  as  a  moral  theologian;  but  his  dogmatic  treat¬ 
ises  on  the  Incarnation,  the  Holy  Eucharist,  and  the  sacra¬ 
ment  of  penance  are  also  highly  esteemed. 

Most  of  the  theological  activity  referred  to  in  the  preceding 
paragraphs  was  caried  on  in  Spain,  and  nearly  all  the  men 
concerned  in  it  were  of  Spanish  origin  and  training.  How¬ 
ever,  other  countries  were  also  active  in  the  same  field, 
although  not  to  the  same  extent.  Thus  Italy  maintained 
theological  schools  of  considerable  importance  at  Padua, 
Naples,  Pavia,  and  Pisa;  while  the  colleges  of  the  different 
religious  orders  in  Rome  were  usually  kept  up  to  a  high 
standard  of  efficiency.  Many  of  the  ablest  professors  were 
indeed  drawn  from  other  countries,  principally  Spain;  but 
Italy  supplied  also  some  eminent  men  of  her  own,  as,  for  in¬ 
stance,  the  Jesuits  Bellarmine,  Viva,  and  Zaccaria;  the  Fran- 
ciscian  de  Rubeis,  and  Cardinal  Gotti. 

France  also  contributed  a  considerable  number  of  able 
theologians,  although  the  University  of  Paris  had  lost  much 
of  its  ancient  fame.  Special  mention  may  be  made  of  the 
Jesuit  Petavius,  the  author  of  a  famous  work  on  positive 
theology ;  the  Oratorian  Thomassin,  who  wrote  a  similar 
work;  the  Franciscan  Frassen;  the  Dominican  Rene  Billuart, 
and  the  Sarbonne  professors  Gonet,  Dupasquier,  Habert,  and 
Tournely.  In  Germany  and  Belgium  a  high  degree  of  excel¬ 
lence  was  reached  by  Becanus,  Lessius,  and  the  authors  of  the 
Theologia  Wirceburgensis. 

Thus  from  the  Council  of  Trent  till  well  into  the  eighteenth 
century,  theological  studies  were  nearly  everywhere  in  a  flour¬ 
ishing  condition.  Besides,  much  excellent  work  was  also  done 
in  canon  law,  exegesis,  and  church  history.  Then  for  a  cen- 


NEO-SCHOLASTIC  THEOLOGIANS  485 

tury  or  more  there  was  a  constant  decline,  until  some  fifty 
years  ago  the  study  of  theology  and  kindred  branches  of  learn¬ 
ing  was  taken  up  again  with  renewed  interest  and  considerable 
success. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 


SCHOOL  DIFFERENCES 1 

As  the  Council  of  Trent  had  been  convened  for  the  purpose 
of  extirpating  heresy,  and  not  with  a  view  to  decide  controver¬ 
sies  that  happened  to  be  carried  on  between  Catholic  theologi¬ 
ans,  it  was  but  natural  that  the  different  theological  schools 
should  continue  to  defend  their  own  particular  views  on  points 
which  had  been  in  no  way  defined.  Hence  in  regard  to  mere 
school  differences,  practically  no  change  was  brought  about 
by  the  Council.  In  a  few  instances,  indeed,  particular  opin¬ 
ions  became  untenable  on  account  of  their  bearing  upon  defined 
doctrines ;  but  that  was  by  way  of  exception.  Generally  speak¬ 
ing,  the  Dominicans,  the  Franciscans,  the  Augustinians,  the 
Scotists,  and  to  some  extent  even  the  Nominalists,  retained 
all  that  was  peculiar  to  their  own  particular  schools  of  theolog¬ 
ical  thought.  Besides,  in  the  course  of  a  few  years  after  the 
Council,  new  differences  arose;  and  these  differences,  in  some 
instances,  caused  divisions  between  theologians  of  one  and  the 
same  school.  Again,  differences  were  occasioned  by  the  rise 
of  new  religious  orders,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Jesuits;  even  if 
they  professed  to  follow  the  same  guide  as  some  older  order. 
To  discuss  all  these  various  and  divergent  opinions  would  be 
to  no  purpose  in  the  present  work,  although  a  few  of  the  more 
striking  of  them  may  be  profitably  noted.  The  following  are 
perhaps  the  most  important.  They  are  so  many  later  devel¬ 
opments  of  mediaeval  teaching. 

1  Cfr.  Schwane,  VI,  57  sqq. ;  K.  non,  Banez  et  Molina,  Histoire, 

Werner,  Franz  Suarez  und  die  Doctrine,  Critique  metaphysique; 

Scholastik  der  letzten  Jahrhun-  Schneemann,  Controversiarum  de 

derte ;  De  la  Serviere,  Theologie  de  divinae  gratiae  liberique  arbitrii 

Bellarmin ;  Kleutgen,  Die  Theolo-  concordia  initia  et  progressus ; 

gie  der  Vorzeit;  Tunnel,  Histoire  *Loofs,  Leitfaden  der  Dogmenge- 

de  la  Theologie  Positive ;  Reg-  schichte. 

486 


SCHOOL  DIFFERENCES 


487 


1.  God’s  Foreknowledge  of  the  Conditionally  Free  Acts  of 
the  Future. —  The  fact  of  God's  foreknowledge,  even  in  regard 
to  the  conditionally  free  acts  of  the  future,  was  unanimously 
taught  by  the  Scholastics  of  the  Middle  Ages.  On  the  other 
hand,  hardly  any  attempt  was  made  by  them  to  determine 
more  closely  the  particulars  of  this  knowledge.  Like  St. 
Thomas,  most  of  the  Scholastics  contented  themselves  with 
saying  that  God  knows  all  future  events,  necessary  or  free, 
absolute  or  conditional,  by  reason  of  their  eternal  presential- 
ity;  yet  in  such  wise  that  His  own  essence  is  the  ultimate  me¬ 
dium  of  cognition.  As  regards  necessary  events,  or  those 
free  actions  whose  futurity  is  absolute,  there  is  no  great  diffi¬ 
culty  ;  for  they  presuppose  in  God  at  least  a  decree  of  concur¬ 
rence  with  the  finite  agent,  by  reason  of  which  they  may  be  said 
to  be  present  in  the  divine  essence,  and  therefore  knowable  in 
the  same.  But  there  appears  to  be  an  insuperable  difficulty 
in  regard  to  future  events  that  are  conditioned  by  the  free  de¬ 
termination  of  the  finite  agent.  For  God’s  decree  of  concur¬ 
rence  presupposes  definite  knowledge  of  the  absolute  futurity 
of  the  event  in  question;  and  whence  does  God  derive  that 
knowledge  so  long  as  the  event  is  regarded  as  conditioned? 
This  view  of  the  matter  was  not  professedly  investigated  by 
the  older  Scholastics. 

After  the  Council  of  Trent  the  solution  of  the  difficulty 
became  urgent  for  two  reasons.  First,  because  Socinus  and 
other  innovators  denied  that  the  conditionally  free  acts  of  the 
future  were  definitely  known  by  God.  Secondly,  because 
God’s  foreknowledge  of  these  acts  is  intimately  connected  with 
the  freedom  of  man’s  will  under  the  action  of  grace,  which 
freedom  was  denied  by  the  Reformers  and  defined  by  the 
Council.  Hence  a  way  had  to  be  found  of  reconciling  two 
apparently  irreconcilable  doctrines.  It  was  not  a  mere  pen¬ 
chant  for  speculation  that  introduced  the  difficult  subject  of 
God’s  foreknowledge  into  the  field  of  theological  discussion, 
but  rather  the  urgent  need  of  finding  a  reasonable  solution  of 
difficulties  that  were  brought  against  the  faith. 

It  was  with  this  object  in  view  that  Molina  worked  out  his 
theory  of  the  scientia  media ,  which  in  the  scheme  of  divine 


488 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


knowledge  holds  a  middle  place  between  the  scientia  simplicis 
intelligentiae  and  the  scientia  visionis,  till  then  commonly  ac¬ 
cepted  as  constituting  a  complete  division  of  cognition  on  the 
part  of  God.  The  idea  itself  of  the  scientia  media  was  not 
new;  for  aside  from  the  many  Patristic  texts  which  imply  it 
more  or  less  clearly,  it  had  already  been  formulated  by  Fon¬ 
seca,  Molina’s  professor,  who  called  it  scientia  mixta.  How¬ 
ever,  to  Molina  belongs  the  credit  of  having  placed  his  pro¬ 
fessor’s  theory  on  a  firm  basis,  and  winning  a  place  for  it  in 
the  theological  world. 

As  is  quite  obvious,  all  objects  of  divine  cognition  may  be 
conceived  to  belong  to  one  of  these  three  classes:  the  purely 
possible,  the  actually  existing,  and  possible  events  whose  future 
occurrence  is  conditioned  by  the  self-determination  of  a  free 
agent.  The  first  class  comprises  the  objects  of  the  scientia 
simplicis  intelligentiae,  the  second  those  of  the  scientia  visionis , 
and  the  third  those  of  the  scientia  media.  Hence  the  scientia 
media  envisages  its  object  as  possible  in  itself  and  as  actually 
existing  on  the  supposition  that  certain  conditions  are  fulfilled, 
and  in  so  far  it  is  intermediate  between  the  other  two  kinds  of 
divine  knowledge.  It  is  from  this  intermediate  position  that 
it  takes  its  name  —  scientia  media . 

An  example  of  this  kind  of  divine  knowledge  is  found  in 
Christ’s  declaration  that  Tyre  and  Sidon  would  have  done 
penance  in  sackcloth  and  ashes,  if  they  had  witnessed  the  signs 
and  miracles  that  were  wrought  in  Corozain  and  Bethsaida. 
The  conversion  of  these  two  cities  was  in  itself  purely  possi¬ 
ble  ;  it  would  have  become  an  actual  occurrence  had  the  afore¬ 
said  signs  and  miracles  been  wrought  in  presence  of  the 
inhabitants ;  and  although  they  were  not  so  wrought,  and  con¬ 
sequently  the  conversion  did  not  take  place,  yet  Christ  knew 
its  conditioned  occurrence  with  absolute  certainty.  Hence  in 
regard  to  the  mere  fact  of  such  a  knowledge  there  can  be  no 
doubt.  It  is  only  when  the  medium  of  cognition  is  considered 
that  difficulties  occur,  and  that  views  of  theologians  begin  to 
differ. 

Molina,  in  common  with  all  other  theologians,  held  that  the 
ultimate  medium  of  cognition  is  the  divine  essence,  in  so  far 


SCHOOL  DIFFERENCES 


489 


as  therein  all  objective  truth  is  reflected.  The  fact  that  Tyre 
and  Sidon,  in  the  example  given,  would  have  been  converted, 
was  objectively  true  from  all  eternity,  and  as  such  it  was  like 
any  other  truth  represented  in  the  divine  essence  as  a  medium 
of  cognition.  This  representation  is  independent  of  any  de¬ 
cree  of  the  divine  will  in  regard  to  the  occurrence  in  question; 
it  is  simply  due  to  the  perfection  of  God’s  essence  as  the  mir¬ 
ror  of  all  truth.  Furthermore,  God's  knowledge,  though  de¬ 
termined  by  His  own  essence  as  the  medium  in  quo,  terminates 
at  the  object  itself;  and  as  His  intellect  is  infinitely  perfect, 
“  He  knows  the  most  secret  inclinations  and  penetrates  the 
most  hidden  recesses  of  man’s  heart,  and  is  thus  enabled  to 
foresee  with  mathematical  certainty  the  free  resolves  latent  in 
man’s  will.”  In  this  sense  God  may  be  said  to  know  the  con¬ 
ditionally  free  acts  of  the  future  even  in  their  proximate 
causes.  However,  the  certainty  of  this  knowledge  is  in  the 
last  instance  not  derived  from  the  object,  which  in  itself  is 
contingent;  but  from  His  own  infinite  perfection. 

This  represents  the  substance  of  Molina’s  theory  as  worked 
out  by  himself,  and  in  the  main  also  as  it  was  adopted  and 
defended  by  Suarez,  Vasquez,  Lessius,  Becanus,  and  those  who 
took  part  in  the  controversy  with  the  Thomists.  However,  it 
was  somewhat  further  developed  by  the  introduction  of  two 
concepts  which  Molina  had  set  aside  as  unnecessary.  The 
first  is  derived  from  God’s  eternity.  As  St.  Thomas  teaches, 
God’s  eternal  existence  necessarily  implies  His  co-existence 
with  all  His  creatures,  and  this  raises  Him  above  and  beyond 
all  divisions  of  time.  Hence  the  free  self-determination  of 
the  will,  even  if  it  still  lies  in  the  future,  is  intimately  present 
to  His  eternal  essence.  And  therefore,  looking  at  the  matter 
from  His  point  of  view,  He  does  not  foresee  but  simply  sees 
the  future.  Consequently,  He  knows  future  events  as  He 
knows  those  of  the  present  ;  because  to  Him  there  is  neither 
past  nor  future,  but  only  the  unchangeable  now  of  eternal 
duration. 

The  second  concept  is  taken  from  the  obvious  need  and 
universally  admitted  fact  of  God’s  cooperation  with  the  actions 
of  His  creatures.  As  no  finite  being  can  act  except  in  so  far 


490 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


as  God  sustains  its  activity  and  concurs  with  the  same,  every 
future  action  presupposes  on  His  part  the  will  to  concur,  and 
this  will  constitutes  the  medium  of  cognition.  In  regard  to 
absolutely  future  actions,  the  will  to  concur  is  absolute;  while 
in  regard  to  conditionally  future  actions  it  is  hypothetical ;  and 
this  hypothetical  will  of  concurrence  is  the  medium  in  which 
God  knows  all  future  occurrences  that  are  conditioned  by  the 
self-determination  of  a  free  agent.  However,  it  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  the  divine  concurrence  does  not  induce  but 
merely  presupposes  the  hypothetical  self-determination  of  the 
agent's  will ;  and  therefore  God’s  infallible  knowledge  of  this 
self-determination  belongs  properly  to  the  scientia  media. 

This  theory  of  divine  foreknowledge,  as  first  formulated 
by  Fonseca  and  Molina  and  then  perfected  by  successive  gen¬ 
erations  of  Jesuit  theologians,  was  fiercely  attacked  by  the 
Dominicans,  who  denounced  it  as  an  unwarranted  innovation. 
They,  too,  recognized  the  necessity  of  giving  a  more  detailed 
explanation  of  the  matter  than  could  be  found  in  the  works 
of  St.  Thomas,  but  in  trying  to  work  out  that  explanation  they 
proceeded  along  lines  directly  opposed  to  those  followed  by 
the  Jesuits.  God’s  knowledge,  according  to  them,  is  of  two 
kinds  only:  the  knowledge  of  simple  intelligence,  and  the 
knowledge  of  vision.  The  former  has  the  purely  possible  for 
its  object,  while  the  latter  extends  to  all  other  events  and  oc¬ 
currences,  even  the  conditionally  free  acts  of  the  future.  The 
reason  why  the  knowledge  of  vision  is  so  comprehensive  lies 
in  the  fact  that  God  knows  things  in  so  far  as  He  is  their 
cause,  either  as  regards  their  absolute  or  their  conditional  ex¬ 
istence.  Even  the  self-determination  of  man’s  free  will, 
although  free,  is  possible  only  under  the  physical  premotion 
of  God’s  concurrence;  hence  in  the  divine  decree  of  that  concur¬ 
rence  the  self-determination  of  the  will  is  contained  as  an 
object  of  eternal  vision.  Hence  there  is  neither  need  nor  room 
for  the  scientia  media  of  Molina. 

This  system,  though  to  some  extent  based  upon  thoughts 
that  are  found  in  the  writings  of  St.  Thomas,  received  its  first 
real  development  from  Michael  Banez,  a  Spanish  Dominican 
and  author  of  Neo-Thomism.  It  was  later  on  completed 


SCHOOL  DIFFERENCES 


49 1 


by  Alvarez,  Gonet,  Gotti,  Billuart,  and  others,  who  excogitated 
the  theory  of  hypothetical  decrees  of  the  divine  will.  Hence 
Thomism  no  less  than  Molinism  is  the  finished  product  of 
many  minds,  but  in  substance  it  has.  always  remained  what  it 
was  in  the  beginning — an  explanation  of  divine  foreknowl¬ 
edge  by  means  of  predetermining  decrees. 

A  word  of  explanation  may  here  be  added  in  reference  to 
the  hypothetical  decrees  of  the  divine  will.  They  are  con¬ 
ceived  as  subjectively  absolute  and  objectively  conditioned. 
On  the  part  of  God  there  is  a  real  decision  concerning  the 
occurrence  of  some  future  event,  hence  the  decree  is  subjec¬ 
tively  absolute  ;  but  the  objective  effectiveness  of  this  decision 
is  made  dependent  on  the  occurrence  of  something  else,  and 
therefore  the  decree  is  objectively  conditioned.  This  some¬ 
thing  else  is  a  condition  the  fulfillment  of  which  is  either  en¬ 
tirely  in  the  power  of  God,  or  partly  also  in  the  power  of  a 
created  will.  Hence  there  are  two  kinds  of  hypothetical  de¬ 
crees.  Of  the  one  kind  the  following  is  an  example:  “I 
decree  that  the  inhabitants  of  Tyre  and  Sidon  will  do  penance, 
if  I  send  them  the  Messias  ” ;  of  the  other  this  is  an  instance: 
“  I  will  -that  all  men  be  saved,  if  they  will  cooperate  with  my 
grace.”  Still,  precisely  as  mediums  of  divine  cognition,  both 
kinds  are  really  the  same;  because  even  where  the  fulfillment 
of  the  condition  is  partly  in  the  power  of  a  created  will,  the 
decree  of  God’s  will  predetermines  the  self-determination  of 
the  created  free  agent.  Hence  God  knows  what  choice  the 
free  agent  will  make,  because  He  Himself  is  the  cause  of 
that  choice,  though  without  interfering  with  the  agent’s  free¬ 
dom. 

That  Thomism  thus  offers  a  much  clearer  explanation  of 
God’s  foreknowledge  than  can  ever  be  attempted  by  Molinism, 
or  by  any  other  theory  of  divine  cognition,  is  quite  obvious. 
For  as  God  Himself  is  said  to  predetermine  the  self-determina¬ 
tion  of  the  free  agent,  He  knows  conditionally  free  actions 
of  the  future  in  the  same  way  as  He  knows  future  necessary 
actions,  and  in  regard  to  these  latter  no  one  has  ever  found 
any  difficulty.  But  the  system  has  two  very  serious  draw¬ 
backs.  First,  it  necessitates  an  infinite  number  of  hypothetical 


492 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


decrees,  which  seem  more  than  unacceptable;  secondly,  to  an 
unbiased  person  it  appears  impossible  that  these  predetermin¬ 
ing  decrees  should  leave  man’s  freedom  untouched.  It  is 
especially  on  account  of  this  latter  difficulty  that  the  system 
has  found  but  little  favor  outside  the  Thomistic  school. 

2.  Controversies  on  Efficacious  Grace. —  The  relation  of 
grace  and  man’s  free  will  is  thus  indicated  by  the  Council  of 
Trent,  in  its  decree  on  justification:  “The  Synod  further¬ 
more  declares,  that,  in  adults,  the  beginning  of  justification  is 
to  be  derived  from  the  preventing  grace  of  God,  through  Jesus 
Christ,  that  is  to  say,  from  His  vocation,  whereby,  without  any 
merits  existing  on  their  part,  they  are  called ;  that  so  they, 
who  by  sins  were  alienated  from  God,  may  be  disposed  by  His 
quickening  and  assisting  grace  to  convert  themselves  to  their 
own  justification,  by  freely  assenting  to  and  cooperating  with 
the  aforesaid  grace;  in  such  a  way  that,  while  God  touches 
the  heart  of  man  by  the  illumination  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  man 
is  not  himself  utterly  without  doing  anything,  while  he  receives 
that  inspiration,  forasmuch  as  he  is  also  able  to  reject  it;  yet 
he  is  not  able,  by  his  own  free  will,  without  the  grace  of  God, 
to  move  himself  unto  justice  in  His  sight.” 

Hence  in  their  discussions  on  grace  and  free  will,  all  Catho¬ 
lic  theologians  regard  two  points  as  incontrovertible:  First, 
that  the  influence  of  grace  is  necessary  for  every  salutary  act; 
secondly,  that  the  human  will  remains  free  under  the  influence 
of  grace.  They,  furthermore,  also  admit  that  there  is  a  dif¬ 
ference  between  merely  sufficient  grace  and  efficacious  grace; 
but  they  are  very  much  divided  in  their  views  when  they  come 
to  assign  the  reason  for  this  difference.  In  their  efforts  to 
demonstrate  the  mutual  relations  between  grace  and  free  will, 
which  form  the  foundation  of  the  difference  between  sufficient 
and  efficacious  grace,  post-Tridentine  theologians  evolved  two 
pairs  of  closely  related  systems,  one  of  which  takes  grace  for 
its  starting  point  and  the  other  the  free  will  of  man.  To  the 
former  belong  Thomism  and  Augustinianism ;  and  to  the  lat¬ 
ter,  Molinism  and  Congruism.  To  these  may  be  added  a  fifth 
system,  known  as  Syncretism,  which  is  eclectic  and  occupies 
a  middle  place  between  Thomism  and  Molinism.  A  few  re- 


SCHOOL  DIFFERENCES 


493 


marks  in  regard  to  each  of  the  different  systems  will  suffice 
for  our  present  purpose. 

(a)  Thomism. —  According  to  Banez  and  his  followers, 
every  act  of  contingent  causes  is  produced  by  an  application 
of  their  potentiality  to  the  act  under  the  physical  premotion 
of  the  First  Cause.  By  an  influence  that  precedes  all  acts  of 
the  creature,  not  in  the  order  of  time  but  in  the  order  of  cau¬ 
sality,  God  moves  every  finite  cause  to  its  proper  acts  —  the 
necessary  to  necessary  acts,  and  the  free  to  free  acts.  This  is 
true  both  in  the  natural  and  the  supernatural  order  of  things. 
Hence  the  efficacy  of  grace  is  due  to  the  intrinsic  nature  of 
the  grace  bestowed,  and  is  in  no  way  dependent  on  the  attitude 
of  man’s  free  will  in  its  regard.  Consequently,  efficacious, 
grace  is  intrinsically  and  of  its  very  nature  different  from  suf¬ 
ficient  grace.  It  has  of  itself  an  infallible  connection  with  the 
free  correspondence  of  man's  will,  so  that  it  not  only  gives 
the  power  to  act  but  causes  the  act  itself.  On  the  other  hand, 
sufficient  grace  does  not  cause  man  to  act,  but  merely  gives 
him  the  power  of  acting.  Nor  is  this  power  in  itself  sufficient 
for  the  intended  act,  but  it  must  be  supplemented  by  another 
grace  which  is  intrinsically  efficacious.  The  grace  is  called 
sufficient  in  the  sense  that  it  prepares  the  way  for  the  supple¬ 
mentary  grace,  which  would  infallibly  be  given  if  the  resist¬ 
ance  of  man’s  free  will  to  the  first  grace  did  not  place  an  ob¬ 
stacle  in  its  way. 

The  objections  to  this  system  are  obvious.  For  how  does 
the  will  remain  really  free,  if  it  cannot  refuse  to  act  under  the 
premotion  of  efficacious  grace?  To  say  that  it  could  refuse 
to  act  in  sensu  dizdso,  though  not  in  sensa  composite >,  appears 
to  be  little  more  than  a  quibble.  Again,  how  can  sufficient 
grace,  as  explained  in  this  system,  with  any  propriety  be  called 
sufficient?  For  as  the  will  cannot  act  except  under  the  influ¬ 
ence  of  physical  premotion,  it  can  obviously  not  do  anything 
else  than  resist  whenever  this  physical  premotion  is  wanting,  as 
it  is  wanting  in  sufficient  grace.  Lastly,  the  system  of  physical 
premotion  seems  to  make  God  the  originator  of  sinful  acts. 
For  when  God  premoves  man  to  the  entity  of  the  sinful  act 
and  at  the  same  time  withholds  the  opposite  premotion  of  effi- 


494 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


cacious  grace,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  man  can  possibly  avoid  sin. 

(b)  Augustinianism. —  As  the  name  indicates,  this  system 
is  professedly  founded  on  the  teaching  of  St.  Augustine.  In 
its  elements  it  dates  back  to  the  Middle  Ages,  but  it  was  fully 
developed  only  after  the  Council  of  Trent.  This  development 
is  largely  the  work  of  Berti,  Bellelli,  Bertieri,  Habert,  and 
other  seventeenth-  and  eighteenth-century  theologians.  Ac¬ 
cording  to  the  advocates  of  this  system,  grace  is  intrinsically 
and  of  its  very  nature  efficacious  or  merely  sufficient,  as  the 
case  may  be;  but  efficacious  grace  does  not  physically  prede¬ 
termine  the  will.  Its  efficacy  implies  a  merely  moral  prede¬ 
termination,  which  results  from,  the  victorious  delight  —  de- 
lectatio  coelcstis  victrix  —  produced  by  its  action  upon  the  free 
agent.  On  the  other  hand,  merely  sufficient  grace  produces 
a  delight  which  is  too  weak  to  overcome  the  contrary  motions 
of  concupiscence.  Hence  the  two  kinds  of  grace  are  intrin¬ 
sically  and  essentially  different;  but  this  difference  arises  ulti¬ 
mately  from  their  respective  relations  to  the  perversity  of 
fallen  nature. 

At  first  sight,  this  system  has  much  in  common  with  Jan¬ 
senism,  in  regard  to  which  something  will  be  said  in  the  follow¬ 
ing  chapter.  However,  it  can  point  to  one  very  essential  differ¬ 
ence,  which  secures  it  against  all  suspicion  of  heresy.  While 
Jansenism  makes  efficacious  grace  -irresistible,  Augustinianism 
does  not.  According  to  it,  the  will  invariably  and  infallibly 
follows  the  stronger  influence  of  grace  or  of  concupiscence ;  but 
it  does  so  without  coercion  or  intrinsic  necessity. 

(c)  Molinism. —  It  was  chiefly  to  safeguard  the  freedom 
of  the  human  will  under  the  influence  of  efficacious  grace  that 
Molina  worked  out  his  theory  of  the  scientia  media .  Hence 
he  entitled  his  work  on  the  subject,  Concordia  Liberi  Arbitrii 
cum  Gratiae  Donis,  Divina  Praescientia,  Providentia,  Prae- 
destinatione  et  Reprobatione.  The  views  on  the  efficacy  of 
grace  defended  in  this  book  are  directly  opposed  to  the  Thom- 
ism  of  Banez,  and  they  started  a  controversy  between  the  Jesu¬ 
its  and  the  Dominicans  that  was  terminated  only  by  an  order 
of  Paul  V,  after  the  matter  had  been  discussed  for  nine  years 
before  the  Congregatio  de  Auxiliis,  first  convened  by  Clement 


SCHOOL  DIFFERENCES 


495 


VIII  in  1598-  No  decision  was  given  for  or  against  either  of 
the  two  contending  parties,  but  each  was  forbidden  to  censure 
the  teaching  of  the  other. 

According  to  the  teaching  of  Molina,  there  is  no  intrinsic 
and  essential  difference  between  efficacious  and  sufficient  grace. 
Both  have  of  their  very  nature  the  efficacia  virtutis,  in  as  much 
as  they  impart  to  man’s  free  will  the  proximate  power  and 
aptitude  to  elicit  a  supernatural  act.  Hence  the  difference  be¬ 
tween  them  in  reference  to  the  act  in  question,  or  the  efficacia 
connexionis ,  comes  ab  extrinsic 0 ,  from  the  attitude  freely  as¬ 
sumed  by  the  will.  If  the  will  gives  its  consent,  the  grace 
becomes  efficacious;  if  the  will  withholds  its  consent,  the  same 
grace  remains  merely  sufficient.  However,  in  giving  its  con¬ 
sent,  the  will  acts  not  merely  as  a  natural  power ;  for  it  is  al¬ 
ready  prepared  and  placed  in  the  supernatural  order  of  activ¬ 
ity  by  the  presence  in  it  of  prevenient  grace,  and  consequently 
the  act  that  follows  is  the  joint  product  of  grace  and  free  will. 
Yet  in  one  sense  this  joint  product  is  to  be  ascribed  to  grace 
rather  than  to  free  will;  for  it  is  not  the  will  which  by  its 
free  consent  determines  the  power  of  grace,  but  it  is  grace 
which  gives  free  will  the  power  to  act  and  cooperates  with  its 
action.  Hence  there  is  absolutely  no  similarity  between  Mo- 
linism  and  Semi-Pelagianism,  as  most  Protestant  writers  as¬ 
sert. 

While  the  freedom  of  the  human  will  under  the  influence  of 
efficacious  grace  is  thus  preserved  intact,  the  sovereign  domin¬ 
ion  of  God  in  the  distribution  of  efficacious  graces  is  placed  in 
safety  by  the  intervention  of  the  scientia  media.  For  by  rea¬ 
son  of  it  God  foreknows  infallibly  what  particular  graces  will 
in  any  given  instance  secure  the  free  consent  of  the  human 
will,  and  what  particular  graces  will  not;  and  in  accordance 
with  this  foreknowledge  Fie  can  decree  to  bestow  whatever 
graces  answer  the  purpose  of  His  own  wise  dispositions  in  the 
economy  of  salvation.  Thus  infallibility  of  divine  cognition 
is  secured,  to  which,  when  there  is  question  of  efficacious 
graces,  corresponds  in  the  absolute  order  of  things  the  infalli¬ 
bility  of  connection  between  grace  and  the  subsequent  act. 

(d)  Congruism. —  When  some  of  Molina’s  followers 


496 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


pushed  his  principles  to  extremes  by  overemphasizing  the 
power  of  free  will,  a  reaction  set  in  which  led  to  the  assertion 
of  an  intrinsic  difference  between  efficacious  and  sufficient 
grace.  This  difference,  however,  was  conceived  to  lie  in  the 
moral  and  not  in  the  physical  nature  of  grace.  Efficacious 
grace,  it  was  pointed  out  by  Suarez,  Vasquez,  Lessius,  Bellar- 
mine,  and  others  of  the  Society  of  Jesus,  is  a  special  gift  of 
God  and  as  such  it  has  a  higher  moral  value  than  merely 
sufficient  grace.  This  higher  moral  value  consists  principally 
in  the  fact  that  the  grace  conferred  is  specially  suited  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  so  that  its  congruity  is  a  powerful 
factor  in  soliciting  the  consent  of  the  will.  Hence  efficacious 
grace  is  called  congruous  grace  —  gratia  congrua  —  whereas 
merely  sufficient  grace  is  termed  incongruous  grace  —  gratia 
incongrua.  This  view  was  strongly  endorsed  by  Claudius 
Acquaviva,  and  by  subsequent  Generals  of  the  Society.  It 
must  be  noted,  however,  that  the  idea  of  congruous  grace  was 
already  contained  in  the  system  as  originated  by  Molina,  only 
it  was  not  emphasized  by  him  to  the  same  extent  as  it  was  by 
later  theologians. 

(e)  Syncretism. —  As  the  name  indicates,  this  system  re¬ 
sulted  from  the  combination  of  elements  taken  from  other 
systems  then  in  vogue.  However, .the  elements  in  question  are 
really  nothing  else  than  Thomism  on  the  one  hand  and  Mo- 
linism  on  the  other.  The  distinctive  trait  of  Syncretism  con¬ 
sists  in  the  acceptance  of  two  kinds  of  efficacious  grace:  one 
kind  that  is  intrinsically  and  of  its  very  nature  efficacious,  and 
another  that  derives  its  efficacy  from  the  free  consent  of  the 
will.  The  latter  kind  is  given  by  God  for  the  performance  of 
less  difficult  good  works,  such  as  the  resisting  of  slight  tempta¬ 
tions,  devout  prayer,  and  the  like  ;  then,  if  man  accepts  these 
graces  and  freely  cooperates  with  them,  God  will  give  him  an 
intrinsically  predetermining  grace  for  the  performance  of  good 
works  that  are  more  difficult.  Thus  the  freedom  of  the  will 
is  kept  intact,  the  necessity  of  prayer  is  emphasized,  and  God’s 
sovereign  dominion  in  the  matter  of  grace  is  vindicated. 

The  system  was  originated  in  the  seventeenth  century  by 
Ysambertus,  and  later  on  developed  by  Duplessis,  Habert, 


SCHOOL  DIFFERENCES 


497 


Tournely,  and  others.  It  was  endorsed  by  St.  Alphonsus  Li g- 
uori,  and  has  not  a  few  advocates  among  modern  theologians. 
Yet  there  is  little  in  it  to  make  it  acceptable.  It  has  to  solve  all 
the  difficulties  that  confront  Thomism  and  Molinism,  and  offers 
no  principle  of  so  doing  which  is  not  contained  in  the  one  or 
the  other  of  the  two  systems. 

3.  Some  Differences  of  Opinion  Among  Theologians. — 
These  differences  are  so  numerous  that  it  is  practically  impossi¬ 
ble  to  give  even  the  briefest  outline  of  them  in  a  compendious 
work  like  the  present.  Nor  is  there  any  need  of  it.  Many  of 
them  are  mere  continuations  of  differences  that  arose  among 
theologians  in  the  Middle  Ages,  and  as  such  have  already  been 
indicated  in  earlier  chapters.  Others  have  so  little  theological 
interest  that  an  exposition  of  them  would  be  out  of  place  in  a 
history  of  dogmas.  Hence  the  following  few  points  will  suffice 
for  our  purpose. 

(a  )  The  Hypostatic  Union. —  The  great  theologians  of  the 
Middle  Ages  defended  the  fact  of  the  hypostatic  union,  but  did 
not  evolve  any  very  definite  theory  as  to  its  ultimate  explana¬ 
tion.  This  was  attempted  by  their  successors  after  the  Coun¬ 
cil  of  Trent.  All  these  theories  are  based  upon  different  philo¬ 
sophical  concepts  of  personality.  Thus  many  Thomists  hold 
that  personality  results  ultimately  from  actual  existence,  be¬ 
tween  which  and  essence  they  place  a  real  distinction.  Hence, 
according  to  them,  the  hypostatic  union  consists  in  the  fact 
that  the  personal  existence  of  the  Word  supplies  the  actual 
existence  of  Christ’s  human  nature.  This  view  is  taken, < 
among  others,  by  Cajetan,  Gonet,  Billuart,  and  more  recently 
by  Terrien  and  Cardinal  Billot. 

Not  a  few  Jesuits,  among  them  Suarez,  Vasquez,  De  Lugo, 
and  Ariaga,  place  personality  in  a  physical  mode,  really  dis¬ 
tinct  from  existing  human  nature.  And  this  mode,  they  con¬ 
tend,  was  impeded  in  the  union,  its  place  being  taken  by  the 
personality  of  the  Word.  Some  of  them,  like  Suarez,  further¬ 
more  postulate  a  modus  unionis ,  in  which  the  union  formally 
consists.  Others  of  the  Society,  as  Molina,  Petavius,  Ti- 
phanus,  Cardinal  Franzelin,  Christian  Pesch,  and  also  many 
Scotists,  place  personality  in  a  real  mode  which  they  hold  to 


498 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


be  only  negatively  distinct  from  complete  and  actual  existing 
human  nature.  Most  of  them,  moreover,  reject  the  Suarezian 
modus  unionis  and  contend  that  the  union  formally  consists  in 
the  extension  of  the  hypostatic  functions  of  the  Word  to  the 
humanity  in  Christ. 

The  Scotists  as  a  school  adhere  to  the  view  taken  by  Duns 
Scotus,  that  personality  consists  in  a  real  but  negative  perfec¬ 
tion.  This  perfection  is  identical  with  the  complete  and  inde¬ 
pendently  existing  nature,  in  so  far  as  it  excludes  both  actual 
and  aptitudinal  communication  of  the  nature  to  another  sup- 
positum.  Hence  as  this  perfection  is  impeded  by  the  acces¬ 
sion  of  the  Word  to  the  human  nature  of  Christ,  the  person¬ 
ality  of  the  Word  must  take  its  place.  In  its  last  analysis,  this 
view  seems  to  be  really  the  same  as  the  preceding. —  Many 
other  theories  have  been  excogitated,  but  these  four  suffice  to 
indicate  the  general  drift  of  theological  thought  on  the  sub¬ 
ject  under  consideration. 

(b)  The  Redemption. —  Omitting  minor  variations  in  the 
soteriological  teaching  of  post-Tridentine  theologians,  it  is 
necessary  only  to  mention  in  this  connection  that  the  view  of 
Scotus  on  the  primary  motive  of  the  Incarnation  and  on  the 
adequacy  of  Christ’s  satisfaction  has  still  its  many  defenders, 
even  outside  the  Scotists’  school  of  theology.  And  this  is 
especially  true  in  regard  to  the  first  point,  although  the  weight 
of  theological  opinion  is  still  in  favor  of  considering  the  re¬ 
demption  of  the  world  as  the  primary  motive  of  the  Incarna¬ 
tion.  The  necessity  of  the  Incarnation,  for  the  purpose  of 
rendering  God  condign  satisfaction  for  the  sins  of  mankind, 
continued  during  all  this  time  to  be  generally  defended,  but 
was  insisted  on  with  special  emphasis  by  the  Salmanticenses. 
This  satisfaction  is,  according  to  all,  in  the  order  of  justice,  but 
many  theologians  deny  that  it  is  ad  rigorem  justitiae. 

(c)  Sanctifying  Grace. —  Although  the  Council  of  Trent 
defined  that  the  created  gift  of  sanctifying  grace  inhering  in 
the  soul  must  be  considered  as  the  sole  formal  cause  of  justifi¬ 
cation,  yet  it  did  not  indicate  all  the  various  functions  of  that 
formal  cause,  and  consequently  there  arose  numerous  discus¬ 
sions  concerning  them  in  the  centuries  that  followed.  Does 


SCHOOL  DIFFERENCES 


499 


sanctifying  grace  expel  mortal  sin  physically  from  the  soul  as 
is  held  by  most  theologians,  or  only  morally  as  is  maintained 
by  the  Scotists?  Is  the  participation  of  the  divine  nature 
merely  in  the  moral-juridical  order  as  the  Scotists  contend,  or 
is  it  physical,  though  only  analogous,  as  the  greater  number  of 
other  theologians  maintain?  Again,  is  sanctifying  grace  as 
a  physical  entity  really  distinct  from  charity,  according  to  the 
more  common  opinion,  or  is  it  essentially  identical  with  that 
virtue,  as  was  taught  not  only  by  the  followers,  of  Scotus,  but 
also  by  Lessius,  Bellarmine,  and  many  others?*  These  and 
many  similar  questions  remain  still  unsolved  in  the  theology 
of  sanctifying  grace. 

(d)  Predestination  and  Reprobation. —  These  two  points 
were  and  still  are  discussed  chiefly  between  the  Molinists  and 
Thomists,  the  question  being  whether  God  predestines  post  or 
ante  praevisa  merita.  The  Molinists  contend  for  the  former 
view,  and  the  Thomists  for  the  latter. 

According  to  the  Molinists,  the  order  of  divine  decrees  in 
regard  to  predestination  is  as  follows:  (a)  Antecedently, 
even  presupposing  the  existence  of  original  sin,  God  truly  and 
sincerely  wills  the  salvation  of  all  m.en,  and  in  accordance  with 
this  will  prepares  for  them  means  of  salvation  that  are  at 
least  remotely  sufficient,  (b)  By  reason  of  a  special  predilec¬ 
tion,  for  some  He  destines  graces  which  He  foreknows  by  the 
scientia  media  will  prove  efficacious,  (c)  By  the  knowledge  of 
vision  He  foresees  that  these  same  persons  will  perform  meri¬ 
torious  actions  and  die  in  the  state  of  grace;  and  thus,  after 
foreseeing  their  merits,  He  predestines  them  to  eternal  glory. 
In  a  similar  way  He  foresees  that  others  will  die  in  the  state 
of  mortal  sin;  and  these,  in  view  of  their  demerits,  He  con¬ 
demns  to  the  punishment  of  hell. 

In  the  Thomists’  view  the  divine  decrees  are  arranged  in  this 
order:  (a)  Antecedently,  even  presupposing  original  sin, 
God  truly  and  sincerely  intends  eternal  blessedness  for  all 
rational  creatures,  and  with  this  intention  He  prepares  for 
them  sufficient  graces,  (b)  When  He  foresees  in  His  decrees 
of  sufficient  grace  that  no  one  makes  a  good  use  of  the  grace 
thus  offered,  He  chooses  some  from  amongst  them  whom  He 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


500 

decrees  absolutely  and  efficaciously  to  save,  (c)  For  these  He 
prepares  efficacious  graces,  through  which  they  will  infallibly 
work  out  their  salvation,  (d)  Foreseeing  in  these  same  de¬ 
crees  that  the  elect  will  perform  good  works,  He  decrees  fur¬ 
thermore  in  the  order  of  execution  to  confer  eternal  life  upon 
them  as  a  reward,  (e)  As  He  foresees  that  all  others,  not 
belonging  to  the  elect,  will  die  in  mortal  sin,  He  condemns 
them  to  eternal  punishment. —  The  Congruists  arrange  the 
divine  decrees  in  a  similar  order,  but  they  derive  God’s  fore¬ 
knowledge  from  the  scientia  media. 

Comparing  the  two  systems,  one  cannot  help  noticing  that  in 
regard  to  reprobation  the  Molinists  have  a  decided  advantage 
over  the  Thomists.  For  in  their  system  of  grace  reprobation 
follows  from  the  free  choice  of  the  reprobate  themselves, 
whereas  in  the  system  of  the  Thomists  it  is  ultimately  due  to 
the  absence  of  a  praemotio  physica  without  which  the  free  will 
of  man  cannot  act.  Hence  the  advocates  of  this  system  are 
forced  to  hold  negative  reprobation,  in  the  sense  that  the 
reprbbate  had  really  no  chance  of  saving  their  souls.  The  in¬ 
ference  is,  of  course,  denied;  but  it  appears  too  obvious  to 
admit  of  denial. 

(e)  Sacramental  Theology. —  The  chief  theological  differ¬ 
ences  in  regard  to  the  sacraments  bear  upon  sacramental  causal¬ 
ity,  the  composition  of  the  sacramental  sign,  the  immediate 
institution  by  Christ,  and  the  nature  of  the  sacramental  char¬ 
acter.  The  following  few  remarks  will  suffice  to  indicate  the 
differences  in  question. 

Sacramental  causality  is  explained  in  many  different  ways, 
but  all  these  ways  may  be  classified  in  four  systems.  The  first 
of  these  is  usually  called  the  system  of  dispositive  causality, 
which  holds,  that  the  sacraments  are  the  instrumental  causes, 
not  directly  of  grace,  but  of  a  disposition  thereto.  In  bap¬ 
tism,  confirmation,  and  orders,  this  disposition  is  identified 
with  the  sacramental  character,  while  in  the  remaining  sacra¬ 
ments  it  is  said  to  be  a  corresponding  ornament  of  the  soul  — 
ornatus  animae.  This  view  was  defended  by  St.  Thomas  in 
his  commentary  of  the  Sentences ,  and  by  the  Thomists  gen¬ 
erally  up  to  the  time  of  Cajetan  (-j-  1510).  Since  his  day 


SCHOOL  DIFFERENCES 


5oi 

most  Thomists  are  in  favor  of  the  second  system,  which  is  that 
of  perfective  physical  causality.  It  differs  from  the  foregoing 
in  this,  that  the  sacraments  are  said  to  be  the  direct  instrumen¬ 
tal  causes  of  grace.  According  to  its  modern  advocates,  the 
system  is  in  accord  with  the  teaching  of  St.  Thomas  as  con¬ 
tained  in  the  Summa  Theologica.  However,  Cardinal  Billot 
and  others  still  contend  for  dispositive  causality,  but  under  a 
different  name.  They  call  it  intentional  causality.  The  sys¬ 
tem  of  perfective  physical  causality  is  also  defended  by  many 
Jesuit  theologians,  as  Suarez,  Bellarmine,  Gregory  de  Valen- 
tia,  and  Sylvester  Maurus. 

The  third  system  advocates  what  is  usually  termed  occa¬ 
sional  causality.  The  name  is  taken  from  the  fact  that  the 
sacraments  are  regarded  as  occasional  conditions  on  which 
the  bestowal  of  grace  has  been  made  dependent  by  the  divine 
will.  The  power  of  God  is  said  to  operate  in  the  sacramental 
rite,  but  in  such  a  way  that  the  rite  itself  does  not  instrumen- 
tally  contribute  to  the  conferring  of  grace.  Hence  the  sac¬ 
raments  are  not  really  causes  of  the  grace  bestowed.  This 
view  of  sacramental  causality  is  usually  attributed  to  St.  Bona- 
venture,  Scotus,  and  many  of  their  early  followers.  Modern 
Scotists  for  the  most  part  subscribe,  though  with  some  reserva¬ 
tions,  to  the  fourth  system,  which  is  known  in  the  schools  by 
the  name  of  moral  causality.  In  this  system  the  sacraments 
are  considered  to  be  only  mediate  causes  of  grace.  Their 
causality  is  conceived  to  consist  in  the  fact  that  they  are 
morally  the  actions  of  Christ,  and  as  such  have  the  inherent 
power  of  infallibly  moving  God  to  bestow  grace  upon  the 
worthy  recipient.  The  system  is  defended  by  the  greater  num¬ 
ber  of  Jesuit  theologians,  and  also  by  some  of  the  older 
Thomists.  The  term,  moral  causality,  as  here  used  seems  to 
have  been  introduced  by  Melchoir  Cano. 

In  regard  to  the  second  point  mentioned  above,  the  compo¬ 
sition  of  the  sacramental  sign,  it  need  only  be  stated  that  there 
is  a  difference  of  opinion  among  theologians  as  to  whether  all 
the  sacraments  are  intrinsically  and  essentially  made  up  of 
things  and  words,  or  matter  and  form.  Many  agree  with  Sco¬ 
tus  that  penance  does  not  include  matter  as  an  essential  part, 


502 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


and  also  that  the  Eucharist  as  a  sacrament  does  not  include 
words  by  way  of  form.  In  regard  to  the  sacrament  of  orders 
there  is  quite  a  variety  of  opinions  as  to  what  parts  of  the  rite 
of  ordination  constitute  the  sacramental  sign.  Not  only  is  it 
a  disputed  question  whether  the  traditio  instrument ornm  forms 
an  essential  part,  but  also  what  particular  imposition  of  hands 
is  to  be  regarded  as  essential.  At  least  four  different  views 
are  held  by  theologians  of  note. 

The  immediate  institution  of  the  sacraments  by  Christ 
seems  to  be  implied  in  several  statements  made  by  the  Council 
of  Trent,  and  hence  it  is  commonly  admitted  by  theologians. 
But  when  there  is  question  of  the  exact  meaning  of  the  term, 
opinions  begin  to  differ.  Some  hold  that  Christ  designated  all 
the  sacramental  rites  in  specie,  as  He  did  that  of  baptism  and 
the  Eucharist;  while  others  contend  that  in  regard  to  five  sac¬ 
raments  He  indicated  only  in  a  general  way  what  external  signs 
should  be  used.  This  latter  view  is  rapidly  gaining  ground, 
as  it  lends  itself  more  readily  to  the  solution  of  historical  diffi¬ 
culties.  If  not  pushed  too  far,  it  seems  to  be  perfectly  safe. 

On  the  nature  of  the  sacramental  character  there  are  two 
different  views,  each  one  of  which  is  defended  by  a  large  num¬ 
ber  of  theologians.  Most  Thomists  consider  the  character  to 
be  a  physical  potency,  which  has  regard  to  the  due  administra¬ 
tion  or  reception  of  the  sacraments.  This  view  was  also  taken 
by  St.  Thomas.  Outside  the  Thomistic  school  of  theology  the 
sacramental  character  is  quite  generally  held  to  be  a  habitus, 
a  spiritual  quality  which  consecrates  the  soul  and  assimilates 
it  to  Jesus  Christ.  It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  the  funda¬ 
mental  ideas  contained  in  these  two  views  are  accepted  by  indi¬ 
vidual  theologians  with  various  modifications,  so  that  there  is 
quite  a  variety  of  opinions  on  the  matter.  Besides,  during  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  the  view  of  Durandus, 
that  the  character  is  nothing  but  a  relation,  came  again  into 
vogue.  This,  however,  is  generally  regarded  as  out  of  har¬ 
mony  with  the  teaching  of  the  Council  of  Trent. 

(f)  The  Eucharistic  Sacrifice. —  That  the  Mass  is  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  term  a  sacrificial  rite,  and  that  both  victim 
and  priest  are  the  same  as  in  the  sacrifice  of  the  cross,  is  a 


SCHOOL  DIFFERENCES 


503 


matter  of  faith  and  taught  as  such  by  all  theologians.  But  in 
what  particular  part  of  the  Mass  the  sacrifice  consists,  and 
what  is  the  formal  reason  of  the  Eucharistic  sacrifice,  are  ques¬ 
tions  in  regard  to  which  theological  opinions  are  very  much  at 
variance.  Some  answer  the  first  question  by  saying  that  the 
essence  of  the  sacrifice  consists  in  the  oblation  that  follows  the 
consecration,  others  contend  that  it  is  found  in  the  communion 
of  the  celebrating  priest,  others  hold  that  both  consecration 
and  communion  are  essential  parts,  while  very  many  maintain 
that  the  consecration  alone  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  sac¬ 
rifice.  At  the  present  time  this  last  view  is  the  more  common, 
and  is  usually  regarded  as  certain. 

There  is  a  similar  variety  of  opinions  as  regards  the  formal 
reason  of  the  sacrifice.  What  is  it  that  makes  the  Eucharistic 
rite  a  true  sacrifice?  Suarez  and  others  answer  that  it  is  the 
destruction  of  the  bread  and  wine  and  the  positing  in  place 
thereof  of  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ  as  peculiarly  pleasing 
to  God.  Others  hold  with  Lessius  that  the  Mass  is  a  sacrifice 
because  the  words  of  consecration  tend  to  bring  about  the 
actual  separation  of  Christ’s  body  and  blood,  and  the  realiza¬ 
tion  of  this  tendency  is  impeded  only  by  the  present  impassible 
state  of  the  Savior.  De  Lugo,  whose  view  is  accepted  by 
many  modern  theologians,  sees  the  specific  reason  of  the  Eu¬ 
charistic  sacrifice  in  the  fact  that  Christ  is  placed  illocally 
under  the  species  of  bread  and  wine,  and  is  thus  deprived  of 
the  connatural  functions  of  His  humanity,  becoming  present 
in  the  condition  of  food  and  drink.  Again,  very  many  hold 
with  Cardinal  Billot,  that  by  reason  of  the  separate  consecra¬ 
tion  of  bread  and  wine  Christ  is  mystically  immolated  in  specie 
sacramenti  as  He  was  once  really  immolated  in  His  natural 
body.  Beside  these  views  there  are  many  others,  but  they 
contribute  little  towards  clearing  up  the  mystery. 

Some  of  the  remaining  theological  differences,  which  are 
almost  innumerable,  will  be  briefly  touched  upon  in  the  follow¬ 
ing  chapter.  Enough  has  been  said  to  make  the  reader  keenly 
conscious  of  two  facts:  First,  that  since  the  Council  of  Trent 
there  has  been  displayed  an  intense  activity  in  the  theological 
world;  secondly,  that  without  the  guidance  of  an  infallible 
Church,  religious  belief  can  find  no  security  anywhere. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 


HERETICAL  TENDENCIES 

Although  the  Council  of  Trent,  besides  defining  many 
points  of  doctrine,  also  afforded  much  help  to  theological  in¬ 
quirers  by  embodying  in  the  chapters  of  its  various  sessions 
timely  expositions  of  truths  still  open  for  discussion,  yet  it 
only  partially  succeeded  in  suppressing  such  heretical  tenden¬ 
cies  as  were  not  directly  affected  by  its  condemnation  of  Prot¬ 
estant  errors.  Men’s  minds  were  restless,  and  not  a  few  of 
those  who  still  remained  faithful  to  the  Church  allowed  the 
critical  attitude  of  the  sixteenth-century  innovators  to  influ¬ 
ence  their  views  and  judgments.  Hence  the  repeated  appear¬ 
ance  of  theological  opinions  that  called  for  censure  on  the  part 
of  the  Church;  hence,  too,  the  tenacity  with  which  writers 
clung  to  their  views  after  judgment  had  been  given  against 
them  by  the  teaching  authority  which  they  themselves  acknowl¬ 
edged  as  competent  to  decide  matters  of  faith.  The  following 
few  points  will  suffice  to  illustrate  the  tendencies  in  question. 

i.  Bains  and  Baianism . —  Michael  Baius  and  his  friend 
John  Hessels  were  both  connected  with  the  University  of  Lou¬ 
vain,  and  they  first  broached  their  untenable  views  during  the 
absence  of  Chancellor  Tapper,  who  had  been  sent  as  theologian 
to  the  Council  of  Trent.  On  his  return,  in  1552,  he  took 
immediate  steps  to  counteract  the  evil  influence  of  the  two 
innovators.  Through  the  intervention  of  Cardinal  Granvelle, 
archbishop  of  Mechlin,  Baius  and  Hessels  were  induced  to  dis¬ 
continue  the  spreading  of  opinions  that  could  apparently  not 
be  sustained.  They  remained  quiet  till  Tapper’s  death,  in 
1559,  but  after  that  they  began  the  discussion  anew.  Though 
ably  opposed  by  the  Jesuits  and  Franciscans,  they  carried  on 
an  active  propaganda  and  gained  many  adherents.  Then  the 

504 


HERETICAL  TENDENCIES 


505 


Franciscans  brought  the  matter  before  the  Sarbonne  of  Paris, 
with  the  result  that  eighteen  propositions  taken  from  the  writ¬ 
ings  of  Baius  and  Hessels  were  severely  censured.  As  this  did 
not  end  the  dispute,  Pope  Pius  IV  imposed  silence  on  both  par¬ 
ties.  A  few  years  later,  Baius  and  his  friend  were  sent  to  the 
Council  of  Trent  as  theologians  of  the  king  of  Spain. 

It  was  in  1566,  two  years  after  the  closing  of  the  Council, 
and  the  very  year  of  Hessel’s  death,  that  Baius  gathered  to¬ 
gether  the  various  tracts  he  and  his  friend  had  issued  from 
time  to  time,  and  published  them  under  the  title  Opuscula 
Omnia.  Shortly  after  their  appearance,  complaint  was  lodged 
with  the  Pope  that  they  contained  many  unsound  doctrines. 
In  consequence  of  this,  Pius  V,  on  October  1,  1567,  issued  the 
Bull  Ex  omnibus  aiHictionibus ,  which  condemned  seventy-nine 
propositions  defended  by  Baius,  but  did  not  mention  the  au¬ 
thor’s  name.  The  Bull  closes  with  the  sentence:  Quas  qui- 
dem  sententias  .  .  .  quamquam  nonnullae  aliquo  pacto  susti- 
neri  possent  *  in  rigore  et  proprio  verborum  sensu  ab  asserto- 
ribus  intent  o  **  haereticas  erroneas  suspect  as  .  .  .  damna- 
mus.  As  the  document  was  without  punctuation,  a  contro¬ 
versy  immediately  arose  about  the  comma  Pianum,  that  is, 
whether  a  comma  should  be  placed  at  *  or  at  **,  the  meaning 
of  the  sentence  being  obviously  quite  different  according  as  the 
one  or  the  other  position  were  chosen.  The  discussion 
dragged  on  for  a  number  of  years,  and  it  was  not  until  Greg¬ 
ory  XIII,  in  1579,  by  the  Bull  Provisionis  nostrae,  confirmed 
the  preceding  condemnation  that  Baius  finally  submitted. 

The  errors  of  Baius  have  a  bearing  upon  the  threefold  state 
of  man:  The  state  of  innocence,  of  fallen  nature,  and  of  re¬ 
deemed  nature.  The  following  is  a  brief  outline  of  them  as 
contained  in  his  writings. 

(a)  The  state  of  innocence,  in  which  our  first  parents  were 
placed,  was  not  supernatural  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term. 
For  the  various  gifts  from  which  that  state  resulted  were  due 
to  human  nature,  at  least  in  the  sense  that  without  them  man 
could  not  be  saved.  Destination  to  heaven,  the  inherent  power 
of  meriting,  freedom  from  concupiscence,  immunity  from  ig¬ 
norance,  preservation  from  suffering  and  death,  are  all  nor- 


5°6 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


mal  requirements  of  human  nature,  and  therefore  they  can¬ 
not  strictly  be  called  gratuitous  gifts  of  grace. 

(b)  Fallen  nature  was  not  only  deprived  of  sanctifying 
grace  and  the  various  gifts  connected  with  the  state  of  inno¬ 
cence,  but  was  vitiated  by  a  positive  evil  quality,  which  con¬ 
sists  in  concupiscence ;  and  this  concupiscence,  as  transmitted 
by  the  laws  of  heredity,  constitutes  original  sin.  Concu¬ 
piscence  is  a  sin  irrespective  of  its  relation  to  the  will  ;  hence, 
aside  from  the  redemption,  human  nature  is  incapable  of  doing 
good;  its  actions  are  necessarily  sinful.  Furthermore,  moral 
responsibility  does  not  require  that  the  agent  enjoy  freedom 
from  internal  determinism,  but  only  from  external  coercion. 
Hence,  in  the  state  of  fallen  nature,  man’s  will  is  not  really 
free. 

(c)  In  the  state  of  redeemed  nature,  the  gifts  of  primitive 
innocence  are  restored ;  and  as  they  are  no  longer  due  to  man 
because  of  the  fall,  they  must  now  be  regarded  as  gifts  of 
grace.  However,  they  are  supernatural  only  in  a  relative 
sense,  that  is,  as  referred  to  man's  present  unworthiness. 
Grace  does  not  elevate  human  nature  to  a  strictly  supernatural 
state;  its  office  and  purpose  is  to  keep  concupiscence  under 
control,  and  thus  enable  man  to  fulfill  the  law  and  perform 
moral  actions.  Hence  in  justification  there  is  no  interior  reno¬ 
vation,  but  only  a  canceling  of  liability  to  punishment.1 

These  views  of  Baius  are  evidently  irreconcilable  with  the 
teaching  of  the  Church  as  formulated  by  the  Council  of  Trent. 
For  in  its  decree  on  original  sin,  the  Council  quite  clearly  as¬ 
sumes  that  the  gift  of  primitive  justice  was  supernatural,  and 
that  original  sin  consists,  not  in  a  positive  deterioration  of 
human  nature,  but  in  the  forfeiture  of  purely  gratuitous  privi¬ 
leges.  Then,  in  the  decree  on  justification,  it  describes  the 
process  by  which  man  is  transferred  from  the  state  of  sin  to 
that  of  justice  as  an  interior  renovation  of  the  soul  by  means 
of  inherent  grace.2  Consequently,  the  condemnation  of  Bai- 
anism  by  Pius  V,  though  an  ex  cathedra  pronouncement,  does 
little  more  than  apply  the  principles  laid  down  at  Trent. 

1  Cfr.  Schwane,  VI,  239  sqq. ;  DB. 

1001  sqq. 


2  Cfr.  DB.  787  sqq.;  793  sqq. 


HERETICAL  TENDENCIES 


507 


2.  Jansenius  and  Jansenism. —  Cornelius  Jansen  was  born  in 
1585,  near  Leerdam,  Holland.  He  received  his  early  educa¬ 
tion  at  Utrecht,  and  then  studied  philosophy  and  theology  at 
Louvain.  During  his  theological  studies  he  came  under  the 
influence  of  Jacques  Janson,  who  was  deeply  imbued  with  the 
errors  of  Baius.  It  was  most  likely  owing  to  this  influence 
that  Jansenius  later  on  revived  Baianism  in  a  somewhat  modi¬ 
fied  form.  Whilst  studying  at  Louvain,  he  formed  a  close 
friendship  with  Jean  du  Verger  de  Hauranne,  through  whose 
recommendation  he  was  afterwards  appointed  director  of  the 
episcopal  college  at  Bayonne,  in  France.  There  the  two 
friends  devoted  about  twelve  years  to  a  close  study  of  the 
Fathers,  especially  of  St.  Augustine.  Then  Jansenius  re¬ 
turned  to  Louvain,  where  he  was  appointed  president  of  the 
new  college  de  Sainte-Pulcherie.  He  received  the  degree  of 
Doctor  of  Theology  in  1619,  and  then  taught  exegesis  with 
great  renown.  In  1636  he  was  consecrated  bishop  of  Ypres, 
where  he  died  two  years  later  in  sentiments  of  great  piety. 

He  is  the  author  of  many  works,  mostly  on  Holy  Scripture, 
all  of  which  were  published  after  his  death.  With  the  excep¬ 
tion  of  one,  they  are  all  perfectly  orthodox  in  doctrine.  This 
one  exception  is  a  work  in  three  volumes,  usually  cited  under 
the  title  Augustinus.  It  purports  to  be  a  faithful  exposition  of 
the  teaching  of  St.  Augustine  against  the  Pelagians  and  Semi- 
Pelagians.  Hence  the  full  title  is:  Cornelii  Jansenii,  Episcopi 
Yprensis,  Augustinus ,  seu  doctrina  S.  Augustini  de  humanae 
naturae  sanitate ,  aegritudine,  medicina,  adversus  Pelagianos 
et  Massilienses.  In  making  provisions  for  its  publication,  the 
author  is  said  to  have  declared :  “  If  the  Holy  See  wishes  any 

change,  I  am  an  obedient  son,  and  I  submit  to  that  Church  in 
which  I  have  lived  to  my  dying  hour.  This  is  my  last  wish.” 
Hence,  although  the  work  contains  grave  errors  against  the 
faith,  it  would  not  be  fair  to  accuse  Jansenius  of  formal  heresy. 

The  errors  of  Jansenius  are  fundamentally  the  same  as 
those  of  Baius.  He,  too,  looks  upon  the  primitive  state  of  our 
first  parents  as  devoid  of  strictly  supernatural  gifts,  in  as  much 
as  the  beatific  vision  is  the  necessary  end  of  human  nature. 
Consequently,  when  man  by  his  fall  into  sin  forfeited  the 


5°8 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


spiritual  endowments  that  fitted  him  for  the  attainment  of  his 
end,  he  was  deprived  of  what  belonged  to  his  natural  integrity. 
The  result  of  this  privation  is  the  utter  corruption  of  our 
nature,  which  shows  itself  chiefly  in  the  powerlessness  of  our 
will.  In  fact,  our  will  is  purely  passive,  and  is  irresistibly 
moved  to  good  or  evil  according  as  the  attraction  of  grace  or 
concupiscence  is  stronger.  Thus  the  will  always  acts  under 
the  pressure  of  internal  necessity;  but  this  necessity  is  con¬ 
ceived  to  be  compatible  with  freedom,  and  therefore  we  are 
morally  responsible  for  our  actions. 

This,  according  to  Jansenius,  represents  the  genuine  teach¬ 
ing  of  St.  Augustine,  whose  writings  against  the  Pelagians  he 
claimed  to  have  read  thirty  times.  The  book  was  received 
with  great  applause  in  the  Netherlands,  and  also  found  many 
admirers  in  France,  where  the  ground  had  been  prepared  by  the 
author’s  friend,  Verger  de  Hauranne.  At  the  same  time  it 
was  severely  attacked  by  Jesuit  theologians,  with  the  result 
that  Urban  VIII  forbade  its  circulation.  It  found  an  ardent 
defender  in  the  person  of  the  Sarbonnist  Antoine  Arnauld, 
whose  hatred  of  the  Jesuits  injected  a  great  deal  of  unneces¬ 
sary  bitterness  into  the  discussion.  In  1649,  at  the  instance  of 
the  Syndic  Cornet,  the  Sarbonne  took  up  the  matter,  and  the 
result  was  that  eighty-eight  bishops  demanded  the  condemna¬ 
tion  of  five  theses  taken  from  the  Augustinus.  They  wrote 
in  this  sense  to  the  Sovereign  Pontiff,  Innocent  X,  but  as 
eleven  other  bishops  asked  for  further  investigation,  a  commis¬ 
sion  of  five  cardinals  and  thirteen  consultors  was  appointed 
for  that  purpose.  The  examination  lasted  two  years,  and 
although  some  members  of  the  commission  were  in  favor  of 
Jansenius,  the  five  propositions  were  solemnly  condemned  in 
the  Bull  Cum  occasione,  May  31,  1653. 

The  condemned  propositions  read  as  follows :  — 

(a)  Some  of  God’s  commandments  are  impossible  to  just 
men  who  wish  and  strive  to  keep  them,  considering  the  powers 
they  actually  have ;  the  grace  by  which  these  precepts  may  be¬ 
come  possible  is  also  wanting  to  them. 

(b)  In  the  state  of  fallen  nature  no  one  ever  resists  interior 
grace. 


HERETICAL  TENDENCIES 


509 

(c)  In  order  to  merit  or  demerit,  in  the  state  of  fallen 
nature,  we  must  be  free  from  all  external  constraint,  but  not 
from  interior  necessity. 

(d)  The  Semi-Pelagians  admitted  the  necessity  of  interior 
preventing  grace  for  all  acts,  even  for  the  beginning  of  faith ; 
but  they  fell  into  heresy  in  pretending  that  this  grace  is  such 
that  man  may  either  follow  or  resist  it. 

(f)  It  is  Semi-Pelagian -to  say  that  Christ  died  or  shed  His 
blood  for  all  men.3 

The  first  four  of  these  propositions  are  absolutely  condemned 
as  heretical;  while  the  fifth  is  condemned  as  heretical  when 
taken  in  the  sense  that  Christ  died  only  for  the  predestined. 

The  condemnation  was  accepted  by  the  Jansenists  in  so  far 
as  the  doctrine  contained  in  the  five  propositions  came  in  ques¬ 
tion,  but  they  denied  that  these  propositions  represented  the 
genuine  teaching  of  Jansenius.  Innocent  X,  in  1656,  rejected 
the  distinction  thus  made  between  the  question  of  right  and 
fact,  and  so  did  Alexander  VII  a  year  later.  In  the  Bull  Ad 
sanctum  Beati  Petri  sedem,  of  October  16,  he  confirmed  the 
condemnation  pronounced  by  his  predecessor  in  these  terms: 
“We  declare  and  define  that  the  five  propositions  have  been 
drawn  from  the  book  of  Jansenius  entitled  Augustinus,  and 
that  they  have  been  condemned  in  the  sense  of  the  same  Jan¬ 
senius,  and  we  once  more  condemn  them  as  such.”  However, 
in  spite  of  this  clear  condemnation,  the  conflict  continued. 
Not  only  Arnauld,  Pascal,  and  the  religious  of  Port  Royal,  but 
several  bishops  also  refused  to  subscribe  the  formula  enjoined 
by  the  Constitution  Regiminis  Apostolici ,  of  February  15, 
1664.  The  more  moderate  of  the  French  Jansenists  then  took 
the  position  that  a  respectful  silence  was  all  that  could  be 
required  by  the  Holy  See.  This  view  was  finally  condemned 
by  Clement  XI,  who  on  July  16,  1705,  issued  the  Bull  Vineam 
Domini  Sabaoth.  After  that  the  opposition  in  France  broke 
down,  and  Port  Royal,  the  center  of  the  rebellion,  was  de¬ 
stroyed.4 

Meanwhile  the  followers  of  Jansenius  in  the  Netherlands 

3  Cfr.  DB.  1092  sqq.  Paquier,  Jansenisme,  etude  doctrin- 

4  Cfr.  Schwane,  VI,  383  sqq.;  al  d’apres  les  sources,  Paris,  1909. 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


5io 

prepared  the  way  for  a  schism.  In  1702,  the  Vicar  Apostolic 
Peter  Kodde  had  been  suspended  on  suspicion  of  Jansenis>tic 
leanings,  and  when  a  successor  was  nominated,  the  States- 
General  and  a  number  of  the  clergy  protested.  The  conflict 
lasted  till  1723,  when  the  Jansenisft  chapter  of  Utrecht  elected 
Cornelius  Steenoven  archbishop  of  that  see.  Some  years  later 
two  suffragan  bishoprics  were  established,  one  at  Haarlem  and 
the  other  at  Deventer.  As  Rome  refused  to  recognize  these 
appointments,  the  schism  became  permanent.  However,  even 
to-day,  the  Jansenist  party  in  Holland  counts  only  a  few  thou¬ 
sand  adherents.5 

3.  Paschase  Quesnel. —  Quesnel  was  at  first  a  member  of 
the  French  Oratory,  but  was  expelled  from  that  congregation 
for  his  Jansenistic  opinions  in  1684.  He  published  several 
editions  of  the  New  Testament,  with  comments  and  moral  re¬ 
flections.  The  last  edition,  in  four  large  volumes,  appeared 
in  1693,  under  the  title:  The  New  Testament  in  French  with 
Moral  Reflections  on  Each  Verse.  It  had  the  approbation  of 
Noailles,  bishop  of  Chalons,  and  was  very  favorably  received. 
However,  as  the  “  reflexions  ”  reproduced  the  teaching  of 
Jansenius  and  Baius  on  grace  and  the  salvific  will  of  God,  sev¬ 
eral  bishops  forbade  the  reading  of  the  book.  Noailles,  who 
had  meanwhile  been  created  cardinal  and  made  archbishop  of 
Paris,  found  himself  under  the  necessity  of  withdrawing  his 
approbation,  but  for  a  time  hesitated*  to  do  so.  Then  appeal 
was  made  to  Clement  XI,  who,  after  a- careful  examination  of 
the  book,  issued  the  Bull  Unigenitns,  in  which  io»i  propositions 
were  condemned.6 

As  several  of  the  condemned  propositions,  when  taken  apart 
from  the  context,  seemed  to  have  an  orthodox  sense,  Noailles 
and  eight  other  bishops  applied  to  Rome  for  explanations  be¬ 
fore  accepting  the  Bull.  Thereupon  a  lengthy  discussion  en¬ 
sued,  in  course  of  which  a  number  of  bishops,  and  hundreds 
of  clerics  and  religious  appealed  from  the  Pope  to  a  general 
council.  However,  the  Pope  remained  firm,  and  in  the  Bull 
Pastoralis  officii ,  of  1718,  excommunicated  the  appellants. 

5  Cfr.  Hergenrother,  VI,  359  sqq.  6  Cfr.  DB.  1351  sqq. 


HERETICAL  TENDENCIES 


5ii 

But  they  refused  to  submit,  and  it  was  not  until  Cardinal 
Noailles,  in  1728,  finally  accepted  the  Bull  Unigenitus ,  that  the 
conflict  gradually  came  to  an  end. 

4.  Gallicanism. — The  essence  of  Gallicanism  may  be  said 
to  consist  in  a  tendency  to  restrain  and  limit  the  Pope’s  author¬ 
ity  in  the  Church  in  favor  of  the  rights  of  bishops  and  of  the 
temporal  ruler.  This  tendency  manifested  itself  in  France 
for  the  first  time  at  the  beginning  of  the  fourteenth  century, 
during  the  conflict  between  Philip  the  Fair  and  Boniface  VIII. 
In  virtue  of  certain  privileges,  which  he  claimed  had  been 
granted  to  Charlemagne  and  his  successors,  the  king  main¬ 
tained  that  he  had  the  right  to  dispose  of  vacant  ecclesias¬ 
tical  benefices.  When  Boniface  refused  to  allow  this  claim, 
he,  with  the  consent  of  the  nobility  and  a  large  number  of  the 
clergy,  appealed  from  the  Pope  to  a  future  general  council, 
implying  thereby  the  superiority  of  the  council  to  the  Pope. 
Similar  ideas  were  introduced  into  the  schools  by  William 
Ockam,  John  of  Jandun,  and  Marsilius  of  Padua,  professors 
in  the  University  of  Paris.  Although  condemned  by  John 
XXII,  and  also  by  the  University  authorities,  they  persisted 
and  found  many  defenders.  At  the  time  when  the  Council  of 
Constance  opened,  Gallicanism  had  already  struck  deep  root 
in  the  minds  of  the  French  people  and  clergy,  and  the  action 
of  the  Council  in  a  manner  legitimatized  the  principles  in¬ 
volved.  It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  the  proceedings  of 
the  Council  in  this  matter  were  irregular  and  without  proper 
authority. 

Gallicanism  is  of  two  kinds:  Parliamentary  and  Episcopal. 
The  former  involves  the  tendency  to  augment  the  right  of  the 
State  to  the  prejudice  of  those  of  the  Church.  The  latter 
involves  a  similar  tendency  to  augment  the  ecclesiastical  au¬ 
thority  of  the  bishops  to  the  prejudice  of  those  of  the  Pope. 
Both  claim  to  be  a  defense  of  the  so-called  Liberties  of  the 
Gallican  Church. 

The  most  important  of  the  Liberties  defended  by  Parlia¬ 
mentary  Gallicanism  are  the  following :  The  kings  of  France 
have  the  right  to  assemble  councils  in  their  dominions,  and  to 
make  laws  and  regulations  touching  ecclesiastical  matters. 


512 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


The  Pope’s  legates  cannot  be  sent  into  France,  or  exercise  their 
powers  within  that  kingdom,  except  at  the  king’s  request  or 
with  his  consent.  Bishops,  even  when  commanded  by  the 
Pope,  cannot  go  out  of  the  kingdom  without  the  consent  of 
the  king.  The  royal  officers  cannot  be  excommunicated  for 
any  act  performed  in  the  discharge  of  their  official  duties. 
The  Pope  cannot  authorize  the  alienation  of  any  ecclesiastical 
landed  estate,  or  the  diminishing  of  any  foundations.  The 
Pope’s  Bulls  and  Letters  may  not  be  executed  without  the  Pa- 
reatis  of  the  king  or  his  officers.  He  cannot  issue  dispensa¬ 
tions  to  the  prejudice  of  the  laudable  customs  and  statutes  of 
cathedral  churches.  It  is  lawful  to  appeal  from  him  to  a 
future  council,  or  to  have  recourse  to  the  “  appeal  as  from  an 
abuse  ”  against  acts  of  the  ecclesiastical  power. —  Altogether, 
as  drawn  up  by  the  Jurisconsults  Guy  Coquille  and  Pierre 
Pithou,  there  were  eighty-three  of  these  “  Liberties,”  and  they 
practically  did  away  with  the  Pope’s  authority  in  France. 

Episcopal  Gallicanism,  which  had  found  expression  at  Con¬ 
stance  and  Basle,  grew  constantly  in  force  till  the  beginning  of 
the  sixteenth  century,  when  through  the  exertions  of  the 
League  against  the  Huguenots  there  was  a  brief  reaction.  It 
was  revived  after  the  assassination  of  Henry  IV  in  1610,  and 
through  the  activity  of  Edmond,  Richer,  syndic  of  the  Sar- 
bonne,  again  rapidly  gained  in  strength.  In  1663,  the  Sar- 
bonne  openly  declared  that  it  did  not  recognize  the  Pope’s 
superiority  to  a  general  council,  nor  his  infallibility  apart  from 
the  consent  of  the  Church.  Matters  came  to  a  crisis  some 
twenty  years  later,  when  Pope  Innocent  XI  resisted  the  pre¬ 
tensions  of  Louis  XIV  in  reference  to  the  regalia.  In  the 
General  Assembly  of  1682,  at  which  were  present  thirty-six 
prelates  and  thirty-four  deputies  of  the  second  order,  four  arti¬ 
cles  were  adopted  in  which  Episcopal  Gallicanism  found  its 
official  expression.  The  first,  however,  deals  only  with  tem¬ 
poral  matters.  They  were  drafted  by  Bossuet,  bishop  of 
Meaux.  In  substance  they  read  as  follows :  — 

(a)  St.  Peter  and  the  Popes,  his  successors,  and  the  Church 
itself  have  received  dominion  from  God  only  over  things  spirit¬ 
ual  and  such  as  concern  salvation,  and  not  over  things  tern- 


HERETICAL  TENDENCIES 


5i3 


poral  and  civil.  Hence  kings  and  sovereigns  are  not  by  God’s 
command  subject  to  any  ecclesiastical  dominion  in  things  tem¬ 
poral  ;  they  cannot  be  deposed,  whether  directly  or  indirectly, 
by  the  authority  of  the  rulers  of  the  Church;  their  subjects 
cannot  be  dispensed  from  that  submission  and  obedience  which 
they  owe  to  their  sovereign,  nor  can  they  be  absolved  from  the 
oath  of  allegiance. 

(b)  The  plenitude  of  authority  in  things  spiritual,  which 
belongs  to  the  Holy  See  and  the  successors  of  St.  Peter,  in  no 
wise  affects  the  permanence  and  immovable  strength  of  the 
decrees  of  the  Council  of  Constance  drawn  up  in  the  fourth 
and  fifth  sessions,  approved  by  the  Holy  See,  confirmed  by  the 
practice  of  the  whole  Church  and  the  Roman  Pontiff,  and  ob¬ 
served  in  all  ages  by  the  Gallican  Church.  That  Church  does 
not  countenance  the  opinion  of  those  who  cast  a  slur  on  those 
decrees,  or  who  lessen  their  force  by  saying  that  their  author¬ 
ity  is  not  well  established,  that  they  are  not  approved,  or  that 
they  apply  only  to  the  period  of  the  schism. 

(c)  The  exercise  of  the  Apostolic  authority  must  also  be 
regulated  in  accordance  with  the  canons  drawn  up  under  the 
guidance  of  the  Spirit  of  God,  and  consecrated  by  the  respect 
of  the  whole  world.  The  rules,  customs,  and  constitutions  re¬ 
ceived  within  the  kingdom  and  the  Gallican  Church  must  have 
their  force  and  their  effect,  and  the  usages  of  our  fathers 
must  remain  inviolable,  since  the  dignity  of  the  Apostolic  See 
itself  demands  that  the  laws  and  customs  established  with  the 
consent  of  that  august  see  and  of  the  Churches  be  constantly 
maintained. 

(d)  Although  the  Pope  has  the  chief  authority  in  questions 
of  faith,  and  his  decrees  apply  to  all  the  Churches,  and  to  each 
Church  in  particular,  yet  his  judgment  is  not  irreformable,  at 
least  pending  the  consent  of  the  Church.7 

A  few  days  later,  Louis  ordered  the  registration  of  the  arti¬ 
cles  in  all  the  schools  and  faculties  of  theology,  and  no  one 
could  be  admitted  to  a  degree  without  having  defended  the 
articles  in  one  of  his  theses.  Furthermore,  it  was  strictly  for- 


7  Cfr.  DB.  1322  sqq. 


5H 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


bidden  to  attack  them  in  writing.  Pope  Innocent  XI  took  a 
firm  stand  against  the  action  of  the  General  Assembly,  and  so 
did  his  successor  Alexander  VIII.  The  latter,  in  the  Consti¬ 
tution  Inter  multiplices,  of  August  4,  1690,  issued  a  strong 
condemnation  of  the  four  articles,  and  refused  to  confirm  any 
bishop  elected  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  contained 
therein.  Under  his  successor,  Innocent  XII,  some  kind  of 
an  understanding  was  reached,  and  thereafter  Gallicanism 
began  to  decline.  It  was,  however,  not  entirely  eradicated 
until  after  the  Vatican  Council.8 

5.  Febronianism. —  In  concept  and  purpose,  Febronianism  is 
a  politico-ecclesiastical  system  founded  on  a  denial  of  the  mon¬ 
archical  constitution  of  the  Church.  Its  author  was  Johann 
Nikolaus  von  Hontheim,  auxiliary  bishop  of  Trier,  who  wrote 
under  the  pseudonym  Justinus  Febronius.  He  had  studied  at 
Louvain  under  the  canonist  van  Espen,  through  whose  influ¬ 
ence  he  became  deeply  imbued  with  Gallican  principles.  How¬ 
ever,  in  the  development  of  these  principles,  he  went  far  be¬ 
yond  the  traditional  Gallicanism  which  his  master  had  intro¬ 
duced  into  the  Low  Countries.  In  working  out  his  system, 
he  seems  to  have  been  guided  by  the  thought  of  facilitating  the 
reconciliation  of  Protestant  bodies  with  the  Church.  At  least 
to  this  thought  he  gives  expression  in  the  title  under  which 
he  published  his  work,  which  reads:  Justini  Febronii  Juris 
consulti  de  Statu  Ecclesiae  et  legitima  potestate  Romani  Pontif- 
icis  singularis  ad  reuniendos  dissidentes  in  religione  christianos 
compositus.  The  work  appeared  first  in  1763,  and  in  a  short 
time  ran  through  several  editions.  Its  contents  may  be  briefly 
summarized  as  follows  :  — 

The  power  of  the  keys  was  entrusted  by  Christ  to  the  Church 
as  a  body,  but  in  such  a  way  that  it  should  be  exercised  through 
her  prelates.  Hence  the  power  is  possessed  by  the  Church,  and 
the  prelates  have  only  the  use  of  it  in  so  far  as  she  communi¬ 
cates  it  to  them  for  her  own  purposes.  The  first  place  among 
her  prelates  is  held  by  the  Pope,  but  even  he  is  subordinated 
to  the  Church  as  a  whole.  The  Roman  Primacy  does  not 


8  Ibid.  1326. 


HERETICAL  TENDENCIES 


5i5 


rest  on  the  authority  of  Christ,  but  on  that  of  Peter  and  the 
Church,  and  therefore  the  Church  has  power  to  attach  the 
primatial  dignity  to  any  other  church,  as  may  be  expedient 
under  given  circumstances.  As  head  of  the  Church,  it  is  in¬ 
cumbent  on  the  Pope  to  watch  over  her  welfare,  to  promul¬ 
gate  laws  in  her  name,  and  to  enforce  the  observance  of  the 
canons;  yet  he  has  no  real  power  of  jurisdiction.  He  merely 
uses  the  jurisdiction  that  belongs  to  the  Church  as  a  whole. 

Now,  in  course  of  time,  especially  through  the  influence  of 
the  False  Decretals  of  Pseudo-Isidore,  the  See  of  Rome  has 
acquired  a  far-reaching  authority,  to  which  it  has  no  right; 
of  this  it  must  be  deprived,  so  as  to  bring  back  the  condition 
of  things  that  obtained  during  the  first  eight  centuries.  Ac¬ 
cordingly,  such  questions  as  were  in  olden  times  left  to  the 
decision  of  provincial  synods  and  of  metropolitans,  but  are  now 
reserved  to  the  Holy  See,  must  no  longer  be  submitted  to  the 
judgment  of  the  Pope.  Hence  the  election  and  confirmation 
of  bishops,  their  transfer  and  removal,  the  establishment  of 
new  sees,  the  condemnation  of  heresies,  and  similar  matters  of 
local  interest,  lie  outside  the  scope  of  the  primatial  power. 
So,  too,  does  the  granting  of  benefices,  and  the  exemption  of 
religious  orders. 

Furthermore,  as  the  Pope  is  not  infallible,  he  cannot,  on 
his  own  authority,  give  any  decisions  on  matters  of  faith  that 
are  of  universal  obligation.  Nor  can  he  in  matters  of  disci¬ 
pline  legislate  for  the  whole  Church,  and  laws  once  properly 
promulgated  he  cannot  alter.  He  is  subordinate  to  a  general 
council,  and  hence  the  right  of  appeal  from  his  authority  to  a 
future  general  council  must  be  admitted.  He  has  neither  the 
exclusive  right  to  summon  a  general  council  nor  to  preside  at 
its  sessions.  Moreover,  the  decrees  of  general  councils  do  not 
need  the  ratification  of  the  Pope.  On  the  other  hand,  such 
decrees  are  not  binding  until  they  have  been  accepted  by  the 
whole  Church. 

Lastly,  although  the  Pope  is  to  a  certain  extent  entrusted 
with  the  care  of  the  whole  Church,  yet  in  the  exercise  of  his 
power  in  that  regard  he  is  not  wholly  independent  of  the 
State.  Catholic  sovereigns  ought  to  take  a  reasonable  interest 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


5l6 

in  the  welfare  of  the  Church  in  their  dominions,  and  for  this 
purpose,  according  to  the  need  there  may  be  of  it,  they  should 
avail  themselves  of  the  Reginm  Placet  as  regards  the  publica¬ 
tion  of  papal  decrees.  In  like  manner  they  should  refuse  obe¬ 
dience  to  the  Pope,  if  the  interests  of  the  national  Church  re¬ 
quire  it.  Subjects,  moreover,  must  have  the  right  to  appeal  to 
the  secular  authority  by  way  of  the  Apellatio  ab  abusu .9 

As  is  quite  evident  from  this  brief  summary,  the  real  object 
aimed  at  by  Febronius  was  nothing  less  than  the  establishment 
of  national  Churches  that  were  to  be  practically  independent 
of  the  Pope,  and  more  or  less  subject  to  the  State.  His  sys¬ 
tem  is  a  combination  of  Gallicanism  and  Csesarism,  and  as 
such  it  is  the  very  antithesis  of  the  Church  Catholic.  It  was 
reduced  to  practice  by  Joseph  II  of  Austria,  with  the  result 
that  in  his  dominions  the  Church  was  almost  ruined.  The 
book  was  formally  condemned  by  Clement  XIII,  in  1764,  but 
it  continued  to  be  widely  read  and  was  translated  into  German, 
French,  Spanish,  and  Portuguese.  Pius  VI,  in  1778,  induced 
the  author  to  retract  his  views ;  but  it  is  very  doubtful  whether 
the  retractation  was  sincere,  as  he  continued  to  write  in  de¬ 
fense  of  his  position.  At  all  events,  the  pernicious  effects  of 
his  work  were  not  checked,  and  many  Catholic  sovereigns 
eagerly  accepted  his  ideas  in  order  ,to  promote  their  own  inter¬ 
ests  at  the  expense  of  the  Church. 

6.  The  Synod  of  Pistoia. —  The  politico-ecclesiastical  sys¬ 
tem  of  Febronius,  tried  on  a  grand  scale  in  Austria  by  Em¬ 
peror  Joseph  II,  was  also  introduced  into  Italy  by  Joseph’s 
brother,  Grand  Duke  Leopold  of  Tuscany.  The  reform 
measures  to  be  enacted  were  outlined  in  two  instructions  sent 
to  the  bishops  in  Leopold’s  dominion,  and  it  was  made  incum¬ 
bent  upon  the  prelates  to  convene  synods  at  which  doctrinal, 
disciplinary,  and  liturgical  matters  were  to  be  discussed  and 
regulated.  The  bishops,  however,  proved  intractable,  the  only 
one  who  entirely  fell  in  with  Leopold’s  designs  being  Scipio 
de’  Ricci,  bishop  of  Pistoia  and  Prato.  He  convoked  a  synod 
on  July  31,  1786,  having  invited  thereto  many  canonists  and 

9  Cfr.  Schwane,  VI,  529  sqq. ;  DB.  1500  sqq. 


HERETICAL  TENDENCIES 


5i7 


theologians  who  were  noted  for  their  Gallican  and  Jansenistic 
tendencies.  The  synod  was  attended  by  246  members,  who 
for  the  most  part  were  strongly  in  sympathy  with  de’  Ricci’s 
designs.  Many  of  them  had  been  irregularly  intruded  from 
other  dioceses,  while  those  of  Ricci’s  priests  who  were  known 
for  their  orthodoxy  had  not  been  invited. 

As  might  have  been  expected  under  the  circumstances,  Leo¬ 
pold’s  ideas  were  fully  carried  out.  The  four  Gallican  articles 
were  adopted,  the  Pope  was  declared  to  be  merely  the  minis¬ 
terial  head  of  the  Church,  episcopal  powers  and  rights  were 
said  to  be  derived  immediately  from  Christ,  and  parish  priests, 
when  acting  in  conjunction  with  the  bishop,  were  held  to  be 
judges  of  the  faith.  Regarding  questions  of  strictly  doctrinal 
import,  such  as  the  primitive  condition  of  man,  the  nature 
and  action  of  grace,  the  administration  of  the  sacraments,  the 
sacrifice  of  the  Mass,  indulgences,  the  veneration  of  images, 
and  the  practice  of  the  Sacred  Heart  devotion,  strongly  Jan¬ 
senistic  views  prevailed.  The  Synod  closed  on  September  28, 
and  in  February  of  the  following  year  its  proceedings  were 
published  with  the  royal  imprimatur.  After  a  careful  exam¬ 
ination  of  the  Pistoian  enactments  by  a  commission  of  car¬ 
dinals  and  bishops,  Pius  VI  condemned  eighty-five  proposi¬ 
tions,  in  the  Bull  Auctorem  fidei  of  August  28,  1794.  Mean¬ 
while,  on  the  accession  of  Leopold  to  the  imperial  throne,  de’ 
Ricci  had  been  compelled  to  resign  his  see.  With  his  retire¬ 
ment  and  the  papal  condemnation  of  the  Synod,  Jansenistic 
influence  in  Italy  came  to  an  end.10 

7.  Rationalism. —  From  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  cen¬ 
tum  forward  there  was  a  decided  turning  away  of  men’s 
minds  from  the  supernatural,  with  the  result  that  many,  espe¬ 
cially  among  the  upper  classes  of  society,  gave  up  all  belief  in 
revealed  religion.  Naturalism,  deism,  and  rationalism  were 
substituted  for  the  teaching  of  Christianity,  and  intellectual 
Europe  seemed  to  be  drifting  back  into  paganism.  This  con¬ 
dition  of  things  obtained  mostly  among  non-Catholics,  but 
traces  of  it  were  found  also  in  Catholic  circles.  And  in  not 


10  Cfr.  DB.  1501  sqq. 


5i8 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


a  few  instances,  well  intentioned  men  only  aggravated  the 
evil  by  their  misdirected  efforts  to  counteract  it.  The  most 
distinguished  of  these  men  were  Hermes,  Guenther,  Bonnety, 
and  Bautain.  Both  philosophical  and  theological  learning 
were  at  a  low  ebb,  Scholasticism  had  again  fallen  into  disre¬ 
pute,  and  in  their  endeavor  to  strike  out  into  new  directions 
they  went  considerably  astray. 

Hermes,  for  ten  years  processor  of  dogmatic  theology  at 
Bonn,  was  strongly  influenced  by  the  teaching  of  Kant  and 
Fichte,  although  he  professedly  opposed  their  systems  of 
thought.  At  the  same  time  he  followed  Descartes  in  making 
“  methodical  doubt  ”  the  starting  point  of  all  certitude.  In 
fact,  he  goes  even  a  step  farther  and  asserts  that  one  must 
positively  doubt  everything  until  reason  finds  something  that 
admits  of  no  doubt.  And  this  holds  true  in  theology  as  well 
as  in  philosophy.  Hence  faith  no  less  than  science  rests  upon 
the  demonstrations  of  reason.  In  this,  however,  he  distin¬ 
guishes  between  practical  and  theoretical  reason.  The  former 
accepts  revelation  because  it  is  compelled  to  do  so  by  man’s 
moral  needs;  while  the  latter  yields  only  to  the  evidence  of  a 
demonstrated  truth. 

The  author  developed  his  system  in  two  works,  entitled  re¬ 
spectively,  Introduction  to  Philosophy ,  and,  Introduction  to 
Theology,  and  then  applied  it  in  his  Dogmatik.  He  had  many 
followers,  and,  protected  by  the  Prussian  government  and  his 
own  ar'chbishop,  he  was  left  unmolested  during  his  life  time; 
but  some  years  after  his  death  a  commission  was  appointed  by 
the  Pope  to  investigate  the  charge  of  unorthodoxy  lodged 
aga-inst  him  at  Rome.  The  commission  found  the  charge  only 
too  true,  and  in  consequence  Gregory  XVI,  in  a  Brief  of  Sep¬ 
tember  26,  1835,  condemned  the  theological  teaching  of 
Hermes  as  “  false,  rash,  captious,  leading  to  skepticism  and 
indifferentism,  erroneous,  scandalous,  harmful  to  Catholic 
schools,  subversive  of  divine  faith,  savoring  of  heresy  and 
already  condemned  by  the  Church.”  The  chief  errors  of 
Hermes  designated  by  the  papal  Brief  bear  on  the  nature  and 
rule  of  faith;  on  Holy  Scripture  and  tradition,  revelation,  and 
the  teaching  office  of  the  Church;  the  motives  of  credibility, 


HERETICAL  TENDENCIES 


519 


the  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God,  and  the  doctrines  concern¬ 
ing  the  nature  of  the  holiness,  justice,  and  freedom  of  God, 
and  His  ultimate  purpose  in  His  works  ad  extra;  on  the  neces¬ 
sity  of  grace  and  its  bestowal;  on  the  reward  and  punishment 
of  men;  on  the  primitive  state  of  our  first  parents;  on  original 
sin  and  on  the  powers  of  man  in  the  fallen  state.11 

Similar  lines  of  thought  were  followed  by  Anton  Guenther, 
a  private  ecclesiastic  residing  at  Vienna,  who  from  1818  until 
the  condemnation  of  his  works  in  1857,  displayed  a  ceaseless 
literary  activity.  His  constant  aim  was  to  refute  the  panthe¬ 
ism  of  modern  philosophy,  and  to  demonstrate  from  the  stand¬ 
point  of  natural  reason  the  truth  of  positive  Christianity. 
The  better  to1  accomplish  this,  he  departed  from  the  beaten  path 
of  Scholasticism  and  endeavored  to  construct  an  entirely  new 
system  of  Christian  philosophy.  Unfortunately,  he  allowed 
himself  to  be  unduly  influenced  by  the  methods  of  Hegel  and 
Schelling,  whose  philosophy  he  tried  to  refute.  His  views, 
however,  were  widely  adopted  by  Catholic  scholars  in  Ger¬ 
many,  although  their  unsoundness  was  clearly  pointed  out  by 
men  of  recognized  ability  and  learning. 

In  1852,  the  Congregation  of  the  Index  began  an  official 
investigation  of  Guenther’s  writings,  and  five  years  later 
placed  them  on  the  list  of  forbidden  books.  This  condemna¬ 
tion  was  approved  by  Pius  IX,  who,  on  June  15,  1857,  ad¬ 
dressed  a  Brief  to  Cardinal  von  Geissel,  archbishop  of  Co¬ 
logne,  in  which  he  pointed  out  some  of  the  more  serious  of 
Guenther’s  errors.  Aside  from  the  fundamental  rationalism 
which  vitiates  the  author’s  philosophy,  these  errors  bear  espe¬ 
cially  on  the  Trinity,  the  person  of  Christ,  the  nature  of  man, 
creation,  and  particularly  on  the  relation  of  faith  to  knowl¬ 
edge.  Guenther  himself  submitted  to  the  judgment  passed  on 
his  works,  and  discontinued  writing;  but  some  of  his  follow¬ 
ers  kept  up  an  active  propaganda  for  his  views  until  after  the 
Vatican  Council.12 

An  altogether  opposite  tendency,  by  way  of  reaction  against 
rationalism,  manifested  itself  in  France,  where  Bautain  and 


11  Cfr.  DB.  1618  sqq. 


12  Cfr.  DB.  1655  sqq. 


520 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


Bonnety  labored  for  the  establishment  of  traditionalism. 
They  built  on  the  philosophical  concepts  of  Bonald  and  F.  de 
Lamennais,  according  to  which  human  reason  is  of  itself  radi¬ 
cally  unable  to  know  with  certainty  the  fundamental  truths  of 
the  metaphysical,  moral,  and  religious  order.  Hence  all 
knowledge  must  ultimately  be  traced  back  to  revelation,  and 
only  by  the  transmission  of  revealed  truths  is  the  human  mind 
put  into  the  possession  of  such  first  principles  as  it  needs  for 
its  proper  operation.  The  system  was  condemned  by  Rome 
in  so  far  as  the  authors  were  required  to  subscribe  a  number 
of  theses  in  which  the  priority  of  reason  to  faith,  the  demon- 
strability  of  the  existence  of  God,  of  the  spirituality  of  the 
soul,  of  human  liberty,  and  the  harmony  between  faith  and 
reason  were  asserted.13 

Besides  the  tendencies  thus  briefly  outlined,  there  were  many 
others,  in  all  the  various  fields  of  intellectual  activity,  that  ran 
more  or  less  counter  to  received  views  and  approved  teaching. 
Some  of  them,  like  the  quietistic  vagaries  of  Michael  de  Moli- 
nos,14  were  almost  entirely  confined  to  the  order  of  Christian 
morality;  others,  like  the  ontological  speculations  of  Gioberti 
and  Rosmini,15  bore  primarily  upon  philosophical  questions. 
Indirectly,  indeed,  they  also  touched  Christian  dogma,  but  they 
never  exerted  a  far-reaching  influence  in  that  direction. 


13  Cfr.  DB.  1622  sqq. ; 


1649  sqq. 


15  Cfr.  DB.  1659  sqq. 


CHAPTER  XXX 


SOME  PAPAL  DECISIONS:  THE  VATICAN  COUNCIL: 

MODERNISM 

Although  the  infallibility  of  the  Pope  had  not  yet  been 
defined,  in  practice  it  was  accepted  by  the  whole  Church.  It  is 
true,  the  Gallicans  made  it  dependent  on  the  assent  of  the 
episcopate,  but  they  were  only  a  small  faction  and  had  little 
influence  outside  of  France.  Hence  papal  decisions  in  mat¬ 
ters  of  faith  were  generally  regarded  as  final,  provided  it  was 
sufficiently  clear  that  the  Pope  intended  to  speak  in  his  capacity 
of  chief  shepherd  of  the  faithful.  In  the  lapse  of  centuries, 
many  such  decisions  issued  from  the  Holy  See,  as  is  quite  evi¬ 
dent  from  what  has  been  said  in  the  preceding  chapter.  Most 
of  them  have  been  referred  to  in  the  course  of  the  book,  but  a 
few  deserve  special  notice  in  this  place. 

A  —  Some  Papal  Decisions  1 

i.  The  Immaculate  Conception. —  The  most  important  of 
these  decisions  regard  the  doctrine  of  the  Immaculate  Concep¬ 
tion  of  the  Blessed  Virgin  Mary.  The  question  had  been  in 
dispute  for  centuries,  although  after  the  Council  of  Trent  there 
were  but  few  theologians  who  did  not  consider  it  rash  to  im¬ 
pugn  the  doctrine.  The  very  fact  that  the  Council  took  occa¬ 
sion  to  declare  that  it  was  in  no  wise  its  intention  to  include 
the  Blessed  Virgin  among  those  who  had  incurred  the  guilt  of 
original  sin,  and  that  it  renewed  “  the  constitutions  of  Pope 
Sixtus  IV,”  2  was  generally  considered  as  a  clear  indication 
that  the  Church  regarded  the  question  to  be  no  longer  open 
for  discussion.  The  constitutions  of  Sixtus  IV  referred  to  by 
the  Council  are  two  in  number.  One  was  issued  on  February 
28,  1476,  and  in  it  the  Pope  adopted  the  feast  for  the  entire 

1  Cfr.  Bachelet.  Immac.  Concept.;  2  Cfr.  DB.  792. 

Reiner,  Der  Syllabus. 


522 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


Latin  Church,  at  the  same  time  granting  an  indulgence  to  all 
who  would  assist  at  the  divine  offices  of  the  solemnity.3  The 
other  appeared  on  September  4,  1483,  and  was  intended  to  end 
the  dispute  between  the  opponents  of  the  doctrine  and  those 
who  were  in  favor  of  it.  Therein  also  excommunication  was 
pronounced  against  either  of  the  disputants  who'  charged  their 
adversaries  with  heresy.4 

After  the  Council  of  Trent,  the  doctrine  was  denied,  among 
others,  by  Baius,  who  explicitly  asserted  that  “  no  one  but 
Christ  was  without  original  sin,  and  that  therefore  the  Blessed 
Virgin  had  died  because  of  the  sin  contracted  in  Adam,  and 
had  endured  afflictions  in  this  life,  like  the  rest  of  the  just,  as 
a  punishment  of  actual  and  original  sin.”  5  This  proposition 
was  condemned  by  Pius  V,  as  already  noted  in  the  preceding 
chapter.  The  same  Pontiff,  moreover,  issued  a  Constitution 
in  which  he  forbade  all  public  discussion  of  the  subject,  and 
also  inserted  a  new  office  of  the  Immaculate  Conception  in  the 
liturgical  books.6  On  December  8,  1661,  Alexander  VII  pro¬ 
mulgated  the  Constitution  Solicitudo  omnium  Ecclesiarum,  in 
which  he  defined  the  true  sense  of  the  term  conceptio,  and  for¬ 
bade  all  further  discussion  in  any  way  opposed  to  the  common 
and  pious  sentiment  of  the  Church.  He  declared  it  to  be  the 
object  of  the  feast  that  Mary  was  preserved  immune  from  orig¬ 
inal  sin  in  the  first  moment  of  the  creation  of  her  soul  and  its 
infusion  into  the  body.7 

From  that  time  forward  the  definition  of  the  doctrine  was 
only  a  question  of  time.  Hence  when  Pius  IX,  soon  after 
his  elevation  to  the  pontifical  chair,  directed  the  bishops  of  the 
whole  world  to  send  in  a  report  both  as  to  their  own  views 
and  the  belief  of  the  faithful,  there  was  not  a  dissentient  voice 
as  regarded  the  truth  of  the  doctrine.  Furthermore,  only  four 
bishops  considered  the  definition  inopportune.  In  conse¬ 
quence,  on  December  8,  1854,  the  Pope  issued  the  Bull  Incffa- 
bilis,  in  which  the  truth  of  Mary’s  Immaculate  Conception  was 
defined  as  having  been  revealed  by  God.8 

3  Cfr.  Ibid.  734,  735. 

4  Ibid.  735. 

5  Ibid.  1073. 


6  Cfr.  Bullar.  Mar.  72  sqq. 

7  Cfr.  DB.  1100. 

8  Cfr.  DB.  1641. 


SOME  PAPAL  DECISIONS 


523 


2.  The  Syllabus  of  Pius  IX. —  On  December  8,  1864,  a  docu¬ 
ment  was  sent  to  all  Catholic  bishops  under  the  title :  “  A  Syl¬ 
labus  containing  the  most  important  errors  of  our  time,  which 
have  been  condemned  by  our  Holy  Father  Pius  IX  in  Allocu¬ 
tions,  at  Consistories,  in  Encyclicals,  and  other  Apostolic  Let¬ 
ters.”  The  document  was  accompanied  by  a  letter  of  Cardinal 
Antonelli,  Secretary  of  State,  explaining  the  purpose  of  the 
Syllabus.  As  there  was  danger,  the  letter  stated,  that  the 
various  papal  documents,  in  which  modern  errors  had  been 
condemned,  might  not  reach  each  and  every  bishop  of  the 
Catholic  world,  a  syllabus  of  these  same  errors  had  been 
drawn  up  for  the  proper  instruction  of  all  ordinaries,  so  that 
thereby  they  might  be  enabled  to  apply  necessary  remedies. 
At  the  same  time,  the  Bull  Quanta  cura ,  which  contains  an  ex¬ 
position  and  explicit  condemnation  of  the  more  fundamental 
modern  errors,  was  also  published. 

The  Syllabus  had  been  in  preparation  for  about  twelve 
years,  and  three  different  commissions  had  successively  labored 
at  its  composition.  Its  contents  are  divided  into  eighty  theses, 
the  wording  of  which  is  taken  from  the  official  declarations 
of  the  Pope.  To  each  thesis  a  reference  is  attached,  indicat¬ 
ing  the  particular  papal  document  from  which  it  was  taken. 
It  is  only  by  referring  to  the  documents  in  question  that  the 
full  meaning  and  theological  value  of  the  subjects  treated  can 
be  determined.  The  eighty  theses  are  grouped  in  ten  para¬ 
graphs,  the  respective  headings  of  which  are:  Pantheism,  Nat¬ 
uralism,  Absolute  Rationalism  (1-7);  Moderate  Rationalism 
(8-14) ;  Indifferentism  and  false  Religious  Tolerance  ( 15-18)  ; 
Socialism,  Communism,  Secret  Societies,  Bible  Societies,  Lib¬ 
eral  Clerical  Associations,  Errors  regarding  the  Church  and 
its  Rights  (19-38)  ;  Errors  on  the  State  and  its  Relation  to 
the  Church  (39-55) ;  Errors  on  Natural  and  Christian  Ethics 
(56-64)  ;  Errors  on  Christian  Marriage  (65-74)  ;  Errors  on 
the  Temporal  Power  of  the  Pope  (75,  76)  ;  Errors  in  Connec¬ 
tion  with  Modern  Liberalism  (77— 80). 9 


9  Cfr.  Ibid.  1700-1780. 


524 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


The  publication  of  the  Syllabus  caused  a  most  violent  out¬ 
cry  among  non-Catholics,  who  regarded  it  as  a  formal  rejec¬ 
tion  of  modern  culture  and  an  open  declaration  of  war  against 
the  rights  of  the  State.  On  the  other  hand,  Catholics  viewed 
it  with  great  satisfaction,  as  it  clearly  defined  the  position  of 
the  Church  in  regard  to  matters  of  the  gravest  practical  im¬ 
portance.  Its  binding  force  was  universally  and  gladly  ad¬ 
mitted,  although  lively  discussions  ensued  in  regard  to  its  exact 
theological  value.  In  fact  the  discussion  is  still  going  on, 
nor  is  it  likely  to  be  ever  set  completely  at  rest.  While  many 
theologians  contend  that  the  Syllabus  is  an  ex-cathedra  pro¬ 
nouncement,  and  therefore  final  and  irreformable,  others  seri¬ 
ously  question  this,  although  they  admit  that  it  commands  not 
only  exterior  submission  but  also  interior  assent.  Further¬ 
more,  all  are  agreed  that  many  propositions  contained  in  the 
Syllabus  have  been  condemned  by  final  and  irreformable  deci¬ 
sions  in  the  various  documents  from  which  they  were  taken. 
It  is,  therefore,  to  these  documents  that  one  must  have  re¬ 
course  in  order  to  determine  the  theological  censure  attached 
to  any  given  proposition. 

B  —  The  Vatican  Council  10 

On  December  6,  1864,  therefore  two  days  before  the  publi¬ 
cation  of  the  Syllabus,  Pope  Pius  IX,  at  a  meeting  of  the  Con¬ 
gregation  of  Rites,  announced  his  intention  of  convening  a 
general  council.  He  then  requested  the  cardinals  to  express 
their  opinion  in  writing,  both  as  to  the  opportuneness  of  carry¬ 
ing  out  his  intention  and  the  subjects  that  were  to  be  discussed. 
As,  with  one  exception,  the  reports  of  the  cardinals  favored 
the  holding  of  a  council,  a  commission  was  appointed  to  dis¬ 
cuss  preliminary  questions  and  make  all  necessary  prepara¬ 
tions.  At  its  suggestion,  a  number  of  bishops  of  both  rites 
were  also  requested  to  send  in  their  views  under  pledge  of 
silence.  Then  many  of  the  ablest  theologians  and  canonists 

^ 10  Cfr.  Granderath  und  Kirch,  gioues  sur  les  constitutions  du  con- 
Geschichte  des  vaticanischen  Kon-  cile  Vatican;  Gibbons,  A  Retrospect 
zils ;  Granderath,  Constitutiones  of  Fifty  Years,  vol.  I. 
dogmaticae;  Vacant,  Etudes  theolo- 


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525 


were  summoned  from  the  various  countries  to  cooperate  in 
the  work  of  preparing  the  subjects  to  be  debated  in  the  Coun¬ 
cil. 

The  first  public  announcement  of  the  contemplated  Council 
was  made  at  a  Consistory  held  on  June  26,  1867.  As  it  was 
the  centennial  celebration  of  the  Apostles  SS.  Peter  and  Paul, 
there  were  nearly  five  hundred  bishops  present  in  Rome,  and 
in  an  address,  dated  July  1,  they  communicated  their  joyous 
agreement  to  the  Sovereign  Pontiff.  The  Bull  of  Convoca¬ 
tion  was  issued  on  June  29,  1868,  and  it  appointed  December 
8,  1869,  as  the  date  on  which  the  Council  was  to  open.  A 
special  Brief,  Arcano  divinae  providentiae,  was  issued  on  Sep¬ 
tember  8,  1868,  to  invite  the  non-Uniate  Orientals;  while  an¬ 
other  Brief,  Jam  vos  omnes,  of  September  13,  notified  the  va¬ 
rious  Protestant  sects  of  the  approaching  Council,  and  ex¬ 
horted  them  to  reflect  on  the  possibility  of  returning  to  the 
true  faith. 

By  way  of  preparation,  five  special  committees,  each  pre¬ 
sided  over  by  a  cardinal,  had  been  appointed  to  prepare  the 
schemata  that  were  to  be  laid  before  the  Council.  Their  re¬ 
spective  work  bore  on  dogma,  Church  discipline,  religious  or¬ 
ders,  Oriental  Churches  and  missions,  and  ecclesiastico-political 
questions.  When  the  Council  opened,  the  following  drafts 
were  ready  for  discussion:  (a)  three  drafts  on  dogmatic  sub¬ 
jects,  namely,  on  Catholic  doctrine  in  opposition  to  the  errors 
of  rationalism,  on  the  Church  of  Christ,  and  on  Christian  mar¬ 
riage.  (b)  twenty-eight  drafts  treating  of  Church  discipline, 
in  respect  to  bishops,  episcopal  sees,  the  different  grades  of  the 
lower  clergy,  seminaries,  the  arrangement  of  philosophical  and 
theological  studies,  marriage,  Christian  morals,  etc.  (c) 
eighteen  drafts  of  decrees  on  religious  orders,  (d)  two 
drafts  in  reference  to  Oriental  Rites  and  missions.  Besides 
the  matter  thus  officially  prepared,  many  petitions  had  been  re¬ 
ceived  from  various  bishops,  asking  for  the  discussion  of  cer¬ 
tain  subjects  in  which  they  were  specially  interested.  Among 
these  were  nine  petitions,  signed  by  nearly,  two  hundred  bish¬ 
ops,  that  requested  the  definition  of  the  bodily  assumption  of 
the  Blessed  Virgin. 


526 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


On  December  2,  1869,  a  preliminary  session  was  held  in  the 
Sistine  Chapel,  at  which  the  officials  of  the  Council  were 
announced  and  the  conciliar  procedure  was  outlined.  The 
formal  opening  took  place  six  days  later,  December  8,  in  the 
northern  right  transept  of  St.  Peter’s.  Between  that  date  and 
September  1 ,  when  the  Council  was  prorogued,  four  public  ses¬ 
sions  and  eighty-nine  general  congregations  were  held.  The 
voting  in  the  congregations  was  by  placet,  placet  juxta  modum, 
non  placet.  In  the  public  sessions  it  was  by  placet  or  non 
placet,  according  as  the  vote  cast  was  affirmative  or  negative. 
The  decrees  promulgated  by  the  Pope  were  to  bear  the  title : 
Pius  E pise  opus,  sen’us  servorum  Dei:  sacro  approbante  Con- 
cilio  ad  perpetuam  rei  memoriam.  Altogether  774  prelates 
took  part  in  the  Council,  out  of  a  total  of  1050  who  were  en¬ 
titled  to  attend. 

Owing  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Franco-Prussian  war,  and  the 
subsequent  occupation  of  Rome  by  the  Piedmontese,  only  a 
small  part  of  the  contemplated  work  was  accomplished  by  the 
Council.  Two  Constitutions  were  promulgated,  both  rather 
brief,  but  of  great  importance.  The  first  is  the  dogmatic 
Constitution  on  the  Catholic  faith,  which  defends  the  funda¬ 
mental  principles  of  Christianity  against  the  errors  of  modern 
rationalism,  materialism,  and  atheism.  The  second  is  the 
dogmatic  Constitution  on  the  Church  of  Christ,  or,  as  it  is 
more  frequently  styled,  on  the  Roman  Pontiff.  This  latter 
contains  the  definition  of  papal  infallibility,  for  which  petitions 
had  been  sent  in  by  a  large  number  of  bishops.  Both  Constitu¬ 
tions  are  divided  into  preambles,  chapters,  and  canons. 

The  contents  of  the  first  Constitution  may  be  thus  sum¬ 
marized:  In  the  first  chapter  is  set  forth  the  doctrine  of  the 
existence  of  a  personal  God,  who  for  the  manifestation  of  His 
perfections  freely  created  all  things  out  of  nothing,  foresees 
all  things,  even  the  future  free  actions  of  rational  creatures, 
and  through  His  providence  leads  all  things  to  their  appointed 
end.  In  the  second  chapter  the  knowability  of  God  is  main¬ 
tained,  both  in  regard  to  natural  reason  and  supernatural  reve¬ 
lation.  The  necessity  and  existence  of  revelation  is  pointed 
out,  and  the  two  sources  of  revealed  knowledge,  Holy  Scrip- 


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527 


ture  and  tradition,  are  defended.  The  doctrine  here  set  forth 
is  a  restatement  of  the  teaching  of  Trent  The  third  chapter 
treats  of  supernatural  faith,  its  reasonableness,  supernatural 
character,  and  necessity;  the  possibility  and  actuality  of  mira¬ 
cles  as  a  confirmation  of  divine  revelation,  and  the  founding 
of  the  Catholic  Church  by  Jesus  Christ  as  the  guardian  and 
herald  of  revealed  truth. 

The  fourth  chapter  is  of  special  importance  in  these  modern 
times,  pointing  out  as  it  does  the  connection  between  faith  and 
reason.  The  mysteries  of  faith  are  indeed  above  reason,  but 
not  contrary  to  it.  On  the  other  hand,  any  assertion  that  con¬ 
tradicts  the  teaching  of  faith  is  by  that  very  fact  to  be  regarded 
as  false.  Faith  and  true  learning  are  never  in  opposition  to 
one  another,  but  each  supports  the  other  in  many  ways.  How¬ 
ever,  faith  is  not  like  a  philosophical  system  subject  to  intrin¬ 
sic  development ;  it  is  a  sacred  deposit  entrusted  to  the  Church 
for  safeguarding  and  infallible  interpretation.  Hence  the  in¬ 
terpretation  of  dogmas  given  by  the  Church  holds  good  for  all 
times,  and  no  deviation  from  it  under  pretense  of  more  pro¬ 
found  investigation  can  ever  be  lawful. —  The  Constitution 
closes  with  eighteen  canons,  in  which  heresies  opposed  to  its 
teaching  are  condemned. 

The  second  Constitution  has  the  following  contents:  In 
the  preamble  it  is  pointed  out  how  the  Roman  Primacy,  so 
essential  to  the  unity,  strength,  and  stability  of  the  Church, 
has  always  been  an  object  of  fierce  attacks  by  the  enemies  of 
the  Church  of  Christ.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  doctrine 
of  its  origin,  permanency,  and  nature  must  be  clearly  set  forth. 
Hence  the  first  chapter  establishes  the  fact  that  the  primacy 
was  given  to  Peter,  not  merely  of  honor  but  of  jurisdiction. 
This  is  followed  by  a  canon,  in  which  anathema  is  pronounced 
upon  those  who  teach  the  contrary  doctrine.  The  second 
chapter,  pointing  out  that  Peter  established  his  see  at  Rome, 
declares  that  his  successors  in  that  see  hold  the  primacy  in 
virtue  of  its  institution  by  Christ.  To  this,  again,  a  canon  is 
attached  in  which  the  contrary  doctrine  is  condemned. 

The  third  and  fourth  chapters  deal  more  directly  with  the 
nature  of  the  primacy,  and  the  powers  involved  therein. 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


528 

After  restating  and  confirming  the  definition  of  the  Council  of 
Florence,  the  third  chapter  explains  that  the  primacy  of  the 
Roman  Pontiff  implies  not  merely  precedence  of  honor,  but  a 
regularly  constituted  authority  over  all  other  Churches,  and  a 
true,  direct,  episcopal  power  of  jurisdiction,  which  the  clergy 
and  faithful  of  every  rite  and  rank  are  bound  to  obey.  How¬ 
ever,  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Pope  does  not  interfere  with  the 
jurisdiction  of  individual  bishops  in  their  own  dioceses,  but 
rather  strengthens  and  defends  the  same.  In  virtue  of  his  pri- 
matial  power,  the  Pope  has  the  right  of  direct  and  free  rela¬ 
tions  with  the  clergy  and  laity  of  the  entire  Church,  and  his 
decrees  are  in  no  wise  subject  to  the  placet  of  the  secular 
power.  The  Pope  is  the  supreme  judge  of  all  the  faithful, 
and  may  be  appealed  to  in  all  matters  that  come  up  for  adju¬ 
dication.  And  from  his  decisions  there  is  no  appeal,  even  to 
a  general  council.  Then  follows  the  condemnation  of  all  con¬ 
trary  teaching,  appended  in  form  of  a  canon. 

In  the  fourth  chapter  is  contained  the  definition  of  papal  in¬ 
fallibility.  First  the  historical  proofs  of  the  doctrine  are 
briefly  summarized,  both  as  derived  from  the  Sixth,  Four¬ 
teenth,  and  Seventeenth  General  Councils,  and  as  contained  in 
the  undisputed  use  of  the  prerogative  by  the  Roman  Pontiffs, 
and  the  constant  appeal  made  to  them  in  matters  of  faith. 
Thereupon  the  definition  is  given  in  the  following  terms : 
“  Faithfully  adhering,  therefore,  to  the  tradition  inherited 
from  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  faith,  we,  with  the  appro¬ 
bation  of  the  sacred  Council,  for  the  glory  of  God  our  Saviour, 
for  the  exaltation  of  the  Catholic  religion,  and  the  salvation  of 
Christian  peoples,  teach  and  define,  as  a  divinely  revealed 
dogma,  that  the  Roman  Pontiff,  when  he  speaks  ex  cathedra, 
that  is,  when  he,  in  the  exercise  of  his  office  as  shepherd  and 
teacher  of  all  Christians,  by  virtue  of  his  supreme  Apostolic 
authority,  decides  that  a  doctrine  concerning  faith  and  morals 
is  to  be  held  by  the  entire  Church,  possesses,  in  consequence  of 
the  divine  aid  promised  him  in  St.  Peter,  that  infallibility  with 
which  the  Divine  Saviour  wished  to  have  His  Church  endowed 
for  the  definition  of  doctrines  concerning  faith  and  morals; 
and  that  such  definitions  of  the  Roman  Pontiff  are  of  them- 


THE  VATICAN  COUNCIL 


529 


selves,  and  not  in  consequence  of  the  Church’s  consent,  irre- 
formable.”  In  the  canon  that  follows,  anathema  is  pro¬ 
nounced  upon  such  as  presume  to  contradict  the  definition  thus 
given.11 

Although  the  Council  accomplished  only  part  of  the  work 
it  had  set  out  to  do,  nevertheless  in  these  two  Constitutions 
most  important  results  were  achieved.  This  is  especially  true 
of  the  second,  which  finally  settled  a  question  that  had  from 
time  to  time  disturbed  men’s  minds  for  nearly  four  hundred 
years.  After  the  definition  of  the  Pope’s  primacy  of  jurisdic¬ 
tion  and  infallible  teaching  authority,  as  contained  in  the  Con¬ 
stitution  on  the  Church  of  Christ,  anything  like  Gallicanism 
and  Febronianism  is  simply  impossible.  Furthermore,  a  most 
effective  means  has  thereby  been  provided  to  meet  the  peculiar 
difficulties  of  modern  times,  which  often  necessitate  the  inter¬ 
vention  of  a  teaching  authority  whose  supremacy  is  universally 
acknowledged  as  contained  in  the  sacred  deposit  of  faith. 
Hence,  although  a  small  minority  of  the  assembled  bishops 
regarded  the  definition  of  papal  infallibility  as  inopportune, 
subsequent  events  have  made  it  quite  clear  that  nothing  more 
opportune  could  have  been  attempted. 

Much  of  the  work  that  had  been  prepared  for  the  Council, 
and  which  had  to  be  left  undone  on  account  of  the  political 
disturbances  that  arose,  was  subsequently  more  or  less  fully 
accomplished  by  the  prudent  zeal  of  the  Sovereign  Pontiffs. 
The  great  encyclicals  of  Leo  XIII  and  the  many  reform  meas¬ 
ures  of  Pius  X  may  be  regarded  as  carrying  out  what  the 
Vatican  Council  had  been  expected  to  do.  Hence,  even  if 
there  should  never  be  an  opportunity  of  reassembling  the 
Council,  its  object  may  still  be  fully  attained  with  the  passing 
of  years.  On  the  other  hand,  the  evil  results  which  some 
apprehended  and  predicted,  by  way  of  schism  and  increased 
hostility  of  the  sects,  proved  to  be  negligible  quantities.  A 
few  secessions  from  the  Church  there  were,  which  gave  rise 
to  the  Old  Catholic  party  in  Germany  and  Switzerland,  but 
they  were  mostly  of  men  whose  Catholicity  amounted  to  little 


11  Cfr.  DB.  1781-1840. 


530 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


more  than  the  name.  Nor  did  the  increased  hostility  of  Prot¬ 
estants  interfere  seriously  with  the  various  activities  of  the 
Church.  For  some  years  Catholicity  was  fiercely  assailed 
from  the  pulpit,  on  the  platform,  and  in  the  press ;  but  most  of 
that  hostility  has  disappeared  with  the  passing  of  time. 

C  —  Modernism  12 

Pius  X,  in  his  Encyclical  Pascendi,  of  September  8,  1907, 
designates  Modernism  as  a  synthesis  of  all  heresies.  And  this 
designation  is  perfectly  just,  in  as  much  as  the  tendencies  usu¬ 
ally  indicated  by  the  term  are  subversive  of  the  very  founda¬ 
tion  upon  which  Christianity  is  built.  Hence  Loisv,  its  high 
priest  and  apostle,  states  quite  frankly :  “  All  Catholic  the¬ 

ology,  even  in  its  fundamental  principles,  the  general  philoso¬ 
phy  of  religion,  divine  law,  and  the  laws  that  govern  our 
knowledge  of  God,  come  up  for  judgment  before  this  new 
court  of  assize.”  13  As  an  intellectual  tendency,  Modernism  is 
traceable  to  the  agnostic  philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
first  manifesting  itself  in  a  false  liberalism,  then  in  crude 
rationalism,  and  finally  in  theological  anarchism.  This  last 
phase  became  prominent  at  the  beginning  of  the  present  cen¬ 
tury. 

As  a  theological  movement,  Modernism  made  its  first  in¬ 
roads  into  France  and  Italy.  In  the  latter  country  it  spread 
so  rapidly  that  as  early  as  1905  it  was  recognized  as  an  immi¬ 
nent  danger  to  religion.  Hence  several  bishops  uttered  grave 
warnings  against  it  in  their  pastoral  letters.  About  the  same 
time  it  attracted  attention  in  France,  where  Abbe  Loisy,  for 
many  years  professor  at  the  Catholic  Institute  of  Paris,  had 
done  much  to  inoculate  the  younger  generations  of  the  clergy 
with  its  virus.  It  had  also  distinguished  representatives  in 
other  countries,  but  in  none  of  them  did  it  find  so  many  and 
such  devoted  followers  as  in  Italy  and  France. 

The  first  thorough  synthesis  of  Modernism  was  given  in 

12  Cfr.  Pesch,  Theologische  Zeit-  ernismo ;  Heiner,  Der  neue  Sylla- 
fragen,  4th  series ;  Rickaby,  The  bus  Pius  X. 

Modernist;  Vermeersch.  De  Mod-  13  Simples  reflexions,  p.  24. 


MODERNISM 


53i 


the  Encyclical  Pascendi ,  and  although  some  Modernistic 
writers  found  in  it  matter  for  criticism,  it  was  generally  ad¬ 
mitted  that  the  statements  contained  in  that  papal  document 
were  substantially  correct  The  doctrinal  decisions  touching 
the  tenets  of  Modernism  had  already  appeared  in  the  Decree 
Lamentabili  sane  exitn ,  which  was  issued  by  the  Holy  Office 
on  July  3,  1907.  This  Decree  was  ratified  by  Pius  X  on  the 
following  day,  and  ordered  to  be  published.  On  November 
18,  of  the  same  year,  the  Pope  published  a  Motu  Proprio,  in 
which  he  prohibited  the  defense  of  the  condemned  propositions 
under  the  penalty  of  excommunication,  reserved  to  himself. 

The  Decree  Lamentabili  is  usually  called  the  Syllabus  of 
Pius  X,  on  account  of  its  similarity  to  the  Syllabus  of  Pius  IX, 
issued  in  1864.  Its  contents  are  mainly  taken  from  the  writ¬ 
ings  of  Loisy,  and  the  condemned  propositions  are  substan¬ 
tially  as  follows.14 

(a)  The  Church’s  interpretation  of  Holy  Scripture,  and 
also  her  dogmatic  decisions,  are  subject  to  the  judgment  of 
scientific  scrutiny  and  do  not  demand  interior  assent;  nor  has 
the  law  of  the  Index  any  binding  force  (1-8). 

(b)  “  Excessive  simplicity  or  ignorance  is  shown  by  those 
who  believe  that  God  is  really  the  author  of  Holy  Scripture  ” 

(9)- 

(c)  Taking  the  term  in  the  Catholic  sense,  God  neither 
inspired  the  sacred  writers  nor  guarded  them  from  all  error; 
the  Gospels  in  particular  are  not  books  worthy  of  historic 
belief,  as  their  authors  have  consciously,  though  piously,  falsi¬ 
fied  facts  (10—19). 

(d)  Revelation  is  nothing  else  than  the  consciousness  ac¬ 
quired  by  man  of  his  relation  to  God,  and  did  not  close  with 
the  Apostles  (20,  21). 

(e)  “  The  dogmas,  which  the  Church  proposes  as  revealed, 
are  not  truths  fallen  from  heaven,  but  an  interpretation  of  re¬ 
ligious  facts,  acquired  by  the  human  mind  through  the  labori¬ 
ous  process  of  thought  ”  (22). 

(f)  One  and  the  same  fact  can  be  historically  false  and 


14  Cfr.  DB.  2001-2065. 


532 


POST-TRIDENTINE  THEOLOGY 


dogmatically  true;  faith  is  based  upon  a  number  of  probabili¬ 
ties  ;  dogmatic  definitions  have  only  a  passing  practical  value ; 
they  are  not  norms  of  belief  but  of  conduct  (23-26). 

(g)  The  divinity  of  Christ  is  a  dogma  which  Christian 
consciousness  deduced  from  its  idea  of  the  Messiah;  the  real 
historical  Christ  is  inferior  to  the  Christ  idealized  by  faith; 
Christ’s  knowledge  was  circumscribed,  and  He  even  fell  into 
error ;  His  resurrection  is  not  an  historical  event ;  his  vicarious 
death  is  a  Pauline  invention  (27-38). 

(h)  The  sacraments  were  not  instituted  by  Christ,  but  they 
originated  with  the  Apostles  and  their  successors,  who,  influ¬ 
enced  by  the  circumstances  of  their  time,  interpreted  Christ’s 
mind  in  that  sense  (39—51). 

(i)  The  thought  of  founding  a  Church  was  never  enter¬ 
tained  by  Christ;  the  Church  is  a  purely  human  society,  sub¬ 
ject  to  all  the  changes  of  time;  Peter  was  unaware  of  any 
primatial  rights  vested  in  himself;  the  Church  is  inimical  to 
scientific  progress  (52-57). 

(k)  “  Truth  is  as  changeable  as  man  himself,  because  it  is 
evolved  with  him,  in  him,  and  by  him  ”(58). 

(l)  There  are  no  immutable  Christian  dogmas,  because 
they  have  developed  and  must  develop  with  the  progress  of 
the  centuries  (59-63). 

(m)  “  Scientific  progress  demands  a  reform  of  the  Chris¬ 
tian  dogmatic  conception  of  God,  creation,  revelation,  the  per¬ 
son  of  the  Word  Incarnate,  and  the  redemption”  (64). 

(n)  “  The  Catholicism  of  to-day  is  irreconcilable  with  gen¬ 
uine  scientific  knowledge,  unless  it  be  transformed  into  a 
Christianity  without  dogmas,  that  is,  into  a  broad  and  liberal 
Protestantism”  (65). 

The  sixty-five  propositions  of  the  Syllabus,  summing  up  the 
teaching  of  Modernism,  are  all  condemned,  but  without  a  defi¬ 
nite  censure  attached  to  each.  That  many  of  them  are  openly 
heretical  is  admitted  by  all  theologians,  while  with  regard  to 
some  others  the  matter  is  not  clear.  Nor  have  theologians 
thus  far  been  able  to  pronounce  definitely  what  precise  dog¬ 
matic  value  should  be  attached  to  the  Syllabus.  Not  a  few 
contend  that  the  Decree  of  the  Holy  Office  is  infallible  and 


MODERNISM 


533 


irreformable  on  account  of  its  confirmation  by  the  Pope,  as 
the  sanction  of  excommunication  seems  to  evidence;  others, 
however,  maintain  that  this  inference  is  not  valid,  since,  in 
spite  of  the  papal  confirmation  and  sanction,  it  remains  simply 
the  doctrinal  decision  of  a  Roman  Congregation,  and  as  such 
it  need  not  be  absolutely  immune  from  error.  But  all  are 
agreed  that  it  binds  in  conscience,  and  that  no  Catholic  is  at 
liberty  to  defend  any  of  the  condemned  propositions. 

It  may  be  added  that  this  authoritative  condemnation 
sounded  the  death-knell  of  Modernism  within  the  ranks  of 
Catholics.  Those  who  had  been  deceived  by  the  specious  ar¬ 
guments  advanced  by  the  propagators  of  the  system,  without 
being  aware  of  its  real  nature,  turned  away  from  it  in  horror; 
while  others,  who  had  suffered  shipwreck  in  their  faith,  sev¬ 
ered  their  connection  with  the  Church.  Furthermore,  as  all 
candidates  for  higher  orders,  newly  appointed  confessors, 
preachers,  parish  priests,  canons,  the  beneficed  clergy,  the  offi¬ 
cials  of  the  Roman  congregations  or  tribunals,  superiors  and 
professors  in  religious  institutions,  are  obliged  to  take  an  oath 
which  binds  them  to  reject  and  oppose  Modernism,  a  remedy 
has  been  applied  to  the  evil  that  appears  to  make  its  revival 
impossible. 


CONCLUSION 


By  the  end  of  the  ninth  century,  as  was  stated  at  the  close 
of  the  first  volume  of  the  present  work,  the  Church’s  teaching 
on  God,  the  Trinity,  the  Incarnation,  original  sin,  grace,  some 
of  the  sacraments,  the  veneration  of  saints,  and  eschatology, 
was  more  or  less  fully  developed.  Yet  that  there  was  still 
room  for  further  development,  and  partly  even  with  regard 
to  these  doctrines,  is  sufficiently  clear  from  the  contents  of 
this  second  volume.  The  following  points  may  be  noted  by 
way  of  general  summary. 

In  reference  to  God,  the  Fourth  Lateran  Council  found  it 
expedient  to  bring  out  more  definitely  the  Church’s  teaching 
on  the  divine  attributes,  and  also  on  the  mystery  of  the  Blessed 
Trinity  —  the  unity  of  the  divine  nature,  the  distinction  of 
persons,  and  the  principles  of  the  immanent  processions  in  the 
Godhead. 

The  same  Council  defined  that  the  three  divine  persons  act 
as  one  principle  in  their  operations  ad  extra,  and  that  there  is 
only  one  Creator,  from  whom  all  finite  beings,  material,  spir¬ 
itual,  and  composite,  have  their  origin.  This  had  been  the 
common  belief  of  Christians  from  primitive  times,  but  it  had 
never  been  defined  by  the  Church.  The  same  doctrine  was 
restated  by  the  Vatican  Council,  which  also  defined  that  God 
created  the  world  freely  and  for  His  own  greater  glory. 

No  particular  aspect  of  either  Christology  or  soteriology 
was  made  the  object  of  a  special  definition ;  yet  there  was  prog¬ 
ress  along  both  lines  of  theological  inquiry,  occasioned  chiefly 
by  the  aberrations  of  Abelard  and  the  sixteenth-century  inno¬ 
vators.  The  condemnation  of  Christological  Nihilism  by 
Alexander  III  directed  the  attention  of  theologians  to  the  real 
nature  of  the  hypostatic  union ;  while  the  Church’s  opposition 

534 


CONCLUSION 


535 


to  Protestantism,  Baianism,  and  Jansenism  brought  out  more 
clearly  the  meaning  and  extent  of  the  redemption. 

Man’s  primitive  state,  his  fall,  the  existence  and  transmis¬ 
sion  of  original  sin,  and  to  some  extent  its  nature  also,  were 
discussed  and  defined  by  the  Council  of  Trent.  In  connection 
with  these  truths,  the  same  Council  defined  the  nature  of  justi¬ 
fication,  man’s  freedom  under  the  action  of  grace,  the  necessity 
of  grace  for  salutary  works,  and  the  uncertainty  of  final  per¬ 
severance.  These  definitions  were  restated  and  in  some  meas¬ 
ure  amplified  by  the  papal  decisions  against  Baius  and  Jan- 
senius. 

The  most  striking  development  took  place  in  the  doctrine 
on  the  sacraments,  which  was  almost  entirely  due  to  the  work 
of  the  thirteenth-century  Scholastics.  Nearly  all  of  their  con¬ 
clusions  were  sustained  by  the  Council  of  Trent,  which  also 
defined  the  number  of  the  sacraments,  their  institution  by 
Christ,  their  objective  connection  with  grace,  certain  condi¬ 
tions  for  their  valid  administration,  and  the  existence  of  a 
sacramental  character.  The  same  Council  also  restated  previ¬ 
ous  definitions  regarding  the  Real  Presence  and  the  nature  of 
the  Holy  Sacrifice. 

In  the  teaching  on  the  Church  it  was  particularly  the  au¬ 
thoritative  position  of  the  Roman  Pontiff  that  was  brought 
out  more  clearly  with  the  lapse  of  time.  His  universal  juris¬ 
diction  was  definitely  stated  by  the  Second  Council  of  Lyons, 
reaffirmed  by  that  of  Florence,  and,  together  with  his  official 
infallibility,  formally  defined  by  the  Council  of  the  Vatican. 
In  this  latter  Council  the  visibility  of  the  Church,  her  position 
in  the  economy  of  salvation,  and  the  four  notes  by  which  she 
may  be  recognized  as  the  Church  of  Christ,  were  also  set  forth 
and  affirmed. 

The  teaching  of  the  Church  on  indulgences  came  into  promi¬ 
nence  only  since  the  beginning  of  the  tenth  century,  and  then 
developed  steadily  till  it  was  defined  by  the  Council  of  Trent. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Council’s  definition  of  the  doctrine  on 
purgatory  was  merely  a  restatement  of  what  had  been  for  cen¬ 
turies  a  matter  of  faith.  The  same  is  true  of  its  teaching  on 
the  veneration  of  saints  and  of  images.  Mariology  was  con- 


536 


CONCLUSION 


siderably  developed  during  the  Middle  Ages,  but,  aside  from 
the  Immaculate  Conception,  no  point  of  doctrine  in  regard  to 
Mary’s  prerogatives  has  been  defined  since  the  Council  of 
Ephesus. 

Eschatology  did  not  advance  beyond  the  development  it 
had  received  by  the  end  of  the  Patristic  age,  although  the 
Fourth  Lateran  found  it  necessary  to  define  Catholic  teaching 
on  the  resurrection  and  eternal  retribution.  The  nature  of 
the  beatific  vision  was  definitely  stated  by  Benedict  XII  in  the 
Constitution  Benedictus  Dei ,  in  which  he  also  defined  the 
Church’s  teaching  on  the  resurrection,  the  general  judgment, 
and  the  immediate  bestowal  of  reward  or  infliction  of  punish¬ 
ment  according  to  each  one’s  deserts. 

The  sources  of  faith,  Holy  Scripture  and  tradition,  were 
made  the  object  of  a  formal  definition  by  the  Council  of  Trent, 
and  the  same  definition  was  restated  by  the  Council  of  the 
Vatican.  The  same  two  Councils  reaffirmed  the  traditional 
teaching  on  the  canon  of  Holy  Scripture,  declared  the  Church 
to  be  the  sole  authorized  interpreter  of  the  Sacred  Writings, 
and  explained  the  meaning  of  inspiration  in  the  sense  that  God 
Himself  is  to  be  accepted  as  the  author  of  the  Bible.  Finally, 
as  the  truths  of  both  reason  and  revelation  have  their  source 
in  the  same  God,  the  Vatican  Council  declared  that  there  can 
be  no  real  opposition  between  natural  and  supernatural  truths. 

Thus,  as  there  had  been  considerable  development  of  doc¬ 
trine  in  the  Patristic  age,  so  was  there  in  later  centuries ;  and 
so  will  there  be  in  the  centuries  to  come.  Very  much  is  still 
to  be  accomplished  —  especially  in  the  teaching  on  God’s 
knowledge,  on  predestination,  on  the  nature  of  grace,  on  the 
causality  of  the  sacraments,  and  on  many  other  subjects  — 
before  dogmatic  development  is  complete.  But  in  the  very 
nature  of  things,  complete  dogmatic  development  is  not  to  be 
looked  for  here  on  earth,  where  we  see  only  “  through  a  glass 
in  a  dark  manner.”  That  perfection  of  knowledge  shall  not 
be  ours  until  we  see  “  face  to  face,”  and  “  know  even  as  we 
are  known  ” ;  and  then  faith  will  have  merged  into  vision. 


INDEX 


Abelard :  position  in  the  schools, 
7;  compared  to  St.  Anselm,  7, 
8;  his  teaching  on  divine  omnipo¬ 
tence,  61 ;  the  Blessed  Trinity, 
85-87;  condemned  by  the  Council 
of  Soissons,  88;  his  error  on  cre¬ 
ation,  104;  on  the  freedom  of 
the  creative  act,  109;  his  Adop- 
tionism,  172,  173;  soteriological 
errors,  197;  Christ’s  descent  into 
hell,  212;  definition  of  a  sacra¬ 
ment,  273;  number  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments,  293. 

Adoptionism;  Spanish,  171 ;  Abe¬ 
lard’s,  172,  173;  of  Durandus,  175. 

Alanus  of  Lille:  works  of,  11;  his 
teaching  on  the  simplicity  of 
God,  40;  on  the  spirituality  of 
God,  46. 

Albertus  Magnus :  his  works,  16, 
17;  his  teaching  on  the  existence 
of  God,  34;  on  divine  knowledge, 
59 ;  predestination,  77,  78 ;  princi¬ 
ples  of  divine  processions,  90; 
on  the  perfection  of  the  world, 
104;  eternal  creation,  no;  con¬ 
servation,  1 12;  elevation  of  the 
angels,  115;  their  spirituality, 
1 18;  the  composition  of  the  hu¬ 
man  soul,  134,  135 ;  its  simplicity, 
134,  137;  original  justice,  146, 
147;  original  sin,  160;  human  per¬ 
sonality,  188;  merit  of  Christ, 
208;  supremacy  of  the  Pope,  222, 
223 ;  actual  and  sanctifying  grace, 
240,  241;  subject  of  faith,  259; 
material  object  of  faith,  260;  vir¬ 
tue  of  charity,  267 ;  sacramental 
character,  288 ;  institution  of  the 
sacraments,  296 ;  baptismal  rite, 
302;  institution  of  baptism,  304; 
Holy  Eucharist,  333 ;  virtue  of 
penance,  345 ;  indulgences,  376 ; 
form  of  extreme  unction,  389; 
extinction  of  the  fome’s  peccati 


in  Mary,  400;  the  Immaculate 
Conception,  407 ;  the  punishment 
of  hell,  428. 

Albigenses :  heretics,  442 ;  their 
teaching,  442,  443. 

Alcuin :  his  teaching  on  penance, 
340,  34i. 

Alexander  II,  Pope:  grants  a  plen¬ 
ary  indulgence,  368. 

Alexander  III,  Pope:  condemns 
Christological  Nihilism,  174;  in¬ 
tention  in  the  administration  of 
the  sacraments,  290;  number  of 
the  sacraments,  294. 

Alexander  VII,  Pope :  defends  the 
Immaculate  Conception,  522. 

Alexander  VIII,  Pope:  condemns 
Gallicanism,  514. 

Alexander  of  Hales:  his  works,  14; 
position  in  the  schools,  14,  15; 
contents  of  the  Summa,  15 ;  his 
teaching  on  the  existence  of  God, 
29;  on  divine  knowledge,  56,  59; 
on  predestination,  74,  75 ;  defini¬ 
tion  of  person,  88;  principles  of 
divine  processions,  91 ;  the  per¬ 
fection  of  the  world,  104;  in¬ 
strumental  cause  of  creation,  1073 
eternal  creation,  no;  conserva¬ 
tion,  1 12;  spirituality  of  the 
angels,  117;  original  justice,  143- 
145;  nature  of  original  sin,  158; 
transmission,  165,  166;  final  cause 
of  the  Incarnation,  181 ;  human 
personality,  185,  186;  the  grace 
of  union,  189,  190:  ecclesiology, 
216;  jurisdiction  of  bishops,  228; 
actual  and  sanctifying  grace,  238, 
239;  justification,  247,  248;  in¬ 
fused  virtues,  253-255 ;  classifica¬ 
tion  of  virtues,  256;  subject  of 
faith,  259;  material  object,  260; 
charity,  268 ;  causality  of  the  sac¬ 
raments,  279,  280 ;  sacramental 
character,  287 ;  necessity  of  inten- 


538 


INDEX 


tion,  291 ;  sacramentals,  293 ; 
institution  of  the  sacraments, 
295;  296;  of  baptism,  304;  of  con¬ 
firmation,  306;  transubstantiation, 
318;  the  form  of  consecration, 
329 ;  the  Eucharist  as  a  sacra¬ 
ment,  333 ;  as  a  sacrifice,  335 ;  vir¬ 
tue  of  penance,  348;  sacrament 
of  penance,  effects,  348;  indul¬ 
gences,  373-376;  extreme  unction, 
institution,  387;  effects,  392;  ex¬ 
tinction  of  the  fomes  peccati  in 
Mary,  400;  Immaculate  Concep¬ 
tion,  405,  408;  veneration  of  the 
Virgin,  416;  punishment  of  hell, 
428. 

Alger  of  Liege :  number  of  the 
sacraments,  293. 

Amalric  of  Bene :  on  the  simplicity 
of  God,  46;  his  pantheistic  views, 
441,  442. 

Angelology:  in  Patristic  writings, 
1 13;  creation  of  the  angels,  113, 
1 14;  elevation,  114-117;  the  an¬ 
gelic  nature,  117^121;  knowledge, 
121-124;  volition,  124,  125;  mu¬ 
tual  relation,  125-127 ;  ministry, 
127,  128. 

Anselm  of  Canterbury :  position  in 
the  schools,  6,  7 ;  compared  to 
Abelard,  7,  8 ;  his  ontological  ar¬ 
gument,  30;  his  teaching  on  the 
essence  of  God,  37 ;  simplicity, 
40;  spirituality,  46;  unicity,  47; 
infinity,  47;  immutability,  51;  im¬ 
mensity,  52 ;  on  predestination, 
72,  73;  refutes  the  Trinitarian 
errors  of  Roscelin,  86;  on  divine 
relations,  95;  original  justice,  142; 
nature  of  original  sin,  155— 157 ; 
transmission,  164,  165;  refutes  the 
Christological  errors  of  Roscelin, 
172;  his  soteriology,  198-200;  Im¬ 
maculate  Conception,  405. 

Anthropology:  man  the  image  of 
God,  129,  130 ;  production  of  the 
first  human  body,  130,  13 1 ;  crea¬ 
tion  of  individual  souls,  133, 
134;  identity  of  the  rational  and 
sensitive  soul,  131-133;  decision 
of  the  Council  of  Vienne,  140. 

Aristotle:  his  works  in  the  schools, 


12;  opposition  of  the  Church  to, 
12,  13 ;  his  authority,  13. 

Arles,  Council  of :  condemns  the 
predestinarian  teaching  of  Luci- 
dus,  67. 

Arnold  of  Brescia:  his  agitation 
against  the  temporal  power  of 
the  Pope,  441. 

Athanasian  Symbol :  on  the  eternity 
of  God,  50;  the  hypostatic  union, 
189. 

Augustine  of  Hippo :  his  authority 
in  the  schools,  5,  24;  his  teaching 
on  God’s  essence,  37;  knowledge, 
53 ;  predestination,  66,  67,  68 ;  di¬ 
vine  persons,  96;  original  justice, 
142;  original  sin,  155;  on  grace, 
234;  the  sacraments,  272,  273. 

Augustinianism :  origin  of,  494 ; 
theory  of  efficacious  grace,  494. 

Averroes :  his  errors  on  creation, 
105  ;  on  the  human  soul,  132;  the 
eternity  of  the  world,  109. 

Avicenna :  his  false  teaching  on 
creation,  105 ;  on  the  eternity  of 
the  world,  109. 

Baius,  Michael :  his  position  at 
Louvain,  504,  505 ;  his  condemned 
propositions,  505,  506. 

Banez,  Dominicus :  author  of  Neo- 
Thomism,  481 ;  opposes  Molina, 
489;  his  teaching  on  God’s  fore¬ 
knowledge,  490;  on  efficacious 
grace,  493,  494. 

Baptism:  definition  of,  298,  299; 
matter,  299;  form,  300-302;  ef¬ 
fects,  302  303 ;  institution,  304, 
305 ;  baptism  of  desire  and  of 
blood,  303,  304. 

Barberiis,  Bartholomew  de :  post- 
Tridentine  follower  of  St.  Bona- 
venture,  482. 

Basle,  Council  of :  convened  by 
Martin  V,  456;  defends  the  Im¬ 
maculate  Conception,  41 1. 

Becanus :  Jesuit  theologian,  484;  his 
teaching  on  the  scientia  media, 
489. 

Bede,  Venerable :  his  relation  to 
Scholasticism,  1,  2. 

Beghards:  mediaeval  heretics,  442; 


INDEX 


539 


their  error  on  the  beatific  vision, 
35  ;  their  teaching  condemned  by 
the  Council  of  Vienne,  453. 

Bellarmine,  Cardinal:  Jesuit  theo¬ 
logian,  483. 

Benedict  XII,  Pope:  defines  the 
nature  of  the  beatific  vision,  430, 
43B  434- 

Berengarius :  his  error  on  the  Eu¬ 
charist,  3 1 2-3 1 4. 

Bernard  of  Clairveaux :  opposed 
to  Abelard’s  influence  in  the 
schools,  8;  his  teaching  on  God’s 
essence,  37 ;  simplicity,  40,  41 ; 
spirituality,  46;  immutability,  51; 
omnipotence,  61 ;  refutes  the 
Trinitarian  error  of  Abelard,  88; 
on  divine  relations,  95;  opposes 
Abelard’s  teaching  on  creation, 
104;  on  the  redemption,  189;  his 
teaching  on  the  spirituality  of 
the  angels,  117;  sanctification  of 
the  Virgin,  397,  398;  Immaculate 
Conception,  404 ;  on  the  punish¬ 
ment  of  hell,  426. 

Bernard  of  Hotun:  defends  the 
teaching  of  St.  Thomas,  20. 

Billuart,  Rene :  Sarbonne  profes¬ 
sor,  484;  his  teaching  on  God’s 
foreknowledge,  491 ;  the  hyposta¬ 
tic  union,  497. 

Boethius :  his  definition  of  eternity, 
50 ;  defines  person,  88. 

Bonaventure :  his  writings,  15,  16; 
his  teaching  on  the  immediate 
knowledge  of  God,  34,  35 ;  divine 
knowledge,  58 ;  freedom  of  God, 
64 ;  predestination,  76,  77 ;  the 
Trinity,  85 ;  principles  of  divine 
processions,  90,  91 ;  divine  per¬ 
sons,  96 ;  circuminsession,  98 ; 
the  creative  act,  102,  103 ;  refutes 
the  Manichaean  error,  106;  in¬ 
strumental  cause  of  creation,  107; 
final  cause,  109;  eternal  creation, 
no;  conservation,  112;  elevation 
of  the  angels,  1 15  ;  their  spiritual¬ 
ity,  n  7;  knowledge,  121  ;  locu¬ 
tion,  127;  composition  of  the 
human  soul,  134,  135,  136;  orig¬ 
inal  justice,  145,  146;  nature  of 
original  sin,  159;  transmission, 


166,  167;  final  cause  of  the  In¬ 
carnation,  181 ;  assumption  of 
human  nature,  184,  185 ;  human 
personality,  185,  186;  the  hypo¬ 
static  union,  190;  adoration  of 
Christ’s  humanity,  192;  the  sote- 
riology  of  St.  Anselm,  201 ;  the 
moral  value  of  Christ’s  death, 
204,  205 ;  Christ’s  merit,  207 ;  the 
soul  of  Christ  after  death,  212; 
supremacy  of  the  Pope,  226,  227 ; 
infallibility,  227,  228;  jurisdiction 
of  bishops,  228;  actual  and  sanc¬ 
tifying  grace,  239,  240;  justifica¬ 
tion,  247,  248;  merit,  251;  in¬ 
fused  virtues  and  sanctifying 
grace,  255;  definition  of  faith, 
257 ,  258;  subject  of  faith,  259; 
material  object,  260,  261;  formal 
object,  261,  262;  certainty  of 

faith,  262,  263 ;  virtue  of  hope, 
263,  264;  material  object,  264; 
subject,  266;  virtue  of  charity, 
270;  causality  of  the  sacraments, 
277,  278;  sacramental  grace,  284; 
character,  288 ;  the  number  seven, 
295 ;  institution,  295,  296 ;  defini¬ 
tion  of  baptism,  299;  form,  301; 
baptismal  rite,  302;  institution  of 
baptism,  305 ;  of  confirmation, 
306;  minister,  307;  effects,  307, 
308 ;  the  heresy  of  Berengarius, 
315;  transubstantiation,  315,  316, 
318;  manner  of  Christ’s  presence, 
320,  321 ;  the  accidents,  324,  325, 
326;  the  form  of  consecration, 
328;  the  minister,  330,  331;  ef¬ 
fects,  334,  335 ;  the  virtue  of  pen¬ 
ance,  344,  345 ;  effects  of  penance, 
348,  349;  value  of  the  absolution, 
352;  contrition,  355;  indulgences, 
376;  holy  orders,  380;  one  sacra¬ 
ment,  382,  383 ;  the  episcopate, 
385 ;  rite  of  ordination,  385 ;  ex¬ 
treme  unction,  387 ;  the  matter, 
388;  form,  388;  subject,  391;  ef¬ 
fects,  391,  392;  anointings,  392, 
393  ;  matrimony,  393  ;  sanctifica¬ 
tion  of  the  Virgin,  397;  her  sin¬ 
lessness,  399;  the  extinction  of 
the  fomes  peccati,  400;  confirmed 
in  grace,  403;  Immaculate  Con- 


540 


INDEX 


ception,  405,  406;  divine  mother¬ 
hood,  412,  413 ;  conception  of 
Christ,  414;  veneration  of  the 
Virgin,  415,  416;  resurrection  of 
the  dead,  420;  general  judgment, 
423,  425;  punishment  of  hell,  426, 
428;  nature  of  beatific  vision,  431, 
432;  essence,  437;  Second  Coun¬ 
cil  of  Lyons,  451. 

Boniface  VIII,  Pope:  his  attitude 
towards  the  secular  power,  220, 
231,  232;  the  first  Jubilee,  369; 
conflict  with  Philip  the  Fair,  511. 

Brethren  of  the  Free  Spirit:  medi¬ 
aeval  heretics,  442. 

Buridan,  John:  his  relation  to 
Nominalism,  23. 

Cajetan,  Cardinal:  his  teaching  on 
sacramental  causality,  281 ;  the 
hypostatic  union,  497 ;  sent  as  le¬ 
gate  to  Germany,  462. 

Calvin :  his  teaching  on  God’s  abso¬ 
lute  power,  63 ;  on  original  sin, 
464;  free  will,  464;  the  sacra¬ 
ments,  265 ;  predestination,  265. 

Cano,  Melchior:  Neo-Scholastic 
theologian,  480 ;  opposed  to  the 
Jesuits,  480;  his  work  De  Locis 
Theologicis,  480. 

Carranza,  Bartholomew :  Neo-Scho¬ 
lastic  theologian,  480. 

Cathari :  mediaeval  heretics,  442 ; 
their  teaching,  442,  443 ;  con¬ 

demned  by  the  Third  Lateran 
Council,  105. 

Cavelli,  Hugh :  Scotist  theologian, 
481. 

Chalons,  Synod  of :  its  teaching  on 
penance,  339. 

Charity :  virtue  of,  267 ;  distin¬ 
guished  from  sanctifying  grace, 
267,  268;  subject  of,  268,  269; 
material  object,  269;  formal  ob¬ 
ject,  269. 

Charles  the  Bald :  his  relation  with 
Hincmar  of  Rheims,  71 ;  with 
Scotus  Erigena,  100. 

Christology:  in  Patristic  writings, 
171 ;  some  errors  on,  171,  172; 
teaching  of  the  Scholastics  on, 
175-195 ;  preliminary  questions, 


179-182;  the  person  assuming, 
182-185;  human  personality,  185- 
188;  hypostatic  union,  188-191; 
consectaria,  191-194;  post-Tri- 
dentine  Christology,  497,  498. 

Chrysostom,  John :  his  teaching  on 
the  essence  of  God,  36. 

Clement  VI,  Pope :  regulates  the 
Jubilee,  369;  explains  the  spirit¬ 
ual  treasury  of  the  Church,  378, 
379. 

Clement  VII,  Pope :  elected  in  op¬ 
position  to  Urban  VI,  454. 

Confirmation:  distinct  from  bap¬ 
tism,  305,  306 ;  matter  and  form 
of,  306;  institution,  307;  effects, 
307,  308 ;  necessity  of,  309. 

Comestor,  Peter :  on  transubstan- 
tiation,  317. 

Congruism:  origin  of,  495,  496;  on 
efficacious  grace,  496. 

Constance,  Council  of :  convoca¬ 
tion,  455 ;  its  views  on  papal  su¬ 
premacy,  455,  22 8;  doctrinal  de¬ 
cisions,  455,  456  ;  in  part  approved 
by  Martin  V,  456. 

Councils,  mediaeval :  general  char¬ 
acter,  447,  448 ;  Fourth  Lateran, 
448-450;  Second  of  Lyons,  450- 
452;  of  Vienne,  452-454;  of  Con¬ 
stance,  454-456;  of  Florence,  456, 
'  457 ;  of  Trent,  467-477. 

Creation :  in  Patristic  writings, 
100;  error  of  Scotus  Erigena, 
101 ;  the  creative  act,  101-105 ; 
efficient  cause  of  creation,  105- 
108;  exemplary  cause,  108;  final 
cause,  108,  109:  creation  in  time, 
109-m;  creation  and  conserva¬ 
tion,  hi,  112. 

Cyprian  of  Carthage:  on  relaxation 
of  penance,  363. 

D’Ailly,  Cardinal :  his  teaching  on 
the  Real  Presence,  317. 

David  of  Dinant :  his  pantheistic 
teaching,  441 ;  on  the  simplicity 
of  God,  461. 

De  la  Mare,  William :  opposed  to 
the  teaching  of  St.  Thomas,  20. 

Dictatus  Papae :  on  the  power  of 
the  Papacy  over  the  State,  231. 


INDEX 


54i 


Dionysius  the  Carthusian:  his 
teaching  on  the  simplicity  of 
God,  44;  the  elevation  of  the  an¬ 
gels,  1 15;  their  spirituality,  118. 

Duns  Scotus :  his  position  in  the 
schools,  21;  his  writings,  21,  22; 
his  teaching  on  the  existence  of 
God,  33 ;  God’s  infinite  perfec¬ 
tion,  36;  essence,  39;  simplicity, 
44 ;  the  distinctio  formalis ,  44,  45  ; 
unicity  of  God,  47;  infinity,  48; 
immutability,  51 ;  knowledge,  57, 
59,  60 ;  omnipotence,  62 ;  freedom 
of  the  divine  will,  63,  64;  predes¬ 
tination,  81,  82;  definition  of  per¬ 
son,  89;  principles  of  divine  pro¬ 
cessions,  91,  92,  93;  relations,  95  ; 
divine  persons,  97 ;  the  creative 
act,  103 ;  efficient  cause  of  crea¬ 
tion,  107;  instrumental  cause, 
107;  eternal  creation,  no;  con¬ 
servation,  1 12;  elevation  of  the 
angels,  1 15 ;  their  spirituality, 
1 17,  1 18;  relation  to  place,  121 ; 
knowledge,  123 ;  volition,  125 ; 
locution,  127 ;  man  the  image  of 
God,  130;  composition  of  the 
human  soul,  134,  136;  orignal 
justice,  152,  153;  nature  of  or¬ 
iginal  sin,  163,  164;  transmission, 
168,  169;  final  cause  of  the  In¬ 
carnation,  182 ;  human  personal¬ 
ity,  185,  186;  impeccability  of 
Christ,  193,  194;  adequacy  of  the 
satisfaction,  202;  the  moral  value 
of  the  Savior’s  death,  206; 
Christ’s  merit,  208;  infallibility 
of  the  Pope,  228 ;  actual  and 
sanctifying  grace,  245,  246;  jus¬ 
tification,  249;  subject  of  infused 
virtues,  254,  271 ;  material  object 
of  faith,  260 ;  formal,  262 ;  ma¬ 
terial  object  of  hope,  265;  sub¬ 
ject  of  hope,  266;  virtue  of  char¬ 
ity,  267;  matter  and  form  of  the 
sacraments,  275,  276;  causality, 
sacramental,  279;  character,  287, 
290;  institution  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments,  296 ;  of  baptism,  305  ;  bap¬ 
tism  of  desire,  303,  304;  effects  of 
confirmation,  308 ;  transubstanti- 
ation,  319,  320;  Eucharistic  acci¬ 


dents,  325 ;  form  of  consecration, 
328 ;  the  Eucharist  as  a  sacra¬ 
ment,  333 ;  as  a  sacrifice,  336 ; 
effects  of  penance,  348,  349;  pen¬ 
ance  as  a  sacrament,  349,  350; 
contrition,  356,  357;  satisfaction, 
359;  indulgences,  378;  holy  or¬ 
ders,  382;  effects  of  extreme  unc¬ 
tion,  392;  sacrament  of  matri- 
mony,  394 ;  Immaculate  Concep¬ 
tion,  410,  41 1 ;  resurrection  of  the 
dead,  420;  punishment  of  hell, 
428,  429,  430;  essence  of  the  bea¬ 
tific  vision,  437. 

Dupasquier :  Sarbonne  professor, 
484. 

Durandus  of  Saint-Pourqain :  his 
relation  to  Nominalism,  22,  23; 
his  teaching  on  the  principles  of 
divine  processions,  90 ;  the  in¬ 
strumental  cause  of  creation, 
107;  final  cause,  109;  eternal  cre¬ 
ation,  no;  conservation,  112;  ele¬ 
vation  of  the  angels,  1 15;  their 
spirituality,  118;  human  .person¬ 
ality,  188;  adequacy  of  the  satis¬ 
faction,  202;  Christ’s  descent  into 
hell,  212;  the  moral  virtues,  256; 
material  object  of  faith,  260;  ma¬ 
terial  object  of  hope,  264;  virtue 
of  charity,  267 ;  sacramental 
character,  287;  Eucharistic  acci¬ 
dents,  324 ;  holy  orders,  383 ;  rite 
of  ordination,  385 ;  effects  of  ex¬ 
treme  unction,  392;  extinction  of 
the  fomes  peccati  in  Mary,  400. 

Eadmer:  defends  the  Immaculate 
Conception,  409. 

Ecclesiology :  general  subject,  214- 
219;  in  the  writings  of  the  Fath¬ 
ers,  214;  of  the  Scholastics,  214- 
219;  Church  and  State,  215,  216; 
constitution  of  the  Church,  216, 
217. 

Eighth  General  Council :  on  the 
oneness  of  the  rational  soul,  131; 
the  primacy  of  Rome,  220,  221. 

Eon  de  Stella :  mediaeval  heretic, 
440,  44i. 

Eschatology :  resurrection  of  the 
dead,  418-422;  general  judgment, 


542 


INDEX 


422-426;  punishment  of  hell, 
426-430;  joys  of  heaven,  430-437. 

Eucharist :  in  Patristic  writings, 
310;  the  error  of  Berengarius, 
3 12-3 14;  the  Real  Presence,  311- 
315;  transubstantiation,  315-320; 
manner  of  Christ’s  presence,  320- 
322 ;  accidents  of  bread  and  wine, 
322-326;  form  of  consecration, 
327,  329;  matter  of  consecration, 
329-332;  the  sacrament,  332-334; 
effects  of,  334,  335 ;  the  sacrifice, 
335-337;  the  teaching  of  Trent 
473-475;  after  Trent,  502,  503- 

Eugenius  III,  Pope:  defines  the 
simplicity  of  God,  41,  42. 

Eugenius  IV,  Pope :  on  the  rite  of 
ordination,  386;  transfers  the 
Council  of  Basle  to  Florence, 
456;  then  to  the  Lateran  at 
Rome,  457;  his  doctrinal  decrees 
to  the  Greeks,  Armenians,  and 
Jacobites,  457. 

Extreme  Unction :  sacrament  of, 
387 ;  institution,  387 ;  matter  of, 
387,  388;  form,  388,  389;  subject, 
389,  39o;  effects,  391-398. 

Faith:  virtue  of,  257-259;  subject, 
259;  material  object,  259-261; 
formal  object,  261,  262;  the  act  of 
faith,  262,  263. 

Febronius,  Justinus:  his  heretical 
teaching  on  the  Church,  514-516. 

Florence,  Council  of :  its  teaching 
on  divine  processions,  94;  rela¬ 
tions,  95 ;  effects  the  union  of  the 
East  and  West,  456,  457. 

Folmar  of  Triefenstein :  his  Chris- 
tological  error,  174. 

Fonseca,  Peter:  Jesuit  theologian, 
483 ;  his  relation  to  the  theory  of 
the  scientia  media ,  488. 

Frassen:  Franciscan  theologian, 

484. 

Fulgentius  of  Ruspe :  his  teaching 
on  predestination,  68. 

Gabriel  Biel:  his  relation  to  Nom¬ 
inalism,  23 ;  his  teaching  on  eter¬ 
nal  creation,  no;  Adoptionism, 
175;  the  Real  Presence,  317. 


Gallicanism:  origin  of,  51 1;  parlia¬ 
mentary,  51 1,  512;  episcopal,  512; 
its  views  on  “  Gallican  Liberties,” 
5I3.  514. 

Gaudentius  of  Brixen:  post-Tri- 
dentine  follower  of  St.  Bonaven- 
ture,  482. 

Gaunilo  of  Marmoutiers :  refutes 
St.  Anselm’s  ontological  argu¬ 
ment,  30. 

Gerhoh  of  Reichersberg :  opposes 
Abelard’s  influence  in  the  schools, 
8;  refutes  Christological  Nihil¬ 
ism,  173 ;  his  Christological  er¬ 
rors,  174. 

Gilbert  de  la  Porree:  his  teaching 
on  the  simplicity  of  God,  40,  41 ; 
condemned  by  the  Council  of 
Rheims,  94;  his  Trinitarian  er¬ 
ror,  94. 

Giles  of  Rome  (Aegidius  Ro- 
manus)  :  defends  the  teaching  of 
St.  Thomas,  20;  his  view  on  the 
spirituality  of  the  angels,  118; 
the  virtue  of  charity,  267 ;  the  ex¬ 
tinction  of  the  fomes  peccati  in 
Mary,  400. 

God:  existence  of,  29-36;  knowable 
by  natural  reason,  31,  34;  no  im¬ 
mediate  knowledge  of  God’s  ex¬ 
istence,  35 ;  the  essence  of  God, 
36-40;  simplicity,  40-46;  spiritu¬ 
ality,  46;  unicity,  46,  47;  infinity, 
47,  48 ;  attributes,  49-65 ;  general 
concept  of,  49;  negative  attri¬ 
butes,  50,  52;  eternity,  50;  immu¬ 
tability,  51;  immensity,  51,  52; 
God’s  knowledge,  52-60;  divine 
will,  60;  omnipotence,  61-63; 
freedom,  63-65 ;  foreknowledge, 
52-60,  487-493. 

Gonet :  his  teaching  on  the  fore¬ 
knowledge  of  God,  401 ;  the  hy¬ 
postatic  union,  497. 

Gotti,  Cardinal:  post-Tridentine 
theologian,  484;  on  God’s  fore¬ 
knowledge,  491. 

Gottschalk:  his  error  on  predesti¬ 
nation,  67-69. 

Grace:  in  Patristic  writings,  234; 
nature  of  grace,  234-246;  Tho- 
mistic  view,  493,  494;  the  teach- 


INDEX 


543 


ing  of  Molinism,  494,  495 ;  Augus- 
tinianism,  494;  Congruism,  495, 
496 ;  Syncretism,  496,  497 ;  of  the 
Council  of  Trent,  470-472;  post- 
Tridentine  theologians,  498,  499. 

Greek  Schism  :  completed  by  Mich¬ 
ael  Cerularius,  1 ;  temporarily 
ended  by  the  Second  Council  of 
Lyons,  452 ;  by  the  Council  of 
Florence,  457. 

Gregory  the  Great,  Pope :  his  au¬ 
thority  in  the  schools,  5 ;  his 
teaching  on  the  simplicity  of  God, 
40;  on  original  sin,  155. 

Gregory  VII,  Pope :  defends  the 
rights  of  the  Church,  220;  re¬ 
puted'  author  of  the  Dictatus  Pa- 
pae,  230,  231 ;  his  treatment  of 
Henry  IV  of  Germany,  230;  of 
Berengarius,  313,  314.  . 

Gregory  XII,  Pope :  resigns  at  the 
instance  of  the  Council  of  Con¬ 
stance,  455. 

Gregory  of  Rimini :  his  relation  to 
Nominalism,  23. 

Guenther,  Anton :  his  teaching  con¬ 
demned,  519. 

Guitmund,  Bishop:  refutes  the  er¬ 
ror  of  Berengarius  on  the  Real 
Presence,  313,  314. 

Habert:  post-Tridentine  theolo¬ 

gian,  484. 

Hauranne,  Verger  de :  friend  and 
co-worker  of  Jansenius,  508. 

Henry  of  Ghent:  his  writings,  16; 
his  teaching  on  the  simplicity  of 
God,  44;  on  eternal  creation,  no; 
conservation,  112;  elevation  of 
the  angels,  115;  their  spirituality, 
1 18;  transmission  of  original  sin, 
164;  on  the  jurisdiction  of  bish¬ 
ops,  228;  the  moral  virtues,  256; 
the  virtue  of  charity,  267. 

Heresies:  mediaeval,  438,  439;  of 
Peter  de  Bruys,  437-440;  Tan- 
chelm  and  Eon  de  Stella,  440, 
441 ;  Amalric  of  Bene  and  David 
Dinant,  441,  442;  the  Cathari  or 
Albigenses,  442,  443 ;  the  Wal- 
densians,  443,  444;  of  John  Wi- 
clif,  444-446;  John  Hus,  446,  447; 


of  the  Protestant  Reformers,  458- 
466;  after  the  Council  of  Trent, 
504;  of  Baius,  504,  505;  Jan¬ 
senius,  507-510;  Quesnel,  510, 
5 1 1 ;  Gallicanism,  511-514;  Febro- 
nianism,  514-516;  of  the  Synod 
of  Pistoia,  516,  517;  rationalism, 
517-519;  traditionalism,  519,  520; 
modernism,  530-533. 

Hermes :  his  rationalistic  teaching, 

518,  519. 

Hessels :  friend  and  co-worker  of 
Baius,  505. 

Hincmar  of  Rheims :  his  relation 
to  Scholasticism,  2 ;  teaching  on 
predestination,  68-71. 

Honorius  of  Autun :  on  the  immen¬ 
sity  of  God,  51 ;  the  nature  of  or¬ 
iginal  sin,  157. 

Hope:  virtue  of,  263,  264;  subject 
of,  265,  266;  material  object,  264, 
265;  formal  object,  265,  266;  the 
act  of  hope,  266,  267. 

Hugh  of  St.  Victor :  mystic  theo¬ 
logian,  11 ;  teaching  on  God’s  es¬ 
sence,  37;  spirituality,  46;  unic- 
ity,  47;  immutability,  51;  im¬ 
mensity,  52 ;  omnipotence,  61  ;  re¬ 
futes  Abelard’s  error  on  the  Trin¬ 
ity,  88;  and  on  creation,  104;  his 
view  on  the  spirituality  of  the 
angels,  117;  original  justice,  142, 
143 ;  original  sin,  158;  its  trans¬ 
mission,  164;  ecclesiology,  214, 
215;  Church  and  State,  232;  defi¬ 
nition  of  a  sacrament,  273 ;  sacra¬ 
ments  of  the  Old  Law,  277;  need 
of  intention,  290;  number  of  sac¬ 
raments,  293 ;  institution,  295  defi¬ 
nition  of  baptism,  299:  form,  300; 
minister  of  the  Eucharist,  330; 
rite  of  ordination,  385;  institu¬ 
tion  of  Extreme  unction,  387. 

Humbert,  Cardinal :  his  formula  in 
ireference  to  the  Real  Presence 
presented  to  Berengarius,  313. 

Hus,  John:  mediaeval  heretic,  446; 
adopts  the  errors  of  Wiclif,  446; 
condemned  by  the  Council  of 
Constance,  447. 

Immaculate  Conception:  in  Patris- 


% 


544  INDEX 


tic  times,  403 ;  during  the  Middle 
Ages,  403-41 1 ;  as  view  by  the 
Council  of  Trent,  470;  in  the  fol¬ 
lowing  centuries,  521,  522  ;  the  doc¬ 
trine  defined  by  Pius  IX,  521-523. 

Indulgences :  historical  develop¬ 
ment,  361-372;  from  the  1st  cen¬ 
tury  to  the  7th,  363,  364;  from 
the  7th  to  the  12th,  364-368;  from 
the  12th  to  the  Council  of  Trent, 
368-372 ;  theological  exposition, 
372-379. 

Infallibility,  papal :  in  the  writings 
of  the  Scholastics,  224-227;  Sec¬ 
ond  Council  of  Lyons,  451 ;  the 
Council  of  Florence,  457 ;  defined 
by  the  Vatican  Council,  528,  529. 

Innocent  II,  Pope,  condemns  Abe¬ 
lard’s  error  on  original  sin,  155. 

Innocent  III,  Pope :  his  teaching 
on  the  nature  of  original  sin, 
158;  its  transmission,  164;  on  the 
efficacy  of  the  sacraments,  276; 
the  sacramental  character,  286 ; 
need  of  intention,  292 ;  infusion 
of  virtues  in  the  baptism  of  chil¬ 
dren,  303 ;  transubstantiation, 
319;  form  of  consecration,  328; 
the  consecrating  minister,  331 ; 
indulgences,  368;  rite  of  ordina¬ 
tion,  385 ;  organizes  a  crusade 
against  the  Albigenses,  443. 

Innocent  IV,  Pope :  on  the  need  of 
intention  in  the  administration  of 
the  sacraments,  291. 

Innocent  XI,  Pope :  opposes  Galli- 
canism,  514. 

Innocent  XII,  Pope:  settles  the 
disturbance  caused  by  the  Galil¬ 
eans,  514. 

Isidore  of  Seville :  on  predestina¬ 
tion,  68;  his  definition  of  a  sac¬ 
rament,  273. 

Jansenius,  Cornelius :  his  early  ca¬ 
reer,  507;  his  Augustinus,  508; 
condemned  propositions,  508,  509; 
the  Jansenist  party,  509,  510. 

Jerome  of  Prague:  mediaeval  here¬ 
tic  and  follower  of  John  Hus, 
447 ;  condemned  by  the  Council 
of  Constance,  447. 


Joachim  de  Floris :  opposes  the 
Trinitarian  teaching  of  the  Lom¬ 
bard,  90. 

John  Damascene:  his  authority  in 
the  schools,  5 ;  teaching  on  the 
divine  will,  65;  his  definition  of 
baptism,  299,  300. 

John  de  Montesa :  censured  for  his 
attitude  towards  the  Immaculate 
Conception,  41 1. 

John  of  Salisbury:  opposed  to 
Abelard’s  influence  in  the  schools, 
8;  records  the  errors  of  Rosce¬ 
lin,  85. 

John  XXII,  Pope:  his  view  on  the 
delay  of  the  beatific  vision,  430. 

Justification:  nature  of,  246-249; 
teaching  of  the  Reformers,  464, 
465;  the  Council  of  Trent,  470- 
472. 


Lanfranc  of  Canterbury:  his  con¬ 
troversy  with  Berengarius  on  the 
Eucharist,  313,  314. 

Lateran,  Third  Council  of :  con¬ 
demns  the  Cathari  or  Albigenses, 
105. 

Lateran,  Fourth  Council  of :  de¬ 
fines  the  simplicity  of  God,  42; 
God’s  attributes,  65 ;  defends  the 
Trinitarian  teaching  of  the  Lom¬ 
bard,  90;  defines  the  doctrine  of 
creation,  105,  106 ;  creation  of  the 
world  in  time,  in,  114;  spiritual¬ 
ity  of  the  angels,  117;  Christ’s 
descent  into  hell,  212,  214;  on 
penance,  343,  344;  indulgences, 
368;  condemns  the  Cathari  and 
Waldensians,  448,  449;  its  dog¬ 
matic  teaching  on  the  Trinity, 
creation,  Incarnation,  the  Church, 
and  the  sacraments,  449,  450. 

Lateran,  Fifth  Council  of :  its  teach¬ 
ing  on  the  human  soul,  132. 

Laynez:  Jesuit  theologian,  482. 

Leo  IX,  Pope :  on  the  creation  of 
individual  souls,  133 ;  defends  the 
primacy  of  Rome,  219,  221. 

Lessius:  Jesuit  theologian,  484;  on 
the  scientia  media,  489;  the  sac¬ 
rifice  of  the  Mass,  503. 


INDEX 


545 


Lucidus:  his  teaching  on  predes¬ 
tination,  66. 

Lugo,  Cardinal:  Jesuit  theologian, 
484;  his  writings,  484;  teaching 
on  the  hypostatic  union,  497;  the 
sacrifice  of  the  Mass,  503. 

Luther,  Martin :  religious  reformer, 
460;  his  Nominalistic  training, 
461;  views  of  justification,  461, 
462;  attitude  towards  the  preach¬ 
ing  of  indulgences,  462 ;  his  first 
revolt,  462 ;  the  dispute  at  Leip¬ 
zig,  462,  463. 

Lyons,  Second  Council  of :  its 
teaching  on  the  Trinity,  93,  94; 
the  primacy  of  Rome,  229 ;  effects 
union  with  the  Greeks,  451,  452; 
teaching  on  baptism,  the  matter 
of  consecration,  purgatory,  mar¬ 
riage,  procession  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  supremacy  of  the  Pope, 
45L  452. 

Mackelfield,  William:  defends  the 
teaching  of  St.  Thomas,  20. 

Magister  Bandini:  his  definition  of 
a  sacrament,  274. 

Magister  Florus :  his  teaching  on 
predestination,  69. 

Mariology:  in  the  writings  of  the 
Fathers,  397;  Scholastic  teaching 
on  her  sanctification  before  birth, 
397-403 ;  the  Immaculate  Concep¬ 
tion,  403-41 1 ;  divine  motherhood, 
412-415 ;  veneration  of  Mary, 
415-417. 

Maronis,  Scholastic :  his  explana¬ 
tion  of  indulgences  a  culpa  et 
poena,  369. 

Martin  V,  Pope :  elected  at  the 
Council  of  Constance,  455 ;  con¬ 
demns  the  teaching  of  Wiclif  and 
Hus,  455 ;  convenes  the  Council 
of  Basle,  456. 

Mastrius:  Scotist  theologian,  482; 
his  commentary  on  the  Sentences 
of  the  Lombard,  482. 

Matrimony:  sacrament  of,  393, 
394;  the  external  rite,  394,  395; 
ministers,  395 ;  matter  and  form, 
395,  396;  impediments,  396;  in¬ 
dissolubility,  395. 


Medina,  Bartholomew  de :  his  com¬ 
mentary  on  the  Summa  of  St. 
Thomas,  481. 

Merit:  nature  and  conditions  of, 
249,  252. 

Michael  Paleologus :  acknowledges 
papal  supremacy,  229;  accepts 
symbol  of  faith  presented  by  the 
Pope,  451 ;  sends  legates  to  the 
Second  Council  of  Lyons,  451; 
promotes  the  union,  452. 

Modernism:  origin  and  nature  of, 
530 ;  condemned  propositions, 
530-533 ;  counteracted,  533. 

Molina,  Louis:  Jesuit  theologian, 
483 ;  his.  writings,  483 ;  theory  of 
the  scientia  media,  487-489; 
teaching  on  efficacious  grace,  494, 
495 ;  the  hypostatic  union,  497. 

Molinism:  origin  of,  487;  God’s 
foreknowledge,  487-489 ;  effica¬ 
cious  grace,  494,  495 ;  predesti¬ 
nation,  499. 

Moneta  of  Cremona :  writes  a 
Summa  on  the  Church,  216. 

Montoya,  Ruiz:  Jesuit  theologian, 
483; 

Mystic  school  of  theology :  its  chief 
representatives,  11. 

Nihilism,  Christological :  meaning 
of,  172,  173,  condemned  by  Alex¬ 
ander  III,  174. 

Nominalism:  origin  of,  22;  influ¬ 
ence  in  the  schools,  23 ;  its  teach¬ 
ing  on  the  existence  of  God,  33, 
34;  on  God’s  essence,  39,  40;  sim¬ 
plicity,  46  ;  divine  knowledge,  60; 
omnipotence,  62,  63 ;  divine  rela¬ 
tions,  95;  eternal  creation,  no; 
Adoptionism,  175 ;  human  per¬ 
sonality,  188;  adequacy  of  the 
satisfaction,  202;  authority  of  the 
Pope,  228 ;  the  moral  virtues, 
256;  the  virtue  of  charity,  267; 
the  Real  Presence,  317;  Eucha¬ 
ristic  accidents,  324. 

Ockam,  William :  his  relation  to 
Nominalism,  22;  teaching  on  the 
omnipotence  of  God,  63 ;  the  Real 


546 


INDEX 


Presence,  317;  promotes  Galli- 
canism,  51 1. 

Odo  of  Cambrai :  on  the  nature  of 
original  sin,  157. 

Olivi,  Peter  John:  opponent  of  St. 
Thomas,  20;  his  teaching  on  the 
composition  of  the  human  soul, 
139,  140 ;  condemned  by  the 

Council  of  Vienne,  140. 

Omnebene :  on  the  number  of  the 
sacraments,  294. 

Ontologism :  teaching  of  Gioberti 
and  Rosmini,  520. 

Orders,  Holy:  Scholastic  teaching 
on,  380-386 ;  number  of,  380-383 ; 
the  sacrament  of,  381,  382;  char¬ 
acter,  383,  384;  matter  and  form, 
385,  386;  the  ordaining  minister, 
387;  the  teaching  of  Trent,  476. 

Original  Justice:  views  of  the 
Fathers  and  early  Scholastics, 
142,  143;  of  the  later  Scholastics, 
143-147;  of  St.  Thomas,  147-152; 
of  Scotus,  152,  153;  points  in 
common,  153,  154;  the  teaching 
of  Trent,  154. 

Original  Sin:  its  nature,  155-164; 
transmission,  164-170;  decisions 
of  Trent,  164,  468-470. 

Otto  of  Freising:  on  the  Council  of 
Rheims,  42 ;  on  the  errors  of 
Roscelin,  85. 

Ovando,  John:  Scotist  theologian, 
481. 

Palts,  John:  explains  indulgences 
a  culpa  et  poena ,  370,  371. 

Papacy,  the :  Scholastic  teaching 
on,  219-233;  spiritual  supremacy, 
220-229 ;  relation  to  the  State, 
229-233 ;  infallibility  of  the  Pope, 
225-228. 

Paul  II,  Pope:  regulates  the  Jubi¬ 
lee,  369. 

Paulinus  of  Aquileia:  his  relation 
to  Scholasticism,  2. 

Peckham,  John:  opposed  to  the 
teaching  of  St.  Thomas,  20. 

Penance :  general  treatise  of,  338- 
360:  views  of  the  Fathers,  338; 
practice  of  the  early  Middle 
Ages,  338-344;  the  virtue  of  pen¬ 


ance,  344-349 ;  the  sacrament, 
349-360. 

Petavius:  Jesuit  theologian,  484; 
his  teaching  on  the  hypostatic 
union,  497. 

Peter  of  Auvergne :  defends  the 
teaching  of  St.  Thomas,  20. 

Peter  de  Bruys :  mediaeval  heretic, 
439;  his  teaching,  439,  440. 

Peter  Damian :  on  penance,  343 ;  on 
the  relaxation  of  penance,  366. 

Peter  Lombard :  his  relation  to 
Abelard,  8;  his  Summa  Sententi- 
arum,  9;  contents  of,  9-1 1 ;  teach¬ 
ing  on  God’s  essence,  37 ;  spirit¬ 
uality,  46;  unicity,  47;  immensity, 
52 ;  knowledge,  53;  on  predesti¬ 
nation,  73,  74;  divine  processions, 
90;  divine  persons,  96;  instru¬ 
mental  cause  of  creation,  107  ;  el¬ 
evation  of  the  angels,  1 1 5 ;  their 
spirituality,  1 1 7 ;  creation  of  indi¬ 
vidual  souls,  133;  original  jus¬ 
tice,  143;  nature  of  original  sin, 
158;  transmission,  164;  Christol- 
°gy>.  175-179;  adoration  of 

Christ’s  humanity,  192;  ecclesiol- 
ogv,  215,  216;  on  actual  and  sanc¬ 
tifying  grace,  234-237;  infused 
virtues,  253,  255;  definition  of  a 
sacrament,  274 ;  sacramental  effi¬ 
cacy,  277 ;  character,  287  ;  need  of 
intention,  291 ;  number  of  the  sac¬ 
raments,  294;  institution,  295; 
definition  of  baptism,  298,  299; 
form,  299 ;  confirmation,  305 ; 
transubstantiation,  315;  conse¬ 
crating  minister,  330,  331 ;  pen¬ 
ance,  349;  meaning  of  the  absolu¬ 
tion,  352 ;  holy  orders,  381 ;  rite 
of  ordination,  385  ;  institution  of 
extreme  unction,  387 ;  matri¬ 
mony,  394, >  395- 

Peter  of  Poitiers:  writings  of,  11; 
his  teaching  on  the  efficacy  of  the 
sacraments,  276. 

Pisa,  Synod  of :  elects  Alexander 
V  to  end  the  schism,  454,  455. 

Pistoia,  Synod  of  :  its  convocation, 
516:  its  teaching  condemned,  517. 

Pius  V,  Pope :  condemns  Baianism, 
506;  defends  the  Immaculate 
Conception,  522. 


INDEX 


547 


Pius  VI,  Pope :  condemns  the 
Synod  of  Pistoia,  517. 

Pius  IX,  Pope:  on  the  rational  soul 
as  the  form  of  the  body,  141 ; 
Syllabus  of,  523,  524;  convenes 
and  approves  the  Vatican  Coun¬ 
cil,  524-529 ;  defines  the  Immac¬ 
ulate  Conception,  521-523. 

Pius  X,  Pope :  condemns  modern¬ 
ism,  531;  Syllabus  of,  531,  532. 

Poncius,  John:  Scotist  theologian, 
481,  482. 

Pontius,  archbishop  of  Arles : 
grants  an  indulgence  in  modern 
form,  367. 

Praepositivus :  his  teaching  on  di¬ 
vine  relations,  95 ;  on  divine  per¬ 
sons,  96;  the  form  of  consecra¬ 
tion,  328. 

Predestination :  controversy  on,  66- 
72 ;  teaching  of  the  Scholastics, 
72;  in  the  teaching  of  the  Thom- 
ists,  499,  500;  of  the  Molinists, 
499. 

Praemotio  Physica  :  in  reference  to 
God’s  foreknowledge,  490-492 ;  to 
efficacious  grace,  493,  494. 

Prudentius  of  Troyes:  on  predes¬ 
tination,  69. 

Pseudo-Areopagite :  his  authority 
in  the  schools,  5 ;  on  the  mutual 
relation  of  the  angels,  125,  126. 

Pseudo-Augustine :  on  penance  in 
the  Middle  Ages,  341-343. 

Quesnel,  Paschase:  his  Jansenistic 
teaching,  510;  condemned  by  Cle¬ 
ment  XI,  510,  511. 

Quiercy,  Council  of :  its  teaching 
on  predestination,  68,  69. 

Rabanus  Maurus :  his  relation  to 
Scholasticism,  2 ;  teaching  on 
predestination,  69;  on  the  pri¬ 
macy  of  Rome,  221 ;  on  penance, 
340. 

Radbertus,  Paschasius :  his  rela¬ 
tion  to  Scholasticism,  2 ;  takes 
part  in  the  Eucharistic  contro¬ 
versy  with  Ratramnus,  31 1,  312. 

Rationalism :  in  the  writings  of 
Hermes,  517,  518;  of  Guenther, 


519;  condemned  in  the  Syllabus 
of  Pius  IX,  523;  by  the  Vatican 
Council,  526. 

Ratramnus  of  Corbie :  his  relation 
to  Scholasticism,  2;  teaching  on 
predestination,  69;  the  Real  Pres¬ 
ence,  31 1,  312. 

Redemption,  the :  see  “  soteriol- 
ogy.” 

Reformation,  the  Protestant:  gen¬ 
eral  outline,  458—466 ;  conditions 
favoring  a  religious  revolt ;  evil 
effects  of  the  Western  Schism, 

458,  459 ;  decay  of  Scholasticism, 
459;  influence  of  the  Renaissance, 

459,  460;  Teaching  of  the  Re¬ 
formers  ;  on  Holy  Scripture,  463, 
464 ;  original  sin,  464 ;  free  will, 
464;  grace  and  justification,  464, 
465 ;  the  sacraments,  465,  466 ;  the 
Church,  466. 

Remegius  of  Lyons :  his  teaching 
on  predestination,  69. 

Reprobation :  see  “  predestination.” 

Rheims,  Council  of :  condemns  the 
error  of  Gilbert  de  la  Porree  on 
the  Trinity,  94. 

Richard  Fitzacre :  opposed  to  the 
teaching  of  St.  Thomas,  19. 

Richard  of  Middleton :  his  writ¬ 
ings,  16;  opposed  to  the  teach¬ 
ing  of  St.  Thomas,  20;  his  view 
on  eternal  creation,  no;  conser¬ 
vation,  112;  elevation  of  the  an¬ 
gels,  1 15;  their  relation  to  place, 
121 ;  final  cause  of  the  Incarna¬ 
tion,  182 ;  the  hypostatic  union, 
182,  183;  the  material  object  of 
faith,  260;  the  law  of  baptism, 
205;  form  of  consecration,  329; 
effects  of  penance,  348;  form  of 
extreme  unction,  389;  effects  of 
extreme  unction,  392 ;  extinction 
of  the  fomes  Peccati  in  Mary, 
400;  essence  of  the  beatific  vision, 
436. 

Richard  of  St.  Victor :  his  teaching 
on  the  simplicity  of  God,  40;  im¬ 
mensity,  52;  definition  of  person, 
88 ;  principles  of  divine  proces¬ 
sions,  91 ;  meaning  of  sacramen¬ 
tal  absolution,  352. 


548 


INDEX 


Ripalda,  Martinez:  Jesuit  theolo¬ 
gian,  483;  his  writings,  483,  484. 

Robert  Grosseteste :  supporter  of 
the  Franciscan  school  of  theology, 
16;  his  writings,  16. 

Robert  Holcot:  his  relation  to 
Nominalism,  23. 

Robert  Pulleyn :  opposes  Abelard’s 
teaching  on  the  omnipotence  of 
God,  61  ;  his  view  on  the  spirit¬ 
uality  of  the  angels,  117;  on  or¬ 
iginal  sin,  158;  its  transmission, 
164;  need  of  intention  in  the  ad¬ 
ministration  of  the  sacraments, 
291. 

Roland  of  Cremona :  opposes  the 
teaching  of  St.  Thomas,  19. 

Roscelin :  his  heretical  teaching  on 
the  Trinity,  85,  86;  condemned 
by  the  Council  of  Soissons,  86; 
his  Christological  error,  171,  172. 

Rubeis,  de:  Franciscan  theologian, 
484. 

Rupert  of  Deutz :  his  teaching  on 
the  spirituality  of  the  angels,  117. 


Sacraments,  the :  in  general,  272- 
297;  definition  of,  273-276;  effi¬ 
cacy  of,  276-283 ;  sacramental 
grace,  284-290;  need  of  inten¬ 
tion,  290-292 ;  the  number  seven, 
292-295 ;  institution  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments,  295-297;  sacramental  the¬ 
ology  after  the  Council  of  Trent, 
500,  501 ;  the  teaching  of  Trent, 
472-476. 

Salamanca,  university  of,  480,  481. 

Salmanticenses :  commentary  on 

the  Summa  of  St.  Thomas,  pub¬ 
lished  by  the  Carmelites  at  Sala¬ 
manca,  481 ;  its  dogmatic  stand¬ 
point,  481. 

Salmeron:  Jesuit  theologian,  482. 

Saltet :  on  reordinations  in  the  Mid¬ 
dle  Ages,  286. 

Savonnierres,  Synod  of :  its  teach¬ 
ing  on  predestination,  71. 

Scholasticism:  meaning  of,  3,  4; 
rise  of,  4 ;  preparatory  stage, 
5*— B ;  further  development,  8—1 1 ; 
golden  age  of,  11-22;  decline,  22- 


24;  centers  of  Scholastic  activi¬ 
ties,  13 ;  the  Scholastic  method, 
13,  14;  sources  of  arguments,  24- 
26. 

School  Differences  after  the  Coun¬ 
cil  of  Trent:  reasons  for,  486;  on 
God’s  foreknowledge,  487-492 ; 
efficacious  grace,  492-497;  the 
hypostatic  union,  497,  498;  the 
redemption,  498;  sanctifying 
grace,  498,  499 ;  predestination, 
499;  sacramental  theology,  500- 
502 ;  the  Eucharistic  sacrifice, 
502,  503. 

Scientia  Media :  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  60;  after  the  Council  of 

^  Trent,  487-490. 

Scotus  Erigena :  his  pantheistic 
views,  100. 

Sens,  Council  of:  condemns  the  er¬ 
rors  of  Abelard,  61,  104,  155,  174, 
188,  212. 

Servatus  Lupus :  his  relation  to 
Scholasticism,  2 ;  teaching  on  pre¬ 
destination,  69. 

Sixtus  IV,  Pope :  explains  the  ex¬ 
pression,  per  modum  suffragii, 
371 ;  defend  the  Immaculate  Con¬ 
ception,  41 1. 

Socinus,  Reformer:  his  error  on 
God’s  foreknowledge,  487. 

Soissons,  Council  of :  condemns 
the  Trinitarian  error  of  Rosce¬ 
lin,  86;  and  of  Abelard,  88. 

Soteriology :  in  the  writings  of  the 
Fathers,  196;  some  errors,  196- 
200;  soteriology  of  the  Scholas¬ 
tics,  201-214;  necessity  of  the  re¬ 
demption,  201-203 ;  the  atone¬ 
ment,  203-206 ;  effects  of  the 
atonement,  206-21 1 ;  the  death  of 
Christ,  211-213;  soteriological 
teaching  after  the  Council  of 
Trent,  498,  499. 

Soto,  Dominicus  de :  Neo-Scholas¬ 
tic  theologian,  480. 

Statuta  Bonifatii :  on  penance  in 

^  the  Middle  Ages,  340. 

Suarez,  Francis:  Jesuit  theologian, 
483;  his  writings,  483;  teaching 
on  the  scientia  media,  489;  the 
hypostatic  union,  497. 


INDEX 


549 


Syllabus,  the:  of  Pius  IX,  523,  524; 
of  Pius  X,  531-534- 

Syncretism  :  origin  of,  496 ;  on  effi¬ 
cacious  grace,  497. 

Tanchelm:  mediaeval  heretic,  440. 

Theodoric  of  Chartres:  on  the  im¬ 
mensity  of  God,  51,  52. 

Thomas  Aquinas :  his  writings,  17- 
19;  opposition  to  his  teaching, 
19-21 ;  his  teaching  on  natural 
reason  in  theology,  25 ;  on  tradi¬ 
tion,  25;  Holy  Scripture,  26;  the 
necessity  of  revelation,  26,  27; 
the  existence  of  God,  31-33;  the 
immediate  knowledge  of  God, 
35;  God’s  infinite  perfection,  36; 
God’s  essence,  38,  39;  simplicity, 
42-44;  unicity,  47;  infinity,  47; 
immutability,  51;  immensity,  52; 
knowledge,  53,  54,  57" 59;  omnip¬ 
otence,  62 ;  freedom  of  the  divine 
will,  63,  64;  predestination,  78- 
Si  ;  number  of  the  elect,  82,  83 ; 
the  Trinity,  85;  definition  of  per¬ 
son,  89;  principles  of  divine  pro¬ 
cessions,  91-93 ;  divine  relations, 
94,  95 ;  divine  persons,  96,  97 ;  cir- 
cuminsession,  99;  definition  of 
creation,  101 ;  the  creative  act, 
101,  103;  the  the  perfection  of  the 
universe,  104,  105 ;  efficient  cause 
of  creation,  106;  instrumental 
cause,  107,  108;  exemplary  cause, 
108;  eternal  creation,  no,  hi; 
conservation,  112;  creation  of  the 
angels,  114;  their  elevation,  115, 
1 16;  spirituality,  118-120;  relation 
to  place,  120,  121 ;  knowledge,  121- 
123 ;  volition,  124,  125 ;  locution, 
126;  ministry,  127;  man  the 
image  of  God,  129,  130;  the  ra- 
tiones  seminales,  130;  formation 
of  the  first  human  body,  131; 
identity  of  the  vegetative  and 
sensitive  soul  in  man,  132,  133 ; 
creation  of  individual  souls,  133; 
simplicity  of  the  human  soul,  134, 
137-139;  original  justice,  147- 
152;  nature  of  original  sin,  160- 
163;  transmission,  167,  168;  fit¬ 
ness  of  the  Incarnation,  180; 


final  cause,  181 ;  assumption  of 
human  nature,  183,  184;  human 
personality,  186-188;  the  hypos¬ 
tatic  union,  189-191 ;  adoration  of 
Christ’s  humanity,  192;  the  sote- 
riology  of  St.  Anselm,  201 ;  ade¬ 
quacy  of  the  satisfaction,  202, 
203 ;  the  atonement,  203,  204 ; 
moral  value  of  Christ’s  death, 
205 ;  Christ’s  merit,  207-210 ;  the 
mediator,  211;  the  death  of 
Christ,  21 1,  212;  ecclesiology, 

216-219;  supremacy  of  the  Pope, 
223;  infallibility,  224-226;  juris¬ 
diction  of  bishops,  228;  the  Pope 
and  the  secular  power,  232;  ac¬ 
tual  and  sanctifying  grace,  240- 
245;  justification,  247,  248;  merit, 
249-251;  subject  of  infused  vir¬ 
tues,  254;  distinction  between  in¬ 
fused  virtues  and  sanctifying 
grace,  255 ;  necessity  and  nature 
of  theological  virtues,  256,  257; 
definition  of  faith,  258;  material 
object  of  faith,  260;  formal  ob¬ 
ject,  262;  virtue  of  hope,  263, 
264;  material  object,  264,  265; 
formal  object,  265;  virtue  of 
charity,  267,  269;  formal  object, 
269,  270;  definition  of  a  sacra¬ 
ment,  274;  matter  and  form  of 
the  sacraments,  275 ;  sacraments 
of  the  Old  and  New  Law,  277; 
causality,  280-283 ;  sacramental 
grace,  284,  285 ;  character,  288- 
291 ;  institution,  296,  297 ;  the 
number  seven,  295 ;  form,  300, 
301 ;  baptismal  rite,  302 ;  effects 
of  baptism,  303 ;  institution,  305 ; 
confirmation,  306;  institution  of, 
307;  minister,  307;  effects,  308, 
309;  the  Real  Presence,  314; 
transubstantiation,  316,  318; 

manner  of  Christ’s  presence,  321, 
322  ;  the  accidents,  323-32 5  ;  form 
of  consecration,  328;  matter, 
329,  330;  consecrating  minister, 
331 ;  the  Eucharist  as  a  sacra¬ 
ment,  332-335 ;  as  a  sacrifice,  335, 
336 ;  the  virtue  of  penance,  345- 
348;  effects,  348;  the  sacrament, 
350,  35i;  the  form,  351,  352; 


550 


INDEX 


meaning  of  sacramental  absolu¬ 
tion,  352,  354;  contrition,  354- 
356;  confession,  357,  358;  satis¬ 
faction,  359 ;  indulgences,  376- 
378;  holy  orders,  381;  one  sacra¬ 
ment,  382-384 ;  the  episcopate, 
385;  rite  of  ordination,  386;  ex¬ 
treme  unction,  387 ;  matter,  388 ; 
consecration  of,  388;  form,  388, 
389;  subject,  389;  reiteration, 
390 ;  anointings,  393  ;  effects,  392 ; 
matrimony,  393,  394;  matter  and 
form,  395,  396;  indissolubility, 

395 ;  sanctification  of  the  Virgin, 
398;  sinlessness  of  Mary,  398, 
399 ;  Mary  confirmed  in  grace, 
402 ;  extinction  of  the  fomes  pec- 
cati,  400-402 ;  Immaculate  Con¬ 
ception,  407-409;  divine  mother¬ 
hood,  412,  414 ;  conception  of 
Christ,  413,  414;  veneration  of 
the  Virgin,  416;  resurrection  of 
the  dead,  419-422;  general  judg¬ 
ment,  422-424;  renovation  of  the 
visible  universe,  426;  the  punish¬ 
ment  of  hell,  427-429;  the  beatific 
vision,  430 ;  its  nature,  432-435 ; 
essence,  436;  he  is  summoned  as 
theologian  to  the  Second  Council 
of  Lyons,  451 ;  after  the  Council 
of  Trent,  his  Summa  becomes 
the  textbook  of  the  schools,  479. 

Thomism :  origin  of,  481 ;  its  teach¬ 
ing  on  God’s  foreknowledge,  490- 
492 ;  on  efficacious  grace,  493, 
494;  on  predestination,  499,  500. 

Toletus,  Cardinal:  Jesuit  theolo¬ 
gian,  482 ;  his  commentary  on  the 
Summa  of  St.  Thomas,  482. 

Toucv,  Synod  of :  convened  to  set¬ 
tle  the  predestinarian  contro¬ 
versy,  7 1. 

Tournely:  post-Tridentine  theolo¬ 
gian,  484. 

Traditionalism:  a  reaction  against 
the  nineteenth-century  rational¬ 
ism,  519,  520. 

Transubstantiation :  denied  by  Ber- 
engarius,  313,  314  ;  origin  of  the 
term,  316,  317;  in  the  writings 
of  the  Scholastics,  314-316;  na¬ 
ture  of,  316-320;  proofs  of,  317; 


the  teaching  of  Trent,  473-475. 

Trent,  Council  of:  convocation, 
467 ;  its  teaching  on  Holy  Scrip¬ 
ture  and  tradition,  468;  original 
sin,  170,  468-47^;  justification, 
470-472 ;  sacraments  in  general, 
472,  473;  baptism,  473;  confirma¬ 
tion,  473 ;  Holy  Eucharist,  473- 
475;  penance,  475;  sacrifice  of  the 
Mass,  475,  476;  holy  orders,  476; 
matrimony,  476;  extreme  unction, 
475;  purgatory,  476;  veneration 
of  saints  and  images,  476;  indul¬ 
gences,  476;  Immaculate  Concep¬ 
tion,  470. 

Tribur,  Synod  of :  on  commutation 
of  penance,  366,  367. 

Trinity,  the  Blessed:  in  Patristic 
theology,  84;  errors  of  some 
early  Scholastics,  85-88;  defini¬ 
tion  of  person,  88,  89 ;  principles 
of  divine  processions,  89-94;  di¬ 
vine  relations,  94-96;  divine  per¬ 
sons,  96-98;  circuminsession,  98, 
99. 


Ulrich  of  Strasburg:  defends  the 
teaching  of  St.  Thomas,  20. 

Urban  II,  Pope :  grants  the  earliest 
known  plenary  indulgence,  368. 

Urban  VI,  Pope :  his  election,  454 ; 
his  subsequent  rejection  by  some 
of  the  cardinals  and  the  resulting 
schism,  454;  regulates  the  Jubi¬ 
lee,  369. 


Valence,  Council  of :  on  predesti¬ 
nation,  70;  on  the  salvific  will,  72. 

Valentia,  Gregory  de:  Jesuit  theo¬ 
logian,  482. 

Vasquez,  Gabriel:  Jesuit  theologian, 
483 ;  his  writings,  483 ;  his  teach¬ 
ings  on  the  scientia  media,  489; 
the  hypostatic  union,  497. 

Vatican  Council :  preparation  for 
524-526;  defines  the  simplicity  of 
God,  45;  infinity,  48;  issues  a 
constitution  on  the  Catholic  faith, 
527,  528;  and  on  the  Church  of 
Christ,  527,  528;  definition  of  pa- 


INDEX 


pal  infallibility,  529 ;  its  work 
continued  by  Leo  XIII  and  Pius 
X,  529. 

Vienne,  Council  of :  its  teaching  on 
the  beatific  vision,  35 ;  defines 
that  the  rational  soul  is  the  form 
of  the  body,  140;  its  teaching  on 
the  moral  virtues,  271 ;  infusion 
of  virtues  in  the  baptism  of 
children,  303 ;  suppresses  the 
Knights  Templar,  452;  con¬ 
demns  the  Beghards  and  Be- 
guines,  452,  453 ;  censures  the 
teaching  of  Olivi,  453,  454. 

Vincent  of  Beauvais :  defends  the 
Immaculate  Conception,  409. 

Virtues,  infused:  na'ture  of,  253; 
subject  of,  254;  theological,  255- 
270;  cardinal,  270,  271;  the  virtue 
of  faith,  257-263 ;  of  hope,  263- 
267;  of  charity,  267-270. 

Vittoria,  Francis  de :  author  of 
Neo-Scholasticism,  479,  480. 

Viva:  Jesuit  theologian,  484. 


Wadding,  Luke:  edits  the  works  of 
Duns  Scotus,  482. 

Waldensians :  mediaeval  heretics, 
443;  their  teaching,  444. 


551 

Walter  de  Mortagne:  his  teaching 
on  God’s  immensity,  52. 

Walter  of  St.  Victor:  opposed  to 
Abelard’s  influence  in  the  schools, 
8;  cultivates  mystic  theology,  11; 
his  opposition  to  the  Lombard, 
11. 

Western  Schism:  origin  of,  454, 
455;  brought  to  an  end  by  the 
Council  of  Constance,  455. 

Wiclif,  John:  his  efforts  at  reform, 
445,  44b;  his  teaching,  445,  446; 
condemned  by  the  Synod  of  Lon¬ 
don,  445 ;  and  by  the  Council  of 
Constance,  455. 

William  of  Auxerre:  writings  of, 
11 ;  his  teaching  on  the  princi¬ 
ples  of  divine  processions,  40; 
on  Christ’s  merit,  208 ;  on  the 
matter  and  form  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments,  275. 

William  of  St.  Thierry:  opposed  to 
Abelard’s  influence  in  the  schools, 
8;  his  teaching  on  divine  omnip¬ 
otence,  61 ;  refutes  Abelard’s  er¬ 
ror  on  the  Trinity,  88;  and  on 
creation,  104;  his  view  on  the 
creation  of  the  angels,  114;  their 
elevation,  114,  115;  refutes  Abe¬ 
lard’s  soteriological  errors,  197. 


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